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Abstract 
The experiences of some children participating in the demanding and intensive world of elite 
sport appear to compromise one of the primary aims of both childhood and parenthood, 
which should be for children to arrive on the threshold of adulthood with their futures open 
and unlimited. A body of evidence in the medical and socio-psychologicalliterature 
contends that child athletes participating in elite sport are being harmed physically, 
psychologically, and socially by the intensive training and competition practices required of 
athletes in sports such as women's gymnastics, figure skating, and others. 
Participation by children in the highest levels of sport change attitudes and impels 
behaviours in ways that are unique in their extent and devastating in their consequences. 
As the varying and often conflicting agendas of athletes, parents, coaches, agents, and 
sporting bureaucracies come into conflict, considerations of care and regard for the athletes 
become down played or even ignored, resulting in these young athletes being harmed, and 
their futures compromised. 
Children are characterised by their vulnerability, naivety, and inability to formulate their own 
life-plans, necessitating a degree of parental paternalism in their relationships with adults. 
This paternalism is justified by the child's dependency on others for protection, and for 
developing the necessary skills for self-sufficiency and self-determination secured through 
their burgeoning autonomy as they advance towards adulthood. Under law, parents are 
given primary responsibility for the health and welfare of their children, because they are 
ideally situated to determine their child's best interests. In sport, this responsibility is 
regularly transferred from the parents to the coach and other involved adults. 
Unfortunately, however, children may be exploited by the very individuals who are entrusted 
with their care and nurturance. A further body of evidence claims the inescapability of 
paternalism in relationships between adults and children in elite sport has been exploited: it 
is disrespectful of the child's burgeoning autonomy, and jeopardises his or her right to an 
open future. The child's right to an open future is an autonomy right-in-trust saved until he or 
she is more fully formed and capable of exercising self-determination. This right may be 
violated in advance of adulthood by foreclosure of options. 
In this thesis, I argue that elite sport children require a form of paternalism that protects their 
interests while at the same time is autonomy-respectful. This is actualised by a bifurcated 
rights system, which works towards securing non-harmful sports practices and preventing 
the premature foreclosure of life opportunities for elite child athletes post-sport. 
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1.0 Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
When one thinks of a world or Olympic champion, it is natural to consider an adult in 
that role. Event titles such as "women's gymnastics" and "ladies figure skating" are 
misleading when one considers that American gymnast Dominique Moceanu won a gold 
medal in 1996 in Atlanta at the age of 14-years, and American figure skater Tara Lipinski 
won the world championship at the age of 14, and then the 1998 Olympic gold medal the 
following winter in Nagano, Japan. Fu Ming-Xia of China was 11-years old when she won 
the world championship in platform diving in 1991, and the following year she won the 
United States International Diving Championship at the age of 12. American figure skater 
Michelle Kwan won the world championship in 1996 at the age of 15. American figure skater 
Sarah Hughes placed third at the 2001 World Championships when she was 15, and won 
the 2002 Olympic gold medal the following year. In tennis, players Martina Hingis, Mary 
Pierce, Anna Kournikova, and sisters Serena and Venus Williams all turned professional at 
the age of 14-years. Hingis was ranked number one in the world at the age of 16 after 
having won at Wimbledon at 15-years. Canadian diver Alexandre Despatie won the 
Commonwealth Games gold medal at the age of 13 in 1998. As all of these young athletes 
are below the age of majority in their countries, they are thus legally considered to be 
children. 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate morally the intensive training regimes and 
competitions of children participating at the highest levels of sport. I will do this by identifying 
the appropriate moral vocabulary in and through which to evaluate the experiences of 
children participating at the highest levels of sport, known variously as elite, high-
performance, or top sport. Moral analysis balances the rights of the child, namely freedom 
from harm and the right to an open future, against the rights of parents in an effort to define 
appropriate boundaries for paternalism-or as it is variously known-parentalism. 
I focus on a discussion of the concept of paternalism within rights theory, and 
incorporate a discussion of autonomy, consent, and harm and their relationships in the 
particular context of children's participation in high-performance sport. Paternalism is 
appropriate in relationships between adults and children because children are physically, 
legally, and often morally immature, and thus require care and nurturance, typically by their 
parents. In the environment of high-performance sport, however, sometimes elite sports 
children are exposed to paternalistic intervention that verges on or indeed becomes 
exploitative and abusive, and therefore morally problematic. Due to the nature of 
inescapable paternalistic behaviour within relationships between adults and children, high-
performance child-athletes require a form of paternalism that is autonomy-respectful and 
which promotes their best interests in both the short and the long term. This discussion 
highlights some of the moral dilemmas arising from conflicts of norms and values, within and 
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between child athletes, parents, coaches, and sporting institutions, each of which affects 
significantly the best interests of the child-athlete. I argue that some child athletes are being 
harmed by their experiences, which abrogates their right to an open future. For parents to 
make the appropriate decisions about their child's participation in sport, they must balance 
the child's inherent vulnerabilities, incompetencies, and burgeoning autonomy with their own 
duties of paternalism to safeguard their child from harm and to promote the child's rights. In 
order to secure non-harmful sports practices, I propose a bifurcated rights system that 
protects high-performance sport children from physical and psychological harms, and 
prevents the premature foreclosure of life opportunities post-sport. The child has a right to 
an open future, and parents, coaches, sporting institutions and all others involved in high-
performance sport have a duty to protect that right. 
1.2 Background clarification and assumptions 
Several assumptions are made within this thesis. First, though, sport itself requires 
some clarification. Sport fits within the physical activity spectrum involving play, fitness 
activities, recreational sport, organized competitive sport, and high-performance sport, and 
is structured according to skill level, gender, age, and jurisdictional authority. Organised, 
competitive sport at the highest levels is known variously as "elite" sport in Britain and the 
U.S.A., "high-performance" sport in Canada, and "top" sport primarily in Europe. These 
terms shall be used interchangeably within this work to refer to the highest levels of sport, 
such as at the world championship, World Cup, and Olympic levels. Athletes who perform at 
the highest level of sport performance have reached this level through talent, training, skill, 
technical development, and performance in competition. The motivating force for high-
performance athletes is the pursuit of excellence, and athletes at this level train more 
intensely and compete more often than most other athletes at lower levels of competition. 
Second, I assume that children participating in high-performance sport are 
members of families, with one or more parents. When I use the term "parent", either in the 
singular or in the plural, I refer to biological, adoptive, or any other type of guardian for 
children. Definitions of families are complicated by the increasing numbers of divorced or 
separated, and remarried parents. Children may have one, two, or more parents, depending 
on remarriage. Others may have state-ordered guardians. When I write of "families" I mean 
the term to refer to all varieties of contemporary families, be they heterosexual, homosexual, 
or others, regardless of whether they are or are not state-sanctioned couplings. The term 
"parent" shall be assumed to mean the primary care-giver or guardian who has jurisdiction 
over the child, and is capable and responsible for providing the primary goods required to 
create and attain a life plan. Such goods refer to the minimum threshold of primary goods 
that a parent is duty-bound to provide to a child. The relationship between parents and 
children is characterised primarily as a "moral" relationship with attendant obligations, 
including primary childrearing responsibility. I assume as well that the family is an important 
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element in the lives of most people, and that they therefore choose the family as a central 
and important institution throughout their lives. 
Third, the children discussed within this thesis are assumed to be those 18-years 
and under, in accordance with the definition stated by the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (1989). While there is a wide range of stages of development and 
competency within the first 18 years of life, the terms "child" or "children", "adolescent", and 
"young athlete" all refer to all individuals 18-years of age and younger. Further, they are all 
assumed to be non-emancipated children, or those under the age of majority, and as such, 
they should not have presumptive decision-making autonomy. Infants and younger children 
(preadolescent) are presumed to be incompetent in significant decision-making skills. While 
older more rationally developed children may demonstrate a threshold level of competency, 
I argue that "competency is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to justify respect for 
the child's autonomy" (Ross, 1996, p. 6). I show that the approach towards autonomy-
respectful paternalism is compatible with respecting the child's right to an open future. 
Fourth, this thesis is written from a western, liberal perspective. While one of the 
strengths of rights theory is that a rights framework-such as that presented herein-is 
universal, it is imperative to consider cultural differences and their impact on such a 
proposal. The doctrine of relativism within ethical theory holds that there are no absolute 
ethical truths-or values-and that all values are relative to time, place, individuals, and 
circumstances (Blackburn, 2000). What is "true" for one person is not necessarily "true" for 
another person. In its milder form, relativism holds that morality does indeed vary from 
culture to culture, and from individual to individual, and we ought to respect the moral views 
of all other people. In its extreme form, relativism accepts all moral assertions without 
dispute or refutation. Naturally there is extreme variation throughout the world between 
cultures with regard to customs, religions, moralities, and attitudes. Some share certain 
values, and many hold widely diverse views. The main challenge with the theory of 
relativism is that there can be no argument regarding the morality of others: if one views 
killing other people as morally acceptable, then the theory (in its absolute form) and its 
adherents accept such behaviour. This theory in such a form would have us accept Hitler's 
value system as well as that of Mother Theresa's as being equally acceptable, and would 
leave us without moral force to condemn any person or culture for doing anything morally 
wrong. Because our cultural mores in western society, as well as others, behove us to 
identify and support right action, the theory of relativism is weak. We may accept the theory 
in its weakest form, in that we ought to respect and tolerate cultural differences; in its 
extreme form, however, the theory is unacceptable. Rights theory, as evidenced in a 
practical form by the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights (1948), and the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) hold that the moral rights supported 
therein are universally applicable, and ought to be respected by all nations. That not all 
nations of the world have ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child would suggest 
that not all nations feel the rights outlined by the United Nations are universal. However, the 
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strengths of both the Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child are that they have been formulated and accepted by the vast majority of nations in the 
world, and thus they may be assumed to represent an acceptance by a diverse group of 
cultures with varying customs and attitudes. While not all of the rights outlined in those 
documents are actually respected or upheld universally in moral or legal circumstances, the 
documents are recognised as serving as guidelines towards right action. The chapter on 
rights theory gives more detail regarding this issue; it is important to note however that 
because of the realities of cultural diversity with differing values and beliefs, such as 
Confucianism, a rights approach to safeguard children in sport may not work as well as it 
may in western, liberal societies who value individual autonomy as paramount. I remain firm 
in the view that harming children is wrong on a universal basis, and that all children have the 
right to an open future; however, in terms of a practical solution to this issue within the 
environment of high-performance sport, it may not be the best approach on a universal 
basis. 
1 .3 Thesis Outline 
From the increasing technical complexity of many sports, a trend of specialisation 
has emerged. Physical and psychological preparation for high performance sports 
necessitates the identification of talent at the earliest possible age, and subsequent 
specialised coaching for accelerated development of athletes. The intensity of training and 
competition, in addition to the often lucrative opportunities for financial reward, raises the 
question of whether these children are participating autonomously. Furthermore, at this elite 
level of performance, it is clear that some children are being physically and emotionally 
harmed by their demanding training and competition regimes. Attention to this concern has 
been raised in sociological and medical contexts but not in any meaningful philosophical 
manner. 
Children participating in sport at the highest levels are exposed to paternalistic 
intervention and exploitation that verges on or indeed becomes abusive and therefore 
morally problematic. One of the major difficulties faced by researchers in this field lies in 
identifying the appropriate moral vocabulary in and through which to consider this issue; 
therefore rights theory has been selected and will be used and applied in the consideration 
of child and adolescent athlete's rights. Thus this work will focus on a discussion of the 
concept of paternalism within rights theory, and will incorporate an analysis of the concepts 
of autonomy, consent, and harm, and their relationships in the particular context of children's 
participation in elite sport. This discussion will highlight the moral dilemmas ariSing from 
conflicts of norms and values, within and between parents, coaches, and sporting 
institutions, each of whom affects significantly the best interests of the child-as-athlete. I 
argue that children have a right to be protected from harm, and that parents have a duty to 
protect their child's right to an open future. 
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In order to contextualise the problem of children's experiences participating in 
organised, competitive sport at the highest levels, Chapter two provides a theoretical 
discussion on harm. It is based on Feinberg's non-normative sense of "harm" as a set-back 
to interests, and the normative sense of "harm" as a wrong, characterised by its violation of 
an individual's rights. 
Chapter Three follows with discussions of actual experiences of children within sport 
to contextualise the discussion and illustrate the harmful nature of certain sporting practices, 
and how they may foreclose children's futures post-sport. The evidence of the harm that 
such participation causes children lies in the medical and sociological literature, although 
descriptions of their experiences in high-performance sport by athletes themselves are also 
drawn from media sources. These descriptions are a litany of injuries, paternalism, coercion, 
and the very denial of childhood, all of which are about harm. The imbalanced power 
relationship between athletes and coaches is discussed here, which serves also to illustrate 
the potentially harmful nature of children's participation in high-performance sport. 
There is a conflict between childhood and the adult world of high-performance sport. 
Legal distinctions are jurisdictionally adjudicated, and are somewhat arbitrary boundaries. 
Through a critical review of the literature on different conceptions of childhood, Chapter Four 
aims to evaluate critically the morally salient features of elite child athletes, and determine 
whether as a category, these children require special ethical consideration. In order to clarify 
the philosophical distinctions between the child and adult athlete, this chapter analyses 
theoretical conceptions of children and childhood, as well as parenthood and the family, and 
articulates a preferred conception of childhood with which to identify for the purposes of this 
work. 
Chapter Five offers a critical account and extended analysis of the concept of 
paternalism within the literature. While paternalism directed towards adults is generally 
characterised as objectionable, it is justified when directed towards children. This chapter 
explores the extent to which the athlete-coach-parent complex is characterised as 
paternalistic and discusses whether this is morally justifiable in the context of children's 
participation in elite sport. Given the inherent vulnerability and immaturity of children, their 
relationships with adults are necessarily paternalistic, but I argue that they must be 
autonomy-respectful paternalistic relationships. 
Chapter Six offers a further substantial analysis of autonomy, consent, and harm as 
they relate to children's participation in elite sport. This chapter discusses the nature of 
autonomy through definition of the concept, capacity to be autonomous, and the value of 
autonomy. It relates autonomy to modern conceptions of childhood, which generally do not 
accept children as being autonomous agents, and discusses the balance of parental duties 
to protect their children and to raise their children in accordance with their own rights to 
autonomy, with the child's need for protective parental paternalism while accommodating 
their burgeoning autonomy. 
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Chapter Seven describes a variety of rights theories to determine whether a rights-
based moral vocabulary is the most appropriate language upon which to construct an 
approach to child protection through children's rights. I argue that rights theory as a moral 
framework does apply to a consideration of the participation and exploitation of children in 
elite sport, and serves to protect them. 
Whereas chapter seven focuses specifically on rights in general, Chapter Eight is a 
detailed outline of children's rights, particularly as they are articulated in the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). A discussion of children's rights in sport 
follows, in particular the focus on the child's right to an open future. I argue that children 
have the right to an open future, and their experiences in childhood ought to, in every 
possible respect, keep their futures as open as possible. I recognise that in every choice we 
make, there are so-called "opportunity costs" in that other choices may be either closed or 
delayed. The challenge lies in determining which limitations should be accepted as part of 
the variety of life, and which limitations ought to be avoided because they unduly limit a 
child's future choices. However, insofar as it is possible, children ought to be equipped with 
the skills of self-sustainment and self-determination so that they may construct their own 
life-plans and live out those life-plans according to their own interests, and not those of 
others. 
Chapter Nine concludes the thesis with a summary of the argument that some 
children are being harmed through their participation in high-performance sport and that 
their right to an open future may be foreclosed by such participation. This chapter also 
includes recommendations for policy improvements, as well as future directions for research 
in this area. 
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2.0 Chapter Two: A Theory of Harm 
2.1 Introduction 
Some children are being harmed by their participation in high-performance sport. 
The evidence of the harm that such participation causes child athletes lies primarily in the 
medical and sociological literature, but is also found in the media. The justification for 
questioning whether children ought to participate in high-performance sport at all is the 
harms they are incurring at the time of the intense training and competition, and also those 
harms which may foreclose their future, not the immorality of their participation in elite 
sports. Their participation in the most competitive and challenging sporting environment 
changes attitudes and impels behaviours in ways that are unique in their extent, and 
devastating in their consequences; for example, the ideal female gymnast may be seen as 
being tiny, child-like, waif-thin, without hips or breasts, and thus the term "women's 
gymnastics" may actually be an oxymoron. These diminutive young female child-athletes 
are often treated harshly and disparagingly by coaches and others, leading to both physical 
and psychological harms (Tofler et aI., 1998; Tofler, 1996). Their standard needs and 
interests are subordinated in favour of sport. For example, at the recent World Gymnastics 
Championships in China, the Canadian women's team had their rooms searched by team 
officials hunting for contraband food, and the athletes were weighed several times a day 
(Personal interview, 2000). This did not happen to the male athletes. The harm argument is 
particularly compelling when one consults the litany of medical reports on the injuries 
suffered by young athletes while training and in competition (Tofler et aI., 1998; Lord and 
Kozar, 1996; Tofler, 1996; Nash, 1987). These sport-specific harms will be expounded upon 
in the third section of this chapter. 
This chapter provides a theoretical discussion of harm in order to clarify the 
problems of children's participation in high-performance sport. It identifies a theory of harm 
as conceptualised by Joel Feinberg, which is based on his non-normative sense of "harm" 
as a set-back to interests, and the normative sense of "harm" as a wrong, characterised by 
its violation of an individual's rights. This chapter will serve to contextualise the following 
chapter which will describe the catalogue of injuries, exploitative paternalism, coercion, and 
even the denial of childhood, experienced by some children who participate in high-
performance sport, and how those experiences can both harm the children and also 
foreclose their futures after sport. Feinberg (1980) was one of the first to identify and specify 
a concern regarding the possibility of certain experiences foreclosing a child's future, and 
articulated this concern as the child's right to an open future. Thus his work is an important 
contribution to the literature in general, and to this work in particular. That general value is 
recognised by others as evidenced by its wide reference and citation. Dworkin (1983) also 
wrote about the justification of parental paternalism in terms of protection of the child's future 
autonomy. This work shall accept and rely on Feinberg's (1984) conceptions of harm as they 
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relate to the harms experienced by child athletes. His work is among the most succinct, and 
will be applied to ground my argument that some children are being harmed by their 
participation in elite sport, and their futures are being compromised. I argue that child 
athletes, just as children everywhere, are entitled to the right to an open future, and their 
participation in elite sport may be compromising that right. 
In the world of high-performance sport, empirical harms of sport may be physical 
and psychological injuries. Moral harms in this environment certainly include these harms, 
but may be extended to include such further harms as a closed future, or a constrained or 
lost childhood, or a compromised education. The word "harm" is used frequently to explain 
an injustice, or damage, or even an inconvenience. It may apply to moral judgments, and 
value weightings of a variety of kinds (Feinberg, 1984). It may apply to things, to people, to 
animals, and to the environment. Each of these applications is quite divergent, and thus the 
precise meaning of the word "harm" as used in these examples is vague and unclear. 
Hence, this chapter will clarify such confusion relating to conceptions of harm. 
The notion of the principle of harm may be traced back to John Stuart Mill's essay 
On Uberty, wherein Mill argued that the only justification of interfering in the actions of 
individuals is the prevention of harm to others: 
the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in 
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That 
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, 
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be 
compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will 
make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or 
even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with 
him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him 
with any evil in case he do otherwise. Over himself, over his own body and mind, 
the individual is sovereign. (Mill, 1991, p. 14) 
While this early mention of harm in his work appeared fairly simple, Mill further expanded his 
conception of harm to a consideration of interests (self-regarding and other-regarding), and 
then to a recognition of rights. He applied his harm principle towards justifying regulations 
and prohibitions in society. Mill's conception of harm is quite broad, including both direct 
personal injury such as physical hurt and also loss of money, and also wider-reaching social 
harms such as the impairment of public institutions. 
The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (1995) defines "harm" simply as 
"hurt" or "damage." Even this definition remains rather vague when we consider the various 
ways in which the term is used, as to refer to describe how one may be wronged. The 
variety of ways in which the term "harm" is used lends an ambiguity to the notion, which 
needs to be clarified so as to avoid confusion. In terms of protective legislation in public 
policy, it would be impossible to prohibit every kind of act that causes harm to others, and 
would likely apply "only those that cause avoidable and substantial harm" (Feinberg, 1984, 
p. 12). Thus, the harm principle requires precise definition, which allows for the formulation 
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of a criterion of "seriousness" to further permit an evaluation of significance of an action, and 
then possibly a call for intervention to prevent that harm. 
Feinberg (1984) begins the clarification of the term "harm" with action: "An act of 
harming is one which causes harm to people" (p. 31). He goes on to consider a harmful act 
as being "one which has a tendency to cause harmed states or conditions in people. A 
harmed condition of a person mayor may not also be a harmful condition, depending on 
whether it has itself the tendency to generate further harm" (p. 31). He gives the example of 
a blistered finger: It may, in some small way, be a harmed condition, but that depends on 
whose finger it is; a blistered finger on the hand of a concert pianist or a baseball pitcher 
may indeed be a harmed condition, but that same blister on the hand of another may not be 
at all harmful. There are several categories of harm: harms as setbacks to interest, harms 
as wrongdoing, and failures to prevent harm. Each of these will be discussed. First, 
however, we shall consider Feinberg's (1984) three senses of harm to further narrow the 
general consideration of the subject. 
2.2 Feinberg's three senses of harm 
Feinberg (1984) distinguishes three senses of harm that are in general circulation. 
The first sense is that of derivation or extension, in that anything at all may be harmed. For 
example, a car may be damaged in an accident, a farmer's crops may be harmed by a 
drought, and books may be damaged by rain. While we may indeed feel aggrieved for the 
harm done to those who have interests in the car or the crops, we do not feel so on behalf of 
the actual car or crops or books; they are not the objects of our sympathies. Even when 
things are not necessarily objects of any particular individual's interests in this derivative 
sense, there are other more appropriate words for "harm" in this sense. For example, words 
such as "damaged," "broken," "mangled," "spoiled," may be more accurate. These things 
"can be done" to a thing even if no person has an interest in that thing. While these things 
may certainly be "'harmed" in the sense that they were damaged or slashed or mutilated, 
and so on, they need to have been of value to someone, or part function as part of a larger 
complex that is now impaired-a complex that someone has an interest in-for it to be a 
genuine instance of harm. 
The second sense of harm, which may be considered to be a genuine sense of 
harm, is that from which the transferred sense derives, "namely harm conceived as the 
thwarting, setting back, or defeating of an interest" (Feinberg, 1984, p. 33). The term 
"interest" used in these descriptions refers to the sense of having a kind of "stake" in the 
well-being of something else; e.g. if one holds stock in a particular company, then one has a 
stake in its well-being, which could be considered an "interest" in the company. One's 
interests are all those things in which one has a stake, and are distinguishable components 
of a person's well-being; he or she will flourish or languish depending on whether his or her 
interests flourish or languish. The thwarting, setting back, or defeating of an interest which 
Feinberg considers to be a genuine sense of harm must be considered in degree, as 
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virtually all kinds of human conduct can affect the interests of others in one way or another, 
in positive or negative ways. Degrees of harm will be discussed at a later stage within this 
discussion. 
Feinberg's third sense of harm is linked closely to the second sense, but is a 
variation that may sometimes be at odds with it. It has to do with wrongs rather than harms, 
per se. To say that A has harmed 8 is the same as saying that A has wronged 8, or treated 
8 unjustly. 
One person wrongs another when his indefensible (unjustifiable and inexcusable) 
conduct violates the other's right, and in all but certain very special cases such 
conduct will also invade the other's interest and thus be harmful in the sense 
already explained. Even in those exceptional cases in which a wrong is not a harm 
on balance to interest, it is likely to be a harm to some extent even if outbalanced by 
various benefits. (Feinberg, 1984, p. 34) 
Consider, for example, a violation of a landowner's property rights, where someone 
trespasses on the landowner's land. Even though the trespass does not harm the land-and 
may in fact have even improved the land-the landowner has been "wronged". The law 
recognises a proprietary interest in the exclusive possession and enjoyment of one's land, 
and even though the trespasser did not harm the land, the landowner's interest was 
invaded. The trespass was only "harmless" in that it did not harm any other interests, 
particularly not those interests of any tangible or material kind. This is an example where the 
landowner's interest was invaded, and thus he or she was wronged, and harmed by the 
trespass. However, this wrong was not actually a harm to an interest, but rather an 
"invasion" of an interest. 
2.3 Interests 
Not all invasions of interest are wrongs, because some actions that invade 
another's interests may be excused or justified, or else they may invade interests that the 
other has no right to have expected. Conflicts of the interests of individuals arise constantly, 
and sometimes unavoidably. Thus a legal system attempting to minimise harm must 
develop some kind of method for establishing priority rankings of certain interests over 
others. "Legal wrongs then will be invasions of interests which violate established priority 
rankings. Invasions that are justified by the priority rules are not legal wrongs though they 
might well inflict harm in the nonnormative sense of simple setback of interest" (Feinberg, 
1984, p. 35). 
Welfare interests are related to minimal but non-ultimate goods that are very 
important to individuals. They are essentially "building blocks" which form a foundation upon 
which an individual builds his or her ultimate goals and aspirations. These are broad-based 
and important goals, but they follow the achievement of welfare interests, which generally, 
are shared by almost everyone. Interests in this category include such things as interests in 
one's physical health, the integrity and normal functioning of one's body, the absence of 
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pain or disfigurement, one's mental health and emotional stability, the capacity to form and 
enjoy friendships and close relationships, some kind of financial security, and relative 
freedom from interference and coercion. Achieving these elementary interests will allow 
furtherance of more ultimate aims. While these interests may seem trivial in isolation, they 
are the most important interests a person has. They are necessary but individually 
insufficient for the "good life". Setbacks to higher aims and goals do not necessarily 
endanger these welfare interests, although setbacks to, or invasions of, the welfare interests 
are serious, but not the only harm one may sustain. 
Our interest in liberty falls within the category of general welfare interests. We have 
an interest in having the freedom to do, pursue, or possess X (Feinberg, 1984). When that 
interest in thwarted, an interest in liberty is impeded, liberty being the choice whether to do, 
possess, or pursue X. Evaluating importance is difficult when we ask how just how important 
is the interest of freedom to choose, or just how great an invasion of that interest may be. 
Feinberg proffers the following example to illustrate the absolute importance to us of our 
interest in liberty: if our state was turned into a ruthless totalitarian regime, and our personal 
liberties were completely rescinded, most people would likely be no more able to pursue the 
ultimate interests that constitute our good than they would if the sources of our financial 
income were destroyed or our health compromised. This importance illustrates our interest 
in liberty and how it is best conceived of as a basic welfare interest. 
In order to survive, we all have interests in access to food, shelter, and other basic 
welfare "goods". Generally speaking, in these matters, more is better than less. That is, we 
would be better off with more food than we actually need so as to provide a buffer between 
not having enough and having perhaps too much, the dangers of each being real but quite 
different. Welfare interests have thresholds; these interests are not violated until they fall 
below tolerable baselines (Feinberg, 1984). Individuals have an interest in having sufficient 
money to exist at or above thresholds; however, individuals have a derivative interest in 
having more money or liberty than one actually requires, which would provide a buffer 
against possible future invasions of one's welfare interest in having enough to survive. 
Hence, the closer one exists to the baseline or minimum threshold of one's assets, be they 
money, health, or freedom, the more harmful are any encroachments of them above that 
minimum. 
Invasions of one's liberty are as much a matter of degree as are invasions of the 
interest of money, suggests Feinberg, although we do not have the same convenient 
conventional units for measuring them. The interest we have in liberty "is an interest in 
having as many open options as possible with respect to various kinds of action, omission, 
and possession" (Feinberg, 1984, p. 207). These open options are possessions of liberty to 
alternative possibilities of action: the more alternatives one has, the more liberty one 
possesses. Feinberg prefers the open option theory of liberty to the theory that liberty is the 
absence of barriers to one's actual desires, whatever they happen to be. In the open option 
theory, one has greater liberty when one has a wider purview of alternatives; the absence of 
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barriers view does not allow for the wider scope, only for no restrictions on what one actually 
wants, regardless of what that may be. 
If considering the value of liberty in attaining happiness or contentment, Feinberg 
suggests that there is no connection. One may have innumerable open options available, 
but still be unhappy and discontent, and one may be happy and content with no liberty at all. 
What this shows is even though freedom and contentment are quite different, they are both 
valuable, although conflicts between them mean one cannot have both. Our interest in 
liberty is based on our welfare interest in having a tolerable bare minimum of liberty, and 
that minimum ought to have alternative possibilities. Without alternatives, if all one's actions 
were at all times the only actions permitted, one could be content if one's desires for 
alternative possibilities were repressed or extinguished. However, Feinberg cautions, if that 
were the case, then one could not take any credit or blame for any personal achievements, 
and one could not be any more responsible for one's life than could a robot or trains that run 
in predestined grooves; furthermore, one could not develop and pursue new interests, nor 
modify existing interests. 
There would be no point, in fact, in thinking of changing in any important way, in 
changing one's mind, one's purpose, one's ambitions, or one's desires, for without 
the flexibility that freedom confers, movements in new directions would be defeated 
by old barriers. The self-monitoring and self-critical capacities, so essential to 
human nature might as well dry up and wither; they would no longer have any 
function. The contentment with which all of this might still be consistent would not 
be a recognizable human happiness. (Feinberg, 1984, p. 212) 
Even if we do not necessarily wish to change our present situation, alternative possibilities 
provide "breathing space," which Feinberg considers an important kind of security. He 
suggests there is a particular kind of comfort in knowing that if we wished to change our 
circumstances, we could do so, even if we have no definite plans to act upon those 
alternative possibilities. Furthermore, another source of the interest in liberty lies in the 
appreciation one may have for the richness and diversity of the world's possibilities, which 
present an enjoyable environment in which to live. Child athletes involved in intensive 
training and competition, who are also removed from a typical childhood involving 
conventional educations with other children their age, are often denied this kind of exposure 
to life choices. They are often unaware of what other possibilities exist, since they are so 
singularly focused on their sport. 
For children, the primary base of the interest in liberty is the fundamental 
importance of exposure to and experimentation with varied modes and styles of life. 
Feinberg goes on to consider as paramount the search "among as large as possible a stock 
of possible careers for the one that best fits the shape of one's ideals, aptitudes, and 
preferences" (Feinberg, 1984, p. 212). These options may be more a vital need than a 
lUXUry for young people whose characters are still developing. For others, accumulating 
these open-options above the threshold minimums could be some kind of ulterior interest 
that would contribute to their well-being. Elite child athletes are rarely exposed to a wide 
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array of these open-options, and thus would certainly not be able to cannot them, and thus 
many elite athletes arrive on the threshold of adulthood without the requisite skills or choices 
that ought to be available for them. 
2.3 The relative importance of the harm 
Evaluating exactly the importance and value of interests is a difficult-or even an 
impossible-task. Feinberg (1984) argues that "it is impossible to prepare a detailed manual 
with the exact "weights" of all human interests, the degree to which they are advanced or 
thwarted by all possible actions and activities, duly discounted by objective improbabilities 
mathematically deSignated" (p. 203). Thus, drafting legislation to prohibit or minimise harms 
is not at all straightforward. It is usually up to the legislator him or herself calling on his or 
her own fallible judgment rather than any sort of empirical measure who must compare 
conflicting interests and judge which are the more important, which dimensions of interest 
are relevant, and what is involved with interest-balancing. 
Conflicting interests are a genuine concern for legislating constraints regarding 
applications of the harm principle. The legislator needs a method of evaluating the relative 
worth of competing interests. But what are the inherent moral qualities of interests affected 
by claims of harm? How can the harm principle reveal those inherent moral qualities? The 
harm principle itself does not address the relative importance of harms. 
Since harm is the setback of an interest, and since setbacks vary in degree, 
Feinberg (1984) queries where is the greater harm when quite diverse interests are assailed 
to the same degree? We ought certainly to protect an interest that would be harmed over 
another whose liability to harm is merely conjectural, and we ought definitely to consider it a 
priority to prevent the complete thwarting of one interest than a minor incursion to some 
small degree of another interest (Feinberg, 1984). While perhaps impossible to be exact 
about the importance and value of harms, Feinberg developed a test to determine the 
relative importance of harms in terms of their relationship to their possessors. Relative 
importance is a function of three different respects in which opposed interests may differ: 
i. how 'vital' or important they are in the interest networks of their possessors; 
ii. the degree to which they are reinforced or supported by other private and 
public interests; 
iii. their inherent moral quality 
(Feinberg, 1984, p. 204-206) 
This test is still not a guaranteed, objective standard to prioritise interests, but it provides a 
general framework for the delicate task of interest-balancing. Generally, a person's welfare 
interests are most vital; when one person's vital interests are pitted against another's less 
vital interests, then the former's interests ought to be considered a priority. For example, a 
hyper-allergenic neighbour's interest in living in a pesticide-free environment would 
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supersede another's aesthetic interest in living with a dandelion-free lawn. In the sporting 
context, a child's interest in spending a weekend with his or her contemporaries ought to 
supersede a parent's desire that the child participate in a hockey tournament against the 
child's will. 
Interests tend to accumulate and support each other, and may also be complicated. 
Consider the example of community interests competing against individual interests: a 
public walking trail in a community is incomplete, requiring pedestrians to detour along a 
busy road. To complete the trail requires the acquiescence of a family to allow the trail to 
cross a section of their land. The family objects to the development on the grounds of 
privacy, they do not want strangers crossing their land. The community argues that broader 
public interests are a priority over individual interests, as more people would enjoy access to 
the walking trail if it could be completed, and the invasion of the individual's interests is 
relatively minor so as to justify this infringement. The community further argues that it is in 
the economic interests of the community to attract more tourists to the region, and a 
completed walking trail would be an attractive feature to help in attracting visitors. They 
could continue this line of thinking to argue that more tourists would help the local economy, 
as well as encourage local residents to become more active. While these extensions of 
interests may be somewhat stretched, they serve to illustrate the accumulation and support 
of one interest to another, and also how they may become quite complicated webs, thus 
making interest-balancing a tricky endeavour. 
The inherent moral quality of interests is also rather difficult to evaluate, as many 
standard interests cannot be evaluated on an objective scale. However, it may be expected 
that most, if not all, reasonable persons may be able to agree that certain interests may be 
less worthy of protection than others. For example, consider the example of an elite 
athlete's interest in maintaining his or her privacy over the public's interest in knowing the 
intimate details of that individual's personal life. 
2.5 Mediating maxims 
The concept of harm, as explained by Feinberg (1984), is exceedingly complex. It 
incorporates various normative dimensions, some more obvious than others. Because of 
this complexity, the harm principle usually requires application with supplementary criteria-
or mediating maxims-some of which are provided by independent moral principles. One of 
these is the volenti maxim. 
The notion of voluntariness relates to the axiom Volenti non fit injuria, a mediating 
maxim for the application of the harm principle. Voluntarily consenting to an action of 
another that sets back one's interests, or voluntarily assuming the risk-in advance-that 
another's action will adversely affect one or more of one's own interests, precludes any 
judgment of wrong, and therefore does not count as a wrong. Harms to which the "victim" 
freely consented are not legitimate breaches, they are "nonwrongful harms." The volenti 
maxim is also a fundamental principle of the law, in that one who consents to being injured 
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cannot make liable the one who causes his injury. The defence of consent or volenti in 
cases of law may be expressed in the form of assumption of risk. The plaintiff will not 
necessarily have agreed to being injured, but they did agree to assume the risk of injury. 
Analyses of harm in even the broadest, untechnical sense, try to eliminate spurious 
or minor conceptions, such as temporary disappointments, minor physical or emotional 
"hurts, and other unpopular mindsets, such as offendedness, anxiety, and boredom. This is 
due to harm being, in the broadest sense, any setback of an interest, and though we may 
judge them to be nefarious evils of a kind other than harm, there is rarely an interest in the 
avoidance of such states. Feinberg cautions that even minor or trivial harms, despite their 
minor magnitude and triviality, are still harms, although below a certain threshold they do not 
count as such, at least for the purposes of the harm principle. Legal interference over trivial 
issues may actually cause more harm than it prevents for both the person directly interfered 
with and possibly also for the innocent victim, whose must be given priority in our legislative 
calculations, as well as for any third party interests. 
In circumstances where harm or the lack thereof is a less than predictable 
consequence of a given kind of conduct-that is, where the action in question is neither 
entirely harmless nor directly and necessarily harmful, as far as may be ascertained, but 
does open the possibility of the danger of harm to some degree-then legislators employing 
the harm principle ought to consider the following: 
i. the more serious a possible harm, the less probable its occurrence need be to 
justify prohibition of the conduct that threatens to produce it; 
ii. the greater the probability of harm, the less serious the harm needs to be to justify 
coercion; 
iii. the greater the magnitude of the risk of harm (determined by a combination of 
seriousness and probability), then the less reasonable it would be to accept the 
risk; 
iv. the more valuable or useful the dangerous action, to both the one performing the 
action and to others, the more reasonable it is to take the risk of harmful 
consequences, and for extremely valuable conduct, it would be reasonable to 
take risks up to the point of clear and present danger; 
v. the more reasonable the risk of harm or danger, the weaker the case is for 
prohibiting the action that creates that harm or danger. 
(Feinberg, 1984, p. 216) 
The harm principle protects personal autonomy and the associated moral value of respect 
for persons. The principle incorporates interest-ranking principles that are not arbitrary, as 
well as principles of fairness which regulate competitions. The harm principle "enforces'" the 
moral principles that protect individual projects that are necessary for human fulfilment. 
When an individual's interests, that is, those things in which one has a stake and which are 
distinguishable components of a one's well-being, are thwarted, set back, or defeated, then 
the individual is harmed. He or she is wronged when one or more of his or her rights is 
15 
violated by unjustifiable and inexcusable conduct. Because almost all rights violations are 
invasions of interests, such violations are harmful to the individual. While almost all wrongs 
harm, not all harms-set backs to interests-are wrongs, such as those to which the victim 
gives valid consent. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has described a conception of harm that refers to incidents of set-back 
interest that are the consequence of wrongful acts or omissions by others. This 
understanding does not include set-back interests that are produced either by justified or 
excused conduct ("harms" that are not wrongs), or violations of rights that do not set back 
interests (wrongs that are not "harms"). 
A harm in the appropriate sense is produced by morally indefensible conduct that 
not only sets back the victim's interest, but also violates his or her right. A right, in turn, was 
analysed as a valid claim against another's conduct, and what gives cogency to a claim is 
the set of reasons that can be proffered in its support. There is room for normative 
controversy over which kinds of consideration constitute good reasons for a claim, but I 
have concluded, subject to certain exceptions, that any interest simply qua interest 
constitutes a proper kind of reason, among others, in support of claims against other people. 
A claim becomes valid, and thus a right, when its rational support is not merely relevant and 
cogent, but decisive. 
It follows then that children have a right to an open future based on their interests in 
such, and when those interests are set back, the children's rights are violated. Through their 
participation in high-performance sport, some child athletes are being harmed, and their 
rights to an open future are being abrogated. From this preliminary discussion on 
conceptions of harm, we turn now to descriptions of the experiences of high-performance 
child-athletes. 
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3.0 Chapter Three: Children's Experiences in High-Performance Sport 
3.1 Introduction 
When the issue of intense training and competition in sport for children is criticised 
in the academic sphere, athletes, parents, coaches and others directly involved in that 
environment are quick to denigrate the criticisms. They deem such commentary from the 
"ivory tower academics" as being uninformed and out-of-touch with the realities of high-
performance sport (Cantelon, 1981). They believe that "winning is the name of the game 
and if winning requires the presence of pain, the possibility of long-term physiological 
deterioration, or abnormal social and psychological pressure, it is worth it, in the quest for 
the gold" (Cantelon, 1981, p. 273). It may be argued, however, that those deeply and 
emotionally involved in any endeavour are challenged to find the perspective necessary to 
make an objective, rational evaluation of that activity. Personal interest and convention may 
contribute to biased views of practices, and thus we must scrutinise our beliefs, choices, 
and actions to ensure that we are sufficiently informed, and that we are not unduly 
influenced by personal interest, personal experiences, or social conventions. We tend to 
adopt the practices with which we are most familiar, and may unquestioningly adopt or 
perpetuate inappropriate, outdated, or morally suspect habits. For example, corporal 
punishment for pupils was considered acceptable in the past, but such acts are now 
considered criminal in many countries, even when carried out by parents. Critical moral 
analysis requires scrutiny on a practical level, as well as careful and thoughtful argument. 
The previous chapter outlined a theory of harm as conceptualised by philosopher 
Joel Feinberg. This chapter examines the experiences of children involved in the practices 
of high-performance sport in order to illuminate and contextualise the actual harms that I 
argue children are experiencing at the highest levels of organised, competitive sport. I 
describe briefly the nature of high-performance sport. Next, I discuss the unique nature of 
the coach-athlete relationship. I then discuss the actual experiences of elite child athletes in 
these contexts, focusing on physical and psychological harms to demonstrate the harms. 
3.2 The nature of high-performance sport 
High-performance sport, particularly professional sport, is an adult world: organised 
for adults and by adults. Children, however, have appeared in certain sports, and have 
become "professional" athletes, at exceedingly young ages. Despite the influence of 
contemporary Western liberal philosophy holding that that children are incompetent and 
adults are competent (as discussed in the following chapter), some children are more 
competent than any adult will ever be, albeit in very restricted and particular environments. 
They may be incredibly competent and talented in the specialised requirements of sport; 
however, they may typically be unaware of their own limitations, their susceptibility to injury, 
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and the long-term consequences of injuries to their development or effective participation. 
Generally, however, adults are capable of acting upon and in the world and children are not. 
Competence, then, is a relative and slippery concept. 
At the highest levels of sport, such as at the world championships, world cup 
events, and the Commonwealth and Olympic Games, sport is embarked upon as a serious, 
full-time, competitive undertaking. 
Hig~ performance sport is no longer undertaken by amateur athletes, on a part-time 
basIs, as a hobby or fitness activity. High-performance sport is a demanding 
undertaking in a ruthlessly competitive international environment in which highly 
talented athletes dedicate one of the most crucial phases of their lives in a quest for 
higher, faster, further. It involves the most advanced technology, world class 
coaching, and a more than full-time commitment without ever guaranteeing a payoff 
in the end. It is not a job that just anyone can do; there are few jobs that are more 
demanding. 
(Beamish and Borowy, 1988, p. 87) 
The world of high-performance sport is stressful since the stakes are incredibly high. The 
winner may earn millions in cash prizes, bonuses, and endorsements, as well as further 
income from appearances and speaking engagements. The other athletes rarely "cash in" 
on such lucrative rewards. This does not mean, however, that they have not trained as hard, 
or as long, or as well, or that they did not enter the sport as early, or that they were not as 
committed or as skilled or talented as the winner. 
While significant publicity is given to the highest paid athletes, many other athletes-
even those at the highest levels of sport-struggle to cover all their expenses (Coakley, 
2001). Athletes have to cover all their own expenses, including travel, accommodation, entry 
fees, and they may also have to cover various fees for their coaches, managers, and 
support personnel such as physiotherapists, trainers, and so on. Agents also take a 
percentage of the athletes' earnings. Athletes may also have to pay investors who 
sponsored them in the early part of their career; in return for help at the beginning, they have 
to pay back a percentage of their earnings (Coakley, 2001). Some athletes may undergo 
years of gruelling training because they know that if they "make it big" their efforts will be 
rewarded. Mike Tyson made $75 million for less than an hour of prize fighting in 1996, but 
Coakley (2001) reports that after paying his large entourage, investors, and so on, Tyson 
was left with very little. Sponsors may also make appearance demands, and tie athletes to 
their equipment and contractual demands for long periods of time. Athletes have to fulfil 
obligations of when, where, and how often they compete, and may have to spend significant 
periods of time endorsing products, attending social functions, testing equipment, and 
signing autographs. Such demands may interfere with their training, and ironically, interfere 
with their performance. 
Thus, while many people may believe that elite athletes earn lots of money, only the 
very top athletes do actually do so from their competitions and endorsements. People fixate 
on the multi-million dollar contracts signed by some professional athletes, and the big 
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purses at major events, but the reality of high-performance sport is quite different, and as 
Beamish and Borowy (1988) noted in their study, one of the main reasons given by national 
team athletes for leaving international sport is the lack of money to support their careers. 
We turn now to consider briefly the nature of the coach-athlete relationship. 
3.3 Coach-athlete relationships 
Close relationships are an inherent component of the sporting environment. Many 
athletes develop close friendships with their team-mates, competitors, coaches, and others 
involved in the sport. Often, the closest relationships are between coach and athlete; these 
relationships are based on power and trust. Kirby et al. (2000) explains the nature of these 
relationships to be similar to other relationships of trust, dependency, and authority, such as 
those between physiCians and patients, and teachers and students. The closeness of such 
relationships exposes those involved to special vulnerabilities of harm and exploitation, as 
well as influence: "situations in which coaches find themselves can introduce temptation into 
human relationships" (McNamee, 1998, p. 158). 
The inevitable disparity in power and control between children and adults often 
dominates their relationships. Brackenridge (1998) writes, "With coaches holding absolute 
power and authority and girls (and boys) desperate to achieve success, the ingredients of 
the coaching situation lead to a potentially risky mix where children are susceptible to 
abuses of power by the unscrupulous coach" (p. 59). Adults might well be outraged to be 
treated in the same way that children often are, within and beyond sporting boundaries. 
Given that the vast majority of relationships between athletes-particularly child athletes-
and their parents and coaches are often ones of control and domination, these situations 
necessitate moral justification. Galasso (1988) discussed the power and domination of the 
coach of the Dallas Cowboys, an American football team, and the irony of their training 
methods. The players are put in 'think tanks' which involves being suspended in the 
darkness in high-salinity floatation tanks, and being given audio and/or visual input 
associated with their playing positions. Galasso relates these experiences to mind control, 
as the team coaches and managers were controlling the athletes' vision, hearing, and 
thoughts. 
Coakley (1993) describes the dynamics of rigid control systems in the relationships 
of abused children and spouses, where the abused children and spouses try to justify the 
behaviour of their abusers, and make excuses on their behalf by saying that they deserved 
such inhumane treatment. Coakley relates this dynamic in coaching relationships, wherein 
coaches use control and dependency with their athletes to become significant in the lives of 
the athletes. This type of control may be used in any relationship where one individual is in a 
position of authority over another, such as a parent-child, physician-patient, or professor-
student relationship. The powerless individual involved in such relationships will often 
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explain the dramatic impact of these controlling people in their lives, an impact which may 
continue well after the athlete retires from competition. 
Coaches may hold tremendous power over athletes, and are highly influential over 
young athletes in their capacities of both instructor and judge (Lee, 1993). While the 
influence of such coaches is great, it has not necessarily led to the development of the 
athletes' self-confidence or independence. Even casual remarks may have a great impact 
on an athlete's self-image and self-esteem. The nature of the coaching relationship is such 
that the athletes and coaches often spend significant periods of time together, travel 
frequently, and share extended periods of time away from home. This means that young 
athletes may rely on their coaches for more than simply sporting guidance, but may seek 
their advice on personal matters, schooling issues, as well as general career guidance. 
Because children in elite sport spend the majority of their day, day-in-day-out, week after 
week, even year after year, with their coach, he or she may influence these young athletes 
far more than their parents or even their teachers: "you would do anything for that smile, that 
pat on the head" said one young gymnast (Ryan, 2000, p. 205). Ryan writes that 
there is no creature on earth more desperate for approval than a girl inching toward 
puberty .... Self-conscious about her looks and sensitive about her body, in 
particular her weight, she is a mass of insecurities looking for an identity. She is the 
perfect clay with which coaches can create the ideal gymnast. (Ryan, 2000, p. 205) 
This vulnerability renders the young athlete highly susceptible to abuse, a situation which 
parents must recognise. "Given that we impart to the trusted coach a valued child, within 
limits of discretionary power we run the risks of verbal, physical, or psychological abuse. 
Anyone who has been engaged with elite sport knows how cruel it can be" (McNamee, 
1998, p. 164). When athletes are under the age of majority, then the relationship is usually 
triadic in nature: the parents, coach, and athlete are all involved. When parents place their 
child under the care of a coach, they enter into a trust relationship with that coach, termed in 
loco parentis: the good coach is presumed to treat the child in the manner of a good parent. 
While we would like to assume that the parents also entrust their child to the coach 
assuming the coach will have only the child's best interests at heart, this is not always the 
case. When the coach is a known tyrant, but a "successful" coach, the parents are handing 
over their child with the expectation that the coach will make their child a better athlete, and 
they are overlooking the well-being of the child for the chance at athletic success. 
Coaches may have significant impacts on the lives of their athletes. They are often 
role models for their young athletes. Many athletes claim their lives have been greatly 
influenced by their coaches, although as Coakley (1993) point out, they do not often realise 
that influence is benign. There are different ways in which coaches may become significant 
to their athletes. Coaches may set good examples for their athletes, and share the kind of 
personal information with the athletes that they are able to use their coach as a role-model 
for making their own decisions. Other times, coaches have acted as advisors or advocates 
for their athletes in the challenges and choices the athletes are faced with in their lives, and 
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the coaches also teach the athletes how to cope with successes and failures. Coaches have 
helped athletes make sense of and take control of their lives, and have kept them out of 
trouble (Coakley, 1993). 
The sports club has been compared to a family-like environment, characterised by 
both nurture and control. "Unless challenged, the sports club can become a dysfunctional, 
surrogate family system in which the hetero-patriarchal authority of the coach is used to 
render all others ... powerless" (Brackenridge, 2001, p. 82). Power may be located in an 
institution-in this case, sport-or in an individual-the coach. In her research with survivors 
of sexual abuse in sport, Brackenridge quotes one of her participants: "they had all the 
power to open all the doors ... they have your hopes, your everything in their hands and they 
can do whatever they want and that's what a coach can do" (p. 84). 
While the coach is the powerful authority figure for the athletes, even parents can 
be strongly influenced by coaches. "I thought [he] was God .... I was afraid of him. If you go 
to [him] and say you have this problem, he tells you how rotten your kid is, how she won't do 
anything. You get lectured and go home and tell your kid how rotten she is" (Ryan, 2000, p. 
204). In many sense the coach is the gatekeeper to the sport: he or she controls many of 
the athlete's experiences, even the athlete's entry into the sport. The coach controls the 
frequency, duration, and intensity of training; determines who plays on the team by cutting 
and promoting athletes; in some cases he or she is responsible for sending athletes to 
national team try-outs, and national team coaches also further control the athletes' career by 
selecting Olympic and world championship teams. The coach may also determine in which 
competitions the athlete may participate. In 2000, a Canadian national team swim coach 
"forgot" to add the name of one of the swimmers to the roster for a particular event in 
Sydney, and even though the athlete travelled all the way down to the Olympic Games, he 
was not allowed to swim because his name was not on the list. The mistake on the part of 
his coach cost the athlete his Olympic experience, and potentially much more. Thus the 
power of the coach is great, and the responsibility of that power ought to be respected and 
taken very seriously by the coach him- or herself. 
Behind every successful athlete is usually an excellent coach. Most coaches are 
involved because of their expertise in sport. Such competencies involve technical skills 
about the sport itself, strategy and tactics, in addition to knowledge of the physical and 
psychological demands of participation (Loland, 2002). While at lower levels of 
performance, many coaches are volunteers who are unlikely to be involved for prestige and 
profit, the high-performance coach is usually in a very different role. He or she is usually a 
professional who earns his or her living "maximiz[ing] the performance potential of each 
individual athlete and team" (Loland, 2002, p. 117). This expectation towards performance is 
characterised by sometimes conflicting demands. Says Loland, on the one hand coaches 
are expected "to produce" a winning athlete, but at the same time, they are also expected to 
represent moral values such as justice and fairness. 
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The professional coaches' conflict is two-fold. First, for a professional coach to be 
considered an "excellent" coach, he or she has to generally "produce" winners. Few coaches 
rise to the pinnacle of success without a successful athlete or team, and success in high-
performance is evaluated in terms of winning. The coaches' employers demand success, as 
does everyone else involved, who may include sponsors, team owners, sport governing 
bodies, sporting officials, the media, fans, parents, as well as the athlete him- or herself. The 
world of high-performance sport is a demanding, cut-throat environment where the winner 
takes all and the loser ends up with nothing; performance is synonymous with profit, 
prestige, and power, and losing is synonymous with failure. This reality that the coach's 
success is evaluated in terms of the team's or athlete's success means that the athlete, or 
team, is the vehicle to the coach's achievement. As Loland writes, those involved in the 
athlete's support system-coaches, managers, sport physicians, equipment specialists, and 
others-are wholly involved in "getting 'their' competitors to the top of the final ranking", 
since "competition outcomes determine their future" (Loland, 2002, p. 117). Their 
professional survival is completely dependent on the success of the athlete. As such, 
athletes may be exploited, or sometimes even harmed, in the process. 
Secondly, the coach is generally expected also to care for the athlete's individual 
well being at the same time that winning is given such paramount importance. These two 
expectations are not always compatible with the environment of high-performance sport. A 
further complication arises when one questions whether the coach has the duty-or even 
the right-to forbid an athlete in attempting activities that may be harmful (Ravizza and 
Daruty, 1988). For example, if an athlete wishes to try a dangerous move on the diving 
board which the coach believes is beyond the ability of the athlete, should the coach 
interfere. From a legal standpoint, it would likely be explained that if the athlete is legally an 
adult, and if the athlete fully understands the risks, and still wishes to proceed, then he or 
she may do so. From a moral standpoint, even if the athlete is a legal adult, the coach 
should still try to convince the athlete that he or she is not sufficiently prepared. In 1983, 
young Russian diver Sergei Chalibashvili was killed after hitting his head on the diving 
platform at the World University Games in Edmonton while attempting a highly technical dive 
that many believed was too difficult for him. If, however, the athlete is a minor, then the 
coach ought to interfere and refuse to allow the athlete to do the activity. Sometimes, 
however, it is the case where the coach pushes the athlete to try challenging activities that 
the athlete does not wish to do. 
The coach must be aware of the temptations of coaching children, who may do 
anything the coach asks of them. The owner of an Atlanta gymnastics school said that when 
a particular move or situation requires a tremendous amount of courage, it is easier to get a 
child to do it than someone more mature with more concern about injuries and such things 
(Hanley, 1996). The expectations of the sport and of the coach must rest with the athlete's 
best interests being the first priority. They have the moral and legal duty to protect children 
in their care. 
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Gymnastics is one such sport where accounts of abusive coaches abound. A former 
national team gymnastics coach in the United Kingdom asserted that he believed ethical 
conduct is incompatible with training young girls to the highest levels in gymnastics, and for 
that reason he coached only male athletes (Personal Interview, 1998). He could not, in good 
conscience, become involved in such a process. The values of child protection seem to be 
at odds with the goal of winning. Three years after her famous vault at the Atlanta Olympics, 
Strug said of her coach, Bela Karolyi: "He knows how to get the most out of each child. I 
think a lot of his motivation is fear. When I messed up, I was more worried about what he 
would think than about messing up" (Raboin, 1999, p. 2A). Looking back at her experiences 
with her coach, she recalled "Bela had complete control of everything in your life-your 
workouts, your eating, your sleeping .... I look back now and say, "That was crazy. That's 
not America." But it was Bela's way or not way. And he was a coach who got you where you 
wanted to go" (Strug, 1999, p. 73). With such extreme practices, athletes and their parents 
have to trust the coaches, and sometimes this trust is misplaced or exploited. 
3.3.1 Trust 
Trust is a vital component of and basis for relationships, for "whatever matters to 
human beings, trust is the atmosphere in which it thrives" (Bok, 1978, p. 31). Interpersonal 
trust relationships have moral content in that "fidelity to trust is morally praiseworthy, 
betrayal of trust is morally blameworthy" (Goold, 2001, p. 26). Trust relationships are found 
in conditions where there is risk and uncertainty in decision-making, conditions most 
definitely found in competitive sport. A child-athletes' acute vulnerability to harm, 
powerlessness, and a compromised future emphasises the need for trust and the reliance 
on trust in the coach of such high import. This vulnerability to the coach requires an 
acknowledgement of their ethical obligations, yet many such obligations are, in reality, 
based more on contractual rather than on ethical terms. Since coaches-as moral agents-
do have moral agency, they have intrinsic moral obligations to their athletes, and particularly 
to child-athletes. The inherently vulnerable nature of the child-athlete justifies imposing 
moral duties on coaches. 
A trust-based relationship consists of a number of factors. It presupposes the 
vulnerability, reliance, and dependence of the truster, as "risk is of the very essence of 
trust." (Baier, 1994, p 196). Trust is an essential part of many relationships, particularly 
those which involve power differentials, such as between teacher and student, doctor and 
patient, and between parent and child. Trust is necessary in almost all relationships: "Trust 
is the grease that keeps the wheels of society moving" (Goold, 2001, p. 30). 
Trusting parties, namely children and parents in the world of competitive sport, 
expect beneficence. According to Gambetta (1998), interpersonal trust is based on the 
specific expectation that the actions of another will be beneficial rather than detrimental. The 
athletes and parents expect that the coach will be concerned with the well-being and 
interests of the child. In addition to expectations of beneficence is the expectation of 
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advocacy: that the coach will act on the child's behalf in negotiations or dealings with sport 
governing bodies, sport officials, and others involved in the process of "producing" a 
champion in sport. Another expectation is that of competence. The athlete and the parents 
give great discretionary power over decisions in conditions of risk and uncertainty, and 
expect the coach to use this power in beneficial ways, on behalf of the athlete. 
In competitive sport environments, vulnerability arises from the inherent nature of 
children being vulnerable beings, as well as from the unknown and unpredictable nature of 
the sporting world. Inexperience and ignorance on the child's part, and possibly on the 
parent's part, contributes to the state of vulnerability. There is also the power differential 
between the coach and the athlete and/or parents, particularly of knowledge and expertise, 
and from the lucrative nature of sport itself which engenders vulnerability. These imbalances 
of power are unavoidable in sport. The child's health, well-being, bodily integrity, and future 
are elements with which the coach is entrusted. Parents may even include the child's future 
financial well-being as an element entrusted to the coach-he or she is the gatekeeper to 
the child's future success in sport. Such conditions of risk, and what is at stake for 
vulnerable athletes, are paramount issues in the sporting environment. Uncertainty of 
outcomes is an inherent feature of sport. 
Strong ethical codes warranted by various intrinsic and universal aspects of the 
coach-athlete relationship. In addition to the vulnerabilities of child-athletes mentioned 
above is the real danger of exploitation by coaches, parents, and even sport governing 
bodies. The lucrative financial nature of sport means that a lot may be at stake, and parents 
and coaches are the primary gatekeepers of the child-athlete's participation in this 
environment. The greatly superior skill and knowledge of the coach, and the power of both 
the parent and the coach renders trust an essential attribute of the relationship. While we 
would like to believe that trust rather than distrust is a prevalent element of the relationship, 
the magnitude of what is at stake points to establishing the rudiments of trustworthiness that 
are essential to deserving trust, and perhaps codifying them in an ethical code of conduct. 
Trust is necessary to achieve the ends of high-performance sport; it is not simply an 
end in itself. Trust is necessary to adhere to demanding training regimens, to try risky 
manoeuvres, to compete in high-pressure environments, to reveal psychological concerns, 
fears, and injuries, and to rely on the coach for recommendations on all aspects of 
participation from diet, to training, to equipment, to attire, and to performance. For a variety 
of reasons, then, it must be a primary objective to engender and maintain the conditions 
necessary to preserve and promote trust, and to avoid abuses of trust in the coach-athlete 
relationship. How this may be accomplished is beyond the scope of this work. We turn now 
to consider the issue of consent, one of the foundations of participation in any activity. 
3.3.2 Consent 
The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" is generally understood as meaning "to those who 
consent, no harm is done". This is the principle upon which participation in sport rests. Since 
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some degree of injury is a relatively common occurrence in sport, and since most injuries, 
and their relative severity, may be forecast, most people who experience a sports injury 
consider it to be part of the sporting experience. For example, since basketball involves a lot 
of jumping, bumping, and quick lateral moves, basketball players occasionally suffer from 
twisted ankles. This is not an unusual injury, and for many, it is not sUffiCiently dangerous or 
injurious in the long term to warrant not playing basketball. Many runners experience 
relatively minor injuries such as achilles' tendon sprains, and strained muscles. Even regular 
knee pain is rarely severe enough to put many runners off their training. Hockey players 
know that the game involves checking, sometimes quite aggressive hits, but know this in 
advance, and consider the risks of harm to be manageable enough to participate in the 
sport. Almost every sport, if not all sports, has 'typical' injuries, which are considered 
"general knowledge" in relation to that sport, and thus those who decide to participate take-
on the risks of potential injury and harm of such participation. 
Sufficient information and the opportunity to exercise one's freedom are required for 
an individual to make rationally informed, autonomous decisions. Consent is one of the most 
important notions when trying to determine whether harms imposed upon individuals is 
justifiable (Scoccia, 1990). Given that children are characteristically unaware of the full 
implications of their decisions, parents are usually the proxy decision-makers; however, 
coaches and administrators within sporting bureaucracies also make decisions affecting 
athletes. 
As we have seen, Article 32 of the UN Convention states "the child has the right to 
be protected from work that threatens his or her health, education or development". These 
positions are in conflict with conventions of high-performance sport for children, if we accept 
that individuals have the right that others not impose risks of harm upon them (McCarthy, 
1997). In view of this statement, then how do we deal with the treatment of young athletes 
in sport? Reviews of the medical literature show evidence of a preponderance of injuries in 
young athletes. Are the proxy-decision makers truly consenting to the risk of harm? What 
about the issue of sport being labour, with young athletes training 30 to 40 hours per week? 
Who is consenting to this situation? If the adults are, and they are since they control the 
purse-strings for coaching fees and equipment, at least for the early years, then is this 
morally appropriate? If the children are making the decisions, is it morally appropriate for 
them to consent to harm of this magnitude? I would argue that children do not have the 
knowledge and ability to comprehend the long-term implications of harm in such high-level 
training and competition. Parents and coaches must intervene paternalistically solely for the 
best interests of the child, but with a view to the child's developing autonomy. Kultgen 
(1995) feels that it is possible to remonstrate with an individual in ways that might be 
coercive, making these actions parentalistic, but acceptable. If we alert a person that the 
consequences of their actions may be such that they may not welcome them-in order to 
dissuade them from the act-then such advice would be parentalistic. Now this could be 
problematic for the parents and coaches who, despite the risks of harm, still want the athlete 
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to participate. There are benefits to participating in high-level sport, but the question is 
whether the benefits outweigh the risks. I would suggest not when consent of participants is 
lacking, or when proxy consent results in children being harmed. 
Along with the issue of consent, and who is giving it, comes the issue of withdrawing 
consent. Once a child is ensconced in the sport, there are many adaptations that have to be 
made on behalf of the child and the family. For example, in a 1998 television documentary 
on children and sport in the U.K., a mother was being interviewed about her daughter's 
participation in horse riding. She talked about the sacrifices she and her husband had made 
for her daughter to participate. Financially they made huge concessions, forsaking almost all 
but that which was required for the sport. The father held two jobs in order to pay for 
coaching and equipment fees. All energies and efforts in the family were directed towards 
making the child a champion. 
It is unlikely that young athletes truly possess the ability to withdraw their consent 
once they have become involved in their sport at a high level. As with all high-performance 
athletes, even young athletes have invested time in training, competition, and travel: time 
which was NOT invested in another vocation. Beamish and Borowy (1988) discuss this 
issue, and note that it is a myth that athletes can simply choose to leave their sport if they 
are unhappy or unsatisfied. Money, often considerable sums, has been invested. Family 
members have invested time and energy to the athlete's career. Coaches will have invested 
greatly in the athlete as well. And finally, there are social and national, sometimes 
international expectations of the athlete. Thus, withdrawing consent is a very complex issue 
within sport and young athletes. 
3.4 Early entry 
As outlined earlier, sport specialization is occurring at increasingly younger ages. 
Dalton (1992) reports a seven-year old child running the Melbourne marathon in 3 hours 31 
minutes, and a 13-year old at 2 hours 55 minutes. With early specialization has come 
increased intensity in training and competition (American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), 
2000b). Media attention has focused on many of these talented young athletes, the 
successes-in terms of celebrity, financial, and otherwise-of whom have served as 
powerful motivators for other youngsters to emulate. While the probability of winning an 
Olympic medal, world championship, or even becoming a professional athlete is very low, 
many children continue to be funnelled into competitive sport, and are expected to specialise 
in one sport very quickly in their fledgling athletic careers. The AAP notes that in order for an 
athlete to be competitive at a high level, training regimens that are considered extreme for 
even adults are required: "the ever-increasing requirements for success creates a constant 
pressure for athletes to train longer, harder, more intelligently, and in some cases, at an 
earlier age" (AAP, 2000b, p. 154). 
The drive towards earlier speCialisation in sport in Canada, the United States, and 
Britain, and other western countries, may have originated in the 1970s, when the former 
26 
East German and Soviet Union began dominating many sporting events at the Munich and 
Montreal Olympic Games. Concerns with how to emulate the "production of performance" 
led to an investigation into the success of these nations. Gilbert (1976) identified four factors 
in East Germany's "miracle system" which were replicated in the Soviet Union, Cuba, and 
other Soviet satellites in Europe: (1) early exposure of children to physical education and a 
wide range of physical activities; (2) a broad base of participants in sport and physical 
activity; (3) early identification of athletic talent, and; (4) intensive and specialized training for 
those identified (Gilbert, 1976, in Donnelly, 2000, p. 176). The early successes of female 
gymnasts, figure skaters, and swimming provided incentives to implement early entry into 
other sports as well. In Canada, hockey was one of the sports already involving talented 
youngsters at very young ages. It was somewhat different to the other sports in that hockey 
was focused solely on boys' involvement. However, the risks and harms were similar in 
many respects. 
Thus far, we have discussed the nature of high-performance sport, and some of the 
experiences of children participating in this environment. We have considered briefly the 
issues of trust and consent as they relate to the issues of harm and exploitation within sport, 
and how weaknesses in the relationships between young athletes and parents, coaches, 
and other adults in the sporting environment may lead to encroachments of the young 
athletes' physical and emotional integrity. We turn now to examine the risks and harms 
experienced by young athletes training intensively and competing in competitive sport. 
3.5 Risks and harms 
Over the years, observations have been made that competitive sport for children 
may be institutionalised forms of child abuse. These are not limited to only recent reports. 
Throughout the last twenty years or so, a number of journalists and academics have written 
about their concerns in a variety of sports. Most of the discussion has focused on women's 
gymnastics, figure skating, tennis, and to a lesser degree, swimming. Men's sports have not 
been focused upon to the same degree, primarily because boys reach puberty at a later 
stage than do girls, and men's strength peaks are far later (Rowland, 1996). Women's 
gymnastics and figure skating also have technical requirements that are not easily attained 
by women after puberty. Such complicated acrobatic skills are disturbed by increases in 
body weight, height, and complicated by factors such as the development of hips and 
breasts, which interfere with the centre of gravity that in turn affects the height and speed of 
leaps and rotations. 
The ideal female gymnast or figure skater-if we consider the medallists over the 
last decade as models-have epitomised the child-like distinctly boyish, figure. The turning 
point in women's gymnastics occurred around the time of the 1972 Munich and the 1976 
Montreal Olympic Games. In 1976, the average U.S. Olympic gymnast was 17.5 years of 
age, stood 5 feet 3% inches tall, and weighed 106 pounds (Ryan, 2000). In 1992, these 
statistics had changed. The average age was 16-years, height was 4 feet 9 inches tall, and 
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weighed a mere 83 pounds (Ryan, 2000). Gymnasts Olga Korbut of the former Soviet 
Union and Romanian Nadia Comaneci ushered in a new generation of elite gymnasts, from 
women into girls. Korbut competed at 85 pounds in Munich, and Comaneci was only 14 
years old. 
Journalist Joan Ryan considered thirteen year-old Michelle Kwan's medal at the 
1994 U.S. Figure Skating Championships as skating's transformation from a women's sport 
into a children's sport. She further described the 1994 Olympic medallists, Oksana Baiul, 
Nancy Kerrigan, and Chen Lu, as each embodying the image of the "ice princess", who is 
"light, young, and pretty" (Ryan, 2000, p. 125). Gymnast Mary Lou Retton retired from her 
sport at the age of 16 after winning her Olympic gold medals, having attained what is 
arguably the highest achievement in her sport. 
Children's experiences in elite sport ranging from physical and psychological injury 
to child abuse to reports of deaths by young girls in competitive gymnastics have been 
reported in newspapers, magazines, books, and discussed in academic journals for the last 
few decades. In her 1995 book, Little Girls in Pretty Boxes, journalist Joan Ryan detailed the 
explOitation, manipulation, harsh coaching styles, injuries, and psychological and physical 
abuse endured by young female gymnasts and figure skaters. She published an update in 
2000. Ryan's research is used extensively in this thesis, as hers is the first and most 
comprehensive investigation into these issues. In 1996, Tofler et al. published their paper, 
"Physical and emotional problems of elite female gymnasts shortly before the Atlanta 
Olympics, and the issues they raised are key to the harms outlined in my argument that 
children participating in elite sport are being harmed, and their futures compromised. 
In 1995, the Australian government set up an independent inquiry at the Australian 
Institute of Sport in Canberra, following allegations from parents that young female 
gymnasts were being physically and psychologically abused (Colman, 1995). The findings 
were inconclusive. There are extreme examples from gymnastics of harm to athletes. In 
Romania, coach Florin Gheorghe smashed eleven-year old gymnast Adriana Giurca's head 
against the balance beam, and then proceeded to kick her viciously for fumbling her 
dismount. The child died later that evening. It took three months after her death for 
Gheorghe to be arrested. The coach was charged with murder in 1995, and sentenced to 
eight years' incarceration (Giurca, 2001). The sentence was appealed, and reduced to a 
charge of manslaughter and a sentence of six years; Gheorghe actually served only three 
and a half years in prison before being released for "good behaviour" (Raducan, 2001). 
Since his release from prison, he has received offers of coaching jobs from other 
gymnastics clubs, including one in South Africa (Raducan, 2001). 
The accidents in gymnastics are not as publicised. In recent years, Sang Lan of 
China was paralysed while vaulting during the 1998 Goodwill Games in New York. 
American Julissa Gomez was sixteen years old when she broke her neck in a vaulting 
accident in Japan, and died following complications (Ryan, 2000). In late December of 2001, 
Russian gymnast Maria Zasypkina became paralysed after a training accident. The 15-year 
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old broke her neck after an awkward landing (BBC Sport, 2001). After a number of 
surgeries, she has regained some movement in her arms and legs, but her prognosis 
remains grim. Other athlete deaths have resulted from eating disorders tied to their sports 
participation, and is discussed in more detail in the section on disordered eating. 
In his discussion on deviance in sport, Coakley (2001) defines the sport ethic as "a 
cluster of norms that many people in power and performance sports have accepted and 
reaffirmed as the dominant criteria for defining what it means, in their social worlds, to be an 
athlete and to successfully claim an identity as an athlete" (p. 146). The normative core of 
high-performance sport culture is constituted by the sport ethic, which is composed of four 
norms (Coakley, 2001). First, the athlete makes sacrifices for the game. This is about 
commitment, establishing sport as the individual's first priority over all other interests. 
Second, the athlete strives for distinction: being an athlete means constantly pushing, 
striving, excelling and exceeding, aiming to win and to be the best. This drive is exemplified 
by the Olympic motto, "citius, altius, fortius." Third, the athlete accepts risks and pushes 
through pain: voluntarily accepting the risks of the sport signifies courage and determination, 
as does training and competing while injured. With an injury that calls for complete rest for 
most people, some athletes continue training with painful injuries: "It's bearable" said 
fourteen-year old Dominique Moceanu several weeks before Olympics on the status of the 
stress fracture in her shin (Hanley, 1996). 
Overcoming the pain of injury was exemplified by gymnast Kerri Strug at the 1996 
Atlanta Olympic Games. Strug had injured her ankle, tearing ligaments while landing a vault. 
Her coach, Bela Karolyi, encouraged her to try another vault, the score of which contributed 
to the team score. The second vault eliminated any chance of her returning to compete in 
the individual all-around competition slated for two days later, "a goal she'd clung to for the 
past four years" (Swift, 1996, p. 104). While Strug and her team-mates won the gold medal 
in the team event, Strug sustained a significant injury, literally sacrificing herself for the team 
(Swift, 1996). Strug was heralded as a hero for her self-sacrifice, and was feted by the 
media for her unselfish act of putting the team before herself. Whether she would have 
attempted the second vault at all is questionable with her injury; that her coach encouraged 
her to do so reflects the pressure exerted on young athletes by coaches, team-mates, and 
others to "take one for the team", but sometimes at great cost to the individual athlete. Few 
viewers saw Strug's vault as an example of a coaches' inappropriate use of power over 
young athletes, as did Lenskij (2000). Many preferred to view Strug's "sacrifice" for the sake 
of her team as an ultimate heroic and courageous sacrifice-her body for the team. 
The fourth and final norm within the sport ethic is the athlete who accepts no limits 
in pursuing the possibilities: this norm is about the athletes' "dream" and his or her obligation 
to pursue that dream, not matter what and at any cost. Athletes ignore external limits, 
believing that in sport, anything is possible-if the athlete is dedicated to pursuing that 
dream. The result of such a narrow focus may be an injured athlete who refuses to leave the 
sport and move on with his or her life. When an athlete is forced to leave the sport, as in a 
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situation where the coach cuts him or her from the team, adjustment to life beyond the sport 
will be very difficult. There are also situations where an athlete has been seriously injured, 
but refuses to leave the field, and continues competing, risking their future health. 
Sometimes the coach or team trainer colludes with the athlete, or even pressures the 
athlete to return to play, and gives him or her painkillers to make the pain manageable. This 
is immoral and unprofessional on the part of the coach or trainer, and I would argue that a 
coach or trainer, or even a parent, who engages in this type of coercive behaviour is 
seriously remiss in their responsibility to protect the athlete from harm. 
The presence of children in the environment of high-performance sport demands a 
consideration of the appropriateness of such participation. Steve Nunno, an international 
gymnastics coach, exemplifies the idea that coaches sometimes think of the athletes with 
whom they work as objects to be moulded rather than as human beings. After the Olympic 
trials in 1992, he said that "he was so excited that he went home and started working on his 
1 O-year olds: the future stars in Atlanta in 1996" (Kantrowitz, 1992). He referred to these 
young gymnasts as if they were "products" rather than human beings. 
The nature of fierce competition, and the pressure of a win-at-all-costs attitude, 
which pervades such an arena, raises the questions surrounding what it is to be a child, and 
why they are part of such a demanding endeavour. High-performance sport is developed by 
adults, organised by adults, watched by adults, and for the most part, participated in by 
adults, and as such, adults must consider and justify children's participation. Adults must 
also focus on the social values such sport represents, and the impact on child participants. 
While children's sport, from gym class to organised community sport, does involve winning 
and losing, the sphere of high-performance sport focuses entirely on competition. Children 
learn very quickly that winning is good and losing is bad. This single-minded orientation 
championing winning as paramount demands that we attend to the social value of children 
participating in such an environment. Such a focus on winning may lead to a consideration 
of the ends justifying the means, which appears to be the case in children's participation at 
the highest levels of sport. "Competitiveness negates [and/or] challenges notions of 
innocence, unselfconsciousness, and the immanent, sentimental value of children that 
remain central to contemporary constructions of childhood" (Cooke, 2001, p.227). We must 
also attend to the issue of children being introduced into competitive sport for the specific 
purpose of being prepared, or "hot-housed" for participation at higher levels of competition. 
In the 1980s, Cantelon (1981), Kidd and Eberts (1982) and GrOpe (1988) started 
writing about the dangers of children participating in intensive, competitive sport 
programmes. Cantelon and Kidd and Eberts identified athletes as workers, and extended 
the concept to children, calling those participating in high-performance sport, "child-athletic 
workers". Donnelly (1997) has continued this trend, also writing about the lost childhoods of 
these young athletes. In his work, GrOpe (1988) put forward a number of arguments for 
rejecting children'S participation in high-level sport. He claims that in these environments, 
children are not allowed to be children, and have their right to be children infringed upon; 
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they do not have their real needs taken into account; they have their futures put at risk; they 
are manipulated; they are abandoned to the "unchildlike" burden of top-level sport in an 
adult world, and are subjected to the "superstress" of high-level training; these children are 
denied important social contacts and experiences; their family life is destroyed; they may 
suffer impaired cognitive development; and they endure a type of abandonment upon 
leaving the sport environment, whether through retirement or injury (Grupe, 1988, p. 225-
226 ). 
Successful child athletes do not necessarily grow up to continue their athletic 
success. Donnelly (1997) states "children who become successful adult athletes in high-
performance sport appear to be survivors rather than products of the current system" (p. 
401). He suggests that the problems created by children's early intensive involvement and 
specialisation in sport are an issue of balance. Parents, coaches, and other adults involved 
need to determine the most appropriate way to nurture the talent of elite child athletes, while 
at the same time safeguarding their overall well-being (Donnelly, 1997). When the talent is 
overemphasised, the child is vulnerable to exploitation or even abuse, and is certainly 
susceptible to physical, psychological, and sociological harms. However, if the talent is not 
nurtured, the child may also miss the opportunities to become an Olympian or professional 
athlete. With every choice there is an opportunity cost; choosing one pursuit may preclude 
other options. 
Children's experiences in sport have not been entirely positive, nor have they 
changed dramatically since the first calls years ago that children might be harmed by their 
experiences in intensive training and competition in sport. Donnelly (1993) claims that the 
experiences of children in competitive sport have become increasingly negative in the past 
twenty years, as evidenced by increasing numbers of children "suffering from competitive 
stress and anxiety, increased aggression, parental pressure, high dropout rates and from 
being treated as adults (rather than children) by their coaches" (Donnelly, 1993, p. 389). His 
research confirms these problems, as does other research about "the sexual, physical, and 
mental and/or emotional abuse of such children, their long hours of involvement in training 
and competition, and their high injury rates" (Donnelly, 1993, p. 390). Beamish and Borowy 
(1988) wrote about the concept of "child athletic workers", noting that child athletes are one 
of the least talked about, yet one of the most pressing concerns in high-performance sport 
today. "Athletes who are still legally minors are working doubled days of labour-at school 
and in sport" (Beamish and Borowy, 1988, p. 99). There are no legal protections for these 
young athletes, unlike children working in the entertainment industry. 
Many people would likely not recognise sport as "work" or "labour" since sport may 
be considered to be non-serious, playful, a respite from the "real world", and located at the 
opposite end of the spectrum from work. In reality, however, organised competitive sport is 
serious, intense, and parallels may be drawn between athletes and workers (Cantelon, 
1981; Donnelly, 1997). Beamish and Borowy (1988) wrote "through their labour, Canada's 
athletes are the heart, soul and backbone of a major, international entertainment industry" 
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(p. 96). If this is the case, that athletes are labourers, then why does Canadian labour law 
not apply to athletes as well? More pOintedly, why are child actors protected by labour laws 
while child athletes are not? 
Donnelly (1997) discusses amendments made to the Ontario (Canada) labour code, 
called "The Child Performers' Amendments to the Ontario Occupational Health and Safety 
Act", for child entertainers, which are clearly relevant to child athletes. In this Act, child 
performers are identified as "special workers" who require special care and protection over 
and above that required for adult performers. These legal documents provide legal 
protection for labouring children, and appear to be relevant to child sport labourers. 
Unfortunately, such legislation is useful only if enforcement is guaranteed. Otherwise, as 
with codes of conduct, these acts and agreements provide valuable guidelines but are 
certainly provide no guarantees for the safety of children, although they provide avenues for 
legal recourse. 
3.5.1 Physical harms 
Heavy training loads, early sport-specific training, inadequate rest periods, as well 
as the pressure to train and compete while injured increases the risk of impaired skeletal 
development and permanent deformity (DiFiori, 1999; Tofler, 1996). The consequences of 
such high intensity training and competition are injury, some of which are long-term 
(Mandelbaum, 1993; Rowland, 1990). The risks of injury rise as training increases in 
frequency, duration, intensity, and with technical difficulty, and may also be attributed to the 
age-related vulnerability of the immature skeletal system. Judged sports such as gymnastics 
and figure skating, as well as those sports with weight classes such as wrestling and rowing, 
impose such severe caloric restrictions "in efforts to improve performance or gain 
competitive advantages" that the limited nutrient intake "may instead result in muscle 
weakness, diminished bone density, calcium loss, iron deficiency, and menstrual 
irregularities" (Rowland, 1990, p. 182). Despite assertions by organizations such as the 
International Federation of Sport and the American Academy of Pediatrics stating that 
intensive training of children has no physiological or educational justification, and that 
diversity of movement and all-round physical conditioning should have priority over later 
specialisation, promising young athletes continue to be inducted into high-performance 
sport. 
While advocates of children's organised sport promote peer socialization as one of 
the benefits (DiFiori, 1999), not all sports provide such opportunity, at least not during 
training itself. One young swimmer spoke of the sensory deprivation experienced while he 
was training: "you can neither hear not [sic] see while you swim. You can see next to 
nothing and the only taste is chlorine! In truth, to the outsider, the only social side to 
swimming training is a shared mutual discomfort ... " (Juba, 1987, p. 174). Juba calls the 
pressure ambitious parents place on their children "parental projection," since these parents 
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view their child as an extension of themselves and perhaps their own missed opportunities. 
Tofler et al.. (1996) refer to this as "achievement by proxy", which is discussed in the next 
section on psychological harms. The importance parents place upon swimming within the 
framework of their lives-both in terms of time and financially-turns into pressure on the 
children. 
Experience suggests that harm, in some degree, is an inevitable component of 
almost all activities. However, in some environments, harm appears to be more prevalent 
than in others. Competitive sport, particularly at the highest levels of performance, seems to 
involve significant risk of injury-significant in both frequency and degree. Reviews of 
literature reveal that young athletes suffer a wide array of injuries while training and in 
competition. In high-performance sport, elements such as injuries, fatigue, and even bad 
weather, rarely interfere with an athlete's participation except in extreme circumstances. 
Given the intense demands of high-performance sport, and the vulnerable nature of 
children's developing bodies and minds, excessive cognitive and physiological demands 
may overburden a child, resulting in harm. For the most part, the effects of those harms on 
the shaping of a child's identity, and on the child's future, are difficult to predict. In terms of 
physical harms, reports have been made about the implications of heavy training loads and 
competition, as well as specific injuries, for an athlete's future both in sport and in general 
activities of daily living (Tofler, 1996). 
High-performance athletes are under considerable social, emotional, and economic 
pressure to return to competition and training as soon as possible. The emotional and 
economic consequences of injuries at a professional or high-performance level of sport can 
be devastating. Nideffer (1997) points out that there can be millions of dollars and the loss 
of an immeasurable amount of prestige, as well as political and personal recognition at 
stake, when an athlete is seriously injured. Under these conditions, the pressure all those 
involved with the athlete, such as the coach, parents, agents, team-mates, and others, feel 
to get the athlete back into the competition arena as quickly as possible, becomes obvious. 
Unfortunately, that pressure does not always facilitate the recovery process, and may in fact 
do just the opposite. The pressure from parents, coaches, team-mates, and others involved 
in sport can be overwhelming for any athlete, let alone a child athlete. There is pressure to 
specialise in one particular sport, to focus on that sport year round, to train long hours, and 
also to compete. Furthermore, there is continual pressure to "progress", to continually 
improve and to move up in levels of competition. This stress from others as well as from the 
athlete him or herself may be too much for a young athlete's developing body, and may 
result in acute or chronic, temporary or long term, injury. Unlike adult athletes, children and 
adolescents still require energy for growth, in addition to energy to train, recover, and to 
compete. Their young bodies are also less stable and more prone to injury than are the 
mature bodies of adults (Kozar and Lord, 1983). 
Concentrated and intense training for young bodies is an obvious factor in the 
increasing number of injuries to child athletes. Coaches sometimes forget that child athletes 
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are not simply mini-adults, and do require particular attention be paid to their developing 
bodies from all perspectives-physical, psychological, and social. The American AssOCiation 
of Pediatrics has published a number of position papers related to children's partiCipation in 
sport. These have focused on specific sports such as soccer and distance running, and 
different levels of sport such as intensive competitive sport, and have also focused on 
specific conditions, such as the female athlete triad. 
While injuries may occur in any sport, gymnastics has been rated as a high-injury 
risk discipline (Bayliss and Bedi, 1996). The nature of the sport for young women is that it is 
essentially a child's sport, since most gymnasts retire while they are still teenagers, as did 
Mary Lou Retton at the age of sixteen. The careers, then, in gymnastics, are short and 
intense. There is little or no time to recover from injuries. Consider the pressure on Kristie 
Phillips, American gymnast and media darling. She was under considerable pressure to win 
the junior title at the 1986 U.S. Gymnastics Championships. A month before the 
competition, she finally had to acknowledge the wrist pain she had been ignoring for five 
months. The doctor explained why her wrist had been so sore: it was broken (Ryan, 2000). 
Despite her injury, Kristie won the junior nationals, but she still refused to take time off to let 
the wrist heal, coping with massive doses of pain killers. Early recognition of almost any 
injury may lead to more favourable outcomes, but the pressure on these young athletes 
results in reluctance to admit to pain or injury. 
Children tend to be injured more often than do adults, perhaps because they are 
usually more active than adults (Leblanc and Dickson, 1997). Children are poor thermo-
regulators, and are highly susceptible to dehydration and heat related illnesses (AAP, 1990). 
Growth itself may increase children's susceptibility to injury, since growth spurts may 
interfere with balance and coordination, as well as decrease flexibility. Children are 
particularly vulnerable to injury because of their immature musculoskeletal systems. 
Excessive or repetitive loading of an immature joint may lead to premature closure of the 
growth plate. The growth cartilage of children is particularly susceptible to repetitive stress 
(DiFiori, 1999). The growth cartilage is found at the articular surface, physes, and 
apophyses, and is particularly vulnerable to injury at the ankle, knee, and elbow. 
Apophyseal injuries are commonly attributed to overuse, resulting from traction-induced 
microtraumas at the tendon-bone attachment (Peck, 1995). The increased traction during 
the adolescent growth spurt is a contributing factor to these types of injuries, in addition to 
strength imbalances between the growth cartilage relative to the tendon, and poor flexibility. 
Physeal injuries may also be caused by repetitive loading, as in vault training in gymnastics, 
which can damage the distal radial growth plate (Caine, Roy, Singer, et ai, 1992). Physeal 
injuries may result in partial or complete growth arrest (Albanese, Palmer, Kerr, et ai, 1989). 
The spectrum of vertebral injury in young athletes ranges from stress reaction to 
spondylolisthesis. The sport of rhythmic gymnastics combines the athleticism of a gymnast 
with the grace of a ballerina, and as such, places the young gymnasts at risk for a myriad of 
injuries. The sport "demands both the coordination of handling various apparatus and the 
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flexibility to attain positions not seen in any other sport. To attain perfection and 
reproducibility of their routines, the athletes must practice and repeat the basic elements of 
their routines thousands of times." (Hutchinson, 1999, p. 1686). These extreme stresses on 
the body are characteristic manoeuvres of gymnastics. They may result in stress fractures 
to the skeleton, with the lumbar spine being at greatest risk. The extremes of jOint position 
can produce significant symptoms with chrondromalacia (Goldberg, 1980). In their 1991 
study of high-performance female gymnasts and swimmers of pre-elite, elite, national and 
Olympic calibre, Goldstein, Berger, Windler, et aI., (1991) found 9% of pre-elite, 43% of 
elite, and 63% of Olympic level gymnasts had spine abnormalities, and 15.8% of all 
swimmers had spine abnormalities. They found that the average hours of training per week 
and age were associated with abnormalities, and that increased intensity and length of 
training correlated with previous data reveals the female gymnast is prone to spine injuries. 
Physicians recommend activity limitation with the onset of skeletal pain in order to avoid the 
permanent structural changes such as either gradual slipping of the epiphysis or growth 
disturbances (Bak & Boeckstyns, 1997). However, in the highly competitive, highly 
pressured athletic environment, this advice is unlikely to be followed. 
Repeated micro-traumas to the growing ephiphyses is of concern for young 
athletes, particularly in sports which require highly repetitive and intensive loading of 
extremeties, such as gymnastics. In their study conducted at the European Gymnastics 
Championships in Lyon, France, Auberge, Zenny, and Duvallet (1984) found delayed bone 
age in the growing epiphyses of 73% of the boys and in 78% of the girls. The authors 
attributed this bone age delay to an unbalanced diet and repeated micro-trauma. 
Overuse injuries in pediatric populations are on the rise, accounting for 30 to 50% of 
all pediatric sports injuries (DiFiori, 1999). The rise in overuse injuries to training may be 
attributed towards young athletes becoming more sport-specific and training nearly 
continuously. Competitive swimming is one of the most demanding and time-consuming 
sports (Bak, 1996). High-performance swimmers may practice twenty to thirty hours a week, 
and over a one year period, the average top level swimmer performs more than 500,000 
stroke revolutions per arm. Over many years, these innumerable repetitions, combined with 
an increasing muscular imbalance around the shoulder girdle, seem to be the main 
etiological factors in the development of over-use injuries in swimming. Sport played at the 
professional and Olympic levels are particularly noted for injuries, which seem to be an 
inevitable consequence of competition (Nideffer, 1997). If one plays long enough, and trains 
hard enough, eventually athletes will become injured. In these conditions, success is often 
dependent upon the ability of the athlete to recover quickly, and at times to be able to 
continue to compete in spite of an injury 
Stress fractures are a common overuse injury among athletes (Brukner & Bennell, 
1997). Standard treatment requires rest from the aggravating activity, and return to sport is 
usual within six to eight weeks. The rate of resumption of activity is influenced by symptoms: 
when pain-free, the sport may be resumed and participation slowly increased. In their 
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prospective study of injuries affecting 50 highly competitive young female gymnasts, Caine 
et al. (1989) reported the findings as disturbing and echoing concerns registered in the 
professional literature. The re-injury rate was particularly alarming, and highlights the need 
for complete rehabilitation before the athletes return to full training and competition loads. 
They also found that rapid growth periods and advanced levels of training and competition 
appear correlated with the predilection towards injury. 
The locus of concern surrounding the injuries sustained by young athletes in sport is 
based on the principles of harm and consent. Many of these injuries have long-term, 
sometimes life-long, sequelae. The questions of whether the young athletes knew the risks 
associated with their sport before entering into competition is significant, as well as the issue 
of whether the young athletes could withdraw from participation once they were ensconced 
into the competitive environment. Since children and adolescents-by law-cannot give 
consent, they could therefore not given informed consent, and thus are wronged by parents, 
coaches, and others who initiate and maintain the child's participation in a harmful activity. 
The medical evidence seems clear that intensive training and competition increases 
the risk of overuse and acute injuries in susceptible child athletes. This evidence also 
outlines the danger of such injuries having life-long sequelae. The significance of such 
evidence is clear: children training and competing in high-performance sport are being 
harmed physically, and such harms lead to the abrogation of the child's right to arrive at 
adulthood with an open future. We turn now to consider psychological harms experienced 
by these young athletes. 
3.5.2 Psychological harms 
In a recent interview, tennis great Martina Navritalova stated that "tennis stunts your 
emotional growth, and you don't know who you are because you are so focused" (Globe 
and Mail, 2002, p. S1). The psychological impact of intensive participation in competitive 
sport for children has been discussed by many researchers, including Rainer Martens 
(1993), Daniel Gould (1993), and Maureen Weiss (1993), to name only a few. Much of their 
work focuses on stress, burnout, and self-esteem issues related to children's participation in 
organised, competitive sport. 
Early sporting experiences leave a lasting impression on children. As such, parents, 
coaches, and others involved in children's sport have a responsibility to ensure that these 
experiences are good ones so that children will remain involved for a life-time. Not only is 
phYSical activity essential to general health, but sport contributes to a child's development 
both psychologically and socially: "Sport can affect a child's development of self-esteem and 
self-worth. [It] is also within sport that peer status and peer acceptance is established and 
developed" (LeBlanc and Dickson, 1997, p. 3). Children are not good at judging their own 
ability, and rely on others to explain how they are progressing in skill development and in 
relation to their peers. As such, enormous responsibility is placed on parents and coaches 
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to set reasonable standards for children. When standards are set too high, disappointment 
and frustration may lead to children not wanting to participate any longer. In his early work 
about why children fail in education, Holt (1964) wrote that children fail because of fear , 
boredom, and confusion: "they are afraid, above all else, of failing, of disappointing or 
displeasing the many anxious adults around them, whose limitless hopes and expectations 
for them hang over their heads like a cloud" (p. xiii). 
While Holt's work focuses primarily on children's struggles in education, his words 
are equally applicable in children's sport organised by adults, wherein children are 
surrounded by adult organisers, coaches, and officials. Coaches and parents play an 
important role in developing and shaping children's perception of themselves (LeBlanc and 
Dickson, 1997). The coach's manner of skill correction, behavioural reinforcement, and way 
in which she or he corrects errors plays an important role in developing or impairing the self-
esteem of young athletes (LeBlanc and Dickson, 1997). Thus, parents, coaches, and 
officials must be vigilant in the environment they create for young athletes. 
Unfortunately, we know that the sporting world is not always a healthy environment 
for the self-esteem and self-confidence of athletes of any age, children or adult. Competitive 
sport values winning above all else, and as such, notions of fair play and other values are 
diminished. For some athletes, sport will be a nightmare, and their lives may be destroyed 
by their experiences (Brackenridge, 2001). While Brackenridge's strong words refer 
primarily to athletes who have been sexually exploited by peers and/or authority figures in 
sports, her words apply equally appropriately to athletes to have been harmed in other 
ways. Many people believe that participation in sport is a positive, character building 
experience for children. Others, however, have expressed concerns regarding those 
experiences for children, particularly about the value of such participation, and the sequelae 
of relentless pressure to win at all costs. 
3.5.2.1 Disordered eating 
While parent, coaches, and team-mates do not explicitly teach athletes disordered 
eating behaviours, such behaviours may be part of the life of gymnasts, figure skaters, and 
various other sports (Coakley, 2001). Eating disorders such as anorexia nervosa and 
bulimia, in addition to a variety of other disordered eating problems rank among the major 
health problems in the U.S. (Yeager et aL, 1992; Taub and Blinde, 1992). Risk factors for 
the development of eating disorders include the need to maintain strong control over body 
shape, which has been identified in many groups such as female adolescents, ballet 
dancers (Brooks-Gunn et aL, 1988; Garner et aL, 1987), models (Garner and Garfinkel, 
1980), and female athletes in certain sports (Brooks-Gunn et aL, 1988; Stoutjesdyk and 
Jevne, 1993; Taub and Blinde, 1992; Picard, 1999). Factors such as pressure from 
coaches, parents, team-mates, and the emphasis on physical appearance in certain sports, 
as well as high self-expectations, competitiveness, perfectionism, compulsiveness, drive, 
self-motivation, and intense pressure to be slim and perform have been identified as 
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correlates in individuals with eating disorders (Picard, 1999; Taub and Blinde, 1992). Ron 
Thompson, co-director of the eating disorder programme at Bloomington Hospital in Indiana 
notes that the characteristics that make great student-athletes also contributes to great 
anorexics; athletes who end up with eating disorders tend to be the 'good' athletes: 
They perform well, they are extremely coachable and will do almost anything to 
please the coach a~d. they are selfless individuals seeking to improve themselves 
and the team and willing to work hard and endure pain and hardship. You can find 
all of these traits in a good anorexic. (Hawes, 2001, p. 6) 
The emphasis in these sports and others for athletes to have low body fat and to be lean 
make it relatively easy for athletes to hide their disordered eating, and they may actually 
even be praised and admired for their self-control and denial of appetite (ANRED, 2002). 
The focus on thinness and demands for self-discipline may tempt the athlete to believe that 
she is being "good" when she limits her food intake, and to believe if she is "good" for long 
enough, her performance in sport will also improve; she thus links her weight loss with 
becoming quicker, faster, and stronger (ANRED, 2002). 
Self-worth linked to external validation is one of the frequent commonalities 
identified in individuals with eating disorders. Since the competitive sporting environment 
focuses almost exclusively on valuing individuals by their performance and success, it is not 
surprising that athletes-particularly the younger ones-have high rates of disordered 
eating (Garner et aI., 1998). When athletes begin their sporting careers at very young ages, 
their identities become moulded by their sport. Athletes rely on their performance to define 
themselves, and to create their personal identities. When they do not perform well, the 
effects on their self-esteem and self-image can be devastating. These young athletes see 
themselves as gymnasts, or figure skaters, or ballet dances only, and anything that may 
threaten performance-such as weight gain-may be perceived with terror and damage 
their fragile and underdeveloped identities (Hawes, 2001). 
Young athletes who depend on others such as their coach or sport officials for their 
self-esteem are in danger. Young athletes obsess over what others say might improve their 
performance, even when it damages them. Ryan (2000) writes that gymnasts tend to be 
such perfectionists who conform and please, and gauge their self-worth on other people's 
judgments. They tend to be young girls who have experienced belittlement and humiliation, 
and "who believe they are as worthless as the authority figures in their lives say they are" 
(Ryan, 2000, p. 59). Gymnasts make few decisions on their own, and transform themselves 
into whatever their coaches, parents, and judges want them to be. Christy Henrich, an 
American gymnast, was the paragon of the "perfect" and obedient athlete. She worshipped 
her coach, AI Fong, and obeyed him to the point of harming herself. Jack Rockwell, an 
athletic trainer, recounted Christy's relationship with her coach: " Christy idolized AI. He's 
not a bad person, he just had a bad attitude. She'd do anything for him. (Ryan, 2000, p. 58) 
Ryan (2000) described an interview with Christy, wherein she related how Fong told 
her to suck in her gut, that she looked like the Pillsbury Dough Boy, and frequently reminded 
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her of how wonderfully thin the Russian gymnasts were. When Christy began losing weight, 
he told her how great she looked, which reinforced her obsession with becoming thinner. 
When Christy became so thin and weak that she was pulled by officials from an international 
competition, Fong kicked her out of his gym and told her not to return until she gained some 
weight. Christy told Ryan that Fong simply gave up on her, and was worried about his 
reputation. Christy eventually left gymnastics, never recovering her strength sufficiently to 
be able to train and compete. She said several years after leaving the sport, "If I wasn't in 
gymnastics ... this wouldn't have happened to me. It's the constant putdowns, the constant 
criticisms, the constant mental and physical abuse. It pushes you over the edge" (Ryan, 
2000, p. 94). After battling anorexia and bulimia for five years, and repeated 
hospitalisations, Christy died, weighing less than 50 pounds. Her mother said that she felt 
guilty for not recognizing that Christy grew up in a world where she was always told "you're 
never going to be good enough" (Ryan, 2000, p. 58). 
When a judge told Christy to lose weight, she obeyed immediately. While some 
athletes could shrug off such comments-like Mary Lou Retton did when a top American 
official told her he could take off half a pOint from her score "just because of that fat hanging 
off your butt"-Christy could not. She was 15 years old, weighed 90 pounds, and stood 4 
feet 11 inches tall, and was terrorized by the judge who told her she would not make the 
Olympic team unless she lost weight. Christy became anorexic and bulimic. She alternated 
between starving herself, and then bingeing and purging. She also used laxatives in her 
desperate attempt to lose weight. 
Even though research shows that disordered eating practices will actually inhibit 
performance, someone who is in such a belief-cycle will reject those findings. Coaches 
suffer from the same misconceptions about "thinner is always better," and often encourage 
weight loss and the drive to be thin, and obedient athletes submit to their demands 
(ANREO, 2002; Robinson, 2002; Ryan, 2000). This is a Significant moral issue, as 
discussed earlier, coaches are highly influential over athletes, and they must recognise the 
seriousness of their comments and directives, and the compulsions of their athletes. 
Practices such as public weighing of athletes involve embarrassment and even humiliation 
for the athletes, and continue to perpetuate the dangerous view that thin is best. 
Sports such as gymnastics and figure skating place aesthetic pressure on athletes, 
rendering these athletes more vulnerable to disordered eating as the focus in on leanness 
for the sake of better performance or appearance (Stoutjesdyk and Jevne, 1993). Athletes 
have to find a balance between maintaining strength and power to perform acrobatic feats 
while maintaining aesthetic beauty, conceived of in many ways by thinness. Many of them 
do not find the balance. Ironically, in gymnastics, balance is an essential component of the 
sport. Even when athletes weaken to the point of falling off the apparatus, coaches react 
only calling them names and accusing them of a lack of focus. Chelle Stack lost 8 pounds 
during the month long stay in Seoul for the 1988 Olympics, and when she fell from the bars 
in competition, her coach called her an idiot (Ryan, 2000). Stack drank 12-ounce bottles of 
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laxatives, claiming liquid works better than pills, and made herself vomit to keep her weight 
down. Kathy Johnson was devastated by her coach's remarks that he would keep her out of 
competitions if she did not lose weight. She weighed less than a hundred pounds. She 
stopped eating, and lost weight. When her coach gushed about how great she looked after 
starving herself, she thought, "I could be even thinner!" (Ryan, 2000, p. 85). Not surprisingly, 
she started hallucinating, fainting, and then falling while training. After landing on her head 
while trying to complete a double flip, she was put in a neck brace and given drugs to cope 
with the pain and injury. Two days later, she removed the brace, and got up on the beam. 
The muscle relaxants dulled her reflexes, and she fell off the beam. So off-balance, she did 
not put out her hands to break her fall, and shattered her elbow jOint. After surgery and 
hospitalisation, the doctor told Johnson that she would need to exercise her elbow every 
hour if she ever wanted to return to gymnastics. So, every hour through the night for weeks, 
her mother woke her up to exercise her arm. Because she could not train during this time, 
Johnson returned to starving herself. Her eating disorder continued for the rest of her 
career. 
Coach Karolyi is renowned for his thin gymnasts. Before the Barcelona Games, he 
restricted his gymnasts' diets-to fuel an eight or nine hour training day-with an apple for 
breakfast, a salad and half portion of whatever the hotel served as the main course, and 
unlimited raw carrots for the rest of the day (Ryan, 2000). Gymnast Betty Okino said Karolyi 
was deliberately trying to get his gymnasts to lose weight, allowing them less than 1000 
calories per day. At the Olympics, Karolyi or his wife constantly monitored the gymnasts. 
Their rooms were searched for signs of food-including under the mattress and in the 
garbage cans-and they were not allowed to order from room service (Ryan, 2000). Ryan 
describes how the girls resorted to clandestine plots to secure food. Male gymnasts and 
other coaches felt sorry for them. They would hide food for the girls where they could find it, 
in the hotel hallways or stairwells, or the others would sneak into their rooms while they 
were away with Karolyi to hide food in their suitcases or gymbags. When all the other u.S. 
athletes received official "care packages" from the States, the gymnasts were forbidden by 
their coaches from accepting them. 
That the gymnasts themselves were confused or deluded about the way they were 
treated is evident in the way Betty Okino describes her experiences. When others claimed 
the gymnasts were being abused, Okino denied it. Such denial is consistent with the 
dynamics of the control seen in relationships of abused children and spouses, where the 
abused children and spouses try to somehow understand or justify the behaviour of their 
abusers. She claimed that the gymnasts could eat anything they wanted at home, "although 
they did weigh us in [every other day], so you had to watch what you ate" (Ryan, p. 70). The 
consequences of eating were severe. Like many gymnasts, Erica Stokes rarely ate in front 
of anyone else, a behaviour promoted by Karolyi. When she and other gymnasts stayed at 
his ranch for training camps, they hid food from him. When they heard him approaching, 
they would hide their food, since he "equated eating with sloth and weakness" (Ryan, p. 74). 
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He once found Erica eating a peach, and exploded. For Erica's transgression, he forced the 
team to train two extra hours. She became bulimic. 
Female distance runners are also at increased risk of disordered eating, and sports 
that involve weight restrictions such as rowing and wrestling reveal a higher prevalence of 
disordered eating (Stoutjesdyk and Jevne, 1993). The highest percentages of females 
scoring in the anorexic range were within the lean-type sports of gymnastics and diving. The 
increased risk of disordered eating coincides with the risk for developing amenorrhoea and 
osteoporosis, a combination referred to as the "female athlete triad". Yeager et al. (1993) 
noted that the triad is particularly common amongst athletes competing in appearance or 
endurance sports. 
In 2000, the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) issued a press release 
outlining their concerns about female athletes. They noted that the number of young female 
athletes at risk is increasing because of the increasing number of young females in sport. 
The AAP also pointed out that participants in sports which judge competitors by their 
appearance such as gymnastics and ballet dancing are particularly at risk. The risk of 
pathologic eating behaviours may be higher in children who participate in sports where 
leanness is rewarded, and one of the sequelae of inadequate caloric intake is compromised 
growth. Child athletes need to increase their energy intake beyond the needs of training 
because of the additional demands and needs of growth. Specific nutritional requirements 
such as iron and calcium may also affect health if not consumed in adequate amounts. 
Normal bone growth may be affected by the lack of calcium, stress fractures may develop, 
and bone healing may be retarded. Children who do not have balanced diets may 
compromise their performance, their health, as well as their development. In addition to the 
problems of nutrition, growth may be affected by intense training. Thientz et al. (1993) have 
suggested that heavy training loads started before and maintained throughout puberty may 
affect growth rates. 
Disordered eating and self-esteem problems related to appearance are not limited 
only to young women, but also affect children. Kostanski and Gullone (1999) found that 
children between the ages of 7 and 10 years reported feelings of being overweight and 
body-image dissatisfaction, and reported dieting. Since children have less total body fat than 
do adults, they are at increased risk of becoming emaciated rapidly, as well at increased risk 
of developing other eating-disorder related sequelae, such as convulsions, renal failure, 
cardiac arrhythmia, perimolysis (dental erosion), and gastric rupture (Childress et aI., 1993). 
Furthermore, excessive dieting by young girls interferes with the onset of menarche, may 
seriously and permanently arrest physical growth, and delay breast development (Russell, 
1993). Nutritional deprivation may also interfere with cognitive functioning and intellectual 
development. 
Disordered eating practices do not disappear when an athlete stops training and 
competing. Dacyshyn's (1999) study on the retirement experiences of high-performance 
female gymnasts revealed that the athletes often had to cope with "the painful emotions that 
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resulted from dashed hopes and dreams. They were often left with a negative body image 
and a preoccupation with weight" (Dacyshyn, 1999, p. 222). After years of taking diuretics 
and disordered eating, gymnast Michelle Hilse ended up in the emergency department of 
the hospital with malfunctioning bowels caused by years of malnutrition. Her weight 
obsession began at Karolyi's gym, and continued after she left gymnastics. She said that 
she has been conditioned to believe her self-worth depends on the scale reading (Ryan, 
2000). Kristie Phillips believed the same thing, and became bulimic after years of training 
with Karolyi. 
Social powerlessness and lack of control over their own lives are causative factors 
for women into anorexia, as well as for chronic stress and burnout in sport (Gould, 1993). 
High expectations of performance and achievement by the others and by the athletes 
themselves pressure the youngsters to seek perfection anywhere in their lives. While young 
athletes feel external pressure to be slim, and are warned constantly about any weight gain, 
they still internalise the desire to be thin, and believe others such as their coaches and 
parents would approve of their weight loss. The preoccupation with eating and the body 
illustrates the areas of their lives that these young girls and women feel they can control. 
That thinness is highly valued in aesthetic sports in particular, as well as in most sports 
generally, only further supports the drive towards slimness and into disordered eating for 
young female athletes. 
Despite the research, and the exposes by former athletes, some people still refuse 
to believe that young girls in aesthetic sports have a predilection towards developing eating 
disorders. Kathy Kelly of USA GymnastiCS believes "It's a female thing. If it was just an 
athlete issue, then it would just be athletes that suffer from it" (Ryan, 2000, p. 63). She 
points to parents, uneducated coaches, and the mass media's glorification of thinness. The 
U.S. gymnastics federation has grudgingly accepted that eating disorders to exist, and has 
organised seminars for coaches, printed articles, created an advisory board on the topic, 
and has offered counselling to any senior or junior national team member who requests it. 
The sport officials refuse to acknowledge the links between the way the sport is taught and 
judged, and as such the problems will surely persist. 
3.5.2.2 Stress and burnout in young athletes 
The psychological benefits of competitive sport for children and adolescents have 
been debated over the last century (Wiggins, 1987). As the participation levels and 
opportunities for children to participate in organised, competitive sport have increased, so 
too have concerns about competitive stress and burnout increased. Stress and burnout 
effects are two of the most intensely investigated issues by paediatric sport scientists, and 
professionals involved in youth sports have called for even more research to be undertaken 
(Gould, 1993). The main concern with intensive sport participation is that it may lead to 
unhealthy anxiety disorders. Competitive sport clearly defines winners and losers, which 
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may threaten a child's self-worth, and causes high levels of stress (Martens, 1993). The 
consequences of prolonged chronic stress for young athletes include burnout and exit from 
sport, adverse health effects such as insomnia, lack of appetite, decreased fun and 
satisfaction, physical injury, and deteriorating performance (Gould, 1993). 
Children's self-perceptions have a powerful influence on their continued 
participation in sport, and the development and progression of skill acquisition (Weiss, 
1993). When children believe that they have failed in sport as a direct consequence of their 
own action or inaction, their self-esteem may be damaged, and feelings of incompetency 
and failure result (Martens, 1993). Some young athletes perceive evaluative and competitive 
environments as threatening, leading them to respond to potentially stressful situations-like 
competition-with significant nervousness and anxiety (Gould, 1993). Children's worries 
about failure and adult expectations, and social evaluation, may be tied to elevations in 
anxiety levels: the more the child worries, the higher their internal anxiety levels. A study by 
Scanlan and Lewthwaite (1984) found that increased parental pressure to participate was 
associated with increased levels of internal anxiety, and thus children who perceived their 
participation to be important to their parents experienced more anxiety that did the children 
who did not perceive parental pressure to participate. Passer (1983) found that soccer 
players between the ages of 10 and 15 years who tended towards high anxiety levels 
worried about losing, not playing well, and about coach, parent, and peer evaluations. 
These anxious young athletes tend to perceive evaluation and failure as major threats. 
In a study of young elite gymnasts, Feigley (1984) reported that the gymnasts most 
susceptible to burnout were the energetic perfectionists who did not have strong assertive 
personal skills, and were more easily influenced by others. Gymnasts generally see smaller 
performance improvements than other athletes, and when they reach adolescence they 
tend to struggle with their increasing needs for self-determination, autonomy, and 
independence which have been constrained by their sporting experience which began years 
earlier (Feigley, 1984). They also become aware of the physical, psychological, and social 
consequences of their gymnastics participation, which may further contribute to burnout. 
In summary, some children experience high anxiety from participating in competitive 
sport. Generally, the higher the level of competition, the more anxiety the athletes 
experience. Repeated failure and resultant lack of self-esteem may have long-term, adverse 
effects on their psychological well-being. It is important to note, however, that not all children 
perceive pressure and experience anxiety in the same way. Some children will not worry 
about performing in front of a group of people, whereas others will; some may not react to 
parental pressure to partiCipate, and others will. Even adults react in different ways to 
stress, some reacting positively and others reacting negatively. These differences highlight 
the importance of treating each child as an individual, and for adults to be highly perceptive 
to indicators of stress and anxiety in young athletes. The significance of this discussion has 
great bearing on the argument that some children are being harmed by their participation in 
high-performance sport, since long-term exposure to high levels of stress have serious, 
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adverse consequences for children. Such experiences will certainly affect their futures in a 
variety of ways, including whether they continue in that sport or another, their attitudes 
towards sport, and also personal feelings of self-worth and self-esteem. High stress and 
prolonged levels of stress are surely inappropriate when we consider normative conceptions 
of childhood, which focus on the vulnerability of children and the duty of adults to protect 
them from harms of all kinds. 
3.5.2.3 Achievement by proxy 
That children may be harmed physically and emotionally by their participation in 
elite sport has been studied by child psychiatrists such as Tofler et al. (1998). Adults may 
sometimes submit children to dangerous situations where the risk of harm is significant. 
When "children and adolescents are placed in these situations for the purpose of a "higher 
goal" such as Olympic sports, entertainment, or the arts with little or no consideration of the 
potential consequences to that child" (Tofler et aI., 1998, p. 806), they are being used as the 
means to the ends of others. The child is being used instrumentally by those purported to be 
their caregivers. A child psychiatrist whose research focuses on the neglect, abuse, and 
proxy abuse of child athletes, has described this phenomenon generally as "achievement by 
proxy" (Tofler et aI., 1996, 1998). It is certainly typical for a parent to experience pride and 
satisfaction in nurturing their child's development through encouraging their talents and 
abilities. While the parents may sometimes benefit financially and socially from the child's 
success, such benefits ought not to be their primary objective in supporting their child's 
pursuits in sport. Parents should be able to recognise when sporting activities become 
deleterious to a child's interests, and make the often difficult decision to decrease the child's 
participation, or even remove the child from the sport altogether. Well-rounded parents 
should be able to recognise their own reactions, and know how to differentiate their own 
goals from those of their child. "A child must never believe that the love of his or her parents 
is contingent on success in one field or endeavour, be it educational, sporting, career-
oriented, or social" (Tofler et aI., 1998, p. 808). 
Within cultural contexts, parents may be expected to "make sacrifices" for their 
children, generally in terms of orienting their lives towards their children. They spend time 
with their children, and nurture their interests. They help them identify and achieve their 
goals, while providing guidance in accordance with the dominant values of the family and 
culture. When, however, the parents exploit their children's talents, and use their children to 
gratify their own needs and goals at the expense of the child's best interests, then they have 
exceeded the boundaries of "good parenting", and their behaviours may be characterised as 
"proxy disordered behaviour" (Tofler et aI., 1998, p. 806). It is wrong for any adult to place 
inappropriate pressure on children to achieve success in any endeavour that endangers 
their physical or emotional health. Inappropriate pressures would be considered those that 
bear the risk of harm, which are set backs to the children's interests and abrogations of their 
rights, as discussed in chapter two of this thesis. 
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An adult assumes the role of achievement by proxy distortion when he or she 
places a child in a potentially exploitative situation to gratify his or her own conscious or 
unconscious needs and ambitions in order to attain certain goals or achievements (Tofler et 
aI., 1998). This type of pathogenic disorder which inflicts physical or psychological harm 
represents a variant of child abuse. In such a case, a child may be deliberately placed in 
situations where they focus on only one activity, excluding all others. In such a situation, all 
other activities are directed towards the achievement of specific goals-such as achieving 
Olympic, sporting, entertainment, music, or even educational success-at the risk of the 
child's well-being. The adult's motivation in directing such a situation is to achieve success 
vicariously, and is directed by their conscious external motivation to experience the benefits 
which accompany those of the child. These may include fame, financial gain, career 
advancement, peer recognition and respect, stronger relationships with the child, social 
acceptance, and improved socio-economic status. The vicarious success achieved through 
the child may be enjoyed by an individual or even a sport governing body. 
There are four stages of Achievement by Proxy Distortion described by Tofler et al. 
(1998). These range on a continuum from normal behaviours which may be relatively 
benign to the potentially pathogenic range which involves abusive behaviour. That these 
behaviours are on a continuum is particularly relevant for this discussion. Parents may begin 
their child's participation in sport as a relatively benign activity, but may become caught up 
in the experience without actually being aware of how the situation changes gradually from 
a relatively non-serious, playful experience to one which is more serious and intense. While 
there certainly are cases of some parents who have determined their child will become an 
elite athlete at a very young age, there are surely other parents who have no such views for 
their young children, but after the child becomes involved in the sport and their talent and 
interest is developed, they realise such potentials may exist. 
"Risky sacrifice" is where an adult has slight distortion in differentiating between 
their own needs for success and achievement from the child's development needs and 
goals. Here the parent may take on additional work to pay for the child's sporting needs. 
The family may move closer to the sporting facilities, or even to another city if the child's 
coach transfers elsewhere. The family may even allow the child to live at the sporting 
facility, rather than with the family, as do many young athletes. The development of regional 
centres of excellence in many nations has led to an increase in this kind of family 
separation. In some instances, the parents may sign over legal custody of the child to the 
coach, as did Bill Bragg with his seven-year old daughter Holly (Ryan, 2000). 
A" these behaviours are purportedly for the child, and the parents rationalise such 
actions by feigning helplessness. Tofler gives the example of parents proclaiming "I want my 
child to train less but she loves it. If she insists on training 8 hours a day, 6 days a week, 
how can I say no? I love my child" (1998, p. 809). Children may actually collude with their 
parents or coaches, whose goal is to encourage "pseudoautonomy". Here the child may say 
"It is MY decision to play injured, no one forces me to" so that when the child gets injured, 
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then neither the parents or the coach feels responsible (Tofler et aI., 1998, p. 809). In an 
interview in 1996, gymnast Dominique Moceanu was adamant that she trained and 
competed in the sport for the love of it. "I love this sport, and I'm doing what I have to do for 
me," she says. "But some people just don't get it. I'm not losing my childhood. I have the 
rest of my life to have a childhood" (Starr, 1996, p. 78). The journalist wrote "Dominique 
believes she is living out her own dream. It is clearly also her parents' dream" (p. 78). One 
year later Dominique claimed that her father had been forcing her to live his dream 
(Langton, 1998). The parents' obligation to protect their child health and well-being is 
abrogated as the sacrifice demanded from the young athlete overshoots justifiable, 
acceptable levels. 
The next level on the continuum is "objectification" which is a moderate loss of the 
adult's ability to differentiate between their needs and those of the child. Pressure on the 
child rises from the first stage, as they are increasingly isolated socially and become defined 
by one activity in which they have shown ability. This unidimensional identity leads to 
increased social isolation, and may compromise the child's developmental possibilities in 
other social, physical, and emotional dimensions. When 11-year old gymnast Shannon 
Miller asked her coach, Steve Nunno, for a Friday evening off from training so that she could 
go to a movie with her friends, Nunno convinced her they were trying to sabotage her 
gymnastics (Ryan, 2000). After winning the world championship, Nunno said of Shannon's 
apparent lack of emotion over the victory: "She's young, ... If she stops to look back at 
what she's done, she might lose her edge. She's got the rest of her life to look back" (Ryan, 
2000, p. 229). RiSk-taking is rationalised by parents or coaches who are unable to 
differentiate their own needs and goals from those of the child. Routine risk-taking is 
exemplified in situations where children are encouraged or even forced into intensive 
training at potentially harmful levels, and may be influenced into using pathogeniC forms of 
weight control that could potentially lead to life-threatening eating disorders (Tofler et ai, 
1998). In such situations, "parents, coaches, and even entire media and government 
systems turn a blind eye to or actively and passively encourage and support pathogenic 
behaviours" (Tofler et aI., 1998, p. 810). The involved adults objectify the child as use him or 
her as the means to their own ends. Once the young athlete becomes objectified, Tofler et 
aI., (1998) note that it becomes more difficult for adults to empathise with adolescent pain or 
experience, leading to the youngsters emotionally distancing themselves from their own 
feelings and colluding in their own objectification, a process similar in nature to the Freudian 
concept of "identifying with the aggressor". Claims by adults that the young athlete can "just 
walk away" or "leave anytime he or she wants" are frequently made. Withdrawal from sport 
at this level is certainly not that easy for the child. They are well aware of the sacrifices their 
parents have made, and their coaches "need" them, and the disappointment-even fury-
these adults will react with if the child expresses a desire to leave the sport. When elite 
gymnast Chelle Stack told her mother she wanted to quit gymnastics, her mother refused to 
allow her to leave. She responded to Chelle by saying: 
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I p~t this muc,h time and effort into this and, by God, if you think I'm going to let you 
qUit now: you ~e crazy. I! I have to literally go out there and get up on the beam with 
you, you re gOing to do It. If I have to beat you every day, you're going to do it. 
(Ryan,2000, p. 153) 
Carrol Stack, Chelle's mother, admits to bribing her daughter to go to gymnastics practice, 
and she threatened her with spankings after the bribes stopped working. Carrol even 
refused to give her daughter medicine for the flu when she was ill as it made her tired and 
interfered with her training (Ryan, 2000). Such behaviour certainly appears to be 
compromising the child's best interests, and certainly falls under Feinberg's (1984) 
conceptions of harm which have been applied to this work. 
The final stage of the achievement by proxy distortion is that of "potential abuse", 
where the adult has lost most or all of their ability to differentiate between their own needs 
and goals for success and achievement from those of the child. The child has become the 
adult's "meal ticket". At this stage, the child has been instrumentalised into an objectified 
and exploited means to the ends of the adult's goals, which are pursued without 
consideration of the short- or long-term physical and emotional well-being of the child. While 
it may appear that a parent, coach, or other adult involved with the child is aware and 
cognisant of the needs of that child, it may not always be the case (Tofler et aI., 1998). For 
example, they may mistakenly blame a child's severe injury in practice as being due to the 
child's daredevil nature, where it is actually a case of the child having been conditioned from 
a very young age to ignore pain and to take risks. After Brandy Johnson injured her foot in 
training, United States Gymnastic Federation officials told her and her coach that she had to 
compete at the World Championships in 1989, regardless of her injury. She trained and 
competed, and despite her injury, managed to win a silver medal in the vault. After returning 
home, x-rays revealed a fracture, and her foot was casted for a month. Brandy said that had 
it been up to her, she would never have competed given the amount of pain she was in 
(Ryan, 2000). French gymnast Elodie Lussac suffered a career-ending injury after falling off 
the balance beam. She had com plained repeatedly the day before to her coach that an 
earlier injury had not healed, but was ignored. She was pushed to compete despite her 
complaints, and ended up with a severe injury (David, 1998). 
3.5.3 The use of performance-enhancing substances 
Another disturbing trend in youth sport is the increasing use of performance 
enhancing substances-banned, illegal, and other-generally considered a problem only in 
adult sport. Olivier (1996) reports the 14-year-old South African athlete Liza De Villiers 
testing positive for an anabolic steroid and a stimulant. A 14-year old U.S. female swimming 
star also tested positive for steroid use and was suspended (Hanley, 1996). Melia et al. 
(1996), Yesalis et al. (1997), Schwellnus et al. (1992), and Skowno (1992) describe the use 
of steroids among school children involved in sport. Faigenbaum et ai, (1998) report 
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preteens using anabolic steroids. Tymowski (2001 c) discussed the deliberate use of 
caffeine and creatine by middle- and high-school students to improve their athletic 
performances. Two teenage Russian rhythmic gymnasts tested positive for Furosemide, a 
masking agent, and had their 2001 World Championship and 2001 Goodwill Games medals 
revoked (Slam! Sports, 2002). 
While the use of performance-enhancing substances by athletes appears to be a 
relatively recent phenomenon, in reality such usage has been present in sport for a long 
time. Ungerleider's (2001) examination of training methods in the former East Germany 
revealed systematic and institutionalised drug use by athletes, primarily in the sport of 
swimming but also in athletics (track and field). He found that the state colluded with 
physicians, trainers, and coaches in giving massive doses of anabolic steroids to athletes as 
young as 12-years old. While these athletes achieved tremendous sporting success, many 
of them suffered permanent physical and psychological damage. In the late 1990s, a 
number of coaches, doctors, and sporting officials admitted to conducting medical 
experiments with the young athletes by administering steroids and other performance-
enhancing substances to them. The formidable institution of East German sport forbid 
athletes or even parents from questioning training methods, and when questions were 
asked about the substances or the frightening changes occurring in their bodies, the 
athletes were usually silenced by threats of being dropped from the team, or worse. During 
the trials, athletes who testified against the doctors and coaches endured threatening phone 
calls and death threats. With the permanent physical effects of steroid use such as 
deepened voices and virile features apparent, judges and defense attorneys openly mocked 
the witnesses. Because of the steroid use, some of the athletes have died, others suffer 
from cancer and ovarian cysts, and many of the women have either been unable to 
conceive, have had numerous miscarriages, or have given birth to deformed babies. Others 
committed suicide. 
Another issue relating to the use of substances to enhance performance is that of 
the use of what are known as "stopper" drugs to delay puberty. In sports like gymnastics, 
figure skating, and diving, the onset of puberty may disrupt, even end, an athlete's career. 
The centre of gravity changes as an athlete grows, and spatial orientation, as well as hand-
eye coordination is affected. While some athletes adjust without any trouble, others cannot 
cope with the onset of puberty. Sudden breast development, the widening of hips and 
thighs, and the growth spurt with its accompanying weight gain may lead to technical 
problems, and the mood swings and concerns about self-image may also contribute to 
emotional distress. To deal with what Ryan described as "a race against time and nature" 
(2000, p. 66) for elite female gymnasts, anecdotal reports claim that athletes are given birth 
control pills before they reach puberty, or other drugs such as Lupron, a hormone-
suppressing substance to delay puberty. The window of opportunity for an elite gymnast is 
very narrow, from about the age of 13 to puberty (Ryan, 2000). While there is no empirical 
evidence to support these claims, given the wide reports of such practices, it is possible that 
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unscrupulous coaches, parents, and doctors may be involved with giving young girls drugs 
of this nature. It is not uncommon for doctors to prescribe Lupron for girls whose parents 
wish to slow the pace to maturity (Qaadri, 2002). Doctors claim that such measures 
"preserve the childhood years" for girls whose bodies are maturing too quickly" (Qaadri, 
2002). Parents request this puberty-delaying medication for various reasons. Some "mourn 
the loss of innocence, others fear the possibility of sexual attention-even predation-of 
their daughters" (Qaadri, 2002, p. R5). Thus, if such medication is available, and its 
therapeutic utility is at the discretion of the prescribing phYSiCian, then surely it is possible 
that it may be used to delay puberty in young athletes as well. 
While some substances may be used to delay growth associated with puberty, 
others may be used to stimUlate growth. Anabolic steroids and human growth hormone 
have been used to treat children diagnosed with delayed growth or unusually short stature. 
Genetic manipulation is the next potential scientific therapy which may impact sport, and the 
implications of that practice may be endless, and also undetectable. As with almost all drugs 
and doping methods, these modalities carry their risks, some known, others unknown, 
particularly those on the cutting edge of technology. 
Drug abuse is not limited to illicit or banned substances. Gymnast Kristie Phillips 
trained with a broken wrist, and coped with the pain by taking twelve Advils and six anti-
inflammatory Naprosyns every day (Ryan, 2000). Another gymnast, 11-year old Elizabeth 
Traylor took six to eight Advils a day, and sprayed her knees with an anaesthetic to dull the 
pain. Many gymnasts use painkillers and anti-inflammatories as part of their training; Brandy 
Johnson said no gymnast arrived at the gym without them. That many of these substances 
are unavailable to children through both cost and accessibility speaks to the issue of others 
securing the drugs for them. Particularly in the case of pain killers, parents are surely aware 
that their children rely on heavy dosages to keep them participating. Such knowledge of 
harmful behaviour contravenes their duty to protect their child from harm. 
3.5.4 Sexual abuse and harassment in sport 
Harassment and abuse of girls and boys, women and men, has not been openly 
acknowledged in sport until fairly recently. Over the last decade, exposes of abuse and 
harassment of athletes by their coaches have been chronicled on television, in newspapers, 
and in books (Brackenridge, 2001; Kirby et aI., 2000; Robinson, 1998). In Canada, it was 
not until National Hockey League player Sheldon Kennedy revealed that he had been 
sexually abused as a boy by his coach, Graham James, that the issue of sexual abuse of 
athletes was openly acknowledged (Robinson, 1998). These exposes, in addition to 
convictions such as that of Paul Hickson-former British Olympic swimming coach-of 15 
sexual offences, including two rapes, of teenage swimmers, led gradually to the 
development of programmes such as the Canadian Hockey Association's Speak Out! 
Workshop, and the United Kingdom's Child Protection in Sport workshops. 
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The issue of sexual harassment and abuse of children in sport is an important area, 
and certainly one that applies here. While this thesis will not consider it in detail, it clearly 
falls within the nature of this discussion of physical and emotional harms. Coaches and 
parents, some of whom are coaches, have been charged with various kinds of offences 
toward child athletes, and thus this issue is related to the harms experienced by children in 
sport (Brackenridge, 2001). A detailed discussion, however, is beyond the scope of this 
work. What is obvious, however, is that children have the right to be protected from such 
harms, and parents, coaches, and other adults involved in sport have the duty to protect 
children from these and all forms of harm. The sequelae of such experiences are often long-
term, and thus such abrogations of the child's right to an open future are relevant and 
applicable. 
3.6 Parents 
The objective of high-performance sport is a continual drive towards excellence, 
exemplified by constant improvement of athletic achievement. This drive, along with the 
concomitant demands of intensive workloads and competition, has led to the earlier and 
earlier entry of athletes into sport during their childhood. This introduction is instigated by 
adults, as "children would never think on their won accord of subjecting themselves to such 
an organised form of sport aimed for long-term performance, and to the organization of their 
daily, weekly, and yearly schedules as is required by the preparation to achieve top 
performance" (Grupe, 1988, p. 225). Ryan (2000) supports this view that adults instigate the 
child's entry into sport, and continue to support the child's progression towards higher levels 
of participation and competition. She says 
Almost every successful child athlete rides to the top on the shoulders of a parent 
undaunted by sacrifice and extremes-whether this means sending a child far away 
to train, mortgaging a home to foot the bills, taking a child out of school so she can 
train longer hours, abusing her physically or verbally for not performing, or even 
giving up custody. (Ryan, 2000, p. 146) 
Due to the necessary involvement of parents in their children's participation, parents are 
linked inextricably to children's sport. This involvement varies on a continuum from "under 
involved" to "over involved" (Hellstadt, 1987). For coaches, parents can be either valuable 
sources of support, or overwhelming sources of stress and frustration (Tutko and Richards, 
1971). Parental involvement affects not only athletes. Lackey (1986) found that parental 
stress is capable of ruining a good season or even a coaching career. Sport psychologist 
Robert Heckel, who works with child athletes, believes that parental ambition, and not the 
child's ambition, is often the driving force behind a child's sport career: "A lot of times we 
find the typical stage mother, who feels unfulfilled, frustrated and who is going by God, to 
live through her child" (Hanley, 1996). Some parents believe they can buy success. Recalls 
Christy Ness, a figure skating coach, talking about parents: "they wanted their children to 
succeed at all costs. They thought they could buy it" (Smith, 1997, p.116). 
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The motivation behind most parents is the best interests of their child. However, at 
times their methods do not reflect this motivation. Sometimes children require state 
intervention to protect them from their parents, the very people who ought to protect and 
nurture them. There are many cases of parents who have failed to provide for their children, 
to protect them from harm, or have even exposed them to harm. The establishment of child 
protection agencies, and the development of laws against child abuse attest to the reality 
that some children come to harm under the purported "care" of adults, and that society 
needs to protect children. In some countries such as Canada and the U.S., the 
criminalisation of intentional failure to pay child support by parents recognises the serious 
harm that may come to children who are not being provided for. Such legislation seeks to 
prevent harm and to punish those who deliberately cause it. Such legislation, however, is 
aimed at existing children. The bounds of liberty are sufficiently broad that legislation cannot 
prevent or restrict procreation by parents who already have a record of failing to provide for 
their children, or even records of child abuse (Dresser, 2002). While there may be a danger 
that such restrictions could lead to future wealth-based restrictions on an individual's 
freedom to have children, the fact remains that children require protection and nUrturance, 
and if not provided for by their parents or guardians, there are few options available for 
those children. Despite legal sanctions to fulfil the obligations of parenthood, there is no way 
of legislating responsible parenting, for parents are afforded great autonomy in childrearing. 
Definitions of childhood often include the description that "children" do not work; in 
practice, however, this is not always the case. Consider the following examples of children 
who "work" in high-performance sport. By the time tennis protegee Martina Hingis had 
reached the age of 18, she had already earned $7 million dollars. That sort of lucrative 
return on what some may consider the "investment" of a childhood may lead parents to 
pressure their children in inappropriate ways. 
When she was 17-years old, U.S. gymnast Dominique Moceanu went to court to 
request a restraining order against her father, and shortly thereafter went back to court to 
have the order made a permanent injunction. Two months earlier, Moceanu had petitioned 
the courts to be considered a legal adult, so that she could have legal and financial 
independence from her father, Dumitru Moceanu. Her parents built a huge $4 million gym 
with money generated by her public appearances and competitions since she turned 
professional at the age of ten (Nissimov, 1998b). After questioning her parents about her 
trust fund-to which only they had access-she charged her father with misappropriation of 
her earnings. Being declared an adult in the eyes of the law meant that she could demand 
an accounting of her trust fund although under Texas law, parents have the right to their 
children's earnings. According to the terms of the fund set up by parents, she could have 
access to that money only at the age of 35. She also claimed that he stalked, threatened, 
and abused her, and alleged that he had been trying to find someone to kill her friend, Brian 
Huggins, and her coach, Luminita Miscenco. 
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Dominique has earned more than an estimated $2-million since she began 
competitive gymnastics, which she charged her father has squandered. In court, she 
testified that she has always been afraid of her father who is an obsessively controlling man 
with a violent temper. She reported that she had never had a childhood, and that her father 
had slapped her in the face for offences such as gaining weight or sneaking candy. She said 
her parents have always yelled at her, and she lived in fear of her father for the way he 
treated her. "It always had to be about the gym .... I would think, 'Don't you guys know 
anything besides gymnastics? Can't we go out for ice cream? Can't you be my mom and 
dad instead of me being your business?'" (Langton, 1998). Her father claimed that he had 
never pressured her into pursuing gymnastics, and that she had everything a child can 
possibly have, including a new Mustang convertible-she traded in her Mercedes 
(Nissimov, 1998a). 
Dom inique Moceanu has set anum ber of records in her short career: in 1993, at 12, 
she became the youngest gymnast ever to win the U.S. National Championships; in 1995 at 
the World Championships she won a silver medal on the beam and placed 5th overall; in 
1996 she won a gold medal at the Atlanta Olympics; in 1998 she became the first non-
Russian to win the all-around competition at the Goodwill Games. She published her 
autobiography at the age of 14, describing how her parents swung her from the clothesline 
as a toddler to prepare her for a career in gymnastics. Her father said that he had promised 
himself that his first child would be a gymnast. When she was three years old, her father 
was already 'badgering' coach Bela Karolyi to take her on in his gymnastics school, but he 
refused. When Dominique was nine, Karolyi agreed to take her on, and so the family moved 
from Florida to Houston. At the age of fourteen, many young girls are still contemplating 
their futures; Dominique had already written her autobiography, detailing her path to the 
pinnacle of athletic success: an Olympic gold medal. Dominique has been compared to 
Nadia Comaneci, the first gymnast to score a perfect "10," both in terms of her physical 
appearance but also her talent. Her choreographer, Geza Pozsar, said admiringly of the 
similarities between Dominique and Nadia Comaneci, 1976 Olympic champion, "these girls 
are not pussycats. Both are fighters-mean fighters" (Starr, p. 78). With these family 
problems, Dominique "has had to make the overnight transition from overprotected, tightly 
controlled gymnastics prodigy to independent young adult" (Swift, 1998, p. 101). 
In 1985, 17-year old Mary Lou Retton had also petitioned the courts to be declared 
a legal adult so that she could invest her earnings after winning a gold medal at the 1984 
Los Angeles OlympiCS. She had also been a gymnast. Her parents never opposed her 
request, which was granted by the court shortly after the petition was filed (Moceanu leaves 
home, 1998). 
Families may be destroyed by the obsessions of parents to "make" their child a 
champion. Wendie Grossman pushed her two identical twin daughters in figure skating to 
the point where the two children fell out with one another, and did not reconcile until a 
decade after they had left figure skating (Ryan, 2000). The two girls competed with each 
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other, and not long thereafter, against each other. The parents' focus on results pressured 
the two girls, and they began measuring their own self worth, and their parents' love, by 
their figure skating results. One of the girls, Karen, left skating when she was 13-years old, 
burned out from the pressure of trying to fulfil her parents' expectations. When her sister, 
Amy, repeatedly failed her compulsory figures necessary to move up to the next level, her 
mother recalls "we were devastated" (Ryan, 2000, p. 158). Since she was unable to 
continue in singles skating, her parents sent 14-year old Amy off to California to train with a 
pairs coach. She was withdrawn from a regular school programme, attending two to three 
hours of tutoring at the rink instead. After five months her partner left, and so she returned to 
her parents. She found a new partner, and progressed to a career best of the bronze medal 
at the national championships. Shortly thereafter she was diagnosed with a degenerative 
disk caused by the throws and lifts in pairs skating, and had to retire from skating at the age 
of 17. She and her sister had little to do with each other, despite attending the same school, 
and did not become friends for another ten years. 
3.7 Coaches 
Few coaches rise to the top of the ranks without a ride on the coattails of a winning 
athlete. Almost always, the competency and calibre of coaches is judged on the success of 
his or her athletes. Coaches have a significant influence over children's self-esteem and 
ability perceptions in sport (Smoll and Smith, 1989). An earlier study was Smith et al. (1979) 
found that coaches' behaviours have a direct influence on the psychosocial development of 
children and adolescents. While good coaches may use this influence to bolster self-esteem 
and motivate young athletes to continue participation in sport, over-eager coaches may 
push their youngest athletes too far, too fast. 
A winning record validates controversial coaching methods. Bela Karolyi, Romanian 
coach of Nadia Comaneci, Mary Lou Retton, Dominique Moceanu, and many other top 
gymnasts, is revered for his "production" of champions" but is also condemned by others as 
abusive (Ryan, 2000). He is noted for his self-promotional behaviour on television, "done for 
the benefit of the judges and, one supposes, the little girls watching on TV who might one 
day aspire to train in Karolyi's gym" (Swift, 1996, p. 104). Swift reports that while he hugs his 
"tiny girl gymnasts" in front of the cameras, he does not hug his gymnasts "when they 
practice till the tears fall" (Swift, 1996, p. 104). 
Young athletes are vulnerable to injury and exploitation, and the well-being of young 
athletes often rests entirely in the hands of their coaches. This is frightening, particularly 
when one hears of coach Bela Karolyi's views on medical treatment. A USA Gymnastics 
official told Ryan (2000) only on the condition of anonymity, that Karolyi's gymnasts would 
often have to "sneak" medical attention and treatment because "Bela would get angry if they 
were hurt" (Ryan, 2000, p. 209). Apparently Karolyi had a deep mistrust of medical trainers. 
He felt that they "babied the athletes or scared them with too much information about their 
.. . "(R an 2000 p 209) He told the national gymnastics federation to ensure their InJunes y, ,. . 
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medical trainer did not speak to the athletes about their injuries, preferring to relay whatever 
information he felt they ought to know himself. He justified such "gate-keeping" by 
rationalizing the doctors were overly concerned with liability issues, saying: "I take the 
liability because I'm the one who must get the technical and physical performance from the 
kids as soon as possible. If I'm not doing it, nobody else is going to do it" (Ryan, 2000, p. 
209). 
Gymnast Kristie Phillips trained for three years with a fractured wrist because 
Karolyi did not consider the injury serious enough to warrant complete rest. Ten years later, 
the wrist is nearly fused (Ryan, 2000). Another gymnast went to a doctor recommended by 
Karolyi because of heel pain. "Without having the gymnast take off her shoe, the doctor 
miraculously diagnosed the heel as a bruise" (Ryan, 2000, p. 209). Kim Zmeskal injured her 
wrist and went to see a doctor recommended by Karolyi. It was shortly before a gymnastics 
competition. The doctor also diagnosed her injury as a sprain. Zmeskal eventually sought a 
second opinion, and an x-ray revealed a fracture of the distal radius, which is a common 
gymnastics injury. At the time, Karolyi said on national television that Zmeskal's injury was 
psychosomatic. "If Bela wants a kid to be injured so she doesn't go to a meet, she's injured . 
.. . If he wants a girl not injured so she can compete, she's not injured" (Ryan, 2000, p. 210). 
After Chelle Stack fell off the beam several times during a meet, Karolyi called her 
performance "the most embarrassing thing I ever been through in my thirty-five-year 
coaching career" (Ryan, 2000, p. 210). Stack had broken her toes earlier while jumping off 
the beam, and Karolyi had ordered an injection of Novacain to deal with the pain. He 
expected her to perform on the beam, dismounts and all, at an international competition, 
with broken toes, numbed by pain medication. That she did not suffer a more serious injury 
is more likely due to luck than anything else. Such stories-and there are many, many 
more-told to journalist Joan Ryan by these young gymnasts are clear examples of how 
children may be harmed by all-powerful coaches who put performance before the health 
and welfare of the athletes. The young athletes are being exploited, the rights of the children 
are clearly being abrogated: this coach's treatment of his young charges is heinous. 
Unfortunately, his winning record continues to be used as justification of his maltreatment of 
children. 
Karolyi's questionable treatment of young athletes extends to influence his adult 
charges as well. Karolyi's former coaching assistant, Steve Newman, claimed to have had 
no idea that he might be damaging his young athletes by calling them idiots and imbeciles 
(Ryan, 2000). Karolyi is credited with introducing twice-daily, 6-days per week training 
workouts for gymnasts, and for implementing a more structured and less forgiving system of 
training (Ryan, 2000). His systems and coaching methods were emulated far and wide, 
"spawning a new generation of American coaches who screamed, taunted, and demanded 
absolute subservience" (Ryan, 2000, p. 215-6). The mother of a gymnast who had switched 
gyms when Newman moved to work for Karolyi said that Newman became a tyrant only 
after he switched. Gymnast Oanielle Herbst said of her experiences with Steve Newman: 
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My coach's desire to win seemed stronger than mine at times .... In times of 
pr~ssure, which not a day passed without ... I was yelled at, screamed at, and had thln~s thrown at me ... Somehow, my coach had convinced himself, and constantly 
reminded me, that I was a fat imbecile, a bloody idiot, no good and worthless. 
(Ryan, 2000, p.216) 
She trained with him from the age of ten until she was thirteen, at which time she dropped 
out of gymnastics suffering from burnout. She told Ryan that Newman's insults remained 
with her into adulthood. 
Parents are not ignorant of this abuse. That they allow their children to be abused 
falls into the "achievement by proxy" pathology identified by Tofler et al. (1998). One mother, 
told Ryan that her young daughter was always trying to please the coach, and that she-the 
mother-thought it was disgusting to see the way these men-"with their huge egos"-dealt 
with the little girls. She did not remove her child from the tutelage of coach Newman, 
however. This mother is as culpable for what happened to her daughter as the coach was, 
since she observed the way he treated her child and the other little girls, but she did nothing. 
One of Newman's former gymnasts, now a gymnastics coach herself, said looking back: 
He succeeded in what he was trying to do-we were great at competitions. But I 
think it's harmful. As children, we don't have our own value system. We don't know 
who we are. We're listening to authority figures to tell us who we are. If somebody 
tells you something so many times, you're going to believe it. 
(Ryan, 2000, p.218) 
Coaches who confuse abuse with discipline are found in figure skating as well. ABC 
Television reporter Jurina Ribbens said that "The root of a lot of evil in this sport is coaches 
who are fulfilling their goals through their skaters" (Ryan, 2000, p. 218). An Olympic figure 
skater told Ryan how her coach screamed at the young girls, hit them, and pulled their hair: 
It wasn't abuse, but rather viewed as "discipline". Olympic Silver medallist Nancy Kerrigan's 
coach, Evy Scotvold, said that no person is capable of attaining his or her absolute best 
alone: "Everybody needs somebody behind them pushing ... You hope that you can get 
your athletes to understand that you're not being mean and hard, that you do these things 
out of love and caring" (Ryan, 2000, p. 220). This sort of statement has been heard by 
abusers before, attempting to justify their behaviour. Brackenridge (2001) mentions one 
sexual abuser trying to justify his behaviour by claiming "I was protecting her interests" (p. 
176). 
Coaches and parents may collude, either consciously or unconsciously, in their 
attempts to make athletes "stars". Gymnast Kristie Phillips blames her suicide attempt and 
her eating disorder on elite gymnastics, where the confluence of a parent's ambition, a 
coach's unrelenting demands and her own blind loyalty nearly destroyed her (Ryan, 2000). 
Kristie's mother, Terri, has no regrets about Kristie's eating disorder or suicide attempt. She 
defends Kristie dropping out of school to attend early morning workouts as having been 
necessary to be on Karolyi's elite team. Terri still believes that training nine hours a day is 
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not excessive for a child who wants to be the best: "If they live away from home and the 
parents are paying a price, then they need to be in the gym for however long they need to 
be there" (Ryan, 2000, p. 119). Mother and daughter differ dramatically in their views of 
Kristie's coach. Kristie said that 
he's in it for himself. He doesn't care about the gymnasts. He doesn't care what 
they go through, what they suffer through, what he makes them suffer through. He 
cares about the fame and fortune he's getting gout of it. .. When we're at 
competitions and when we're on TV and he has a microphone on, he's a different 
person. ~e:s massaging o~r necks, smiling and laughing and patting you on the 
back. ThiS IS what the public sees of Bela. But it's really the exact opposite. 
(Ryan, 2000, p. 119) 
Terri dismisses Kristie's allegations of mental abuse by Karolyi, and says that if she had 
another talented daughter, she would send her to Karolyi as well, because he is the best 
gymnastics coach in the world. She says that children have to be mentally strong to become 
champions, and that Karolyi's humiliation of the athletes and his verbal tirades were 
necessary. Terri said that she was sometimes appalled by Karolyi's tactics, but she never 
objected. He was the best coach money could buy-she paid $180,000 U.S. over six 
years-and if he needed to belittle and humiliate little girls to produce champions, who was 
she to argue (Ryan, 2000). 
At the elite level of sport, the stakes are high. Sport governing bodies do not wish to 
interfere with "winning" coaches. Even when allegations of abuse are made, or even when 
such abuse is widely known, "it may seem safer for officials to keep quiet in order to 
safeguard the possibility of medal successes" (Brackenridge, 2001, p. 168). Karolyi has 
been portrayed in the media, and by stories told by some of his former athletes, as a coach 
who exploited and abused his young charges. That parents, and even some athletes have 
justified his tactics is testament to a number of issues; first, no other coach has "produced" 
as many world champions and Olympians as has Karolyi, and this appears to justify his 
methods; second, children are easily influenced by adults and those in positions of power, 
and Karolyi's strong personality has convinced them that his methods are best, and that 
their experiences were worthwhile. If they were to deny the value of those experiences, they 
might invalidate much of their lives and their identities that were moulded in and by 
gymnastics. When only one individual or even a few individuals on a team have made 
allegations of abuse towards a coach, team-mates and others involved-even the victim's 
parents-may remain silent, align themselves with the coach, or spurn the victim in order to 
protect themselves and their sporting careers. These strong reactions to such allegations 
may also be due to "elements of hero-worship, infatuation and even love from the athletes 
towards a coach" (Brackenridge, 2000, p. 169). These sorts of reactions contribute to 
making it very difficult for athletes and others to reveal instances of abuse. 
3.8 Conclusions 
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When one considers the dedication and drive required to achieve the pinnacle of 
success in high-performance sport, one has to be concerned about the development of such 
precocious talent in children. Talented, high-achieving children are at risk of neglect, 
exploitation, and abuse by the very individuals charged with their care and protection. This 
speaks to the desperation of some individuals to achieve athletic superiority and the 
accompanying lucrative rewards at any cost. This chapter has examined the experiences of 
children involved in the practices of high-performance sport. I have argued that children are 
being harmed through their intensive training and competition. The inherent vulnerability and 
powerlessness of children render them susceptible to exploitation by others, particularly by 
coaches and even their own parents. Because of the authority and power of the adults 
under whose care children are entrusted, the young athletes cannot protect themselves, and 
they may suffer long-term harm from these experiences. Furthermore, their right to an open 
future is being compromised. This chapter has contextualised the nature of the problems of 
children's participation at the highest levels of sport, and has described in detail the kinds of 
harm that they are experiencing. In the next chapter we turn to a theoretical consideration of 
the conceptions of children and childhood. 
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4.0 Chapter Four: Conceptions of Children and Childhood 
4.1 Introduction 
Talented children participating in high-performance sport are often treated as adults 
rather than as children since their athletic success leads others to view them as athletes 
first. While watching an elite gymnast at the Olympic Games perform a spectacular series of 
flips and leaps across the balance beam, it is sometimes difficult to remember that she is a 
child, particularly when one considers that she has been training at least six hours a day, six 
days a week, for the last eight years, since she was four years old. Her ferocious intensity 
and concentration is not often seen in the face of a child participating in sport. After being 
bombarded by months of intensive media coverage of the athletes, watching the figure 
skaters on the winner's podium at the Olympic Games receive their medals seems 
incongruous when one is reminded that the gold medallist has just turned 15-years old (and 
is therefore legally still a child), and that she will turn professional after the Games. In order 
to be competing at the highest levels of sport, we know that these young athletes have been 
competing internationally for a number of years, in addition to many years of intensive 
training. This has involved separation from their families and considerable travel to foreign 
countries, as well as a life separate from other children their own age who are not involved 
in sport. Few young athletes competing at this level have gone to regular schools in their 
neighbourhoods, and they have missed ordinary childhood experiences such as growing up 
with their brothers and sisters, and even going to birthday parties-not to mention having 
missed celebrations of their own birthdays. Additionally, participation at the Olympics in 
recent years has become increasingly characterised by unparalleled security, with 
thousands of police officers and machine gun-toting soldiers guarding heavily fortified 
athletes' villages and other venues. Such issues demand a consideration of whether these 
types of experiences are appropriate for children. In turn, such a query invites questions 
surrounding conceptions of children, and the nature of childhood. If the environment of high-
performance sport seems incongruous with modern views of appropriate environments for 
children, then we must ask what is it about our notions of children and childhood that do not 
mesh with such experiences. 
In this chapter, I will explore conceptions of children and of childhood in order to 
formulate a response to the questions raised about their participation in high-performance 
sport. An important distinction that ought to be made before entering this discussion is that 
between a concept of childhood and a conception of childhood. A concept of childhood 
necessitates that children be discernible from adults by a set of unspecified criteria, whereas 
a conception of childhood is a specification of those distinguishing criteria (Archard, 1993). 
Thus, for me to have a concept of childhood, I would have to recognise that children are 
distinctly different from adults, and would treat them accordingly. A conception of childhood 
would require that my treatment of children and the way in which I speak to them reveals a 
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particular view of the differences between adults and children. We may share the concept of 
childhood, but could have different conceptions of childhood. 
I shall begin with historical views of childhood, and move to a consideration of 
contemporary views. While there exists a robust literature in the area of sociology on the 
subject, there has been relatively little written from a philosophical perspective. David 
Archard, John Kleinig, and Tamar Schapiro are among the few philosophers who have 
considered this particular area, although others have discussed the notion of children's 
rights from a philosophical position (Aiken and Purdy, 1998; Ekman-Ladd, 1996; O'Neill, 
1988). This discussion will focus on the philosophical conceptions of children and childhood 
put forth primarily by Archard, but will discuss Kleinig's (1982) notion as well. It will also 
include discussion from SOCiological and historical literature as well in order to formulate a 
broader consideration of the subject. 
4.2 Historical conceptions of childhood 
Human beings are broadly divided into two general categories: children and adults. 
There are many other sub-categories within these divisions, such as infancy, adolescence, 
middle-age, and old age; however, the distinction between adults and children remains the 
most discrete and most meaningful. Historical views of children have shown the child's role 
to be generally one of inferior status. Children seem to have been conceived of as property 
belonging to the child's parents or guardians, as in that objectified status, were treated much 
like possessions. Throughout history, children have been treated very cruelly, by today's 
standards. They have been sacrificed to the gods, bartered in exchange for goods, sold as 
slaves, treated as indentured servants, used for sex, and exploited as labourers. Such 
treatment of children was not relegated to any particular class, but was seen from the lowest 
classes to the highest (Radbill, 1980). While child sacrifice was outlawed hundreds, if not 
thousands, of years ago, infanticide remains in certain cultures. Girl children in certain 
cultures are not as valued as are male children, and in countries such as China and India, 
infanticide is still practiced. In other countries, sex-selection in-utero is now possible with the 
advent and widespread use of ultrasound machines, and as such, abortion of female 
foetuses may be considered the "new" form of infanticide. 
Beginning in about the sixteen century, the identification of what has been 
recognised as a more distinct notion of childhood began. In his locus classicus, Centuries of 
Childhood (1962), Philippe Aries, a French theorist and historian, formulated a history of the 
conception of childhood, what he referred to as a "sentiment" of childhood, or an awareness 
of the particular nature of childhood. His thesis had a profound impact on social history, and 
is the most commonly discussed work in any treatise on childhood, be that from a social, 
historical, moral, legal, or political perspective. The thesis focused on the concept of 
childhood, and maintained that only in modernity could an adequate understanding of 
childhood be acquired. 
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Aries gleaned much of his information and formulated many of his theories relating 
to children and childhood from artwork and literature through the centuries. His work puts 
forth very much a Western European perspective, and has been criticized as such, in 
addition to criticisms of his work as having a rather limited perspective since it relied so 
exclusively on artwork depicting children. However, despite the criticisms, Aries was one of 
the first authors to attempt to document the history of conceptions of childhood, particularly 
in Europe, and thus his work remains an important contribution to the area. 
Aries introduced two theories of childhood. The first, and most widely held theory 
considered children to be creatures who required coddling, and that childhood itself ended 
shortly after infancy. The second theory perceived the innocence and the weakness of 
childhood, and thus the duties of adults to "safeguard the former and strengthen the latter" 
(Aries, 1962, p. 316). This second theory was held primarily by the small community of 
lawyers, priests, and moralists. Aries notes that without their influence, children would have 
remained "simply the poupart or bambino, the sweet, funny little creature with whom people 
played affectionately but with liberty, if not indeed with licence, and without any thought of 
morality or education" (Aries, 1962, p. 316). The child became part of the adult world after 
the age of five to seven, being briefer in the lower classes than the upper. The concept of a 
longer childhood was created and supported by the educational institutions and practices 
which the moralists and pedagogues of the seventeenth century guided and supervised. 
Aries attributed the modern concepts of both childhood and education to these same 
moralists and pedagogues. 
Following the earliest years of childhood, when the child still promenaded on a 
"leading string" and spoke his or her "jargon", and prior to full adulthood, a special 
intermediate stage-albeit an ambiguous one-was introduced. It established vaguely the 
concepts of adolescence or youth: that of the school or college. This stage was recognised 
in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, when the schoolboy or scholar was 
understood to be in the age of adolescence. At the same time, a vocabulary relating to 
infancy appeared: the word "bebe" was adopted for the very little child. Girls were not 
usually educated other than in domestic matters, although this was not to be 
underestimated as by the age of ten, some girls were able to run entire households. 
However, they were not taught to read or write; the lack of these skills must certainly have 
limited them in their domestic duties of running large households. Both conscription and the 
military service were introduced at this last stage of childhood in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, ending the exclusivity of education for this period. While one might 
assume that this opportunity was limited to those in the upper classes, Aries notes that 
many young nobles actually ignored education and colleges, instead going straight into the 
army. He mentions too that there were fourteen-year-old lieutenants in the army at the end 
of Louis XIV's reign, and that some boys joined the army at the age of eleven. 
As childhood was not portrayed until about the twelfth century, Aries believed that 
medieval art "did not know" childhood. This he attributed to there being no place for 
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childhood in the medieval world. When the children began being portrayed, they were 
depicted simply as little people, adults on a smaller scale, without the distinguishing features 
common to children. Some painters even gave the naked body of children the musculature 
of an adult. In contrast, Greek art of the Hellenistic period seemed to have been the only art 
that portrayed children in a realistic way. Romanesque art then took over, and rejected the 
special and particular features of childhood. Aries begins his study of childhood with pictorial 
representation, makes claims about the concepts based on images and, to some extent, on 
literature. He makes sweeping conclusions based on his survey. As child prodigies behaved 
with the courage and displayed physical strength of doughty warriors, according to the 
literary historian Mgr Calve, Aries writes "This undoubtedly means that the men of the tenth 
and eleventh centuries did not dwell on the image of childhood, and that the image had 
neither interest nor even reality for them." He continues with the suggestion that "in the 
realm of real life, and not simply in that of aesthetic transposition, childhood was a period of 
transition which passed quickly and which was just as quickly forgotten" (Aries, 1962, p. 32). 
In the thirteenth century, several images of children represented the emergence of the 
modern concept of childhood, and continued in frequency and representation to the modern 
day, although slowly. It was not until the seventeenth century, however, that portraits of 
children themselves and alone, began to appear with any frequency. Aries suggests that 
this may have come about by the expectation that many children would survive to 
adulthood, as previously infant and child mortality rates were extremely high; thus children 
moved from anonymity in paintings and pictures to having distinct identities. The literary 
scenes of childhood which he surveyed, Aries proclaims, "reflected the discovery of infancy, 
of the little child's body, habits and chatter" (Aries, 1962, p. 47). 
For many years between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, schools did not 
make any distinctions according to age amongst the students. Aries suggests that this may 
have been due to the disregard of schools to educate children, perhaps because they 
lacked the very concept of 'childhood': the medieval school was "a sort of technical school 
for the instruction of clerics, 'young or old' ... [Thus] it welcomed equally and indifferently 
children, youths, adults, the precocious and the backward, at the foot of the magisterial 
rostrum" (Aries, 1962, p. 317). By the end of the eighteenth century, however, the mentality 
towards education began to change. Ten-year old children continued to be educated beside 
twenty-year old men: essentially, people went to school whenever they could, regardless of 
their age. During the Renaissance, education was spread over the entire span of human life, 
without relegating it to children or youth. The special nature of childhood was recognised by 
"men of authority, reason, and learning" who devised special institutions for the systematic 
education of childhood. The new concern for education recognised that "the child was not 
ready for life, and that he had to be subjected to a special treatment, a sort of quarantine, 
before he was allowed to join the adults" (Aries, 1962, p. 396). This group was also held 
responsible for the segregation according to social class: the higher social classes with the 
privileged extended classical education, and the lower classes with an inferior, practically-
61 
oriented vocational type of instruction rather than "education" per se. The latter state 
continues to this day, according to Aries, with the lower classes tending not to focus as 
much attention and importance on education, seemingly to prefer early entry into working 
life. Child labour and the early entry into adult life retains this characteristic of medieval 
society. 
Children's clothing, as seen in the artwork and as described in literature, varied 
greatly with class. Once the infancy stage was over, the lower class did not appear to make 
many distinctions between children's and adult's clothing. The upper classes, however, 
dressed children somewhat differently, with a particularization for children's clothing noted 
especially for boys. Girls tended to be dressed as miniature adult women at an early age. 
Work is one of the elements which typically-in modern times-differentiates the 
worlds of the child and of the adult. Historically, however, children have often been exposed 
and indeed, immersed, in working. In the last few centuries, children, valued for their 
diminutive sizes and relative powerlessness, were often sent down mineshafts and up 
chimneys. They worked in dangerous conditions for minimum wages, if any, for long, 
arduous hours. They were treated as slaves and often were forced to endure what many 
would consider unbearable conditions. In 1842, child labour was outlawed in British mines, 
and the modern conception of childhood in Western liberal societies saw the world of work 
as an inappropriate environment for children. Notions of childhood stressed the innocence 
and frailty of children, and viewed childhood as a period of preparation for adulthood, and 
thus children were banished from labour into the classroom. This was not the case for 
children everywhere. Even today, children in third world and developing countries are forced 
to work. Their earnings are valuable and are usually essential contributions to pitiful family 
wages. 
The family of today is dramatically different from that of a century ago, and even 
more so of the family several hundred years ago. Notions of the home, the child, and the 
family were very different from today's versions, not surprisingly. Sociologist John Holt 
(1975) views the family of which we speak now, "Mom, Pop, and the kids," as a modern 
invention. Even this notion is undergoing dramatic change as single parents, same-sex 
parents, and other permutations of 'primary-care givers' evolve. Holt believes that, at its very 
best, "the family can be what many people say it is, an island of acceptance and love in the 
midst of a harsh world" (Holt, 1975, p. 37). 
From his work, Aries appears to favour the modern conception of childhood as 
being a particular and separate world. While this conception is now widely accepted, it has 
not always been this way. Children are now viewed as separate from adults, and childhood 
as a separate world from adulthood. Earlier societies appear to have possessed different 
conceptions of childhood, which does not necessarily mean, as Aries claims, that they did 
not have a concept of childhood. His thesis seems to hold the assumption that since they 
did not hold the present day conception of childhood, they did not have a concept of 
childhood. This is not the case, since they essentially had different conceptions of childhood 
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which informed their concept. They still considered children as differing from adults, but 
marked that difference in a different place than is done today. We turn now to consider 
contemporary conceptions of childhood. 
4.3 The concept of childhood 
Children are recognised throughout the world as being special, different from adults, 
and are often treated as such. They are not simply scaled-down or miniature versions of 
adults, but are human beings in their earliest stages of life, the nebulous period of which is 
termed 'childhood'. The word "child" is equally as vague as "childhood", referring broadly to 
people in all of their first and most of their second decade. The dichotomy of childhood and 
adulthood is sometimes trichotomised by adding infancy to the continuum, as all three 
stages vary greatly. The stages of childhood development have been more specifically 
categorised, varying between cultures. There are various legal and normative determinants 
of childhood which add to the diverse characterizations of childhood. There are, of course, 
many other conceptions of children and childhood. Victorian novels such as those by 
Charles Dickens often portrayed childhood as a virtual nightmare, as a dreadful stage that 
one was fortunate to survive. Dickens described the difficult, dangerous, and often loveless 
lives of children, particularly in the lower classes of eighteenth century England. 
Throughout history, conceptions of children and childhood have also differed, in 
addition to the aforementioned permutations. There appears, however, never to have been 
such a focus on the period of childhood as there is today. It is certainly not an invention of 
modernity, although Aries pointed out that conceptions of childhood changed dramatically 
during modernity; however childhood is very much an issue of our time. Childhood itself has 
become the focus of widespread examination and evaluation in many fields of study, rather 
than simply being seen as an element of the family, or of education, or even of society as a 
whole. 
We all have general understandings of what a child is, or represents, in our 
respective societies, necessarily so due to all of us having been one regardless of where or 
when, or to whom we were born. When we put forth the conception of childhood we must 
consider it from a variety of perspectives, in relation to other presuppositions surrounding 
the term. For example, in our Western liberal democratic society, a child is not necessarily 
understood, accepted, and treated in the same way as is a child in a third world country, or 
in another political, economical, or cultural environment. Nor would the conceptions 
necessarily be the same at different times in history, as the later discussion will illuminate. 
The length of childhood, or how long one remains a child, varies, as does the nature or 
qualities which distinguish children from adults, and also the significance or importance of all 
of these differences (Archard, 1993). The implications of those variations are significant 
when we wish to examine other related issues, such as the treatment of children because of 
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normative commitments. For example, the education for children, or the lack thereof, will be 
affected directly by what society feels is appropriate for its citizens. 
While the distinction between the concept of childhood and conceptions of childhood are 
relatively clear, and we can be relatively certain that most, if not all, societies have always 
recognised the concept of childhood, conceptions of childhood differ more dramatically. A 
variety of claims have been made regarding the duration of childhood (the length), its nature 
or the qualities distinguishing childhood from adulthood, and its significance in relation to 
these differences (Archard, 1993). Three basic respects in which conceptions of childhood 
may differ between societies and cultures have been identified by Archard (1993) as 
boundaries, dimensions, and divisions. 
4.3.1 Boundaries of childhood 
The point at which childhood ends is the boundary of childhood. That there is an 
end means there must be a beginning as well. These boundaries have been contested in a 
variety of contexts. The issue of when personhood begins is certainly pertinent to 
discussions of abortion, but is not a crucial component of this discussion which focuses on 
identifying the differences between childhood and adulthood. Conceptions are not absolute, 
and thus the upper limits of childhood, and when the child becomes an adult, are vague and 
open to variance. Many cultures have an age of majority which stipulates that boundary, and 
thus the law draws the important distinction of when an individual becomes legally 
responsible for his or her actions (Archard, 1993). 
In modern times, we assign "age" to people, a number which matters from the time 
of birth, and we tend to categorise people in relation to those chronological boundaries. For 
instance-depending on the jurisdiction-at 6-years of age one begins formal education, at 
16 one may become licensed to drive a car, at 16 enter the army, at 18 one may marry or 
vote, and at 18, 19, or sometimes even at 21, one may buy alcohol. The age of majority is 
18-years in many nations, and the United Nations defines a child as one under the age of 
18-years. Thus an 18-year old is considered an adult under these definitions. This is 
paradoxical, as it is possible for an individual to be a parent, married, and a soldier on active 
duty defending one's country, and yet be classified legally as a "child". In the United States, 
individuals who are found guilty of murder committed below the age of 18-years may even 
be sentenced to death. This is in contravention to the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of the Child (1989). The early years of the educational system tends to be organised 
fairly strictly according to chronological age: rarely maya five-year old be allowed to start 
school when the age has been set at six; children in each class are almost always very 
close to the same age. Notions of "social promotion" have shown the importance placed on 
keeping children with their cohort rather than separating them according to ability and 
progression. 
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In addition to chronological age, biological determinants affect age considerations of 
individuals. The medical community classifies the human body in terms of physiological age, 
which includes evaluations such as skeletal or bone age (Malina, 1989). These may differ 
from the established chronological age. For instance, girls are increasingly reaching puberty 
at an early age (Qaadri, 2002). Causes of early puberty may be genetic, but more often they 
are being attributed to environmental contaminants and obesity. Estrogen-like chemicals 
found in hormone-treated beef, sunscreens, pesticides, plastics, and nail polish, and the 
increased numbers of fat cells found in obese individuals act as estrogen factories, all 
factors which may hasten the onset of puberty (Qaadri, 2002). When a child reaches early 
puberty, she may have a physiological age which is advanced of her chronological age. This 
may be manifested by the development of breasts, widening thighs and hips, a growth spurt, 
and the onset of menstruation. Other factors may also contribute to advanced bone age. For 
example, one of the components of the female athlete triad (American Association of 
Pediatrics, 2000c) is decreased bone density, which may lead to osteoporosis. Thus the 
bones may be identified as being at a more advanced bone age than chronological age. For 
instance, in an article entitled "Young athletes with old bones", a 15-year old ballet dancer 
complaining of shin pain was discovered to be in the early stages of osteoporosis. She 
presented with a classic case of the female athlete triad (Stedman, 1999). 
Sport age is another classification of age introduced by Kirby (1986), applicable 
mainly within the world of high-performance sport. She found that chronological age is not a 
useful indicator when considering the average chronological ages of children who are at 
their performance peak in different sports. For example, in gymnastics and figure skating 
generally peak at far younger ages than do women in rowing or basketball. Kirby notes that 
these average peak ages are so noticeable and marked that some sports recruit athletes 
retiring from sports with younger peak ages. For example, a number of divers are former 
gymnasts, and some gymnasts have become coxswains. Kirby's concept of sport age 
allows for a more accurate comparison of athlete development between sports which allows 
for a consideration of performance development in relation to the age of the athlete when 
peak performance is expected (Kirby, 1986). Sport age is a gender-sensitive concept, since 
the chronological age of a male and female gymnast would be meaningless in trying to 
assess their relative performance levels. Sport age would allow a more accurate 
assessment to compare performance potential, and may also be used as a mechanism for 
identifying and assessing periods of highest risk of sexual abuse of young athletes in a 
variety of sports (Brackenridge and Kirby, 1997). 
Normative boundaries may be established by cultures in rites of passage and 
initiation ceremonies which may signal the end of childhood and the beginning of adulthood. 
These may be at the time of puberty, or later. Variations of such ceremonies include the 
Bar'mitzvah, circumcision or female genital circumcision (or "mutilation", as it has become 
increasingly viewed), and marriage. With children, notably girls, reaching puberty as far 
younger ages than in the past is an important consideration with regard to such ceremonies, 
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as a rite of passage from childhood at the age of eight is far more significant than at the age 
of 13-years, for instance. 
That different conceptions of childhood have different boundaries is an important 
part of criticisms levelled at Aries. An important distinction may be made between failing to 
mark a distinction between childhood and adulthood, and marking such a distinction in the 
wrong place (Archard, 1993). Non-modern societies may be charged with failing to include 
as children those persons typical Western liberal societies deem as being children. For 
example, in the normative rites of passage in some cultures mentioned earlier, puberty 
attained at the age of eight or nine for girls, and slightly older for boys, signals the end of 
childhood, whereas in most "modern" societies, persons at those ages remain well within 
the boundaries of persons who are considered to be children, and are treated as such. 
Aries saw these cultures as lacking a concept of childhood for failing to recognise these 
differences, whereas Archard considers those cultures rather as having different 
conceptions of childhood. 
4.3.2 Dimensions of childhood 
There are several perspectives from which childhood may be examined, particularly 
in identifying differences between childhood and adulthood (Archard, 1993). For example, 
moral or juridical perspectives could judge person incapable-by virtue of their age-of 
being held responsible for their actions. From an epistemological or metaphysical 
perspective, individuals could be seen as being deficient in adult reason and knowledge, by 
virtue of their immaturity. From the political perspective, such young persons could be 
viewed as incapable of contributing towards and participating in the organisation and 
management of their communities. Such dimensions are valued by our societies and play an 
important role in moderns conceptions of childhood (Archard, 1993). 
Two further important examples of dimensions of childhood described by Archard 
(1993) which do not allow for a consistent and absolute definition of childhood are 
procreation and self-sustainment. While a child may be physically capable of procreation at 
puberty, he or she is not necessarily an adult from the epistemological or metaphysical 
viewpoint. Even though a girl of ten may be physically capable of bearing her own children, 
she may be entirely incompetent to independently sustain herself and her child in modern 
society. One way of dealing with such inconsistency is to consider a child to cease being a 
"sexual" child while remaining a "legal" child to the age of majority. 
In contrast, another way of dealing with this inconsistency is to consider a particular 
dimension as being consistent with all others, so that "the point at which a given conception 
deems childhood to end has a notional or virtual status" (Archard, 1993, p. 25). Thus, the 
boundary of a given conception of one aspect of childhood may be extended to another 
dimension. For example, when a child give birth to a baby in Canada, she is understood to 
be the mother of that child and is therefore legally competent to make decisions regarding 
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the welfare of that baby. By generalising from one criterion for adulthood being attained by a 
child to assuming then that all criteria have been fulfilled is risky, even dangerous. 
Confusion between whether an individual is an adult or a child sometimes exists in 
particular environments. Highly talented and accomplished child athletes and other child 
prodigies are often viewed as adults, simply because of their astounding athletic talents and 
accomplishments. Skater Jaimee Eggleton said that sport forced him to grow up very fast: 
"You learn how to deal with politics and with people. So you're beyond your years that way, 
but you've very immature in others" (Smith, 1997, p. 236). Many athletes have been so 
focused on their sporting careers that they have not experienced and learned what Smith 
calls "worldwide street smarts". When the athlete leaves his or her training environment, "all 
of a sudden they're in the real world and bang. It's hard for them. It's hard for them to fit in 
with everyday, normal people" (Smith, 1997, p. 236). 
This may happen to other child prodigies outside sport, such as musicians. These 
children are then treated as adults rather than as children (Roberts, 1986), which may be 
harmful as they often still require guidance and protection. Violinist Midori, a former 
"wunderkind" who continues to perform at the highest levels, recalls being told by the press 
when she was still very young that child prodigies never succeed when they grow up, 
"Imagine a child being told she's going to fail. It was pretty terrible" (Anson, 1997, p. R3). 
Clearly they failed to recognise the kind of damage such statements could inflict on a child. 
Midori started taking lessons at the age of four, and performed with the New York 
Philharmonic in 1982, when she was only 11 years old. Midori was a child working in the 
adult world, and adults were unsure or ignorant of how perceive and behave towards her. 
Ukrainian figure skater Oksana Baiul's experiences after the Olympics turned her 
into what journalist Christine Brennan calls "sport's most poignant cautionary tale" (1988, p. 
195). She won the World Championships at the age of 15, and went on to win the gold 
medal at the 1994 Olympic Games, which earned her millions of dollars in endorsements 
and bonuses. She turned professional right after the Olympics, and continued earning 
millions of dollars. She was only 16-years old, and an orphan, with no adult guidance 
(Brennan, 1998). After her triumph in Lillehammer, "Baiul went on a joyride through life. She 
moved to America, got rich, bought a $450,000 house in Connecticut, dyed and cut her hair, 
bought new clothes, did photo shoots, changed her hair color again, left her coach, dumped 
her old friends, hung out with new friends-and occasionally practiced her skating" 
(Brennan, 1998, p. 194). Kristi Yamaguchi, 1992 Olympic gold medallist, said that when she 
got out of hand, her family was the first to bring her back to reality; "unfortunately, Oksana 
doesn't have that source of fam ily" (Brennan, 1998, p. 194). After she left the intense 
demands of training and competing at the highest levels of her sport, she began living 
dangerously. She suffered a serious injury seven months after her Olympic triumph, but 
refused to take time off to heal. She continued performing in skating shows, but her 
performances suffered. She fell in every show, and within a year of winning her Olympic 
medal, "skaters and coaches wrote her off. As a competitor, they said, she was finished" 
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(Brennan, 1998, p. 196). She soon became an alcoholic, and had a nervous breakdown. 
She lost control of her life, jeopardising her skating and her future-all by the age of 17. The 
spiral continued, and she continued to risk her health and career. Fortunately, after being 
charged with drunk driving at 19 (and being two years below the legal age drinking age in 
Connecticut), she ended up in a rehabilitation centre. Counselling helped her mature and 
cope with the pressures and stresses of celebrity with its fame and fortune. She had been 
viewed and treated as an adult and not as the child who desperately needed care and 
nurturance, and she was not yet mature enough to handle the demands of her sudden life 
change. 
Tennis player Jennifer Capriati experienced similar trials. She turned professional at 
the age of 13, and was overwhelmed with the sudden fame and fortune-and accompanying 
pressure and stress-of earning millions of dollars for her performances. She also lost 
control of her life; after being charged with drug possession and shoplifting, she dropped out 
of tennis. After several years of counselling and guidance, she was fortunate in being able to 
return to her accomplished tennis career. Like Oksana, Jennifer was viewed and treated as 
an adult before she was com petent and reasonable enough to cope with the pressure and 
demands of the adult world. Sport psychologist Julie Anthony, also a former professional 
tennis player, believes that the increasing trend in women's tennis towards developing 
younger and younger champions is actually developing "idiot savants" (Kennedy, 1997). 
Anthony commented that 
Tennis has become big business, and these kids are under pressure to play more 
tournaments and bring in more money. You wind up with children travelling all over 
the world looking very sophisticated, often supporting their parents, when in fact 
they are still children and very vulnerable. (Kennedy, 1997) 
That children are working contradicts modern conceptions of childhood, but that their work 
supports their family is a further incongruity. At 16, Martina Hingis earned $10 million from 
her clothing contact with Sergio Tacchini, and her earnings paid for the house she shares 
with her mother (Kennedy, 1997). At 19 years of age in 2000, Hingis earned $4 million in 
prize money, and the same in endorsements (Wertheim, 2001). Winning a Grand Slam 
event on the professional women's tennis tour can earn players astronomical amounts of 
money. The youngest American (she has since changed her nationality to French) to turn 
professional, tennis player Mary Pierce earned $610,000 for winning the French Open in 
2000 (Duncan, 2000). In the doubles event, Pierce and Hingis each won close to $100,000. 
At the age of 25, Pierce's career earnings are estimated at $5.5 million, and she may earn 
an additional $20 million in sponsorship deals. 
Very few adults ever earn that kind of money, let alone children. However, some 
elite athletes do earn such vast sums for victories, and many earn additional money from 
sponsorship deals. In 1999, baseball player Roberto Alomar signed a four-year contract with 
a professional team for $20 million (Duncan, 2000). Such lucrative winnings and 
endorsements may certainly influence parents into enter their children into sport at younger 
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ages, and pressure the youngsters to succeed. Melanie Molitor, mother of Martina Hingis, 
says in response to such allegations, "People say that I ruined Martina's childhood and that I 
only want the money and to satisfy myself ... that's not true. I pursued this so Martina could 
have a chance in life" (Kennedy, 1997). There is no question that Martina was set for a 
career in tennis; she says of her mother, "Since I was in her stomach, she was thinking I was 
going to be a great tennis player. ... in the beginning she wanted it more than I did" 
(Kennedy, 1997). By the age of two, Molitor was hitting tennis balls to Martina, who was 
playing with a sawed-off wooden racquet. At 12, Hingis won the under-18 junior division of 
the French Open. While she was generally viewed as being very well adjusted to the world 
of professional tennis since turning pro at the age of 14, and admired for her poise and 
grace with the media, the public was reminded that she was still a child playing in an adult 
world. At the French Open in 1999, she had a very public temper tantrum after losing to 
Steffi Graf, and had to be escorted back onto the court for the awards by her mother. After 
that tournament, Hingis parted briefly from her coach-mother but returned to her after a 
period of what many would consider normal teenage rebellion. Unfortunately, Hingis had to 
endure the world's attention, and its attendant stress and pressure while trying to work out 
the relationship with her mother. Many teenagers experience similar angst, yet only a few 
have to go through it with such media attention. Journalist Stephen Brunt commented upon 
Hingis' return with her renewed confidence, 
Back to being a pro, to being the best and to being unflappable and steady and the 
same player week to week to week. Maybe that little glitch was childhood. Maybe it 
was adolescence. Maybe it was the last time that Hingis will ever seem like a kid. 
(Brunt, 1999, S1) 
Brunt suggests that "In the real world, it probably ought to be viewed as remarkable that 
Hingis and the other child-athlete bread winners on the women's tennis circuit don't all grow 
up to be axe murderers" (Brunt, 1999, S1). Brunt believes that no other sport "feeds on the 
young" the way tennis does. He comments that no other professional sports have 15-year 
old athletes, although he acknowledges the "kiddie corps in gymnastics" but comments that 
"they're not doing it for money and they're not being trotted out around the globe, week after 
week, often as the meal ticket for their entire family" (Brunt, 1999, S1). The Women's Tennis 
Association chief executive officer, Bart McGuire, admits that there are some issues with 
such young children earning these unbelievable amounts of money: 
If you have both parents who have given up their jobs and are living off the earnings 
of a player on the tour, the pressure gets to be a concern .... Implicit in the 
relationship is the fact that if you don't practise for a few days, we don't eat. 
(Brunt, 1999, S1) 
The results of such situations are sometimes frightening. When the livelihoods of parents, 
coaches, and other adults depend on the performances and achievements of children, the 
young athletes' interests, health, and welfare may be compromised. Parents sometimes lose 
all perspective, and seem to forget or ignore that their children are children first, and athletes 
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second. Confusion over appropriate parenting may lead to exploitation and abuse of their 
own children. 
In an article about tennis player Mary Pierce entitled "Turning professional? It was 
my father's decision", journalist Andrew Duncan recounts how, in 1993, Pierce's "despotic" 
father was forcibly removed by seven men from the Roland Garros tournament in Paris 
because of inappropriate behaviour (Duncan, 2000). Her father is called "the ultimate tennis 
dad from hell" for having "threatened, bullied and physically beat her to "develop" her talent" 
(Duncan, 2000, p. 10). He was banned by the Women's Tennis Association from attending 
all future matches. Signs with his photograph were posted at tournaments, reading "This 
man is banned from the grounds. Stop him from entering if possible. However, if sighted he 
must not be challenged but control must be informed" (Duncan, 2000, p. 10). After her 
parents divorced, Jim Pierce sued for part of Mary's winnings, and called her a "prima donna 
bitch without integrity", and was stabbed in a fight with her minder. Pierce claims, however, 
that she bears few emotional scars or stitches from the years of physical and emotional 
abuse she suffered from her father while growing up and becoming a tennis star (Powell, 
2000). 
Powell (2000) calls the abusive behaviour of fathers "Tennis Dad Disease". He says 
Jelena Dokic, another young player, is somehow surviving despite the actions of her 
father-also her coach-who also suffers from "Tennis Dad Disease". Like Jim Pierce, 
Damir Dokic has also been banned from a number of tournaments such as Wimbledon and 
the U.S. Open for inappropriate behaviour such as fighting, drunkenness, and shouting and 
swearing at umpires and other match officials. He can neither coach nor spectate at these 
and other tournaments, and has also been denied Olympic accreditation. After an article 
appeared in the Australian Tennis magazine suggesting that her father needed 
psychological help to control his volatile temper, her father sent Jelena to Belgrade to apply 
for a Yugoslav passport (Independent, 2000). He claimed it was too dangerous for his family 
to continue living in Australia. The family left their native Yugoslavia in 1994 for Australia, 
where they became Australian citizens, and now they are reapplying for Yugoslav 
citizenship. Anecdotal reports abound of other so-called "tennis dads from hell", who pushed 
their children from very young ages. Jennifer Capriati's father is said to have made her do 
sit-ups in her cot! (Barnes, 1997). 
Another example of confusion over conceptions of children: a former elite level 
gymnast and now gymnastics judge spoke out at a recent conference on talented children in 
sport in Toronto in 2001. She told of the lack of athlete representation for female gymnasts 
within the governing body of the sport, as the athletes were considered too young to travel 
unaccompanied across Canada to meetings in Ottawa. The irony is that these young 
athletes are sent all over the world to gymnastics competitions by the very governing body 
which objects to their attending and participating as athlete representatives for their sport, 
among the governing officials of their sport. 
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A conception of childhood determines the criteria which are considered significant in 
differentiating between children and adults. Such criteria form the basis for a relatively clear 
boundary to childhood. The selection of these criteria are dependent on broad value-
judgment (Archard, 1993). For instance, if rationality is identified as the distinctive and 
unique attribute of human beings, then it follows that the acquisition of reason is considered 
a fundamental criterion of maturation. It may also be the case that prevailing social priorities 
inform the differentiation criteria between childhood and adulthood. Thus, in a society where 
basic survival and reproduction is paramount, then the ability to be self-sustaining and earn 
a living, and bearing children would be clear criteria for marking maturity. 
4.3.3 Divisions of childhood 
The third element of Archard's (1993) view on how conceptions of childhood differ 
from adulthood is in its divisions. The broader notion of childhood may be sub-divided into a 
number of different stages. Most cultures, if not all, identify the period of infancy 
characterised by complete dependency and extreme vulnerability. Most contemporary 
cultures recognise the great importance of these very early years, although Aries' views of 
infancy-on the modern conception-see this stage extending from birth to about the age of 
seven-years. Non-Western cultures view weaning as a stage of great significance since it 
tends to make the point at which the infant becomes replaced as "the object of great 
maternal attention" since weaning often occurs during the next pregnancy of the mother 
(Archard, 1993, p. 26). The stage at which a child learns to speak is considered a milestone 
in other cultures. For instance, Roman law identified three phases of childhood: first, infantia 
was the stage when the infant was unable to speak; second, tutela impubers was the stage 
before puberty, when the child had a tutor, and; third, cura minoris followed puberty but 
preceded adulthood, when the child had not yet attained the age of majority and still 
required a guardian (Archard, 1993). 
Archard (1993) believes that there are two distinct ways in which to understand 
childhood. One is a broad view that accepts childhood to be an all-encompassing term 
which covers the period from birth to adulthood. The terms of infancy, adolescence, and 
others may be used by a culture to form sub-categories within this broad period. The other 
view, somewhat narrower, is that childhood is the middle ground between infancy wherein 
the individual is entirely helpless and dependent for his or her very survival on others, and 
adolescence where the individual lies just before the threshold of competence and self-
sufficiency, or adulthood. This view sees infancy as a relatively long period, perhaps up to 
the age of about six or seven years. The in-between period of "childhood" proper views the 
"child" on the continuum after infancy, but before adolescence (Archard, 1963). 
Adolescence, first recognised during the nineteenth century (Aries, 1962), is a key 
period in the modern conception of childhood. It may be argued, in opposition to what Aries 
believes, that there was earlier recognition of "youth" as an age of apprenticeship for 
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adulthood. Archard believes that adolescence, with its characteristic psychological qualities 
and social significance, is a particularly modern construct. The term refers to those 
individuals in the period just before adulthood, who have moved beyond the early stages of 
infancy and childhood. 
The stage of childhood may be understood as the middle years between infancy 
and adolescence, roughly between the ages of six and twelve. The earliest years, right after 
infancy, characterise an individual who is beginning to think about him or herself and the 
world in important new ways as he or she begins to gradually acquire qualitatively higher 
cognitive competence. The latest part of childhood is the stage where the individual is at or 
close to puberty. Here the child is more accurately described as a young person who is 
looking towards the next phase of development. 
In summary, conceptions of childhood vary according to where its boundaries are 
set, the way its dimensions are ordered, and how divisions are managed (Archard, 1993). 
Such conceptions will determine the thoughts about and treatments of children within the 
notion of childhood. The identification and adoption of anyone conception over another is 
dependent on prevailing social beliefs, assumptions, and priorities. Sometimes the way in 
which boundaries, dimensions, and divisions of childhood interrelate may case difficulties. 
There can be discrepancies, views may be ambiguous, and the weight of each area may be 
unbalanced. For example, a society that values winning in sport above all else may exploit 
and abuse its children through a confusion of divisions. Conceptions of childhood would 
circumscribe appropriate ways for children to be treated, and when the child enters into 
some realms of adulthood, people may forget that the sports star earning millions of dollars 
in prizes and endorsements, and being heralded as a hero by the world's media, is actually 
a child. The result is that the child may be harmed by such confusion. 
The conceptions of childhood as outlined above are based on the concept of 
childhood, that adults and children are different. Understanding the difference between the 
concept of childhood and the conception of childhood means that one understand that there 
may be different criteria in different societies which inform conceptions of childhood through 
varying values, priorities, and assumptions. The three basic aspects: boundaries, 
dimensions, and divisions in which conceptions of childhood may differ, determine how a 
culture thinks about the extent, nature, and significance of childhood. They represent the 
prevailing beliefs, assumptions, and priorities a society or culture holds about its children, 
but clearly affect societies' understanding and treatment of adults as well, since conceptions 
of neither adulthood nor childhood can be understood as social isolates. The dynamics of 
conceptions of childhood in any society may cause difficulties, revealed in practical utility, or 
normative commitments. Some individuals may reach the thresholds of each aspect at 
different times: the physiological ability to procreate will most likely precede the political 
capacity to vote. When cultures mix, as they do in our increasingly multicultural society, 
conceptional variation will challenge the prevailing society's laws and customs. 
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4.3.4 Institutional and normative notions of childhood 
Different claims and understandings of conceptions of childhood have evolved over 
time and with various cultures. John Kleinig has divided the concept of childhood into two 
components, institutional and normative, whereas David Archard holds there to be three 
components to conceptions of childhood: its boundaries, dimensions, and divisions. 
The institutional concept is a legal or quasi-legal one usually defined in modern 
societies as chronological age; in other societies, it may be defined by rites of passage or 
puberty. Chronological age defines childhood in modern societies. It is understood in terms 
of age, and that under normal circumstances through the normal course of physiological 
development, children will grow up into adults. This notion is similar to Archard's (1993) 
separation of childhood into its boundaries. 
The normative concept of childhood is connected to certain capacities, particularly 
the acquisition of fundamentals such as knowledge and experience, and the possession of 
certain moral interests or reasonable expectations which may inform an individual's 
predicted behaviour at particular phases of development. Under the normative perspective, 
children are matched against a range of evaluative criteria such as physical, emotional, and 
intellectual maturity. Evaluation of these criteria are clearly subjective, and the implications 
of normative divisions are not as apparent as are institutional or chronological age divisions. 
That children are often cared for with great love and tenderness is not denied by 
Kleinig (1982). However, he puts forth that their inherent powerlessness and dependence 
has made them particularly vulnerable to oppression from others. Children do not have the 
same rights, freedoms, privileges, and immunities taken for granted by adults; they are 
denied freedom of movement; are compulsorily schooled and expected to obey adults under 
whose care they fall; they may be physically and otherwise assaulted within broad 
guidelines; they have little freedom or autonomy in their dress, nutrition, or activities; with 
whom they associate is closely directed by parents, educators, or other guardians deemed 
(without consultation) in loco parentium by some adult. Kleinig asks how one could justify 
this state of affairs. This question, however, is beyond the scope of this work and thus must 
wait for a further investigation. We shall focus instead on conceptions of childhood. 
4.4 Modern conceptions of childhood 
Conceptions of childhood are based on two elements. First, one must understand 
that children are different from adults. Second, one must also understand that there are a 
variety of criteria that inform that difference. Conceptions of childhood may differ from one 
society to another, and some conceptions may be contradictory; therefore there is no one 
particular clear and consistent conception of childhood. Modern conceptions of childhood 
are based on the values, priorities, and assumptions of a society, as well as what may be 
viewed as myths or cultural ideologies (Archard, 1993). The result of such combinations is 
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that the difference between the "real" conceptions of childhood and the symbolic conception 
of childhood becomes difficult to identify. 
4.4.1 Creation and separation 
The variety of theoretical understandings and cultural representations of children 
presents a spectrum of conceptions of children and of childhood. Modern conceptions-
modern in that they have been put forth only in the last several hundreds of years-are still 
evolving and changing. As cultures become more intertwined, conceptions become further 
amalgamised. Both literary and scientific conceptions, the latter the most recent, being only 
developed in any coherent manner within the last century, have viewed and presented the 
child as a distinct, separate being from the adult. It is the particular nature of children, with 
their constituent elements, which separates them. They neither work nor play with adults, 
and they do not participate in the adult worlds of government and politics. While they are 
"innocent" there is a sharp distinction with the "knowing" adult, and between the behaviour 
demanded of children and expected of adults (Archard, 1993). In other cultures, this 
distinction is not always as clear. 
Children in non-Western worlds are not necessarily exempt from responsibilities of 
contributing to their own, their family, and their community's existence, and their tasks are 
not unrelated to their size and abilities. Understandings of children and adults may not differ 
as dramatically as they do in typical Western nations. One particular understanding of such 
difference is illustrated in notions of work and play. In Western nations, modern 
understandings of children are those of individuals who play and do not work. Work and play 
exist on two ends of a continuum; play is synonymous with childhood, and work is 
synonymous with adulthood. Many societies expect their children to work, albeit in a 
relatively simply way. Older siblings are expected to supervise younger ones, as well as 
tend to animals. Children may carry water or gather firewood for cooking fires, chase away 
birds from crops, or run errands. As the child grows and develops, the tasks increase in 
magnitude. In Western societies, children typically do not work, although some families may 
encourage their children to help around the house, performing chores such as taking out the 
garbage and cutting the lawn. Children who grow up on farms often help to run the farm, 
with parents gradually increasing the complexity and demands of the tasks. While almost all 
work that children perform may be considered "forced" labour since rarely are children in a 
position to give their consent, and adults typically control all aspects of their lives (Donnelly, 
1997), these sorts of tasks are generally considered a healthy contribution to the children's 
development as children learn to take on responsibility for themselves and their families. 
Such a view changes when we turn to the issue of child labour. Child labour implies that 
children are being exploited or over-worked in environments that may be deleterious to their 
health and welfare, and they may be deprived of their rights to education (Donnelly, 1997). 
Child labour has attracted growing attention from such organisations as the United 
Nations, the American Academy of Pediatrics, among others. Free the Children is a 
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relatively new group in Canada founded by Craig Kielburger when he was a child himself. 
These organisations have raised the profile of issues of child labour, leading to increased 
awareness and concern about the negative effects children experience. For example, in 
recent years investigations of sport-giant Nike have revealed their garments and shoes are 
often made by children and women working in dangerous "sweatshops", and young children 
have been found to be making soccer balls for Adidas in third world countries. In the World 
Labour Report (1992), the International Labour Office has described some of the harms 
experienced by child labourers. These include bone and postural problems associated with 
spending long hours in awkward positions while weaving carpets, embroidering, and heavy 
lifting. Their eye-sight is often damaged by working 12 -14 hours at tasks that require close 
attention, such as embroidering, sewing, or other fine work. The hot and dirty working 
environments are often contaminated with pollutants from manufacturing processes. 
Sometimes safety guards are removed from machinery, if indeed there were any to begin 
with. 
Like Aries, Archard observes the most important feature of the modern conception 
of childhood to be that childhood is a separate world from adulthood. Different behaviour is 
expected from children than is expected from adults; they are treated differently from each 
other, and each have different roles and responsibilities. That children in high performance 
sport DO work and play with adults is somewhat problematic and inconsistent with this 
notion of childhood. SOCiologist Peter Donnelly (1997) has argued that children's 
involvement in high-performance sport ought to be viewed as sport labour, as the problems 
are similar or equivalent to those of child labour. While not all the problems experienced by 
children may be as harmful and damaging as those in child labour, some of them are, while 
others have many similar characteristics of such risky and dangerous practices. Also, many 
more children are involved in child labour than are in high-performance sport, although this 
does not negate the importance of child protection in any environment. Donnelly (1997) 
suggests the application of child labour laws to sport might address and move towards 
resolving many of the problems associated with the health and welfare of children in high-
performance sport. This issue is addressed elsewhere in this work. 
Returning to the notion of the separateness of childhood and adulthood, it seems 
quite clear that there is a generally accepted view that children are very different beings 
from adults. What separates the twentieth century view from earlier ones is the breadth and 
depth of the knowledge we have now about the nature of children. "What the present age 
knows all about is what it is to be at the stage of an in the state of childhood" (Archard, 
1993, p. 30). 
Over the last one to two hundred years, children have been examined in the 
disciplines of psychology, biology, medicine, educational theory, and sociology, among 
others. Childhood as a stage of development is the dominant notion of childhood. 
Developmental psychologists view childhood as one stage on the continuum polarizing the 
child with the adult, understanding the child as a sort of "unfinished" or "incomplete" adult 
75 
who moves towards "completion" having attained full adult capacities and characteristics 
(Archard, 1993). Traditional concepts of childhood tend to consider childhood as a primary 
stage, something one "outgrows" along the journey to adulthood. It may be seen as almost a 
type of pathology when thought of as "unfinished", preceding adulthood which is viewed as 
the "finished" stage of being. Moving from childhood to adulthood is associated with the 
acquisition of distinctive rights, as well as capacities such as autonomy and self-
determination, and is usually seen as an important and significant milestone in an 
individual's life. Children are everything that adults are not: they are lacking in the skills, 
capacities, and powers that adults possess. 
Whereas childhood may be understood as the absence of adulthood, an adult is 
generally considered to be one who is not a child, not possessing the childhood 
insufficiencies of physical, emotional, and intellectual maturity. The "ideal" adult, according 
to Archard (1993), is one who has certain cognitive abilities and capacities, one who is 
rational, physically independent, autonomous, has a sense of their own identity, and is 
aware on a conscious level of its beliefs and desires. Thus the adult is able to make free 
and informed choices for which he or she is held personally responsible. These capacities 
and dispOSitions allow an adult to be able to work for a living, be legally accountable for his 
or her actions, make sexual choices, and participate in choosing a government for the 
surrounding community (Archard, 1993). The adult must leave behind all that is childlike in 
order to survive and fit within the adult world, as such things are inappropriate to adult life. 
Adulthood is conceived of as the culmination of the development process, and the 
"complete" stage of life. 
That an adult must leave childhood and all things "child-like" behind when moving 
into adulthood is a reflection of the nature of the adult world. This illuminates what is bad 
about the real world; "It is good to be an innocent in an innocent world; it is a matter for 
regret but not self-condemnation that one cannot be an innocent in our world" (Archard, 
1993, p. 31). 
The significance of childhood in our Western society is more prominent that ever 
before, and this recognition warrants the worlds of children and adults to be separate and 
distinct. Never before has childhood lasted as long as it does today. With seemingly 
increasing views that the world at large is a "big bad place" with great potential to harm, 
children are more coddled and protected. For instance, the vast majority of children are 
driven or bussed to school; very few children walk to school, even in urban centres. The 
notion of the "good parent" is one who knows where his or her child is at all times, and thus 
rarely does one see children playing unsupervised. Schools have become increasingly 
vigilant about the safety and protection of students; exterior doors are often locked from the 
outside (but may be opened from within) as soon as classes start. Students may not be 
picked up by anyone not designated by parents on a special form for that purpose. Babies 
are foot-printed as soon as they are born for identification purposes. Parents are 
encouraged to maintain folders with recent photographs and fingerprints of their children in 
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case they go missing. Adult-organised, after-school programmes have grown in number to 
meet the demands of parents for adult-supervised activities for their children. Some of these 
programmes are academic in nature, whereas others are focused on a specific activity such 
as sport or art. Even at university, anecdotal reports from faculty members claim a marked 
increase in parental involvement with their children's affairs than seen in the past, and an 
apparent weakness of students to be autonomous and self-sufficient. Ironically, however, is 
that while childhood has been extended in length more than ever before, and children are 
increasingly coddled and protected, children are also been encouraged to grow up as 
quickly as possible. 
That children are being "hurried" to grow up fast is related to the changing world of 
adult society (Elkind, 1988). The last two decades have seen trends towards divorce, single 
parenting, two-parent working families, and blended families as the middle-class norm. Elkin 
suggests that the conception of children as growing and in need of adult nurture, protection, 
and guidance has become the source of parental anxiety and guilt. Parents are now facing 
pressures in their careers which may conflict with having and raising children. Other 
conflicts for parents may include new partners, loyalties to children from previous marriages, 
attempting to achieve and maintain an acceptable standard of living, and pressure to raise 
their children in accordance with the notion of children as in need of parental nurture. Even 
though many parents are living what he calls the "new lifestyle", Elkind suggests that these 
parents have remained invested in more traditional values of parental nurturing, and thus 
feel residual guilt about leaving their children in nurseries and daycare centres with 
strangers, particularly in the child's earliest years. Traditional values hold that young 
children ought to remain with at least one parent if they are to actualise their complete 
intellectual, personal, and social potential. In order to deal with this guilt, parents who have 
neither the time nor the energy for childhood but nevertheless love their children, have 
reconceptualised childhood as a period wherein the child is "competent to deal with, and 
indeed as benefiting from, everything and anything that life has to offer" (Elkind, 1988, p. 
xiii). 
The desires of parents to enhance the child's intelligence and give him or her a "leg 
up" on the competition has seen foetuses being regaled with music (preferably Mozart) and 
are read to daily (sometimes through a "Pregaphone", an invention which amplifies the 
parent's voices for the foetus), infants are spoken to not in "baby talk" but in regular adult 
language, and young children are shuttled between school, music lessons, art lessons, 
extra-curricular tutoring, and an array of sports. In the school system, students are 
increasingly attending school longer each day, and homework is being levied even in pre-
school. Every minute of their days are accounted for, as an idle child may "get behind" in the 
race towards adulthood. To best foster self-determination and creativity, It could be argued 
that children ought to be free to follow their own inclinations, but such organised and busy 
schedules of the modern child hinder their freedom to exercise their own resourcefulness 
and imagination. Physical, conceptual, and moral boundaries restrict the rovings of children, 
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justified by the prevailing ideologies of care, protection, and privacy (James et aI., 1998). 
These boundaries require children to be "organised" and "directed at all times, under the 
supervision of adults. In the modern world, these adults are rarely the child's parents but 
tend to be teachers, tutors, and coaches. When children spend approximately seven hours 
a day undergoing formal education, followed by several hours of extra-curricular activities 
, 
and if their weekends are filled with yet other activities like art classes and sports 
competitions, they end up spending very little time with their parents. One of the elements 
within modern conceptions of childhood is the notion that children and parents ought to 
spend more time together, yet in reality it seems they are actually spending less and less 
time together. The elite child athlete tends to spend even less time with their parents with 
the requisite travel, training, and competition demands of their sport. Some tend to spend all 
or most of their time in the company of adults, rather than with children their own age. For 
example, Martina Hingis has been coached by her mother, with whom she lived, trained, 
and travelled. The world of professional tennis has little if any room for children, and thus 
from at least the time she turned professional, Martina has lived in an adult world. 
Elkind suggests that Western society's new conception of children is epitomised in 
the metaphor of the "Superkid", and thus parents feel these "Superkid" children can be 
hurried along with impunity. This is the notion of "child competence" which is being 
encouraged: the younger the child learns to speak, to read, to speak another language, to 
recite their times tables, and so on, the better. Child stars are headlined, and thousands 
wish to emulate their accomplishments. For instance, a Six-year old girl was profiled in a 
Sports Illustrated magazine for becoming the youngest female ever to earn a black belt in 
karate (Alyssa Ann Rosati, 2001). While her favourite move is "the tornado kick", we are 
reminded that she is a child with her comment that her lucky breakfast is "Powderpuff Girls" 
cereal. 
Entrepreneurs have hurried to fill the demand of parents for both adult-supervised 
activities to protect their children, and also activities which support the notion of child 
competence. Elkind (1988) suggests that in some ways, these entrepreneurs have even 
exploited parental guilt and anxieties. Advertising tells parents that "children deserve every 
advantage" to help them survive in the increasingly competitive world, and asks parents 
"don't you owe them that much?" Such a conception of childhood with its unrelenting 
pressure towards child competence does not benefit children, and unduly stresses them 
(Elkind, 1988). 
The modern view of childhood as an extended stage prior to adulthood has 
demanded its own separate world (Archard, 1993). Such a view underpins society's 
practices and institutions, such as the disparate attribution of rights and responsibilities. The 
notion of children's rights is relatively new, with calls for the recognition of such rights going 
back only thirty years of so. The chapter on children's rights covers this area in great detail. 
In the past, adults were seen as having rights and responsibilities, whereas children were 
not. For the most part, children's rights still tend to be moral rights rather than legal rights, 
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although this is changing. While the United Nations has stipulated very clearly the kinds of 
rights children ought to have in its Convention on the Rights of the Child, such a document 
is not legally binding towards any nation, and serves more as a guideline. Archard cautions 
that it would be wrong to think that because a child inhabits a different world that it must also 
have a distinct set of characteristics which fit him or her for a different kind of life, since it 
may well be that children have separate natures because they are set apart and raised to 
act and think of themselves as different and separate from adults. He points out that "It is 
the separation of worlds that explains the separateness of natures, and not the latter which 
justifies the former" (Archard, 1993, p. 31). 
The sources of the view of childhood as a separate stage are both scientific and 
cultural. The science of psychology pursued the study of childhood, and concluded that it 
was essentially a stage in human development (Archard, 1993). After the normal course of 
events of childhood, maturity is attained by all persons, and is considered a valuable 
accomplishment. The attainment of the normative status of adulthood is a biologically driven 
process through the child learns from experience and environment. 
Whereas childhood is viewed as a stage, adulthood is the culmination and goal of 
the developmental process undergone by children. While childhood is separate and distinct 
from adulthood, the two concepts necessarily inform each other: "The needs and interests of 
childhood, and the value accorded to them are relative to those of adulthood" (Archard, 
1993, p. 36). Adulthood is seen to be attained when all elements of childhood are left 
behind. An adult is one who has achieved maturity, physically, intellectually, and 
emotionally, and is "defined by the possession of properties which clearly and distinctly 
separate it from childhood" (Archard, 1993, p. 36). Maturity is understood in two ways, first 
as a desired end state of childhood, and second, as a description of physical age. Even 
though adulthood is seen as the end of childhood, it is not a distinct concept with strict 
boundaries. It is a process of "continual becoming, a never-completed maturing" (Archard, 
1993, p. 36).There is no guarantee that an adult will achieve the qualitative state of maturity, 
as sometimes the characteristics of childhood are retained, and may appear in various 
degrees at various times throughout an individual's life. 
The modern Western conception of adulthood as a state of being along the 
continuum originating in infancy, and progressing through childhood, and it is defined 
opposite childhood. Archard notes that if adulthood is defined as a process of continual 
becoming, then it is not possible to set a clear demarcation between it and childhood since, 
"if adulthood is a never-realised goal towards which one is forever maturing childhood is not 
obviously an inferior stage which is left behind at once and completely" (Archard, 1993, p. 
37). In sum, the dominant notion of childhood remains a separate world, away from which 
adults strive towards maturity in every dimension. That treating an adult as though he or she 
were a child is considered prima facie wrong in most circumstances illustrates a further 
dimension of childhood, and that is it is somehow conceived of as an inferior stage which is 
left behind as soon as possible, and forever (Schapiro, 1999). 
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4.4.2 Ideals: Childhood as innocence 
Christianity imbued a confusing and somewhat contradictory image of childhood. 
Children are considered pure and nearest to God, whereas adults are seen as furthest from 
him (Archard, 1993). The child is pure and innocent of evil, whereas the adult who wishes 
to become pure again must reclaim the state of childhood. The notion of purity in these 
ideals are based on ignorance: "the innocent do not sin because they do not know how to. 
The child cannot be tempted because it has no understanding of wrongdoing" (Archard, 
1993, p. 37). Thus, the notion of purity and innocence of the child is somewhat empty. 
Polarized with this view of the child as moral purity is the view of the child as having 
inherited the inherent sinfulness of man: the child is born with Original Sin. The child, under 
this conception, is seen as inherently bad, correctable only by a rigid disciplinary upbringing. 
Literature has illustrated the model of the innocent child as polarized with that of the 
evil child. Children are angelic and innocent, uncorrupted by the world they have entered, 
and have a natural goodness and clarity of vision. The Romantics, particularly Blake and 
Wordsworth, celebrated the original innocence of childhood in their prose, with Blake 
contrasting evil with the innocence in his Songs of Innocence and Songs of Experience. The 
view of innocence slipped (Archard uses "deteriorated") later in the Victorian period into an 
air of sentimentality and nostalgia. Charles Dickens juxtaposed the frailty and vulnerability of 
children against the harshness and brutality of English life, particularly so for the poor. 
Archard (1993) views the English literary exploration of childhood as being an exploitation of 
childhood, in that it has been used as a symbol for what is considered to be missing from, 
and degenerate about, adulthood. The innocence of childhood is a false one, based on 
nostalgia, sentimentality, and a regretful sense of loss on the part of adults. Incompetence 
ought not to be confused with innocence. 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau believed that a" creatures are born good, but as they enter 
the world, humanity corrupts them by interfering with their inherent goodness and spreading 
evil. Rousseau wanted to be rid of a" concepts of original sin and argued that instead of 
trying to beat children into goodness, it might be a better idea to recognise and value the 
special and intrinsic values they hold. Through Emile, Rousseau promoted the child to the 
status of person. He raised the issue of the child's particularity, that a child was a specific 
class of being with needs and desires and even rights, separate from other beings, namely 
adults. Rousseau seems to have paved the way for contemporary society's concern about 
children as individuals. Rousseau brought attention to the needs of children, and persuaded 
many to believe that childhood was worthy of the attention of intelligent adults. He 
encouraged an interest in the process of development, rather than just being concerned with 
the end product. The education of children was also part of the interest in progress which 
was predominant in the inte"ectual trends of the time. 
At the turn of the twentieth century, Freud introduced what became highly influential 
views on children. He believed that they are not innocents, but rather libidinous creatures 
whose aberrant sexuality ought to be channelled in appropriate directions. Freud believed 
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also that anomalous adult behaviour can be explained by experiences from childhood. 
Freudian theory posits the child within the conception of childhood as a stage of becoming. 
The twentieth centuries' views of children have changed dramatically, although 
current conceptions have legacies rooted in the past. Children are recognised for their 
particularity, and not merely as collections of negative attributes or incomplete persons 
awaiting completion when they reach adulthood. It is important to understand the 
significance of the reality that children have to live in a world which has been created by 
adults. Sociologists have urged parents and educators-those charged with raising 
societies' children-to do so while ensuring their state of pristine innocence remains unspoilt 
by the violence and ugliness that may surround them (James et aI., 1998). Also instilled in 
the adult-child relationship is the notion of responsibility, which must be reconciled with 
Rousseau's advocacy of freedom for the child. If it is the case that childhood innocence 
ought to be nurtured at all costs, then society must develop publicly recognisable standards 
regarding the treatment of children. All adults, regardless of whether they are parents or 
educators, must assume responsibility for children at the point where they recognize the 
child's intentionality and competence. This means that routine mistreatment of children can 
no longer be tolerated, however, children cannot simply be left to their own devices either 
(James et aI., 1998). Archard captures the modern conception of the child as "an innocent 
incompetent who is not but must become the adult" (1993, p. 41). Human development 
precedes regardless of ideals relating to maturity. The modern conception of the appropriate 
place for the child is as a separate and distinct ideology, one where the child cannot and 
does not share the rights and responsibilities of the adults. Children have been moved into 
the forefront of society's values and priorities, and are recognised as an investment in the 
future in terms of the reproduction of social order. 
4.5 Parenthood 
The role of a parent is to be the guardian or caretaker of one's children. As 
caretakers, parents are expected to protect their children's health (Blustein, 1982). They 
ought to develop the physical, emotional, and intellectual competences necessary to rational 
action, and are expected to nourish the child's self-esteem and self-confidence. Parents 
must prepare their children to take advantage of and responsibly exercise their rights and 
liberties as citizens, and, insofar as they are able, provide them with an environment 
conducive to maximising the educational, occupational, and other opportunities available to 
them in society (Blustein, 1982). Once children become adults, Jane English (1997) 
suggests that the relationship between parents and their children ought to be characterized 
by friendship based on mutuality. "The quantity of parental sacrifice is not relevant in 
determining what duties the grown child has" (English, 1997, p. 176). 
Children are not possessions or chattels of their parents. Parents should not use or 
objectify their children in any way. Kant argued that it is as rational beings that people exist 
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as ends in themselves. It is impermissible to treat a person as the means to the ends of 
others, and so it is impermissible for parents to treat their children as a means to their ends 
- to produce a high-performance athlete, for example. Treating a child as a commodity is to 
treat it with disrespect; it could be seen to be "using" it as the means to one's own ends. In 
Kantian terms, it is inappropriate to "use" a person, to treat "beings worthy of respect, as if 
they were worthy merely of use". When a parent trains their child from a very early age, 
before the child becomes self-determining, and the experience of such training forecloses 
the child's opportunity to formulate his or her own life plan, then the parent has wronged the 
child. Not only is it morally wrong to use a child as the means to the parents' ends, but 
Gibson (1995) suggests that it is morally wrong to have a child as a means to one's own 
ends. She claims that for a parent to have a child because of a desire to be the parent of a 
future prime minister or film star is to have a child for wrong, "selfish" or self-regarding 
reasons. To try to bring these desires into existence by deliberately forcing a child to follow 
a specific path-com petitive sport for instance, in order for them to become a high-
performance athlete-is to further compound the harmful consequences of such desires. 
Parental love is not supposed to be conditional upon the child having particular skills or 
talents, or characteristics. Children ought not to be evaluated in terms of their "instrumental 
value"; they ought to be valued regardless of their phYSical or psychological traits. Anderson 
(1990) writes "the most fundamental calling of parents to their children is to love them. 
Children are to be loved and cherished by their parents, not to be used or manipulated by 
them for merely personal advantage. Parental love can be understood as a passionate, 
unconditional commitment to nurture one's child, providing it with the care, affection, and 
guidance it needs to develop its capacities to maturity" (Anderson, 1990, p. 33). 
Reasons for having children may be judged morally desirable or undesirable, 
depending on the extent to which these reasons "enhance or detract form the possibility of 
forming a particular kind of relationship with that child" (Gibson, 1995, p. 238). She views 
one of the most important objectives of the parent-child relationship to be the nurturance of 
the child's sense of his or her own value, regardless of his or her value to any other person. 
4.5.1 Children and childhood as investments 
When parents enrol their children into organized, competitive sport at a very young 
age, and then pressure the child to achieve performance results to maximize their chances 
of success in professional sport, they will likely be overwhelmed with disappointment and 
frustration if the child is not interested in being an athlete. They may even use the argument 
that "Since we paid for your skating lessons, drove you to the rink all those years, and made 
such sacrifices, you owe it to us to continue ... and become a star and make lots of 
money ... " This kind of demand serves only to alienate affection between child and parent, 
as it shifts the justification for love to debts owed. The tuition paid, the time spent, the 
sacrifices made, "are depicted as investments for a return rather than done from love, as 
though the child's life goals could be "bought" (English, 1997, p. 177). 
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Determinants of a child's future include genetic factors, but these do not take into 
account interests and the child's individual personality and characteristics. Even if one or 
both parents are athletes, and raise their child in a sporting environment, there is no 
guarantee that the child will be interested sport, or in pursuing sport in a competitive 
manner. When parents have formed a life plan for their child, they will naturally restrict 
opportunities which are not part of their preconceived expectations. For example, for an 
elite child gymnast, music lessons or art classes are rarely possible with a 35 or 40 hour per 
week training schedule. 
When a child is raised specifically for his or her athletic prowess and earning 
potential, the child is commodified and treated as the means to the ends of the parents. 
Parents who believe that their child will become the next tennis sensation or hockey star, 
and therefore pay little or no attention to the child's education, and do not encourage the 
child to pursue other interests, are being negligent in their parental duties to prepare their 
child with the widest possible future. Children are not investments, and parents should not 
look at the time or money they spend on their children as a kind of financial investment, with 
the expectation that some day that time or money will payoff. When the expectations for 
performance objectives are high, the value of the child seems to be measured in terms of 
their sporting success, rather than for who they are as persons. Children need to be loved 
and valued for who they are, not for their skills, talents, or even their appearance. 
For some athletes, the sacrifices they made in their youth do end up with rewards. 
However, rewards do not always come in the form of money. After her final Olympic 
performance in 1996, American gymnast Kerri Strug is "enjoying what most elite gymnasts 
never do: a long-term financial return on the investment of a childhood" (Ryan, 2000, p. 
243). She went to university, she has started running, and spends her weekends making 
paid appearances or volunteering with charitable organizations. Not all athletes are as 
fortunate. If they did not pay attention to their education in their early years, then college or 
university is not always an option. Parents who focus their child's life in such a narrow 
direction restrict or foreclose the child's life to an open future. 
Children are not their parents' chattels. While the parents "produced" the child, the 
child is not a "product" in the same way a material possession may be considered. The 
interests of both the child and the parents may also be divergent, and sometimes even 
conflict. A child is also not simply "just" a child; life begins as an embryo, which is then born 
as an infant, and then progressively becomes an individual with its own rights and 
demands. The embryo begins life as wholly one with the mother, and moves towards not 
only a separate being, but potentially even an adversarial one. The parents are guardians of 
the child, and they are also providers of life prospects. Ruddick (1979) proposes that 
parenthood is now largely a matter of choice, rather than a biological or cultural fate for 
women. He suggests that their "productive aims may be reproductive, in the service of 
continuing some aspect of their own lives through their children" (p. 125). Somehow we 
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need to manage parents' desires and children's needs within a framework that can direct 
parental actions with a minimum of regret, resentment, or legal enforcement. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the various views of historical and modern conceptions 
of childhood. It has relied heavily on David Archard's thoughts on children and childhood. 
His philosophical conceptions have focused on philosophical differences between the 
worlds of children and adults, and thus serve as a valuable foundation for the consideration 
of children's participation in the adult world of high-performance sport. 
In sum, there is no universal conception of childhood, although almost all cultures 
have a concept of childhood in that they view children as being different from adults. The 
dominant modern notion of childhood in western nations has been created by different 
theoretical understandings and cultural representations. Childhood is a period of 
incompetence, defined by limited cognitive capacities, irrationality, physical dependency, 
and deficiencies in the capacities, skills, and powers of adulthood. It is a stage of human 
development located on the continuum between the wholly dependent stage of infancy and 
the completely independent sphere of adulthood, seen as the culmination of development. 
Whereas adults are thought to be autonomous, to have a sense of identity, are conscious of 
their beliefs and desires, and are able to make free and informed choices for which they can 
be held personally responsible, children are not. The child is viewed in a negative series of 
inabilities and insufficiencies. The significance of childhood in the modern Western world is 
more discernible than for our previous societies, or perhaps for other cultures. The extent of 
childhood in our time is also longer than that at any other time in history, being a distinct, 
extended stage before adulthood. Our culture's practices and institutions have deeply 
embraced, normalised, and institutionalised this view of childhood, and to this kind of 
embeddedness we may characterises the underpinning of differential attributions of rights 
and responsibilities to children and adults. 
The modern conception has been influenced by literature over the last two hundred 
years or so, and science for roughly one hundred years. The concept of childhood is shared, 
as it recognises children as having a unique nature and inhabiting a separate world. The 
passage of childhood to adulthood is often viewed in a nostalgic and wistful manner, as in 
order to reach and survive in the adult world, children have to leave behind much of what 
defined their world. The modern child then is an innocent incompetent who is not yet an 
adult, but must become one through the realities of physical development and the ideal 
character of maturity. 
This chapter has discussed a number of the problems faced by children who 
necessarily inhabit the adult world. In high-performance sport, the inherent nature of 
children as incompetent and vulnerable to abuse and exploitation may be overlooked or 
ignored. It is imperative that those working with children in all environments recognise the 
needs of children, and react to care for and protect children from all kinds of harm. 
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Sometimes they may even require protection from themselves, as children do not always 
have the experience and knowledge for their own personal protection. We turn now to 
consider the philosophical notion of paternalism in the next chapter. 
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5.0 Chapter Five: Paternalism 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter on paternalism follows the chapter outlining conceptions of children 
and childhood, which served to contextualise the nature of children in the environment of 
elite sport within society's more general conception of children. In this chapter, I will 
consider the varieties and understandings of paternalism, and outline several justifications 
of paternalism, such as harm and consent. Within high-performance sport, athletes in 
general and child-athletes in particular are treated paternalistically by parents and coaches 
and also by others involved in the sport. That paternalism serves ostensibly to protect 
children from harm and to promote their interests, including the promotion of their future 
autonomy. This is an important discussion relating to children's participation in high-
performance sport. As outlined in the previous chapter, children are by their nature 
vulnerable to harm, and require protection from others. While paternalism is often 
considered inappropriate for adults, it is an integral component of the child-adult 
relationship. In the world of elite sport, however, paternalism interventions may become 
exploitative and abusive, which is morally problematic. I propose a form of autonomy-
respectful paternalism for elite sport children that will promote their best interests in both the 
short and the long term. 
When someone interferes with the decisions or actions of another person, to either 
promote that person's interests or to protect him or her from harm, and without the person's 
consent, then that individual is being treated paternalistically. Often the individual being 
paternalistic has some kind of power or authority over the individual who is being 
"paternalised". For example, a coach may make a decision for an athlete that the coach 
believes is in the athlete's best interest. Parents treat their children paternalistically, which 
alludes to the origin of the term "paternalism" - to treat another in the manner of a parent. 
Paternalism may be justified when individuals are unable to make rational and 
autonomous choices for themselves. Not only is paternalism directed towards children 
justified, but children are generally thought to actually require paternalism. As discussed in 
the chapter on children and childhood, children are characterised by their temporary state of 
incompetency and irrationality. They are still developing their cognitive capacities to make 
good decisions with the information they have of themselves and of the world around them, 
and are learning to be self-sustaining and self-determining. As they learn about themselves 
and about others, and the interaction of the two worlds, their emotional inconsistency 
sometimes results in unpredictable and widely ranging decisions, some of which may be 
harmful and autonomy-restricting. 
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5.2 The nature and scope of paternalism 
Present political and philosophical circumstances in western liberal democracies are 
such that paternalism of any kind is considered abhorrent. When governments attempt to 
curtail the freedom of citizens, and even when such interference is in the interests of 
individuals but against their will, intrusion is resisted. The American Constitution declares 
explicitly that life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are among the most important 
aspects of citizenship. The view that the value of individual liberty is absolute is reflected on 
the New Hampshire license plates that read "Live Free or Die". While the United States 
declares those values quite overtly, freedom has long been one of the most important 
values for people all over the world, and many have struggled to retain autonomy over their 
own lives. This struggle from undue interference by the state continues today in many 
nations in the world. For example, as in China where, among other individual liberties, 
religion is controlled by the state, and citizens may attend only state-sanctioned places of 
worship. When one's freedom or liberty is curtailed, it would seem an egregious abrogation 
of one of the fundamental states of maturity, adulthood, or citizenship. 
Paternalism is a liberty-limiting principle, the application of which would result in an 
abrogation of an individual's autonomy. The justification of paternalism may be on the basis 
of either preventing harm or furthering the good of, or benefiting, that individual whose 
freedom is being encroached. The only reason where state power may be used over any 
individual in a society would be where that individual's actions may cause harm to, or 
impede the liberties, of others. This interference may be understood as being coercive 
(Carter, 1977), and not in accordance of the wishes of the individual (Kultgen, 1995). In the 
child liberation movement, many would argue that children deserve to be treated 
autonomously, while beyond that movement others believe that children necessarily need to 
be treated paternalistically, that the very nature of the parent-child relationship is that of a 
paternalistic one. This faction would argue that the authority of the parents is in the best 
interests of the child, not simply some kind of arcane or dictatorial privilege. That adults are 
treated paternalistically, though, is frowned upon, or put down entirely. It is a deprecatory 
accusation to charge another with acting paternalistically, and few would dare confess to 
paternalistic proclivities. 
Current views are that it is not appropriate to treat others paternalistically; however, 
some believe that it is never right to do so, while others believe that there is a place for 
paternalism in certain kinds of relationships, and indeed, that it may even be morally 
required at times (Kultgen, 1995). The conflict lies between the basic moral principles of 
autonomy and beneficence. While paternalism is generally considered as the usurpation of 
a person's choice of their own good by another, the most fundamental element of 
paternalism is that it is founded upon the principle of beneficence, generally understood as 
the obligation to maximise benefits over risk, and not to harm others. Paternalistic 
intervention is intended to benefit another person, and to be in their best interests, typically 
without their consent. However, while paternalism has such altruistic aims, it seems to be 
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held in contempt by many, and both demands and requires moral justification. These 
seemingly contradictory factors may explain the difficulty and disdain with which paternalism 
has been viewed, but also suggests that there must be something inherently valuable with 
this concept, or otherwise it would have long been discarded. Many regard action predicated 
on good intentions to be morally acceptable, however, Gert et al. (1997) disagree. Even 
when an action taken is based on the most benevolent desires for another, it does not 
necessarily make that act a moral action, just as an act of paternalistic intervention based on 
such benevolent desires does not justify itself. Quite simply, an analysis of paternalism 
reveals that "morality requires more than good intentions" (Gert et ai, 1997, p. 195). Thus, 
both kinds of interventions may well be based on good intentions (the principle of 
beneficence) but this is not sufficient for moral justification. While many paternalistic 
interventions may be morally unjustified, there are also cases where paternalistic 
interventions are not only justified, but may actually be a moral requirement (Gert et al. 
1997). In defining paternalism so as to be morally acceptable, then, an adequate definition 
must involve beneficent action and justification, although the definition must also account for 
unjustified paternalism. The definition needs to be able to distinguish between justified and 
unjustified paternalism, and also be able to exclude actions which are not paternalistic. 
Arguments against paternalism usually focus on the importance of individual 
autonomy, and the imperative of respecting that principle. Philosophical analyses of 
paternalism have been conducted to determine if ever there are justifications of restricting 
the freedom of others, regardless of how benevolent or altruistic the motives of the 
paternalistic intervention may be. Justifications of paternalistic acts are always warranted, 
and generally demanded. Staunch liberals would argue that there are no situations wherein 
an adult's freedom may rightly be broached, even when it may be in their interests. 
Other liberty-limiting principles include the harm principle such that a person's 
liberty may justifiably be restricted to prevent harm to others caused by that person; the 
principle of legal paternalism which justifies a restriction of a person's liberty to prevent that 
individual's immoral behaviour, and; the offence principle which justifies the liberty restriction 
based on the prevention of offence to others caused by the individual (Feinberg, 1983). 
The concept of paternalism has long been treated with contempt, particularly 
because of the issues of control surrounding it, the notion of one's locus of control lying with 
another. Many view paternalism with disdain, disregarding that paternalistic intervention is 
intended to benefit another, with the other's best interests at the forefront of the intervention. 
Philosopher and libertarian John Stuart Mill was one of the first to put forth the 
concept of paternalism in his essay, On Uberty, although he did not label it as such. He was 
an ardent anti-paternalist, decrying undue interference in the affairs of individuals. Mill 
outlined two qualifications on individual freedom. The first is the Harm Principle, which 
allows for intervention by the government or other citizens into an individual's affairs if that 
individual's actions may cause harm to others, or impede their liberties. While interference in 
the affairs of competent adults is considered preposterous-Mill considered the value of 
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individual liberty to be absolute-he made allowances of interference for the treatment of 
children, and others not "in the maturity of their faculties." This is his second qualification, 
that individual freedom applies only to mature, rational, or competent adults. He believed 
that children require others to care for and protect them against both their own actions and 
external harms. 
Mill justifies what is now considered as weak paternalism, a defence of interfering 
with the liberty of another against their will for their own interests, if they are considered 
incompetent. Children are a unique group of human beings, in a unique period of human 
life, in what Locke refers to as the "imperfect state of childhood", and their treatment by 
parents, guardians, and the state brings about a different perspective of paternalism and its 
applicability towards them. Their wholly dependent state, particularly in their early years, on 
others makes the application of paternalism towards their population unique and almost 
always, if not indeed always, justified. The applicability of paternalism towards children will 
be discussed further on. 
5.2.1 Paternalism and moralism 
It is important to note the distinction between paternalism and moralism. Some 
believe that a measure of paternalism but not moralism to be compatible with liberalism. Mill 
did not appear to recognize such a distinction. He wrote interchangeably of interferences 
intended to secure a person's "moral good" and those originating in beliefs about what is 
morally 'right". Hart (1963) views positive morality as comprising the moral traditions of a 
particular society, without regard to their defensibility; however, in contradistinction, critical 
morality is "enlightened" in that it rests on rational beliefs as to matters of fact, and accepts 
that all human beings are entitled to equal consideration and respect. The harm principle, is 
a principle of critical morality, since harming others is, paradigmatically, to deny them equal 
consideration and respect (Hart, 1963). Hart believes we can say the same thing for a 
principle of strong negative paternalism. As far as harm may be concerned, there is no 
significant difference whether it is inflicted upon others or upon oneself. The harm principle 
is concerned with harm in the sense of damage as well as in the sense of harm as an injury 
or as a wrong (Kleinig, 1983). Hart espouses the principle of strong negative paternalism in 
the first sense, as damage. The individual who endangers him or herself does not violate 
any rights. The strong paternalist intervenes in the actions or activities of another without 
considering their will, thereby giving the other's interests priority over their autonomy. 
Thus, there are no decisive distinctions drawn here between morality and 
paternalism so far as the moral standing of each is concerned. Kleinig says that defenders 
of strong paternalism may also, ipso facto, need to be prepared to defend a limited measure 
of moralism. 
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5.2.2 A reconceptualisation of paternalism 
Early definitions of paternalism by Dworkin (1988) and Feinberg (1983) appear to 
have been influenced by John Stuart Mill, particularly in terms of the orientation of coercion 
towards protecting others from harm. Recognition, however, of the intentions behind 
promoting the interests of others and the protection of them from harm-despite the 
apparent lack of explicit consent-has led to a reconceptualisation of paternalism (Kultgen, 
1995). 
There is some debate over the usage of the term "paternalism". Some would argue 
that it is an exclusionist term, with such a strong emphasis on the "father" perspective. The 
Latin origin of the word alludes to the father figure, and the relationship as being as a father 
would relate to a child. As the term now refers more generally to "parental" attitudes, 
Kultgen (1995) has suggested that it ought to reflect that duality of parenting rather than 
referring to only the "pater" figure, and thus prefers "parentalism" to "paternalism." Kleinig 
(1995) notes that the term "paternalism" is inherently sexist in that it sometimes 
characterises circumstances where women are singled out as the special object of enforced 
benevolence. Protective exclusion of women from certain occupations which were 
heretofore considered inappropriate for the "weaker sex" was paternalistic in a sexist sense. 
Kleinig (1995) differentiates between "paternalism" and "parentalism" in that the latter is 
quite straightforwardly enforced benevolence, rather than any other kind of understanding of 
paternalism, such as sexist understandings where women may be treated paternalistically 
by men. The term paternalism is well established in philosophical literature, and also by 
general convention. It does convey the hierarchical ancestry of the concept. 
Feminist ethicist Sue Sherwin argues that this usage of "paternalism" may be 
considered a special case where gendered language ought be maintained. It directs our 
attention to the origin of the concept, establishing the link between the privileges of a father 
in a patriarchic family who "use their supposedly superior knowledge and judgment to make 
decisions on behalf of other family members" (1992, p. 138), and those in authority, such as 
physicians, who "appeal to this model in claiming that their greater knowledge and 
understanding of the human body (and mind) constitutes justification for making 
authoritarian decisions about their patients' well-being, just as fathers claimed their inherent 
superiority served as justification for imposing their will on other family members" (Sherwin, 
1992, p. 138-9). Sherwin notes that this power implicit in the hierarchical arrangements of 
the patriarchal family may be easily abused, as "it is often distorted into rationalizations of 
the father's self interest" (p. 139). She extends this warning to carefully limit the power 
inherent in the patient-physician relationship, which may be just as easily abused, just as 
the power-imbalanced coach-athlete relationship may be exploited. Thus, the case may be 
made to retain this word "paternalism" because of the historical orientation of the term 
towards such heavy-handed treatment, as from a father. Traditional relationships of 
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domination and subordination which are seen as paternalistic would include that of teacher-
student, doctor-patient, coach-athlete, and necessarily, parent-child. 
John Kultgen (1995) premises his work on the basic relationship between people 
being one of care. He differentiates between intimate relationships in the personal sphere, 
such as those between friends, family, and 'intimates', with those in the public sphere, such 
as relationships between institutions, legislation, and professional practices. In opposition to 
many other moralists, he argues that it is sometimes necessary, or even obligatory, to 
intervene in the lives of others even though there is a prima facie objection to paternalistic 
actions because of the encroachment or usurpation of the autonomy of the recipients of 
such intervention. He is careful to acknowledge that while paternalistic intervention may 
indeed by morally dangerous, it may also be just as perilous to not intervene when another's 
welfare is at stake. 
Feinberg (1986) cautions us not to confuse paternalism with other things that may 
also be called "paternalistic". First, he views it as a "quite respectable proposed legitimising 
principle ... which does after all purport to be solicitous of the interests of the persons it would 
protect" (1986, p. 4). We must not to confuse it with attitudes, practices, and rules that are 
not even remotely benevolent. For example, an athlete who has to ask the coach for 
permission to go to the toilet or who is required to produce a physician's note for absences 
is being treated as a child, and not for their own good. These rules manifest the 
untrustworthiness assumed by the coach of his or her athletes, and the lack of respect given 
them. Furthermore, Feinberg emphaSises the highly benevolent and non-demeaning nature 
of paternalism. The analogy is a particular parental restriction meant to protect children-not 
from themselves but from others. When a coach continually tells an athlete to wear clothing 
of a particular style because she does not like the way the athlete dresses, this is not 
paternalism. The coach is attempting to change the way the athlete dresses for her sake, 
and not with the athlete's wishes as a primary concern. Again, the coaches' actions may be 
considered disrespectful as she is attempting to change the athlete's behaviour for her own 
purposes, but not necessarily for the athlete's benefit. 
However, despite paternalism having such altruistic aims and the intention of 
benefiting another, it both demands and requires moral justification. These seemingly 
contradictory factors may explain the contempt with which paternalism has been perceived, 
but also suggests that there must be something inherently valuable with this concept, or 
otherwise it would have long been discarded. A further complication arises from the many 
and varied conceptions of the term. I shall attempt herein to survey the leading conceptions 
of paternalism, and to discuss their justifications. 
Certain professions, such as medicine, have a convention of treating people-
patients in this example-paternalistically, believing paternalism to be the most appropriate 
manner in which to manage treatment, purportedly always with the patient's best interests in 
mind. The principle of beneficence refers to the obligation that health care professionals 
have toward their patients to seek the well-being or benefit of the patient (Gert et aI., 1997). 
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(Kleinig, 1983, p. 4). Competent adults would rather make their own decisions based on 
their own individual value systems, and on their personal conceptions of the good. This 
definition though would regard paternalism as being directed towards young children as 
being acceptable. Unlike Gerald Dworkin (1988b), Kleinig feels that paternalism does not 
need to be either coercive or restrict one's liberty of action. The next section expounds on 
these views. 
5.3 Paternalism, liberty of action, and coercion 
The perceived immorality of paternalism is founded on its interference with the 
freedom and self-determination of individuals. A definition of these concepts and an 
assessment of their value are necessary before evaluating the morality of paternalism. 
Individuals are free when their actions and options are unrestricted (Hayri, 1998). 
Restrictions may be imposed by the actions-as in active paternalism-or inactions-as in 
passive paternalism-of others, or from natural causes over which no one has any power. In 
the first sense, I am free to leave my house so long as no one has locked me in, or 
threatened me if I were to attempt to leave. In the second sense, I may walk to work along 
public paths so long as these are in existence. In the third sense, I am free to walk outside 
in any weather, although safety and comfort may determine appropriate clothing for climatic 
variations. The opposite of freedom-constraint-may be understood as a restriction of my 
options. I may be constrained in my actions if someone locks my front door that prevents me 
from leaving my house, if there are no public paths along which I may walk, and there is a 
typhoon outside which restricts my freedom to walk outside. When one is positively required 
to do something, for example to give a urine or blood sample in the case of an athlete in 
certain arenas of sport, to wear a helmet while riding a bicycle or motorcycle, to carry a 
whistle, wear a life jacket, and have a bailing device while boating, then one's liberty of 
action is infringed upon, particularly because there is a threat overhanging refusal to 
acquiesce. For example, if one refuses to wear a helmet on a bicycle or motorcycle, or to 
wear a seatbelt while driving, among other regulations, one may receive a fine. The 
requirement for an individual to actually refrain from doing something, for example, not to 
walk in certain protected areas, not to practice very dangerous elements in a sport, and not 
to consent to potentially useful but risky training methods for performance improvement, 
precludes people from action, and is thus considered to be passive paternalism (Kleinig, 
1983, p. 6). 
Kleinig's (1983) argument that paternalism does not have to be either coercive or 
restrict one's liberty of action is illustrated in the following examples. First, though, he 
explains that coercion is understood, for these purposes, as: "X coerces Y to do a if and 
only if X gets Y to do a as the result of a threat to interfere with Y (or one of Ys interests) or 
to withhold from Y something that Y has reason to expect" (Kleinig, 1983,p. 5). The main 
point here is that something is elicited that would not have been given without threat. In a 
situation where a cyclist must wear a helmet or risk being fined, specific behaviour is 
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required with the threat of a fine being the cost of not acquiescing. This paternalistic helmet 
requirement is coercive. Another example of paternalistic limitations of liberty without 
coercion is the situation where athletes are given food vouchers to a cafeteria which serves 
only healthy food. They are not being threatened for refusing to eat healthy food, but their 
liberty to eat junk food is restricted. The motivation behind this action is for athletes to eat 
healthy food, and is thus paternalistic in nature, but not coercive. When a coach locks up the 
track bicycles during the lunch break to prevent the novice riders from fooling around on 
them, and possibly injuring themselves, the coach is not being coercive; she is simply 
limiting their freedom in a paternalistic manner. If an athlete is awarded a significant lump 
sum of money by the sport governing body to cover annual training and competition 
expenses, and the money is spread out over a one year period with monthly sums given to 
the athlete, the athlete is not being coerced but her liberty of action to spend all the money 
is impeded. The sport governing body is hesitant to give the money as one lump sum as in 
the past, athletes have used all the money in the first few months of the year, and were 
hampered in their training for the rest of the year without any money. This is paternalistic 
action on the part of the sport governing body to noncoercively limit the athlete's liberty of 
action, thereby promoting what they consider to be the athlete's best interests. In the United 
States, the national body governing collegiate sport (National Collegiate Athletic 
Association) restricts the hours certain student-athletes may train, purportedly to prevent 
their training from interfering with studies. Such paternalism is supposedly in place to 
promote the best interests of the student-athletes. Ironically, many college level gymnasts 
do not participate on varsity teams because of the twenty-hour rule; they prefer to train with 
private gyms where there are no time restrictions, and they may thus train well beyond the 
twenty-hour weekly maximum. 
Each of these examples involves some restriction on one's liberty of action. There 
are, however, other examples of paternalism that do not fit into this account. Consider the 
example where a young gymnast is about to perform the final vault in an important team 
competition. If she misses the vault, the team loses the competition; if she performs well, the 
team wins the gold medal. The young athlete asks the coach how important her vault is to 
the team's standing. Knowing that the gymnast would be highly stressed if she knew the 
entire team's standing depended on her vault and that added stress and pressure would 
likely cause her to falter, the coach tells her that the vault does not really matter, and to 
relax. The gymnast flies down the runway, hits the vault, and scores well enough that her 
team wins the gold medal. This case involves paternalistic deception without any obvious 
limitation on liberty of action. While withholding or falsification of information usually does 
constitute some kind of constraint on liberty of action (Kleinig, 1983), the paternalism in this 
case is different. 
Kleinig (1983) accepts that paternalism does not require coercion or interference 
with liberty of action, and suggests that perhaps paternalism does not require freedom to be 
compromised either. Gert et al. (1997,1976) hold this view, considering that it is not the 
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constraint of freedom, but rather the violation of a moral rule that is required for paternalism. 
However, since their argument embodies a non sequitur, and its conclusion is false, one 
could reject their argument that the loss of freedom is not involved in paternalism. They do 
show a few instances where this may be the case, but from only a few instances one cannot 
conclude generally that paternalism may be practiced without any loss of freedom. The 
moral rules to which Gert et al. (1997) refer are based on their framework of morality, which 
is related to everyday moral practices. These practices are not always clear or consistent, 
so for the sake of consistency, they formulated a moral system that they believe to be free 
of aberrations and ambiguities, inevitably introduced by local beliefs and practices. The ten 
moral rules that they assert to be the general moral rules connected with human nature and 
rationality include admonitions to individuals not to harm others unless they have adequate 
reasons to do so (Do not kill, Do not cause pain, Do not disable, Do not deprive of freedom, 
and Do not deprive of pleasure), and then five further admonitions not to act in ways would 
might result in someone suffering those harms (Do not deceive, Do not break your promise, 
Do not cheat, Do not break the law, and Do not neglect your duty). These moral rules are 
explained in a later section on conceptions of paternalism 
There are other freedoms, such as freedom of thought and expression, and 
freedom to be left alone, which may be quashed by paternalistic actions in the very 
situations where no interference with liberty of action has occurred (Kleinig, 1983). For 
example, consider the case of a long distance swimmer who is crossing a large body of 
water. The swimmer relies entirely on her coach to tell her where she is, and how much 
further she has to swim. When the swimmer begins to tire, and becomes demoralized, the 
coach deceives her by telling her she is almost there. The swimmer renews her efforts, and 
continues. Again, later on when the athlete asks how much further now, the coach once 
again lies to her, telling her again that she is almost there when really she has a long way to 
go. In another example, a coach tells an athlete that if she continues training hard, she will 
probably make the elite team for the big championship at the end of the season. The coach 
knows that there is no chance of this athlete making that team, but feels that if he tells her 
this, she will give up, and not continue training for the rest of the season. So, with the goal of 
making the team in mind, the athlete commits to training even harder, believing that she 
may qualify for the elite team if only she works hard enough. Both athletes here have been 
deceived by their coach. The coaches have imposed their wills on the athletes, making them 
believe certain things. While the coaches were well-intentioned, they violated a moral rule. 
The athletes were not in control as the coaches had given them false information, upon 
which they based their actions; their autonomy was not respected. Both athletes had been 
denied information that concerned their interests, and as Kleinig (1983) would argue, 
information which they had a good (if not overriding) reason to possess. 
Given these examples, it appears that there is a constraint on freedom in acts of 
paternalism, although not necessarily a coercive constraint or interference with a liberty of 
action. Kleinig (1983) suggests then that we may speak of an "imposition" since regardless 
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of other issues within conceptions of paternalism, a paternalistic act imposes upon another: 
"the paternalist exercises some measure of control over some aspect of the life of another-
be it a thwarting of the other's desires, a manipulation of the other's beliefs, or a channelling 
of the other's behavior" (Kleinig, 1983, p. 7). When an individual imposes his or her will on 
another, the autonomy of the other is being abrogated. Conceptions of autonomy are 
discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
There are some persons-or some persons may be in certain states-towards 
whom one cannot act paternalistically. For instance, it has been suggested that one cannot 
act paternalistically towards infants because infants do not believe that they can make their 
own decisions on any matters, and indeed, may not actually believe anything about 
themselves at all (Gert et aI., 1997). This argument may be extended to individuals in a 
comatose state whose views could not be known before entering into this condition, and 
who need some kind of action on their behalf before they cease to be comatose. If an 
individual not does believe anything about him or herself, then it would be inappropriate to 
consider any action on his behalf as being paternalistic. An act can only be paternalistic if 
the individual is capable of making his or her own decisions about the situation (Gert et aI., 
1997). 
Individuals who are not capable of making autonomous decisions may be 
considered "incompetent" to do so. Children fall into this category. Criticisms of the 
argument of incompetency argue raise the issue of the widely divergent capacities of 
children, ranging from complete incompetence at infancy to advanced competence in 
adolescence. In the advanced stages of cognitive development, cognitive skills and 
experience are broadened, and thus competence varies dramatically throughout childhood. 
Thus, children ought not to be considered as a homogenous group, but rather as a group of 
individuals with burgeoning competencies who ought to have their individual abilities 
respected. Knowledge and experience tend also to be task or situation-specific. A child 
suffering from a chronic illness may have considerable knowledge about his or her particular 
condition, and may be able to make informed, rational decisions relating to that particular 
issue, perhaps more competently than an adult who lacks that specific experience and 
knowledge. Thus, because a child may be competent in some areas and not in others does 
not preclude them from having those limited competencies respected and being allowed to 
participate in some degree about decision-making issues related to themselves. 
When we care for another and want to promote his or her interests as best as we 
can, then we ought to help the other to achieve and live an authentic existence, even if this 
help conflicts with his or her interests (Kultgen, 1995). Within a consideration of paternalism, 
respect for autonomy does not necessarily require that we comply entirely with the wishes of 
the other person, that we allow the other to live as he or she chooses, "as long as he 
observes minimal restrictions having to do with the well-being of others" (Kultgen, 1995, p. 
8). In an authentic caring relationship, what Kultgen refers to as "authentic solicitude", one 
deliberately tries to promote the others' true or objective well-being. Respecting the 
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autonomy of the other may be evident in the active preservation or enlargement of the 
others' autonomy, and in honouring his or her wishes, but valuing the others' autonomy may 
also be evident when one forces the other to make decisions when he desires 
irresponsibility. 
One who cares for another should realize that autonomy is not the only objective 
good; there are other goods as well. If we accept that the caretaker ought to respect 
autonomy, then he or she must weigh it in relation to other goods in determining what is 
best for the other person. Therefore, if parentalism (the term Kultgen prefers to paternalism) 
of any sort is to be justified, "it must be parentalism that (intelligently and effectively) 
promotes the optimal balance between autonomy and other objective goods for the 
recipient" (Kultgen, 1995, p. 8). When other types of parentalism are not justified, it may be 
due to their diminishing of both the sum of autonomy and of other objective goods, not only 
because they diminish autonomy alone. 
5.4 Soft and hard paternalism 
There are two main streams of thought regarding paternalism. There are absolutist, 
anti-paternalists like Mill who regard the value of individual liberty as absolute, and that the 
only reason for which state power may be used over any member of society would be if that 
member's actions cause harm to others. This absolutist position considers all forms of 
control-even benevolent-as being immoral. Others such as Dworkin and Kleinig hold that 
there are acceptable instances of paternalism predicated upon beneficence which may be 
justified by preventing harm or promoting some benefit. The demarcation line between 
acceptable and unacceptable forms of paternalism may be drawn between autonomy-
respecting and autonomy-violating types of caring control over others (Hayri, 1998). 
Autonomy-respecting paternalism would include soft paternalism, which is not constraining, 
and does not require any moral justification. Weak paternalism seems at first to be 
condemnable as it restricts liberty, however, because the controlled decision-making is 
impaired in some way, the interference is justifiable. Hard and strong paternalism are both 
autonomy-violating, and are thus genuine violations of personal autonomy, and thereby 
unjustifiable. 
5.4.1 Soft paternalism 
Soft paternalism is a benevolent intervention in the affairs of another that does not 
involve restrictions of liberty or violations of autonomy, and allows for the protection of an 
individual from non-voluntary choices. In his differentiation between hard and soft 
paternalism, Dworkin (1988b) explained that by soft paternalism, he meant first, that 
paternalism is sometimes justified, and second, that the person toward whom another is 
acting paternalistically must necessarily be incompetent in some way. In contrast, hard 
paternalism is that which is sometimes justified, even when the action is entirely voluntary. 
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The first set of considerations regarding soft paternalism are based on rationality and 
competence, and the second considerations relating to hard paternalism are based on 
consequences of danger and harm (Dworkin, 1988b). Feinberg (1986) compares the 
motivating spirit of soft paternalism as lying closer to the liberalism advocated by Mill than 
the protectiveness of hard paternalism. Examples of this kind of caring action would be 
warning labels on certain kinds of sporting equipment such as roller blades or track bicycles 
which do not have brakes attached, or containers containing dangerous or harmful products, 
such as poison, or truthful and nonsensational health education. Feinberg explains soft 
paternalism as accepting state intervention to prevent self-regarding harmful conduct "when 
but only when that conduct is substantially nonvoluntary, or when temporary intervention is 
necessary to establish whether it is voluntary or not" (1986, p. 12). Soft paternalism is 
justified only when an individual is acting non-voluntarily, or when the paternalist needs time 
to determine whether or not the individual is acting voluntarily. While this weaker kind of 
paternalism does interfere with an individual's self-determination, it generally does not need 
justification. 
5.4.1.1 Active and passive paternalism 
Active paternalism is where an individual (X) requires another (Y) to do certain 
things, in order to secure his or her (Y) good (Kleinig, 1983). For example, society requires 
that children attend formal education until a certain age, regardless of their wishes, so that 
when they will be equipped with the basic skills with which to become productive members 
of society. Active paternalism is more difficult to justify, although they both require 
justification of some kind. In passive paternalism, an individual is required to refrain from 
performing certain actions. For example, the state prohibits the use of narcotic drugs, 
swimming at dangerous beaches or near dams, driving over the posted speed limits, or of 
committing suicide. 
5.4.2 Hard paternalism 
Hard paternalism is an interference by another in an individual's actions that involve 
at least initial restrictions of liberty or violations of autonomy. Such intervention, in the 
strictest interpretations of what constitutes a violation, violates people's self-determination 
(Hayri, 1998). It imposes its own values and judgments on individuals, "for their own good" 
(Feinberg, 1986, p. 12). Hard paternalism allows as justification for criminal legislation the 
necessity of protection of "competent adults, against their will, from the harmful 
consequences even of their fully voluntary choices and undertakings" (Feinberg, 1986, p. 
12). Dworkin considers hard paternalism to be interventions that are sometimes justified, 
even when the person's actions are entirely voluntary (1988b). He gives the examples of 
preventing a person from selling their body parts to others, or of selling themselves into 
slavery, even when that individual wishing to engage in such practices appears to be 
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behaving "freely". Another example in sport would be the associated bans of an athlete 
engaging in blood doping or using blood-boosters or plasma expanders (products which are 
considered "controlled substances" in the eyes of the law) for sporting benefit. If one may 
reveal the individual to have been coerced into becoming a slave, or of being under the 
influence of another in seeking such a state of affairs, then intervention in their actions 
would be considered as soft paternalism, and would not require considerable arguments for 
justification; the challenge of justification lies where the person seems to be fully rational 
and cognizant of the situation, and persists in wanting to become the slave of another, and 
to live their life in servitude. Generally speaking, in western liberal democratic societies, it 
would be highly unusual to find an individual who wishes to enter into a life of indenture. If, 
in the unlikely event, they truly wish to do so, one cannot stop them on these grounds. 
However, as Dworkin explains, if this is the case, then we would have to find other reasons 
for stopping the person from committing his or her life to such servitude, such as an appeal 
to the idea of what it is to live the good life and to be a good person - neither of which would 
allow for a person to become a slave to another (1988b). The justification for paternalistic 
intervention would thus be argued on the grounds of maximizing some other good. 
Direct paternalism has as its direct objective the interests of the person whose good 
is being secured: "X, in order to secure Y's good, imposes only upon Y" (Kleinig, 1983, p. 
14). For example, all drivers and passengers are required to wear seatbelts as mandated by 
law, or be fined. Indirect paternalism would be where the direct object of paternalistic 
intervention is not the person whose good is being sought, although they are being imposed 
upon: X imposes on Z in order to secure Y's good (Kleinig, 1983). Consider the example of 
indirect paternalism as the governmental regulations of the sale of food and drugs on the 
grounds that the public could be harmed if there were no regulations. Hard paternalism may 
be subdivided into strong and weak paternalism. 
5.4.3 Strong paternalism 
Strong paternalism cannot be justified in that the individual being paternalised is 
competent and capable of making their own informed decisions. In this type of paternalism, 
"X imposes upon Y without considering Y's capacity to choose that good for him- or herself' 
(Kleinig, 1983, p. 14). Advocates of strong paternalism wish to control what they consider to 
be self-destructive, immoral, or irrational behaviour. They wish to do so even when there 
does not seem to be any clear impairment of deCision-making ability, and also when there 
do not appear to be any particularly strong evidence that the actions are anything but 
completely voluntary. The legal mandate of a state that drivers and passengers in motor 
vehicles must wear seatbelts or else face punishment, or that motorcyclists wear helmets, 
are paradigmatic examples of strong paternalism. The state is not interested in the wishes 
or desires of the individuals involved; they justify their intervention based on the interests of 
those individuals, not on their autonomy. In these examples, the paternalistic interventions 
are protecting bodily integrity, which may be strong justification for such interference. 
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Dworkin (1988b) calls these "safety cases." They require either specific actions on the part 
of others: people have to buy or use specific things, for example, lifejackets, helmets, 
seatbelts, infant seats in motor vehicles, and so on, or else they may forbid individuals from 
buying things such as heroin, explosives, guns, etc. (these bans are jurisdictionally variant). 
There is no strong reason to think that individuals who do not wish to act in these ways, or 
who do wish to obtain restricted or illegal items are incompetent, even if we do wish to doubt 
the reasonableness of weighing the inconveniences with the risks of harm. Dworkin believes 
we are justified in compelling individuals to adhere to safety requirements since the cost is 
relatively trivial compared to the harm which could be experienced. 
The second set of cases Dworkin (1988b) puts forth to test justification of hard 
paternalism are "collective decisions". He gives the example of communities putting fluoride 
in the water supply; another would be the adding of vitamin D to milk to enhance calcium 
absorption. This set of cases differs from the safety cases in that people are not actually 
required to drink the water or the milk; however, it is made easier for those who do wish to 
do so, and more difficult for those who wish to avoid doing so. From an economic 
standpoint, it is cheaper and more effective for the community at large to implement such 
collective decisions. However, it creates problems for the minority of people who do not wish 
to participate in such schemes. Dworkin suggests that some balancing of interests might be 
appropriate here; some people will be in the majority over some decisions, and in the 
minority for others. The restrictions here on the minority are not motivated by paternalism, 
but by the interests of the majority. Since the majority is acting so as to promote their own 
interests, they are not deliberately interfering with the minority. Thus, concludes Dworkin 
(1988b), in the final analysis the minority are not being deliberately paternalised, and so 
these collective decisions are really not cases of paternalism at all. 
The third set of cases Dworkin considers are the "slavery cases", in which "people 
are not allowed to enter into certain voluntary agreements that would result in great loss of 
liberty of serious risk of bodily injury" (1988b, p. 110). These are difficult cases for soft 
paternalism because the individuals being paternalised are competent, and they are being 
denied entry into fully voluntary agreements. We feel that they should not be allowed to 
enter into such agreements which would result in great loss of liberty or even serious risk of 
bodily injury. Dworkin notes that there is a presumption that these kinds of choices are not 
entirely voluntary, given what we know about human nature; however, even when we 
appeal to the wrongness of such a contract on the promotion of individual autonomy, we are 
still not able to justify the restriction against entering into such agreements. Individuals may 
define their personal autonomy in this very manner, as Dworkin suggests an individual could 
say: "I want to be the kind of person who acts at the command of others. I define myself as 
a slave and endorse those attitudes and preferences. My autonomy consists in being a 
slave" (1988b, p. 111). The argument can realistically rest only on a conception of the good, 
and the restriction on entering into an indentured life would be based on the imposition of 
this conception of the good life on another. 
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Hayri (1998) puts forth three arguments to justify strong paternalistic intervention in 
these situations, although none of these is particularly strong. First, the principle of utility is 
suggested for benevolent control on behalf of the foolish decision-makers and also for 
others. The doctrine of utilitarianism requires the maximization of happiness in the form of 
pleasure, preference fulfilment, or need satisfaction, and the minimization of unhappiness. 
According to this view then, justification exists when the paternalist has good reason to 
believe that the welfare of the individual or even the universal well-being of humanity is 
better served by benevolent control. This model is limited for two reasons. One, the well-
being of others is not a justification for paternalistic intervention. Hayri (1998) points out that 
it is the harm principle that legitimises interference here, not paternalistic considerations. 
The second argument put forth to justify strong paternalistic interventions refers to 
morality of the actions. In this situation, the freedom of an individual could be broached 
based on the offence principle, in that others may be morally offended by the actions in 
question. Proponents of this justification argue that one's actions, even in the privacy of 
one's home or other private location, are inherently wrong, and thus ought to be stopped or 
controlled. Supporters of this moralistic belief feel that there are certain actions that ought to 
be forbidden, even if they do no harm or involve anyone else; they are Simply wrong and 
thus ought to be controlled. This argument is weak, since it relies on intellectual calculation 
or emotion, and certainly not on the notion of harm. 
The third defence of strong paternalism is that it is irrational to act in certain ways, 
regardless of the morality or immorality of these actions, and without concern for their 
effects on others. The support of constraining and violating the autonomy of others lies with 
the idea that everyone is, to some degree, irrational, and it would be prudent to somehow 
collectively ensure that our lack of reason would not lead us to engage in action that we 
might later, in a more rational light, regret. This argument is also weak because if it relies on 
incompetence of the agent, then it would not be strong paternalism but weak, and thus 
interference would be justified. If this incompetence based on irrationality was a temporary 
rather than a permanent state of affairs, then justifications would still lie in weak paternalism. 
The nature of human beings is such that even when we have full knowledge of a situation, 
and are able to evaluate the options of our decisions, our emotions may sometimes lead us 
to act irrationally or imprudently, but this does not justify paternalistic intervention by others. 
It is the degree of voluntariness that is the deciding factor between strong and weak 
paternal ism. 
5.4.4 Weak Paternalism 
Weak paternalism is justified by the incompetence of the person being paternalised. 
It consists of limiting another's freedom without their consent or against their will in order to 
support their interests when they are themselves incompetent: lOX'S imposition is premised 
upon Y's incapacity to make that choice" (Kleinig, 1983, p. 14). It allows for the protection 
from harm of an individual caused by conditions beyond his or her control. Those individuals 
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in this special category would include all incompetent people, for example, children, the 
mentally challenged, and the mentally ill; these individuals are seen as lacking in knowledge 
and control over their actions, or act under undue influence. Paternalistic acts towards 
these individuals is justified on the basis that since their autonomy "has not been fully 
developed or will never be fully developed or has been temporarily or permanently lost, 
seeming violations of their self-determination are not necessarily immoral, because the 
interventions can actually support their autonomy instead of suppressing it" (Hayri, 1998, p. 
454). 
Ten (1971) give four justifications of weak paternalism. His first justification is the 
same as that discussed above; where special categories of persons who are incompetent 
are involved, weak paternalism is justified. His second instance would be where there is a 
lack of knowledge that would prevent an individual from making fully informed decisions. If 
their actions were not checked, then they may act without full cognisance of the dangers 
involved. He gives the example of an individual intending to take a medication without full 
knowledge of its harmful side effects. Mill's famous example justifies paternalistic 
intervention in the case of an individual whose deficiency of knowledge leads him to danger. 
In this case, a man is about to walk across a bridge that someone else knows to be on the 
verge of collapse. The man is unaware of the impending collapse which may harm or kill 
him, and therefore is not consenting to put his life in danger. The other individual interferes 
with the man's action, and this interference is justified on the grounds that the man's 
conduct was not expressing his genuine choice. The third instance would be where there is 
a lack of control of the agent involved. Temporary incompetence due to grief, distress, even 
inebriation, would render the person unable to appreciate the full significance of the 
consequences of their intended action, and would therefore justify paternalistic interference. 
The fourth situation where paternalistic interference could be justified is where a person's 
decision-making abilities are impaired because of undue influence. This may come from the 
explicit use of coercion, or less conspicuous pressures from religion, economic factors, 
traditions, customs, etc. Ten gives the example of the tyranny of custom that led individuals 
to duel for reasons of honour; in such situations paternalistic intervention may have been 
legitimate. 
Kleinig (1983) suggests that it might actually be inappropriate to consider weak 
paternalism an instance of paternalism at all. We turn now to consider how paternalistic 
intervention may be defined. 
5.5 Defining paternalistic intervention 
All people are required to make moral decisions and judgments on a daily basis. 
Almost every interaction with another person involves moral matters in some way. For 
example, whether we treat others with respect, tell the truth, or harm or refrain from harming 
them all involve moral decisions in one way or another. When we consider such highly 
controversial moral issues such as abortion and euthanasia, it seems to suggest that there 
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is little consensus on any adequate account of morality. However, such controversial issues 
generally exist in the minority. Many moral matters on which people make moral decisions 
and judgments are uncontroversial to the extent that individuals may not even be aware of 
making conscious decisions about them. Furthermore, many people do not hesitate to agree 
that certain acts are condemnable, such as harming another individual simply because he or 
she is disliked, or unjustifiable deception, breaking promises, lying, cheating, breaking the 
law, or not doing one's duty (Gert et ai, 1997). Thus, it would seem that there is not as much 
overall moral disagreement as some might believe. 
A set of moral rules was formulated by Gert et al. (1997) to prohibit causing harm or 
prevent actions that generally result in harm to individuals. They propose that an explicit, 
clear, and comprehensive account of morality would clarify the uncontroversial nature of 
many decisions in the medical field, but their account is actually based on the moral system 
that is already implicitly used by many people in their daily decision-making. Thus their 
formulation of moral rules would apply also to the world of sport for everyone involved, 
regardless of whether they are athletes, coaches, referees, or even parents. 
This proposed moral system consists of two sections: (1) rules prohibiting acting in 
ways that cause, or significantly increase the probability of causing any of the five harms that 
all rational persons want to avoid, and (2) ideals encouraging the prevention of any of these 
harms. These moral rules are explicated as the following. 
I. The first 5 moral rules prohibit directly causing the five harms. 
1. Do not kill. (includes causing permanent loss of consciousness) 
2. Do not cause pain. (includes causing mental pain, for example, sadness or 
anxiety) 
3. Do not disable. (more precisely, "do not cause loss of physical, mental, or 
volitional abilities") 
4. Do not deprive of freedom. (includes freedom from being acted upon as well as 
depriving of opportunity to act) 
5. Do not deprive of pleasure. (includes future as well as present pleasure) 
II The second 5 moral rules include those rules which when not followed in particular 
cases usually-but not always-cause harm, and which always result in harm being 
suffered when they are not generally followed. 
6. Do not deceive. (Includes more than lying) 
7. Keep your promises. (Equivalent to "Do not break your promise") 
8. Do not cheat. (primarily involves violating rules of a voluntary activity, such as a 
game.) 
9. Obey the law. (equivalent to "Do not break the law") 
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10. Do your d uty. (equivalent to "Do not neglect your duty") 
(Gert et aI., 1997, p. 34) 
In the moral rules, the term "duty" is understood in reference to requirements of a person's 
role in society, such as in their job. It is not understood in the manner usually used by 
philosophers, as a synonym for "what one morally ought to do." Violations of these moral 
rules may be justified or unjustified. A rule is not broken every time someone is harmed. 
Thus, is it important to determine whether actions are justified violations of a moral rule, 
unjustified violations, or indeed, and kind of violation at all. 
Gert et al. (1997) consider how paternalism may violate their system of moral rules, 
and whether paternalistic intervention may be justified. Their definition of paternalism 
requires that all paternalistic action must be predicated on good intentions, and that is must 
be justified for it to be considered morally acceptable. They believe that an adequate 
definition must also consider both justified and unjustified paternalism. The aim of providing 
a definition of paternalism as being the impetus for a more helpful discussion of what is 
generally considered to be paternalistic behaviour. This definition ought to encompass the 
clear cases and exclude behaviour which is not commonly considered to be paternalistic. 
They put forth the following definition of paternalistic behaviour: 
P is acting paternalistically toward S if and only if: 
1. P intends his action to benefit S; 
2. P recognizes (or should recognize) that his action toward S is a kind of 
action that needs moral justification; 
3. P does not believe that his action has S's past, present, or immediately 
forthcoming consent; and 
4. P regards S as believing he can make his own decision on this matter 
(Gert et aI., 1997, p. 196) 
Kultgen (1995) considers an action to be parentalistic if the intervention in an individual's life 
is intended to benefit that individual, but without regard for his or her consent. Unlike Gert et 
al. (1997), however, Kultgen does not require the recognition of the one interfering in the 
actions of the other to recognise that the interference requires justification. He views an 
intervention (Action A) as being paternalistic if and only if: 
(a) P believes that A is an intervention in S's life; 
(b) P decides to perform A independently of whether S authorizes A at the time 
of the performance; 
(c) P believes that A will contribute to S's welfare; and 
(d) P performs A for this reason. (Kultgen, 1995, p. 62). 
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Gert et al.'s definition is based on the assumption that P'S beliefs are at least rational, 
though the beliefs need not be true. For example, if an individual's beliefs are irrational-
say he thinks, for instance, that flowers are competent to give consent. It would be 
implausible to maintain that he is acting paternalistically toward the flowers when he waters 
them, even though he actually believes that the flowers would prefer to remain dry (Gert et 
ai, 1997). 
The first requirement in their definition, that P's action towards S is paternalistic if P 
intends his action to benefit S, is straightforward. Sometimes P's action may be only partially 
paternalistic towards S, as they may benefit S but also benefit others, even P. For example, 
a parent enrols his son in a swim club because he thinks it is important for his son to learn to 
swim well, and he thinks his son might also learn valuable life lessons from belonging to a 
swim club, such as team work and dedication. He also thinks that he might meet some 
people in the community through his son's participation on the swim team. He is not much 
concerned that his son does not like swimming. Thus, the parent's intervention is classified 
as paternalistic since it is intended to confer benefit to his son, although he may also 
experience benefits from the son's participation. 
The second requirement for paternalistic intervention is that P ought to recognize 
that his action toward S is one that requires justification. If he is unaware that his action is 
such that it requires moral justification, then it is not paternalistic. This action would be 
paternal or parental but unless it is a violation of a moral rule, then the action is not 
paternalistic. For example, if a mother registers her daughter for swimming lessons before 
the family goes on a boating trip, it would be a parental action. Her action intends to benefit 
her child, but it is not violating a moral rule and thus does not require moral justification. If 
the mother registers her husband for the same swimming lessons, and insists that he go, 
her actions would be paternalistic. She would be depriving him of his freedom to watch 
television on Monday nights, and his right to self-determining actions, and she would be 
required to morally justify her acting on his behalf. She might justify her action on the basis 
that it is just as dangerous for her husband not to be able to swim as for her young daughter, 
and she is aware that he will not register himself for the lessons as he is lazy and would 
rather watch television than learn to swim, and thus she acts on his behalf to promote his 
interests. 
The third requirement for an action to be paternalistic is that P does not believe his 
action has S's past, present, or immediately forthcoming consent. From the previous 
example, the wife knows that her husband will resent her having registered him for 
swimming lessons, and that he will be attending against his will. He would not have 
consented to registering for the lessons. She hopes that one day he will thank her when they 
are on their boating holiday, but she knows that he may never thank her. However, she 
knows it will not be in his interests (or the family's interest) to drown, and thus she behaves 
paternalistically towards her husband. A discussion on the justification of paternalism based 
on consent is held in the next section. 
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The fourth requirement, that P regards S as believing he can make his own decision 
in this matter, is again explained through the previous example. The husband believes he 
will be safe enough if he wears the life jacket on board the boat. The wife knows that he will 
be unlikely to wear it all the time, and thus even though he insists that he will be fine in a life 
jacket, the wife ignores him and registers him for the swimming lessons anyhow. While 
ultimately it is his decision, she knows that he thinks he knows what is best for him, but she 
feels that she ought to over-ride his preferences based on what she considers to be his 
interests. She also makes this decision based on what is best for her and for the family. If he 
were to drown it would be traumatic for the entire family, and would affect them all 
negatively. Thus, the interests the wife is promoting are not his alone, but are shared. 
Competence to make informed decisions has significant bearing on this requirement for an 
action to be construed as an act of paternalism. A discussion on the issue of competence is 
found elsewhere in this work. 
One of the main arguments to support the ban of drugs and doping methods in sport 
is that athletes who engage in such behaviour will be harmed. This interference with 
athletes' self-determination is paternalistic, as the ban is premised on the idea that the 
athletes who take such substances may be harmed by that behaviour, and as such, ought to 
be prevented from doing so by sporting authorities. Some athletes support such action, but 
many athletes feel such actions-despite the concern for their health-violates their right to 
self-determination. These authorities justify their paternalistic interference on the basis of the 
harm principle: they act paternalistically so as to prevent harm to, and thereby promote the 
interests of, the athletes. Another sporting example of paternalism would be a situation 
where the coach tells a sick athlete to go home and not train for a few days. The athlete 
disagrees with the coaches' directive. The coach overrides the athlete's view, and insists he 
leave practice. The coach in this situation recognizes that the athlete is sick, and will benefit 
from rest; the coach overrules the athlete's protestations that he can make his own decision, 
as he feels the athlete is incapable of making the best decision, and the coach justifies his 
intervention on the basis of promoting the athlete's interests. A further example would be 
where an athlete requests a letter of recommendation from the coach to attend a national 
team try-out. The coach refuses to give the athlete the "entry ticket", which is the letter of 
recommendation, as he believes it is not in the athlete's best interests to go to the try-outs. 
The athlete argues that he is the best judge of his abilities, and that it will be a good 
experience; the coach overrules his desire and justifies it on the basis that the athlete will 
not have a good experience (the coach knows the athlete is not prepared, and will likely 
suffer a blow to his self-esteem if he were to be attend). The coach knows that the athlete 
will not agree with his decision, and believes that he is the best judge of the situation, but 
refuses to give the athlete the admission letter based on his own judgment of what is best 
for that athlete. 
Thus for an action to be considered paternalistic by Gert et al. (1997), it must violate 
their moral rules. They caution though that one must separate performing the kind of action 
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which does require justification in order to be morally acceptable (violating a moral rule), 
from failing to act in a way that while being morally encouraged does not have to be justified 
(not following a moral ideal). An action can only be called paternalistic when it requires 
moral justification. The actions that require moral justification are those that break the moral 
rules. Extending from this definition of paternalism put forth by Gert et al. (1997), the 
following statements may be made: "a paternalistic attitude is an attitude that indicates a 
willingness to act paternalistically, and a paternalistic person is a person who is more 
inclined than most to act paternalistically. A paternalistic law is a law that is intended to 
benefit the person whom it deprives of freedom" (p. 196). Paternalistic laws, such as those 
requiring the wearing of seatbelts in motor vehicles and helmets on motorcycles, differ from 
paternalistic actions. Paternalistic laws are typically legislated in order to protect or benefit 
those who are being deprived of freedom by those laws, and thus violate the moral law of 
depriving individuals of freedom. Paternalistic actions are usually far broader in their 
breaching of moral rules; for example, paternalistic actions would break the moral rules 
against deception, causing pain, depriving of pleasure, in addition to the deprivation of 
freedom. One must avoid using paternalistic laws as paradigmatic for paternalistic actions, 
as it may lead to defining paternalism as involving the deprivation offreedom (Gert et aI" 
1997); their definition of paternalism does not necessarily involve the deprivation of freedom. 
The deprivation of freedom is sometimes considered a requisite for an act to be considered 
paternal istic. 
In his principle and highly influential work, "Paternalism", Dworkin characterises 
paternalism as "the interference with a person's liberty of action justified by reasons referring 
exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or values of the person being 
coerced" (Dworkin, 1988a, p. 20). He explained that his rough characterisation of 
paternalism as interference with others' liberty for their own good, but notes that the class of 
persons whose good is involved is not always exactly the same as the class of the persons 
whose freedom is being restricted. He gives the example of professional licensing, where 
the practitioner is being interfered with directly so as to benefit the client whose interests are 
presumably being served. By disallowing the defence of consent by the victim to certain 
types of offences, the "would-be aggressor" is affected at the cost of protecting the willing 
victim. The juxtaposition of the two values of freedom and benevolence are what make 
Dworkin's (1988a) account of paternalism as interesting as it is: he accepts the abrogation of 
Individual freedom in the name of benevolence. 
In his subsequent work on paternalism, Dworkin (1988b) responded to the critics who 
felt that his definition of paternalism as interference with a person's liberty of action was 
overly restrictive. He agreed that a broader definition was warranted, and reworked his 
definition of paternalism to include the notion that paternalism must involve a violation of an 
individual's autonomy, which he conceives of as being distinct from that of liberty. Curtailing 
the freedom of another may be accomplished in several ways. First, an individual may 
deprive another of his or freedom by controlling their behaviour. For instance, a coach may 
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refuse to allow an athlete to miss a practice to attend her graduation ceremony. By 
overruling the athlete's desire to go to her graduation controls her behaviour, and thus 
curtails her behaviour. Another aspect in which the freedom of the athlete has been taken 
away by the coach in this example is the issue of control. The coach is not allowing the 
athlete to control her own life. 
Dworkin (1988b) says that there must be usurpation of decision-making in one of 
two ways: either a person is prevented from doing what he or she has decided to do, or he 
or she is interfered with in the way in which he or she comes to make the decision. He notes 
the implication of such a view is that there might not be any particular methods of influencing 
others which are necessarily immune to being used paternalistically. For example, Dworkin 
explains that even though some people prefer to make their decisions impulsively, to insist 
that they listen to rational arguments-promoting their interests-would be paternalistic. 
What we have to determine in situations when deciding whether acts are paternalistic, is if 
the act in question could be considered as an attempt to substitute one person's judgment 
for someone else's to promote the latter's benefit. Thus, a person acts paternalistically 
towards another if his or her act is intended to avert some harm or promote some benefit for 
the other, if his or her act is in opposition to the current preferences, desires, or dispositions 
of the other, or if his or her act is a violation of the other's autonomy (conceived of as 
separate from liberty). 
Dworkin (1988b) considers the violation of a person's autonomy to an attempt to 
substitute one's judgment for that of another, and when this is done to promote the interests 
of the other, it is a paternalistic act, a violation of a person's autonomy. Consider the 
example of two tennis players. One refuses to play tennis with the other because the latter 
becomes upset with the frequency with which he loses to the other. So, for the good of the 
other, and against his wishes, the first player refuses to play with the other. While the first 
tennis player is not necessarily interfering with the liberty of the other, Dworkin views this 
situation as a case of paternalism as by refusing to play tennis with the one who becomes 
upset at losing, the first player is acting paternalistically because his refusal to play is 
predicated on the good of the other. Gert et al. (1997) would not view this as an example of 
a paternalistic act since there is no moral rule being broken, and the act does not require 
moral justification: the tennis player is simply acting with a paternalistic attitude. Refusing to 
play tennis is not paternalistic: there is no moral rule being broken, and thus the refusal does 
not need any kind of moral justification. The second player may not want to be treated this 
way, which is what makes this refusal to playa paternalistic action; it is the attitude and the 
reason for the refusal that makes it so, and not the act itself. Paternalistic deception is 
another example of paternalism that does not involve an attempt to control behaviour or to 
apply coercion. For example, a coach may lie to an athlete to prevent him or her from giving 
up too soon in what appears to be a certain loss. The athlete is told that there is more time 
left in a match than there really is, and thus the athlete perseveres because she thinks there 
is sufficient time to score. If she really knew there were only a few minutes remaining, then 
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she would probably stop trying, and so the coach deceives the athlete because it is in her 
best interests to continue playing. 
Brock defines paternalism in a similar way as does Dworkin, although he admits that 
it is not a precise definition: "Paternalism is action by one person for another's good, but 
contrary to their present wishes or desires, and not justified by the other's past or present 
consent" (Brock, 1983, p. 238). Childress (1982) defines paternalism in the following 
manner: "paternalistic action is non-acquiescence in a person's wishes, choices, and 
actions for that person's own benefit" (p. 241). He differentiates between active paternalism 
and passive paternalism as in the former, the agent refuses to accept a person's wish or 
request that he not intervene, while in the latter, the agent refuses to carry out a person's 
wishes or choices. He recognizes that active paternalism is more difficult to justify than 
passive paternalism, but both still require justification. Thus, Brock, Dworkin, and Childress 
all agree that paternalism requires justification, and differ with Gert et al. only in the 
requirement "that the only actions that need moral justification are violation of moral rules" 
(Gert et aI., 1997, p. 201). 
Brock (1983), Childress (1982), and Dworkin (1988b) believe that paternalism 
involves acting in opposition to the wishes of the person toward whom one is acting. While 
Gert et al. (1997) agree that these are among the paradigm cases of paternalism, they also 
think, along with Brock and Dworkin, that this is an inadequate way to characterise 
paternalism because it is possible to act paternalistically toward someone even if you do not 
know whether your action is contrary to his wishes. Not all actions that are contrary to the 
wishes of a person require justification. While Childress acknowledges the difference 
between refusing to accept a person's wish or request not to intervene, and refuSing to carry 
out a person's wishes or choices, he thinks that both need justification. Gert et al. (1997) 
think that an action only counts as paternalistic when refusing to comply with a person's 
wishes involves violating a moral rule. Usually, this involves intervention, but it could involve 
not carrying out a person's wishes when one has an obligation to do so. An example to 
illustrate that acting paternalistically does not require violation of a moral rule is as follows: a 
coach who knows that if given the chance, the divers will try out the high diving board 
despite not having the requisite skills to do so, removes the access ladder. The coach has 
not violated a moral rule by removing the athletes' opportunity to use the high diving board. 
He has no obligation to allow the athletes access, and may actually have a duty of care to 
prevent them from harm. The coach has interfered with the athletes' self-determination and 
has violated their autonomy. While Dworkin would consider this example a case of 
paternalism, Gert et al. would not. Dworkin would likely view the coach's behaviour as 
violating the autonomy of the divers, while Gert et al. would view the behaviour as non-
paternalistic since he did not violate any moral rule toward the divers. Gert et al. would call 
this paternal behaviour, which is done to benefit the athletes, without breaking a moral rule. 
They may also consider this type of protective action to be a duty of the coach, who may 
have a duty of care to protect athletes from harm, despite the fact that the athletes are 
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adults. The coach is being neither deceptive nor coercive in his action; he is coaching in an 
appropriate manner according to the expertise and skill level of the athletes in question. 
Kleinig (1983) is one of the few philosophers who extends his discussion of 
paternalism to include animals as well as humans. Animals may just as well be the object of 
paternalistic impositions as are humans. What is interesting and important in his inclusion of 
animals in this discussion is how in many ways, animals are similar in nature to infants, 
young children, and adults who are not considered "competent" to make reasonable or 
rational deCisions, or to give informed consent. Alan Soble (1976), for example, considers 
paternalism to apply only to competent beings, and not to those considered as being non-
competent. Soble's concern with this issue is addressed by Feinberg's (1986) distinction 
between strong and weak paternalism, or sometimes between hard and soft paternalism. 
Paternalistic action directed towards individuals who are incompetent may not be cases of 
paternalism at all. Kleinig, however, asserts "the dissimilarities in justificatory structure 
required for strong and weak paternalism do not ipso facto make it pOintless or misleading to 
see them both as forms of paternalism" (p. 9). Still, there may be cases where weak 
paternalism may be inappropriately thought of as paternalism at all. Kleinig notes that it is 
not "the wisdom of whatever it is that has elicited the imposition, but with whether whatever 
that is genuinely represents the person's will" (p. 9). Thus, in Mill's example of interfering 
with a man about to cross an unsafe bridge described in Section 6.6, the issue is not the 
danger involved, but the ignorance of the man to have the knowledge that the bridge is 
unsafe: it is not his decision to undertake the risk of crossing an unsafe bridge if he is not 
aware of the risk. He is not making an informed decision. Kleinig is wary of this example 
though, as it is not always the voluntariness aspect of decisions with which we may seek to 
interfere, but also the wisdom of the conduct is an issue of justifiability. In sport, while 
athletes who are considered legal adults are able to provide consent for participation in 
inherently risky activities, it could be argued that an athlete who has a significant stake in the 
outcome of an event may be psychologically unable to provide "informed" consent as he or 
she may be overly influenced by the activity. They may consent to participate in an activity 
that they might not normally agree to, but the outcome of the event is of such magnitude that 
they may not be acting rationally. For instance, an athlete who is already injured may agree 
to participate in a competition, despite the risk of further injury, because of the immediate 
outcome of that event, rather than the long-term consequences of playing injured. 
5.6 Justifications of paternalism 
Moral prescriptions attempt to guide moral action. Morality may even attempt to set 
requirements for action which overrides the self-interest of the persons to whom it is 
directed. The warrant for such a demand must be justified. Paternalistic acts are a kind of 
moral action, an interference in the affairs of another, based on the intention to promote the 
interests of that other, or, on beneficent principles, and thus the intention of the interference 
in the affairs of another may be considered morally acceptable. While acts of paternalism 
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are sometimes considered absolutely immoral, others accept that there are types of 
paternalism that may be justified. Gert et al. (1997) consider the only actions which require 
moral justification are those which violate moral duties, which they have outlined elsewhere. 
Dworkin (1988a; 1988b) and Brock (1983) disagree with this claim, as they believe that 
some actions which are do not necessarily violate the moral rules do require justification. 
The moral rules that Gert et al. (1997) have put forth as an account of morality do 
more than simply guide one towards solving moral problems. Their account of morality, and 
other accounts of morality, alert us to the presence of a moral problem, for example, 
paternalism. If one is aware that violating a moral rule requires justification, then one may be 
able to direct behaviour towards avoiding breaking any moral rules. This avoidance is not 
always possible, however, and not always necessarily desirable, as in the case of 
paternalism. They give the following examples to differentiate between justifiable 
paternalistic intervention, and that which is not justifiable. They give the example of an 
individual who pulls another from the path of a speeding car that he does not see. Because 
this action involved unconsented touching-a violation of his personal freedom-the action 
requires justification. If the justification was that I believe that he would have consented to 
my action had I been able to ask him, and if this confirmation will be given right away, then 
my action is not paternalistic despite satisfying all the other conditions of paternalistic 
behaviour. If I know, however, that he is trying to commit suicide because he is temporarily 
depressed, and I believe that he will thank me later when he recovers from his depression, 
then my action is paternalistic, although it may be justified. Only situations where it is 
impossible to ask for consent prior to acting that immediately forthcoming consent prevents 
the intervention from being counted as a case of paternalism. Another example from Gert et 
al. (1997) involves the "Surprise party". Deception is often required in such situations. If a 
person deceives the other-and the other loves surprise parties, and they are immediately 
delighted when surprised-then the deception is not considered as being paternalistic. 
However, if the party organiser (and the one doing the deceiving) is not quite sure that the 
person loves surprises, but feels that it would be beneficial because he would realize how 
many people care about him-and even if they would initially be upset but by the end of the 
party would enjoy it, then such deception would be paternalistic. These examples 
differentiate between paternalistic and non-paternalistic actions. 
Human relationships are complicated. There are many such relationships that 
involve hierarchies of authority. For example, doctors and patients, teachers and students, 
professors and graduate students, parents and children, bosses and employees. For a 
variety of reasons these relationships are usually not equal but are hierarchical. One person 
or group of persons is the authority, and the other individual or group is not. That this is the 
case is not the issue contested herein; what is under discussion is a defence or justification 
of paternalism in these relationships. Different theories of paternalism, outlined earlier, 
attest to the difficulties in finding a cohesive, agreed upon conception of paternalism. Many 
of those conceptual differences will influence the justifications. For example, Regan 
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develops a conception of personal identity which proposes that for differing moral purposes, 
different stages of the same self may be treated as different persons. This would provide the 
foundation for claiming that, in preventing a person from harming a later self, one is simply 
preventing harm to another, much like Mill's view. While it is certainly more difficult to justify 
paternalism in terms of the treatment of adults, it is not as difficult in relation to children. 
Both situations will be discussed. 
One of the possible justifications for breaking this moral rule against paternalistic 
behaviour is the reasonable probability of harm which may come to an individual if one does 
not interfere. Another possible justification could be that of consent. Various philosophers 
have attempted to justify paternalism on appeals to promoting or maximising good 
consequences, or on the basis of consent-prior, present, or future-among others. When 
one acts paternalistically towards another, the motivation behind the intervention is to benefit 
the one being paternalised. On this basis of beneficence, the consent of the person would 
justify the intrusion. However, when one consents, the intrusion ceases to be paternalistic. 
The next section will discuss justification of paternalistic behaviour, beginning with harm, 
moving then to consent, and finally, to the argument from future selves. 
5.6.1 Justification on the grounds of harm 
The general understanding of paternalism is that a paternalistic act involves 
interference in the affairs of another in order to protect or promote their interests, without 
their full understanding or consent. Because a paternalistic act bypasses an individual's 
moral authority over themselves, it requires justification. Paternalism may be justified if there 
is a reasonable probability of harm coming to an individual without the interference of others. 
In Mill's classic example of a man about to cross a dangerous bridge, interference is 
justified. The man will be harmed if the bridge were to collapse, and since he is ignorant of 
the bridge's condition, he is not making an informed and reasoned decision to cross. Thus, 
paternalistic restraint on his liberty is justified, at least to ensure that the man was aware of 
the risks of crossing the bridge. Since the man was ignorant of the risks, some would not 
classify such intervention by another as paternalistic at all, in the same way that some 
believe intervening in the affairs of someone who is incompetent is not an instance of 
paternalism, since paternalism requires a violation of a person's autonomy (Gert et al. 
(1997). 
5.6.2 Other-regarding conduct: 
If the man was informed, and it was clear that he was competent to fully 
comprehend the dangers associated with his planned crossing, then his actions ought not 
be hindered. However, as Mill outlined, if the man's actions were to harm another, then 
paternalistic interference would be justified. The harm to others principle justifies 
paternalistic acts if the action is predicated on protecting a person from the choices of 
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others. For example, if the man attempted to cross the bridge, after having been informed of 
the associated dangers, and wanted to take a small child across with him, then once again 
interference is justified. According to Mill, the man, being fully informed and having accepted 
the risks of crossing was at liberty to put himself at risk, but by putting another in harm's 
way, his actions could then be intercepted. The child is not competent to give informed 
consent to being harmed, and thus paternalistic action is appropriate. If he was attempting to 
cross the bridge with a fully rational but uninformed adult, then we would also be justified in 
preventing the crossing on the basis of the harm principle, as (soft) paternalism justifies 
intervention of "involuntary choices" (Feinberg, 1986, p. 12). 
While it is always wrong to harm another, sometimes it is justified. For example, a 
doctor may have to harm a patient temporarily in order to secure the patient's long term 
good. When harm to another is not adequately justified or excusable, that action is morally 
blameworthy, and morally indefensible (Feinberg, 1984). Some children who participate in 
high-performance sport are harmed physically and psychologically (Cahill, 1993; Coakley, 
2001; Dacyshyn, 1999; David, 1999). This harm cannot be justified. In addition to the 
physical and psychological harm suffered by some children in this environment, the child's 
right to an open future may also be compromised by their participation in high-performance 
sport. Training a child to become an elite athlete teaches them an exceedingly narrow band 
of skills, with a singular focus that is not easily transferred to other careers, particularly if the 
child has never known a life without their sport. Thus not only does the very participation in 
elite sport restrict a child's future, but it may also harm them directly. These specific harms 
were discussed in detail in chapter three. 
5.6.3 Self-harming conduct: 
When a fully informed and competent adult wishes to put him or herself at risk of 
harm, the justification of paternalism becomes more difficult. All things being equal, 
everyone ought to try to maximize goods such as happiness, and minimize harms, such as 
pain and suffering. We could argue that any person who wishes to put him or herself at risk 
of harm, or to harm him or herself directly is not acting rationally, reasonably, and we may 
question their competence. Mill argues that an adult has such a prerogative; competent 
adults are free to live their lives as self-determining beings, and thus paternalistic acts-
even those which might benefit that individual-cannot be justified. The objective of 
maximizing good and minimizing good in this explanation is not a utilitarian view. 
Utilitarianism directs action with only these imperatives. The moral principles of beneficence 
and nonmaleficence accept these objectives but do not make them the sole objectives in 
guiding moral action. There is a general desire for people to act in ways which promote their 
interests, and which will benefit themselves. Kleinig (1983) suggests that the justificatory 
problems surrounding paternalism could be clarified if several sets of distinctions are taken 
into account. These include positive paternalism-a deliberate act on behalf of another in 
order to secure some kind of positive benefit for them-which is justified on the basis of 
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promoting their interests. His negative paternalism is justified by the notion of protecting 
people from self-caused harms. The rationale for imposing upon another to protect them 
from harm, or to restore them from some kind of harmful condition, is to act in a negatively 
paternalistic fashion. 
As in the above example, Mill would accept paternalistic intervention into self-
harming conduct if it were to ascertain whether the individual was indeed rational and 
competent to make autonomous decisions. The practical difficulty with this determination is 
the accuracy of an evaluation of competency. It is sometimes difficult to determine a 
person's competency, and often time becomes a factor in determining competency before 
harm is done. When it is reasonably clear that the action is seriously and permanently self-
harming, the difficulty of such determination is increased. A person who is temporarily 
incompetent may also be paternalised, with the justification being that they were not able to 
make an informed decision. For example, a person who is inebriated or in a drug-induced 
haze and is in possession of a weapon may justifiably be interfered with if they attempt to 
harm their person, since they are unable to comprehend their actions or the consequences 
of their actions. They would not be acting autonomously. 
State intervention in prohibiting certain behaviours, such as taking drugs, is often 
justified on the basis of preventing harm. The likelihood of harm in taking heroin is high, and 
since legislation and enforcement of prohibition is relatively feasible, utilitarian morality 
demands-and justifies on the basis of harm-reduction-state intervention in such a self-
harming activity. This discussion may be greatly expanded, and while arguments exist that 
the use of illicit drugs is other-harming as well, this example is exceedingly basic. Self-
regarding and other-regarding behaviour is sometimes very difficult to disentangle. 
Individuals are part of families and communities, and as such, self-regarding behaviour 
almost always affects those intimately and even more remotely related to the individual 
engaged in self-harming actions. 
That preventable harm-both personal harm and harm to others-is considered an 
evil is a justification of paternalism (Feinberg, 1986). "If society can substantially diminish the 
net amount of harm to interests caused from al/ sources, that would be a great social gain" 
(Feinberg, 1986, p. 25). However, the problem with paternalism, cautions Feinberg, is that 
hard paternalism is offensive, since "it invades the realm of personal autonomy where each 
competent, responsible, adult human being should reign supreme" (Feinberg, 1986, p. 25). 
Thus the harm principle may be a strong justification of paternalistic interference in the lives 
of others, but it must be used carefully. While we may wish to promote the interests of 
others, we must be very wary of enforCing imposed prudence on others. 
5.6.4 Consent 
The Roman legal maxim, "Volenti non fit injuria", understood generally to mean "to 
one who consents no harm is done" (Feinberg, 1983) would appear to absolve another of 
violating a moral rule against paternalism. The consent of that person would render the 
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action no longer a violation, and further, with consent, the action would no longer be 
paternalistic. Feinberg here refers to harm in the context of a moral wrong, not in the general 
sense of physical or psychological damage. 
According to Rosemary Carter (1977), paternalism is a problem in the general area 
of rights. Her conception of a paternalistic action "is one in which the protection or promotion 
of a subject's welfare is the primary reason for attempted or successful coercive interference 
with an action or state of that person" (Carter, 1977, p. 133). This interference is a violation 
of a person's right to non-interference. Because she does not put forth "a developed and 
convincing theory of rights" within this work on paternalism, she depends on certain 
conjectures, such as "the conditions under which prima facie rights fail to be actual rights" 
(Carter, 1977, p. 134). She considers the condition of when the prima facie right is alienated 
by its possessor so as to be relevant to the justification of paternalism. Actual consent is the 
foundation upon which she builds as being a necessary and sufficient condition for this 
justification. She puts forth two related ways of alienating the right to non-interference: prior 
and subsequent consent, which she contends as being a hypothetical and acceptable 
justification for paternalistic actions: "(1) the possessor of the right can consent in advance to 
interference under certain specified circumstances; or (2) he can subsequently approve of 
interference" (p. 134). Carter expands further on her consent requirements in that a 
paternalistic act will only be justified if one of the two types of consent is given: 
1. prior to the interference the subject explicitly consents to the paternalistic 
intervention; or 
2. subsequent to the interference the subject 
i. explicitly consents to the action; or 
ii. is disposed to consent either upon request, or upon the receipt of a 
relevant piece of information 
(Carter, 1977, p. 136) 
Carter claims that it is an analytic truth that there can never be a justified violation of an 
actual right, and that a paternalistic act can only be justified when a person's prima facie 
right of non-interference is "not an actual right" (p. 134) at all. The two kinds of situations 
where this could result would be (1) where the person has given prior consent to 
interference, and (2) subsequent to an interference, where the person specifically consents 
to that interference, thereby alienating "his right to non-interference for that particular act" (p. 
135). An example of the first would be the case of a dieting friend who requests that one 
prevent him from eating a piece of cake at the party later that day. An example of the second 
would be where the friend thanks the other the following day for having hidden the cake the 
previous evening, as had he seen the cake, he would have eaten some, and he really did 
not want to do that. While Carter's (1977) conception of paternalism is developed with the 
justification of consent as part of the formulation of paternalism itself, Brock does not 
consider consent as being sufficient to justify paternalism. He sees the person being 
115 
paternalised as resisting the interference, and as such, "consent appears an unlikely 
candidate for justification of paternalism" (p. 238). 
Giving free and informed consent to someone else's act is understood as a way of 
surrendering or waiving the right that that action would otherwise abrogate (Srock, 1983). 
The requirements in basic moral principles that regulate paternalism of free and informed 
consent, or of hypothetical consent in the absence of specified conditions, seem acceptable 
only on the condition that moral rights (whose violation is to be avoided) are assumed 
present (Srock, 1983). Since we can-and sometimes do-give consent to what does not 
promote our good, consent cannot be a necessary condition for justification of paternalistic 
action. 
Some philosophers use an appeal to promoting or maximizing good consequences 
as a way of justifying coercive interference with another person's actions (Van De Veer, 
1979). While Van De Veer requires the element of coercion in his conception of paternalism, 
he dismisses Carter's argument, viewing the appeal to consent in order to justify 
paternalistic intervention as being far more complicated than Carter suggests. First, the 
presumption that a person has the right not to be coercively interfered with has to be 
considered, perhaps in that this right may be "non actual" if the person gives permission or 
consent to the interference. Since, for an intervention to be considered an "interference," it 
would seem that consent was absent at the time of the paternalistic intervention. Second, 
Van De Veer considers believes that the idea of prior consent-prior to the intervention-as 
put forth by Carter, is also problematic. Her explanation and his concerns about prior 
consent are discussed next. 
5.6.4.1 Prior consent 
The story of Odysseus and the Sirens provides an example of people's preferences 
for preferences. Odysseus gives the crew of his ship consent to tie him to the mast, and 
then to ignore his protestations when he demands to be freed while the Sirens are 
attempting to lure him and his ship onto the rocks. Odysseus knew that a time would come 
when he would want to go to the Sirens, but he knew also that he had an overriding desire 
not to do so, so he had a preference to override the preferences he knew would be 
forthcoming, which he knew too would not be in his best interests. Thus he gave prior 
consent to have his crew ignore his behaviour in a specific situation so that his preferred 
preferences-to pass safely by the Sirens and sail on to his destination-could be realized. 
Paternalistic interference in this case helps the person engaged in this temporary behaviour 
to achieve their larger preferences which they desire above their indicated behaviours. His 
prior consent justified the paternalistic intervention. Without the paternalistic intervention of 
his crew, Odysseus would not have been able to overcome the lure of the sirens, and he 
foresaw this problem, and circumvented it with his prior consent. In sport, we may see an 
equivalent example of an athlete giving prior consent to the coach to be "induced" into 
pushing him or herself to physical limits; this induction may come in the form of the coach 
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yelling and screaming at the athlete to "push, push, push", and shouting at the athlete to not 
give up in a session. Under so-called "normal" circumstances, few individuals would consent 
to another treating them in that manner; however, they may do so in sport in order to attempt 
to push themselves further, faster, or higher. 
The question in the former example lies in whether the acts which would restrain 
Odysseus, to which he gave prior permission, are really acts of paternalism at all. According 
to Carter's definition of paternalism, coercive interference is a necessary condition of 
paternalistic action. Since prior consent precludes coercive interference, then how is prior 
consent a justification, since according to her definition, prior consent would preclude an act 
from being a case of coercive interference and thus not a case of paternalistic interference. 
Coercive interference must be differentiated from cooperative interference. In the 
case of coercive interference, "the settled preferences of a subject of interference are in 
opposition to the interference; therefore, it is perceived by him as a threat to make him 
worse off, on balance" (Van De Veer, 1979, p. 636). Cooperative interference is not 
perceived as a threat: "he may rightly believe that it is the most effective way to maximize 
his own satisfactions in the long run, given his own less than perfect ability to exercise self-
control in particular types of circumstances" (Van De Veer, 1979, p. 636). Prior consent, 
then, does not justify paternalistic interference as it precludes the intervention from being 
considered paternalistic at all. It may well be interference, but it is not an instance of 
paternalism. 
5.6.4.2 Hypothetical, future-oriented, anticipated, or presumed consent 
Hypothetical, future-oriented, anticipated, and presumed consent all essentially 
point to the same idea: that consent will be obtained at a later time from that of the 
interference in the affairs of another. This kind of future-oriented consent clashes with the 
principle of protecting the rights of others to fully informed agreement. There can be no 
guarantee that there will never be an instance where an assumption of agreement turns out 
to be wrong. Subsequent, future, or anticipated consent to paternalistic intervention can be 
seen as an expression of gratitude or thanks, or approval of what was done-at a later time 
than when the action has taken place (Kleinig, 1983). While some philosophers such as 
Carter (1977) believe that the expectation of receiving consent after an action has taken 
place will justify the paternalistic intrusion, others do not accept future-oriented consent-
even when that consent is virtually certain-as either justifying paternalism, or making the 
action non paternalistic. Gert et al. (1997) believe that the only way consent obtained 
beforehand would be considered non paternalistic is if one would have received consent for 
that action, had one been able to ask for it. They think that even a belief, including a justified 
belief, that the person being interfered with without their consent will immediately thank the 
other individual for doing something to them without their consent, does not alone make an 
action non paternalistic. For example, one of the reasons that obtaining a valid consent from 
a patient is because almost all medical interventions which are not emergencies would be 
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paternalistic if the patient had not consented. Most medical interventions involve some kind 
of pain being caused, or a deprivation of freedom, and thus require the patient's consent as 
justification. "When such actions are done for the benefit of the patient and with his valid 
consent, all medically appropriate treatments are strongly justified. The very same 
intervention with the same benefit but without the patient's consent may not be" (Gert et aI., 
1997, p. 204). 
Some of the concerns relating to an attempt to justify paternalistic intervention 
include the state of competency of the individual being paternalised. If they are temporarily 
incompetent-such as in a state of inebriation-and intervention to prevent them from harm 
is required, then this intervention is not paternalistic, since they are incapable of making a 
reasonable, informed decision. If they are permanently incompetent, then again, the 
intervention is not a paternalistic one. If the individual lacks the information he or she 
requires to make an informed decision-such as Mill's bridge scenario-then again the 
interference is not necessarily paternalistic since the individual was making an "ignorant" 
decision, and may not have made such a decision if he or she was in possession of all 
relevant information. 
There are two further divisions of the concept of future-oriented consent. These are 
actual consent, and anticipated consent. Actual subsequent consent is consent given by the 
person subjected to the paternalistic action or interference after it has occurred. Anticipated 
consent is justified on the grounds that we are able to anticipate the subsequent consent of 
the person, even if some circumstance prevents this consent ever being given to us. This 
future-oriented consent is often used by parents in an attempt to justify paternalistic 
interventions. The "some day they will thank me" approach is based on the idea that one day 
the child will look back, and be thankful that his or her parents forced them to do something 
that at the time they may not have wanted to do. However, this is certainly not always the 
case. The issue of parental decision-making on behalf of their children is discussed 
elsewhere. However, it is unacceptable that people with vested interests deem themselves 
suitable judges of what is ethical. Children do not have moral obligations to their parents to 
become high performance athletes, or indeed, to take on any kind of career at all. 
5.6.4.3 Subsequent consent 
Subsequent consent is approval from the one being paternalised after someone has 
intervened in their affairs, or acted on their behalf. Approval after the act, however, is not 
consent. It is simply that: approval of a prior interference. This kind of approval after 
intervention cannot retroactively rescind an earlier violation of a person's right to autonomy. 
That right stood at the time of intervention, and was abrogated when the other interfered, 
and so even approval after that act cannot change the earlier rights infringement. 
Anticipating that the other will later approve of the intervention may help to reassure the one 
acting paternalistically in determining the expected value of the paternalistic act, but it 
cannot override the actual rights violation. In sport an example would again be the coach 
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who is shouting and screaming at the athlete to push him or herself further and faster' 
, 
generally few individuals would acquiesce to such treatment. In sport, however, the athlete 
may later approve of the coach's techniques ostensibly aimed at improving athletic 
performance. 
5.7 Children and paternalism 
The term 'paternalism' originates or is based on the way in which parents treat 
children, generally a relationship of adult domination and child subordination. Justifications 
of paternalism often rest on the incompetence and vulnerability of children, and not on the 
'need' of parents to dominate them, as suggested in the power differential between the two. 
Arguments against paternalism usually rest on some kind of defence of the imperative of 
respecting autonomy. This may be appropriate in the case of paternalism directed towards 
adults, but is not as strong when applied to children. Generally, paternalistic interventions 
are based on need; children, particularly in their early years, are entirely dependent on 
others for all their needs. Paternalistic interventions are justified in the face of incompetence 
and danger. Parents and guardians necessarily make choices for children who are either 
incapable of making choices, or whose choices may be risky (refusing to attend school) or 
are potentially dangerous and irreversible in effect (falling into a river and drowning, eating 
poison). 
Sometimes our personal relationships, such as those between husband and wife, 
and between parent and child, clash with the demands of morality. We may give up basic 
rights within intimate, personal relationships, but do so within the bounds of trust and care 
and not of moral rules. For example, due to the intimate nature of personal relationships 
between consenting adults, physical interaction occurs that one would not allow with others. 
Within these relationships, talk of rights and duties would lead those involved to question the 
intimacy of the relationship, and thus such talk does not usually intrude into close 
relationships between spouses, parents, children, or even with close friendships. 
Parenthood is a unique relationship, quite different from relations between spouses 
and close friends. Parents control the freedom of their children, restricting and proffering 
access to opportunities that they deem appropriate. Parents make decisions and retain 
control of all kinds regarding their children, relating to education, recreation, and sometimes 
even employment. For instance, parents may garner the wages of their children, if they 
work. For example, a child actor or child athlete who earns income is not legally in control of 
that money, although certain actor's guilds and unions may hold back certain percentages of 
the child's income in trust funds that become accessible when the child reaches the age of 
majority. Otherwise, the parent controls the child's access to earning opportunities and also 
to their income. 
It is presumed that parents care for their children, and seek to promote their 
interests. This is the nature of 'parenthood'. The child-parent relationship is not one of 
partnership-certainly not in the earliest stages of a child's life-because the parent and 
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child are not equal in terms of being rational beings, of competency, knowledge, or in terms 
of power. Jane English (1997) suggests that the relationship between parents and their 
grown children ought to be characterized by friendship based on mutuality, more of a 
friendship than a dependent relationship. 
One of the concerns regarding the unfettered application of paternalism by parents 
and other adults towards children, is that unfortunately, they may be misguided in their 
concerns, and sometimes they may not always have the best interests of the children at 
heart. This is one of the major concerns with promoting paternalism by parents and coaches 
who are involved with children participating in high-performance sport. In this environment, 
these adults may have vested interests in the children's participation, which may lead to 
their exploitation. Thus, one of the problems with the presumption that parents always have 
their child's best interests at heart lies within the nature of high-performance sport. How can 
these parents and coaches, who have vested interests in the children's success in high 
performance sport, deem themselves suitable judges of what is appropriate for their 
children; they become overwhelmed by the so-called rewards, i.e. fame and fortune, and 
may no longer be considered competent in protecting their children. Thus, an application of 
paternalism as the sole means of directing appropriate moral action in the care and 
nurturance of children is limited. 
5.8 Conclusion: Autonomy-respectful paternalism 
While there are certainly legitimate concerns regarding the profligate application of 
paternalism, there are clear and justified uses as well. One of the strongest moral 
arguments for the legitimisation of paternalism is that it is based on the prinCiple of 
benevolence, and an ethic of care. Without a consideration of concern for the interests of 
another, paternalism would not exist, and in a world of inescapable and meaningful 
relationships, we ought to promote rather than to discourage care and concern for the 
interests of others. Paternalistic interventions are premised on actual or allegedly 
benevolent control over other individuals. This control is action intended to promote the 
good of another, but may contrary to their present wishes or desires. Paternalism is not 
justified by consent, as consent precludes an intervention being an instance of paternalism. 
Parents may be justified in acting paternalistically towards their children "if and only if they 
believe that the expected value of the action for the child will be more significant than any 
alternative, and they have reason to trust their own estimation of that benefit, despite the 
opposition of anyone, including the child, who is the recipient of the intervention. 
Within high-performance sport, child-athletes are treated paternalistically by parents 
and coaches and also by others involved in the sport, which is entirely appropriate. In the 
world of elite sport, however, paternalism interventions are sometimes exploitative and 
abusive. I propose a form of autonomy-respectful paternalism for elite sport children that will 
promote their interests in both the short and the long term. This chapter has considered the 
varieties and understandings of paternalism, as well as several justifications of paternalism, 
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such as harm and consent. The discussion on settled preferences highlighted the unsettled 
preferences of children who are still in the stage of determining their needs and desires. In 
order for children to arrive on the threshold of adulthood with their futures wide open, they 
need autonomy-respectful paternalistic protection to safeguard their futures until they 
become competent to make preferences about their life plans. 
There are several categories of autonomy-respecting paternalism, which include soft 
paternalism. This category does not require moral justification as it is not constraining since 
the person for whom one is acting paternalistically is in some way impaired or incompetent. 
Hard paternalism involves at least initial restrictions of liberty or violations of autonomy, and 
is sometimes justified even if the action if completely voluntary. Weak paternalism is hard 
paternalism which involves restrictions of liberty but is morally justifiable as the individuals 
being paternalised are incapable of acting in their own best interests. Strong paternalism is 
hard paternalism that is autonomy-violating paternalism, and as such, constitutes genuine 
violations of self-determination, or individual autonomy that cannot be justified. We turn now 
to consider autonomy, and the relationship between it and paternalism. 
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6.0 Chapter Six: Autonomy 
6.1 Introduction 
A powerful reminder of the paramount importance of freedom to citizens of the 
United States is the proclamation "Live free or die," which is printed on the licence plates of 
the state of New Hampshire. The concept of autonomy is based on the idea of choice. 
Individuals value highly the freedom to make their own choices about their lives, and to live 
as autonomous agents free from the interference of others. Interference with an individual's 
decision-making, or constraints on his or her actions, often results in moral indignation, 
particularly when that interference or those constraints claim justification on the grounds of 
paternalism. Thus, restrictions of individual liberty always require justification. All things 
being equal, individuals prefer to have the freedom to make their own choices concerning 
their own lives. I n arguing their case for liberty, others have argued that absence of coercion 
is a necessary, albeit an insufficient, condition "for individual self-realization and social 
progress, and for such specific goods as individual spontaneity, social diversity, and the full 
flowering of various moral and intellectual virtues" (Feinberg and Gross, 1977, p. 3). Most 
individuals are quite aware of the preciousness of our own personal liberty, and can be 
expected to suppose that personal liberty is equally valued, and equally worth respecting, in 
other individuals. 
The notion of autonomy is derived from two Greek words, autos, meaning "self', 
and nomos, meaning "rule" or "law". Autonomy means self-rule or self-determination, and 
thus one who is autonomous is someone who thinks and acts independently, rather than 
being controlled by others. The autonomous person is the creator, the author, the director, 
the captain, of his or her own life. Autonomy may be contrasted with heteronomy, which is 
derived from heteros, meaning "other" and nomos. An individual is heteronymous if his or 
her will or desire is under the control of another. Failure to be autonomous is not always 
necessarily due to the control of another, as there are other kinds of constraints that may 
interfere with a moral agent being self-determining. 
In our western democratic societies, the notion of liberty is held in high esteem. This 
helps explain why the view of the human agent as one who is self-determined and self-
expressive is so strongly held and defended, and why personal autonomy is held within the 
realm of inviolable sanctuary (Feinberg, 1986). The concept of autonomy also implies a 
value in being able to control one's own resources and in leading a self-directed life. A moral 
agent has the capacities and dispositions of reason and rationality to guide personal 
decision-making, and the freedom to choose amongst options. Making one's own choices 
and decisions are viewed as essential components of mature, independent, and responsible 
adulthood. Individuals are considered to be acting autonomously when they themselves 
make decisions that affect their lives, and then act in accordance with those decisions. 
These individuals are thus considered "autonomous agents" and their acts are "autonomous 
acts". 
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For an action to qualify as being autonomous, it must be: (i) intentional; (ii) based on 
sufficient understanding; (iii) without controlling influences that determine action 
(Beauchamp and Childress, 2001). The first requirement, that an action be intentional is not 
a matter of degree; either an act is intentional or it is not. The second and third 
requirements, however, are not as clear. An act may satisfy generally the requirements of 
understanding and not having been influenced or controlled, and thus actions may fall 
somewhere along a continuum, being autonomous by degrees. On the one end autonomy 
may be fully present, and on the other end it may be wholly absent. Children are a group 
who begin as entirely dependent on adults for survival, without any capacity for autonomy, 
to exhibiting varying degrees of autonomous action in the later stages of childhood and 
adolescence. The elderly may exhibit the same kinds of autonomy but in reverse to children, 
becoming less autonomous rather than more. Beauchamp and Childress (2001) explain that 
for an action to be autonomous within this framework "it needs only a substantial degree of 
understanding and freedom from constraint, not a full understanding or a complete absence 
of influence" (p. 59). They suggest that in reality, people's actions are rarely, if ever, fully 
autonomous. Thus, "to restrict adequate decision-making by individuals to the ideal of fully 
or completely autonomous decision-making strips their acts of any meaningful place in the 
practical world" (p. 59). Consequential decisions ought to be based on substantially 
autonomous, but not necessarily fully autonomous actions by individuals. The determination 
between substantially and fully autonomous actions may be difficult to determine, and may 
even appear to be arbitrary. Thresholds delineating substantially autonomous decisions may 
be carefully held against fixed objectives, such as meaningful decision-making and 
consequences. Beauchamp and Childress hold that appropriate criteria for determining 
substantial autonomy are best addressed in particular contexts. 
While we accept that moral autonomy generally applies primarily to adults, children 
and adolescents-in their progressive development towards adulthood and its 
competencies-begin learning self-direction and deCision-making early on in their lives. One 
may be competent to make self-regarding decisions in certain spheres of life earlier on than 
in others. For example, a child may be able to make simple decisions about appropriate 
clothing and food before he or she may be able to do so in other aspects of his or her life. 
Autonomy has assumed increasing importance in contemporary philosophy, 
principally in the field of ethics. Applied ethics, and particularly bioethics, holds the concept 
of autonomy as fundamental in determining how best to guide action and solve moral 
problems. The basic premise of the principled approach championed by Beauchamp and 
Childress is that problems may be appropriately identified, analysed, and resolved by 
referring to a set of four principles, each of which corresponds to a prima facie, or 
conditional, obligation. The four principles do not constitute a general moral theory, but 
rather provide a framework for identifying and reflecting on moral problems. These 
principles are the principle of respect for autonomy, which is the norm of respecting the 
decision-making capacities of autonomous persons; the principle of nonmaleficence, the 
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norm of avoiding the causation of harm; the principle of beneficence which involves a group 
of norms for providing benefits and balancing benefits against risks and costs; and the 
principle of justice, the group of norms for distributing benefits, risks, and costs fairly. This 
principle-based approach deals with several prima facie principles of obligation. These 
principles sometimes conflict, which then requires an assessment as to which principle has 
overriding weight or significant in any particular set of circumstances. The principle of 
respect for autonomy in this biomedical context requires that health-care professionals not 
interfere with a patient's autonomy, but more generally, it remains that respect for autonomy 
maintains the requirement that others not interfere with an individual's right to make his or 
her own decisions. The principlist approach is certainly not the only approach in this 
particular field of applied ethics, but is the dominant one to guide moral action. 
Not all agree with the promotion of autonomy to the heights it has been elevated. 
Macintyre (1981) and Sandel (1984) have both presented their dissatisfaction with the 
principle of respect for autonomy as part of communitarian critiques of liberalism in ethics 
and political philosophy. They argue that our individualist culture neglects the importance of 
community and shared values, and that individual rights, freedom of choice, and 
independence disregard the moral importance of commitments and obligations that arise 
from our shared history and community ties. Bioethicist Daniel Callahan (1994) has 
criticised the field of bioethics for its individualism, and its great emphasis on autonomy, 
overshadowing a concern for the common good, or public interest. Supporters of liberalism, 
such as Joel Feinberg (1990) have argued that liberalism does include a conception of the 
common good, in addition to a number of shared interests such as mutual tolerance, 
respect, public service, patriotism, charity, and cooperation. 
Autonomy involves respect for other individuals since the very nature of life and 
community necessarily involves relationships, all of which ought to be based on the 
fundamental notion of respect for others. Certain relationships such as those that are 
oppressive or dependent may impair autonomy. The authority of states, religious 
organizations, and other communities that legislate individual and group actions may 
diminish autonomy. However, if moral agents freely choose to accept the direction of an 
authority, institution, or community, then there is no fundamental inconsistency within these 
relationships. Oppressive socialisation can interfere with the development and formation of 
autonomy "by forming an agent's desires, beliefs, emotions, and attitudes through thwarting 
the development of the capacities and competencies essential for autonomy, and through 
various restrictions and limitations on the range of options for action" (Beauchamp and 
Childress, 2001, p. 61). 
While certain relationships as those outlined above may impair autonomy, authentic 
human relationships ought to respect and even promote autonomy. Fried (1974) considers 
authentic human relationships to be those that manifest four fundamental characteristics: 
lucidity, autonomy, fidelity, and humanity. These four rubrics converge towards the integrity 
of interpersonal relationships. In a human relationship, a person is to be treated without 
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deceit or violence. The characteristic humanity stresses that each person is a unique 
individual with a correspondingly unique biology, as well as individualized needs 
, 
weaknesses, strengths, and life plans. Humanity means attention to, and respect for, this 
"full human particularity" by those who enter into relations with the individual. Autonomy, or 
self-determination, implies the need and the capacity to deliberate about personal goals, 
and the liberty to act accordingly. A relationship that fosters autonomy is notable for the 
absence of fraud, force, and the tendency to use another human being as a disposable 
resource. Even if a person is fully informed, he or she cannot be coerced or forced into 
action against his or her will, as this would violate that individual's right to autonomy. Fried 
suggests there to be a no more controversial notion that that of liberty. "The intuitive notion 
is of liberty to dispose of one's self, that is of one's person, one's body, mind and capacities 
according to a plan and a conception fully chosen for one's self' (Fried, 1974, p. 102). 
6.2 Historical development of autonomy 
The etymological derivations of the term "autonomy" is from the Greek autos ("self') 
and nomos ("rule," governance," or "law"), combining to refer to the self-rule or self-
governance of independent City-states. Within philosophical and political literature, this early 
conception of the self-governance of city-states has been extended to the modern 
conception of "autonomy" which has been applied towards individuals, and has been used 
in various contexts to refer to "self-governance, liberty rights, privacy, individual choice, 
freedom of the will, causing one's own behavior, and being one's own person" (Beauchamp 
and Childress, 2001, p. 58). 
One of the foremost moral philosophers, Immanuel Kant, contended that there are 
unconditional categorical imperatives of morality, which focus on how we ought to act; he 
called these imperatives "commands of reason". He formulated his Categorical Imperative 
as a formula for universal law. The general conception of his primary Categorical Imperative 
may be understood to be that individuals (moral agents) ought to act in such a way that 
they, as rational beings, could will those acts to be universal laws. Kant believed strongly 
that human beings are moral agents who legislate or will for themselves universal laws. 
Crucial to his conception of moral agents is that they are rational beings who are capable of, 
and do, act independently-or autonomously-of their particular desires as sensuous 
human beings. He understood human dignity to consist largely in autonomy, which he 
understood as the ability of each person to determine individually his or her personal 
conception of the good life. Dignity is associated more with the power of a person to 
consider and adopt his or her own views than it is with any particular conception of the good 
life. Kant believed that moral agency presumed autonomy of the will. He thought that we 
ought to attribute some sense of autonomy to the moral agent since moral agents are those 
possessing the capacities and dispositions to make their own decisions according to 
categorical imperatives. These moral agents act according to a sense of duty; as rational 
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beings, they behave in accordance with their actions being a universal law. The moral agent 
acts morally because he or she understands that it is a duty to act so, that there is a moral 
obligation to act in such a manner. 
While Kant conceived of autonomy as moral autonomy, others have conceived of it 
rather as personal autonomy. Personal autonomy emphasizes the importance of personal 
preferences and personal options, and the agent's deliberate and reasoned choice amongst 
those options. Kant's conception of moral autonomy was duty-based, and oriented towards 
a moral obligation to act rightly in the universal sense. He saw right action as rational choice 
in accordance with the precepts of morality. Kant's autonomy is thus the ability to know what 
morality requires of a moral agent, and it serves to direct the moral agent to act on objective 
and universal rules of conduct, sanctioned only by reason. Desires are not legislated by 
reason, and thus the agent who acts upon desires and not on reason is heteronymous. 
A society which promotes autonomy in its citizens is considered a liberal society, in 
that it promotes freedom and self-determination of and for its citizens. A liberal society is 
one which remains neutral on any particular substantive view about the ends of life or what 
constitutes the good life (although by promoting autonomy it is judging autonomy to be 
valuable). This liberal society does not prescribe any particular variety of the good life, other 
than that the good life is one which is self-determined, but ensures equal respect in that 
citizens deal fairly with each other and the state deals equally with all. Negative liberty is 
"the claim that the liberty of a person is strictly a function of the restraints that the agent 
faces in the carrying out of her decision (however the concept of a restraint is construed)" 
(Christman, 1991, p. 343). Negative liberalists claim that the state ought to protect individual 
freedom without formulating and prescribing the goals and purposes championed by free 
people. The person him or herself does not factor into the freedom of that agent: the 
freedom is a constant. Those espousing positive liberty "insist that the person and her 
capacity to formulate her desires, values, and goals is a crucial element in the calculation of 
the freedom of the agent" (Christman, 1992, p. 343). 
The autonomy of an individual precedes the autonomy of a group. Group rights 
have the potential to extinguish the abilities of individuals within those groups to make their 
own life choices, therefore in such cases the individual must be supported against the 
group. There are times, however, when group rights may supersede individual rights, as in 
the case where national security might be compromised by individuals who claim personal 
rights to privacy might overrule the state's right to protect all citizens. For example, 
individual identity cards with fingerprints and photo identification may be required to be 
carried at all times by citizens so as to prevent crimes. 
To guard their longevity and future, some groups are authoritarian and prevent 
others from exercising their autonomy. For example, the Amish have an interest in 
preventing individuals within the community from leaving, as it may mean ultimately the 
demise of that community. In order to guard and mould the shape of the children's lives 
within the community, the Amish do not allow their children to pursue "higher learning" 
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beyond grade eight, as that learning and knowledge about the world at large could 
potentially destroy their community. The Amish have a concept of life almost entirely 
separate from the world and its values. 
The Amish believe that compulsory school attendance after grade eight takes away 
from their community both physically and emotionally during what is considered the 
formative adolescent stage of development, and indeed, threatens to undermine Amish 
community and religious practice as they exist in the present. The Supreme Court of the 
United States ruled that the Amish may withdraw their children from school after the eighth 
grade, as the compulsory school-attendance law violated the rights of the Amish under the 
Free Exercise of Religion Clause of the First Amendment (Feinberg, 1980). Amish parents 
are able to foreclose the futures of their children, contrary to the best interests of their 
children. These children will not be able to make an informed choice between the Amish 
way of life, and that of any other way of life in the outside world. This case involves the 
fundamental interest of parents only, rather than that of the state or of the children 
themselves, to promote the religious future and education of their children. Rather than 
preparing a child to move into the adult world with as many open opportunities as possible 
so as to maximize his or her chances for self-fulfilment, these children enter the adult world 
with a very narrow scope and ultimately, with no choice in their life plans. Admittedly, 
education in large, modern high schools may be viewed as a kind of indoctrination into 
secular values; however, with a broader knowledge of the world at large comes the 
opportunity to learn about other lifestyles, and the freedom to make informed choices about 
which life style to pursue. The Amish lifestyle does not invite choice. 
The value of autonomy that grounds the ethics of teachers, coaches, and parents 
should preclude in aSSisting parents in a project that so dramatically narrows the autonomy 
of the fledgling adult-to-be. They need to question how experiences might interfere with the 
child's right to an open future, and how any experience might benefit the child's future. 
Parents invest their time, emotion, money, among other things in their children, and in their 
hopes and dreams for them. Parents whose preferences for their children are so compelling 
for them to take active steps in controlling their children's lives, are committed to certain 
specific expectations which may subtly or overtly limit that child's development and coerce 
them into following their parents' values and dreams, rather than their own. 
6.3 Defining autonomy 
The term "autonomy" has been used in different fields with different definitions, 
many of which have been influenced by its philosophical and political use. Gerald Dworkin 
(1978) wrote a "A person is morally autonomous if and only if his moral prinCiples are his 
own" (p. 157). He selected six more specific characterizations of what it might mean for 
moral principles to be one's own: 
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1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
A person is morally autonomous if and only if he is the author of his moral 
principles, their originator. 
A person is morally autonomous if and only if he chooses his moral principles. 
A person is morally autonomous if and only if the ultimate authority or source of 
his moral principles is his will. 
A person is morally autonomous if and only if he decides which moral principles 
to accept as binding upon him. 
A person is morally autonomous if an only if he bears the responsibility for the 
moral theory he accepts and the principles he applies. 
A person is morally autonomous if and only if he refuses to accept others as 
moral authorities, i.e., he does not accept without independent consideration the 
judgement of others as to what is morally correct. 
(Dworkin, 1978, p. 157) 
This variety of different definitions of autonomy shows that one ought not to assume all who 
use the term do so with exactly the same intentions. 
Autonomy is to be distinguished from freedom. A person may be free to do as he or 
she wishes, but may not be autonomous; for example, a person may be free to act however 
he or she wishes, but actually does only what he or she is told is free but not autonomous. 
Likewise, a person may not be free but may act autonomously. For example, someone who 
is imprisoned may not be free, but if he or she does what he or she wishes to do within the 
confines of little freedom, then he or she is acting autonomously (Barrow & Milburn, 1990). 
6.3.1 Conceptions of personal autonomy 
Feinberg (1986) categorizes the application of autonomy towards individuals as 
being separable into four meanings. First, it may refer to the actual capacity to govern 
oneself, which is a matter of degree; second, it may refer to the actual condition of self-
government and its associated virtues; third, it may refer to an ideal of character stemming 
from that conception; or fourth, applying autonomy towards individuals may also refer to the 
sovereign authority to govern oneself, the right to self-determination, which is absolute 
within one's own moral boundaries, territory, realm, sphere, or domain. Thus, Feinberg's 
autonomy consists of a potential, an actuality, a value, and a norm. Paralleling these 
meanings of the term "autonomous" is the term "independent" which corresponds to "the 
capacity to support oneself, direct one's own life, and be finally responsible for one's own 
decisions; the de facto condition of self-sufficiency which consists in the exercise of the 
appropriate capacities when the circumstances permit; the ideal of self-sufficiency; and the 
sense, applied mainly to political states, of de jure sovereignty and the right of self-
determination" (Feinberg, 1986, p. 28). 
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6.3.2 Autonomy as capacity 
Capacity refers to the threshold conception of natural competence outlining the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the sovereign right of self-government ascribed to 
individuals. Capacities of competence vary by individual and by degree; some people are 
more intelligent, prudent, sagacious, self-reliant, authentic, or possess more integrity than 
others. Differences in life circumstances and experiences will too determine and influence 
various competencies. 
6.3.3 Autonomy as condition: 
This sense of autonomy is outlined as being a condition to which we aspire as an 
ideal, both in itself and in what it may render-responsibility, self-esteem, and personal 
dignity. Despite having the capacity for and the right to self-government, a slave would not 
in possession of the opportunity to exercise his or her rights and capacities. Generally 
speaking, however, opportunity is available for most people, and it is the autonomous 
person who capitalizes of opportunity. So understOOd, autonomy refers to a collection of 
virtues, all of which come in various degrees from a conception of self-determination. This 
collection of virtues is linked, sometimes rather tenuously, to the generating idea of self-
government. While each of them is also causally and conceptually interconnected, 
individually they fall short of the composite ideal of autonomy. Feinberg outlines a twelve-
part framework of the concept of autonomy, each of which is tied to the central concept but 
is insufficient in any individual piece: 
a. Self-possession: the autonomous person has no keeper, he is "his own man" and 
"she is her own woman;" there is no sense of property or belonging to any other in 
this conception. 
b. Distinct self-identity (individuality): the autonomous person is unique; they are no 
'shadow' of anyone else, and have a particular sense of identity. They are not 
defined in relation to anyone else, as they stand alone. 
c. Authenticity; self-selection: Again, the autonomous individual is unique and speaks 
only for him or herself, not as a 'mouthpiece' for any other. This person is in control 
of his or her tastes, opinions, ideals, goals, values, and preferences without undue 
influence from anyone else. He or she is not manipulated or coerced by others, and 
does not conform for the sake of conforming. The oppOSite of an authentic individual 
would be one who is "other-directed" or an uncritical conformist. The autonomous 
individual in this case is authentic in every way, including in his or her opinions and 
values, which are subject to rational scrutiny, and open to change if reason or will 
dictates such change. "The authentic person will buy his clothes in part to match his 
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purse, his physical characteristics, and his functions; he will select his life style to 
match his temperament, and his political attitudes to fit his ideals and interests. He 
cannot be loftily indifferent to the reactions of others, but he is willing to be moved 
by other considerations too" (Feinberg, 1986, p. 33). 
d. Self-creation (self-determination): A person must already be in possession of some 
kind of character before he or she can change or choose a new character, says 
Feinberg (1986). This person applies some already accepted principles which 
adhere to rules of rational procedure to reflect rationally. While a person cannot 
literally be self-made, an autonomous individual in this sense rationalizes and 
consciously directs and forms the self, to the extent possible, so it is a self-re-
creation. Some principles, particularly the commitment to reasonable self-criticism 
need to be "implanted" in a child if he or she is to have a reasonable opportunity of 
playing a role in the direction of his or her own growth. Self-creation in the authentic 
person is a flexible process which rationally accommodates new experiences and 
old policies; this process of self-revision must have been entrenched at a young age 
by parents, educators, peers, and strengthened by our own employment of it. 
e. Self-legislation: Immanuel Kant understood autonomy in the literal sense, in that our 
rational will is the legislator of the law to which it is subject. In other words, in 
accordance with his categorical imperative, Kant believed we are obliged to follow 
and accept the moral law because we are also the very authors of that law: Our 
actions ought to be such that our will must be to have those actions accepted as 
universal law, and as such, the authority of the moral law, the source of its binding 
obligation, is our own rational will. Feinberg criticises this view of autonomy since it 
appears to support anarchy ("I make my own laws"), while Simultaneously 
supporting moral rectitude at the expense of genuine independence; he would 
prefer a conception of autonomy which avoids such extremes. 
f. Moral authenticity: this conception of autonomy is a special case of the concept of 
authenticity. An autonomous person is shaped by moral beliefs which are derived 
from a committed process of continually reconstructing the value system the 
individual inherited. The morally authentic person is not conforming mindlessly, or 
acting blindly obediently, and neither are they being coerced or intimidated; he or 
she has moral beliefs which are deeply rooted in reason, and will change those 
views only in response to reasoned argument. Someone who has "shallow" 
convictions-morally inauthentic-may easily be swayed or convinced by seduction, 
indoctrination, or suggestion into changing his or her moral beliefs. When 
confronted by conflicting self-imposed duties, the morally authentic person "must be 
his own moral court; he must weigh and balance interests, reconcile and distinguish 
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cases, reason and decide, on his own" (Feinberg, 1986, p. 38). For example, if a 
person decides to become a vegetarian based on his or her own moral reasons 
, 
then he or she assumes a duty whose binding force comes from his or her own 
making. The morally authentic person does not necessarily "manufacture" or create 
his or her own moral principles, however this person has principles which are of his 
or her own choosing. 
g. Moral independence: if we think of personal moral autonomy as de facto 
independence simply, then an uncommitted person is an autonomy-hoarder. For 
example, someone who does not have any children, no pets, lives far from 
neighbours, is not engaged in any significant relationship such as marriage, refrains 
from promises to others, and joins no partnerships, may be considered an 
uncommitted person, maximally independent of the demands of others. It might be 
difficult to think of such a person as having any of the moral virtues which thrive on 
involvement, such as compassion, loyalty, cooperativeness, engagement, or trust. 
In some ways, we inherit some commitments, such as the commitment to care for 
our parents; we had no choice or control over being born, but have the moral 
responsibility associated with looking after those who did the same for us when we 
were young and in need of care ourselves. We ought to conceive of de facto 
independence in a way that would not diminish it by the existence of voluntary 
commitments, although such commitments ought to be at least below a reasonable 
threshold. In a large scale example, the United States has undertaken certain 
obligations by being part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.). Part 
of that agreement is the acceptance of an obligation to consider an attack on any of 
the N.A.T.O. group as being an attack on any of the involved countries, and 
therefore an agreement to aid any and all those involved in the alliance. This 
obligation and commitment to others ought not to be considered a diminishment of 
its degree of independent self-government. 
h. Integrity (self-fidelity): someone of integrity is a person committed and dedicated to 
his or her own principles. Integrity thus presupposes moral authenticity. While 
integrity is a virtue linked closely to our conception of autonomy, autonomy is not 
the whole virtue, and therefore there may be yet be negative aspects of autonomy. 
A person may have strong, authentic moral principles, but might betray those 
principles by an overriding motivation, such as passionate pleasure (as in 
seduction), or self-gain (as in bribery). Moral weakness, then, is a failure of acting 
according to one's authentic principles. Criticism directed to one who betrays his or 
her moral principles is harsh when the moral failure is related to passionate 
pleasure or self-gain; however, when an individual compromises his or her moral 
principles for neither self-regarding or malevolent motives, but rather "when pity, 
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mercy, sympathy, benevolence, or compassion erodes one's resolution, judgment is 
not as harsh" (Feinberg, 1986, p. 40). 
i. Self-control (self-discipline): a person who governs him or herself from within, is in 
control, or self-governed. When, however, a person is neither governed from 
outside, nor in control him or herself internally, then no one is in control. This 
situation may be linked to the analogy of a political state of anarchy: "a condition 
which is neither heteronomy (government by another), nor autonomy (government 
by self), but no government at all" (Feinberg, 1986, p. 41). If an individual is not in 
reasoned control of his or her own person, then his or her principles, ideals, goals, 
and values, are meaningless and unconnected to the "real" or "true" self. The 
reasoning inner core directs and regulates a person, and without this, the individual 
would fail to be in control of him or herself, thus failing self-governance, and lacking 
in self-control and self-discipline. 
j. Self-reliance: where possible, the morally independent person avoids unnecessary 
ties with others, as one who is self-reliant does not rely on others' commitments. 
While in some respects self-reliance to be considered a traditional virtue, there are 
ways in which it is not so much a virtue-such as where a person deliberately 
avoids reciprocal commitments. Self-reliance is more admirable when being 
conceived of as a trait which enables an individual to rely upon him or herself when 
others fail. Having inner resources such as strength, courage, ingenuity, toughness, 
and resilience ought to be regarded as a virtue. Ultimately, a person has to rely on 
him or herself, and the knowledge that one can rely upon oneself ought to be 
reassuring and self-affirming. "A person's highest good in life is self-fulfillment, and 
by its very nature, fulfillment is not something that can be achieved for the self by 
someone else. Others can help and provide necessary means, but no one can 
simply make a gift to a person of his self-fulfillment" (Feinberg, 1986, p. 42). 
k. Initiative (self-generation): an autonomous person in possession of personal tastes, 
opinions, and authentic principles creates his or her own ideas, projects, 
enterprises, and strategies. The autonomous individual initiates activity and does 
not rely upon others to generate proposals or direction for his or her own life. If a 
person rarely takes personal initiative to formulate endeavours of his or her own, 
then he or she could be considered deficient in autonomy. 
I. Responsibility for self: when an individual acts autonomously, responsibility for his 
or her actions and resulting states of affairs may be ascribed to that moral agent. If 
the person's actions were not autonomous, or the person was not an autonomous 
"actor" then retrospective responsibility judgments are revised or withdrawn. For 
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example, if the person was under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or otherwise not 
in "control" of his or her actions, then that person would not necessarily be held 
"responsible" for him or herself. If he or she was governed by another (as in the 
situation where he or she was acting only as an agent of another, a servant, or 
pawn) then also, the consequences may not be attributed to that agent. Also, if the 
person's opinions and tastes are inauthentic, representing instead those of his or 
her manipulators or peer group, then again, he or she "is not even subject, without 
severe qualification, to the judgment that they truly represent or belong to him" 
(Feinberg, 1986, p. 43). De facto autonomy thus seems to be a presupposed 
condition of judgments of responsibility. 
Responsibility itself contains a specific set of virtues; it involves people being responsible for 
actions and consequences, being responsible to others, and of being responsible in its 
broadest sense. Someone who is responsible is a capable subject of assignments of 
responsibility, and is also a qualified subject of retrospective ascriptions of responsibility, by 
virtue of possessing the appropriate traits for exercising responsibility. They are steady, 
trustworthy, and reliable, and have the virtues of good judgment, initiative, and self-reliance 
which include the ability to use discretion in problem-solving: altogether, this person can do 
things on his or her own. A responsible person is juxtaposed with the irresponsible person, 
and the nonresponsible-or incompetent-person. While this list of virtues may overlap that 
list of autonomy-defining virtues, the list only overlaps but does not coincide: 
Independent judgment, self-reliance, and initiative are on both lists, but 
trustworthiness, dependability, steadiness (as opposed to recklessness) and 
especially the willingness to take on new commitments are more firmly on the 
responsibility list than they are on the autonomy list, just as moral independence 
and self-legislation, sometimes assigned to the autonomy list, have no necessary 
place in the account of responsibility. 
(Feinberg, 1986, p. 44) 
Assigning tasks of responsibility which require initiative, judgment, and perseverance to a 
child Thus, autonomy contributes to responsibility, and responsibility contributes to 
autonomy. promotes the development of self-possession, distinct identity, authenticity, self-
discipline, self-reliance, and the other components of the autonomous idea. 
These twelve components of the conception of autonomy as "condition" are each 
insufficient to be more than simply a 'piece' of the broader understanding of autonomy. 
Some of these elements are vague, raising doubt as to whether all of them are in fact 
virtues to begin with. 
6.3.4 Autonomy as ideal 
In order for the conception of autonomy outlined above to be heralded as an ideal, 
this conception requires clarification and focus. Even a refined conception of autonomy will 
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remain only a narrow ideal, since autonomy itself is insufficient for complete moral 
excellence. Further analysis may not dismiss "a selfish but autonomous person, a cold, 
mean, unloving but autonomous person, or a ruthless, or cruel autonomous person", 
because, "after all, a self-governing person is no less self-governed if he governs himself 
badly, no less authentic for having evil principles, no less autonomous if he uses his 
autonomy to commit aggression against another autonomous person" (Feinberg, 1986, p. 
45). The aggressor might be morally deficient, but that deficiency is not in autonomy; an 
individual might well be rich in autonomy. Thus, refining a conception of ideal autonomy is 
hopefully of the view that it is better to be autonomous than not to be so. 
One ought to question the validity of some of the aforementioned components of 
autonomy, earlier called virtues, and wonder if they truly are virtues at all. Others are virtues 
only within a narrow scope of limitations, and yet others seem to be confused in their very 
conception. For example, the Kantian notion of self-legislation which has long been affiliated 
with the concept of autonomy, proffers two conflicting views: on the one hand there is the 
"picture of a proud anarchist who accepts no commitments he has not himself made, who 
can commit or uncommit himself at will to anyone or anything, and is in principle capable of 
"inventing" his own moral principles" (Feinberg, 1986, p. 45); on the other hand is what 
Rawls also saw as Kant's rationalistic and objectivist orientation, "a concept of a person who 
can act autonomously even when he acts against his will, if his compelled behavior would 
have been chosen by some hypothetical persons more "rational" that he" (Feinberg, 1986, 
p.45). Less confusing a concept is moral independence, however, it may not be any more 
attractive an ideal, for it is one thing to avoid the state of moral overcommitment, but quite 
another to calculatingly arrange one's life to minimize involvement with others-and thus 
commitment to others-on the grounds that commitment per se would diminish autonomy. 
Integrity might also be overrated as a virtue, particularly when we begin to find it 
objectionable. When an autonomous person is self-governed by what may be called narrow 
or cruel principles, it is a "virtue" that makes that person as rigid and repellant. When self-
reliance is taken to an extreme, it becomes an anti-social virtue and may even inhibit 
cooperation in group endeavours. Self-reliance may become tinged with pride or self-
righteousness. Self-control requires subtle but complex management among diverse 
elements within the self so as to be rational and worthy. Some of the virtues of autonomy, 
such as self-reliance, independence, and self-control, can certainly be true virtues, but 
Feinberg cautions that they may not be good in great quantities: "they are virtues only when 
their elements exist in just the right degree, neither too little nor too much" (p. 46). 
Human beings tend to thrive as social beings: as constituents of ongoing 
communities, which are defined by reciprocal bonds of obligation, common traditions, and 
institutions. These relationships between individuals affect our thinking about personal 
autonomy. Each individual comes into the world with links to other people, and those 
relationships expand as that individual makes and breaks social connections in every 
sphere: family, career, and social environments. The human world does not and can not be 
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comprised of over a billion separate sovereign individuals, with each individual exercising 
his or her own individual autonomy about where, what, how, and when he or she shall be 
, 
and each individual capable of surviving and even flourishing in complete independence of 
all other humans. Our notions of the ideal human virtue has to be consistent with the view of 
people being part of ongoing communities with various relationships rather than isolated, 
wholly independent individuals. The concept of autonomy ought to be some kind of 
equilibrium between totalitarian collectivism and atomic individualism. The ideal, then, of the 
autonomous person is authentic individual whose self-determination is as complete as is 
consistent with the requirement that that individual is part of a community. 
6.3.5 Autonomy as right 
This final sense of moral autonomy is described as a sense of sovereignty. The 
analogy is drawn from sovereign nations to sovereign persons, in that both senses possess 
an ultimate authority and/or power: the "uncommanded commander" (Feinberg, 1986). This 
analogy is explained through examining the difference between local autonomy and full 
sovereignty. Consider, for example, the nation of Great Britain (officially entitled the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), with constituent parts of Scotland, Northern 
Ireland, and Wales. Great Britain, the sovereign nation, has granted local autonomy to each 
of these (each of which has been granted power in varying forms), however it has not 
granted full sovereignty (the right of self-determination) to any constituency. The term 
"devolution" is sometimes used to explain granting of limited "autonomy", in that only some 
areas of responsibility are delegated to subordinate officers or committees (Feinberg, 1986). 
Thus, none of Wales, Northern Ireland, or Scotland are full sovereign nations, separate and 
independent from all other nations, with full rights of self-determination; however, they have 
been granted local autonomy, or devolution, in various forms to oversee various aspects of 
local administration. 
Sovereignty and political autonomy are different in at least two respects: autonomy 
is partial and limited, and sovereignty is whole and undivided. As in the above example, the 
autonomous region governs certain limited parts, while the sovereign state is entirely 
governed by itself, even when it delegates autonomy. The other main difference here is that 
the authority of the sovereign state is a right, whereas the authority of the autonomous 
region is a revocable privilege. While the sovereign grants autonomy freely at his or her 
pleasure and withdraws it at will, local autonomy is delegated. Sovereignty is basic and 
foundational; it may be considered an ultimate source of authority. 
Personal sovereignty-if, as Feinberg queries-there is indeed such an entity, 
belongs to all competent adults. It is not held by any newborn infants, but may be held 
ultimately by children, although before the point of qualification, those children may be 
understood to have various degrees of "local autonomy" (Feinberg, 1986, p. 48). The 
analogy is weakest in linking devolution and the granting of local autonomy to adolescents. 
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Parental delegation of local autonomy to older children may be more difficult to accept, as "a 
certain minimum, at least, he has by natural right, even if his privileges to use the family car, 
to stay out past midnight, and the like, are delegated and revocable" (Feinberg, 1986, p. 48). 
Individual competencies will vary, as will parental delegation of rudimentary autonomy, 
which challenge Feinberg's analogy. He prefers the term "sovereignty" for the fourth sense 
of moral autonomy, and uses the term "personal sovereignty". 
In most states, there is an ultimate authority and/or power, which may be a 
monarch, council, legislature, or electorate. This "uncommanded commander" of society is 
this sovereign person, or body of persons. The constitutional checks and balances, universal 
electorates, and counterpoised social classes make this a more unusual state of affairs-to 
have this "uncommanded commander" of society. Sovereignty, more than representing a 
determinate internal sovereign, really represents the recognized national sovereignty vis a 
vis that authority recognized by external powers. It would be what one nation "recognizes" in 
another when it is acknowledging the independent national status of the other, and the 
"jurisdiction" that nation has, which is unconditional and absolute over its sovereignty. 
Feinberg defines a nation as being a group of individuals possessing a high degree 
of unity by common cultural elements, who occupy a territory over which they have 
established a system of law or authority. The sovereign right of political independence 
seems to be accepted by others in that any particular country is a sovereign nation with the 
exclusive prerogative of governing its own territory. Fragmented states which have local 
provinces claiming independence from the sovereign state may face civil war, or ongoing 
internal conflict. For example, the Canadian province of Quebec has a small political faction 
which has been demanding independence from the rest of Canada; however, in a number of 
referenda, the majority of the province have repeatedly claimed to want to remain with 
Canada. There have been other cases where the international community becomes 
fragmented over particular cases of sovereignty and independence, such as with China and 
Taiwan. 
The word "person" and the word "nation" are both somewhat ambiguous. A nation 
may refer to a juridical entity, the state, or to a collection of united individuals, or the word 
"person" may refer "to the entity that is a proper subject of such moral predicates as "right" 
and "duty". Another sense of person is essentially juridical: a person as an appropriate locus 
of rights and duties. In this sense, a person is a moral agent and possessor of rights. A 
person is "naturally sovereign" over him or herself, in much the same way a state is 
sovereign over its territory. The analogy between the sovereignty of a state and personal 
sovereignty diverges in that parts of a sovereign state consist of persons with their own 
sovereign rights, whereas the parts of a person, e.g. desires, values, purposes, organs, 
limbs, etc. are themselves "nonpersons". A state may choose to exterminate parts of itself, 
i.e. kill off people in parts of its sovereign state (e.g. Nazi Germany, the former Yugoslavia), 
in much the same way as a person may decide to cut off parts of limbs or exterminate 
certain desires; the difference between the two, however, lies in that the "nonperson" parts 
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of a person do not have any rights themselves, while the persons within all parts of a nation 
do have their own sovereign rights. Others ought not to interfere with a sovereign person's 
"internal affairs" wherein they might be harming their constituent parts, e.g. smoking, 
whereas others might justifiably interfere with a nation who is harming its own citizens, who 
are persons with individual sovereign rights. The point of Feinberg's linkage between the 
sovereignty of a nation and individual personal sovereignty is to propose that the individual 
ought to be thought of as a sovereign nation, with all the accompanying rights to self-
governance and decision-making. 
6.4 The capacity for autonomy (Competence) 
Competence, in its simplest form, may be understood to mean "capable" (Gaylin, 
1980). Within this context, however, competence shall be understood to mean the 
acknowledgement (legal or moral) of one's capability. Competence to make decisions is 
linked closely to autonomous decision-making: autonomy may be understood as the 
capacity to exercise choice. An individual is "autonomous in this sense to the extent that 
impediments to the meaningful opportunity to exercise his freedom of choice are removed" 
(Husak, 1980, p. 35). Adults, or those above the age of majority, are considered competent 
give valid consent; however, some adults in particular temporary or permanent states of 
mental incapacity, such as those suffering from conditions such as clinical depression or 
Senile Dementia may be considered incompetent in this regard. All children, for the most 
part, are considered incompetent in this regard. Moral obligations to vulnerable populations 
preclude the exploitation of those who are incompetent to consent for themselves. Children 
and others who are not competent to consent for themselves remain unique individuals who 
command all the respect, justice and inclusiveness that are accorded to competent 
individuals. 
Children are a unique group within the designated "incompetent" group. While 
human beings are born wholly dependent upon others for their very survival, they gradually 
become more competent as they develop into adults, adulthood being the "completion" of 
childhood. Clearly, infants are not born autonomous, and as children grow and develop, 
their competence increases and they develop their autonomy progressively. Gaylin (1982) 
refers to the competence of children as "variable competence". Autonomy is also not 
developed simultaneously in all areas; a child may be knowledgeable and experienced 
enough to make certain decisions in a competent fashion, such as what they wish to wear, 
or which music they wish to hear, and whether they would prefer peas or carrots for lunch, 
and so on. While they may remain incompetent to make significant decisions regarding their 
future until later years, children may decide quite competently what they wish to do that 
afternoon, or that weekend. 
In certain environments, the presumption of the child's incapaCity has weakened as 
adults have come to recognize that chronological age is not necessarily an accurate 
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indicator of mental capacity, or competence (Schultz, 1993). Children are becoming 
increasingly involved in decision-making related to health care. Pediatricians are becoming 
more aware of the need to assess and enhance the decisional capacities of their young 
patients, and to progressively involve children in the decision-making process as they 
mature. The requisite abilities for decision-making by adults in the health care environment 
are the same for children: comprehension of the information, consideration and reasoning 
regarding that information, and freely choosing among the options. Many children are 
competent to at least participate in the decision-making process, and adolescents may 
possess most, if not all, of the capacity to give truly informed consent regarding their health 
care. Most children attain this level of reasoning around 12- to 13-years of age, and 
evidence suggests that by the age of 14-years, many children have reached the stage of 
cognitive development associated with the psychological elements of rational consent 
(Schultz, 1993). Thus, competence and by extension, autonomy, is learned progressively, 
and ought to be respected and encouraged as an ongoing process. 
6.5 The value of autonomy 
Autonomy is valued highly in our society. It is an ideal that has long been endorsed 
as being of great value to individuals and to society, and is propounded by western liberal 
democratic societies as being central among social traditions. The acceptance of autonomy 
is rooted in prior acceptance of modern social democratic traditions. Moral traditions such as 
deontological theories propound moral autonomy as emphasizing the dignity and inviolability 
of the person, the value of whom "is their ability to follow laws that are self-imposed, 
formulated by exercises of their capacity to deliberate and reason" (Husak, 1980, p. 28). 
Autonomy is held as a necessary and desirable feature of a "good" society, and similarly of 
a "good" person. The concept is held to high ideals, and much is expected of it. 
It is used sometimes as an equivalent of liberty ... sometimes as equivalent to self-
rule or sovereignty, sometimes identical with the freedom of the will. It is equated 
with dignity, integrity, individuality, independence, responsibility and self knowledge. 
It is identified with qualities of self-assertion, with critical reflection, with freedom 
from obligation, with absence of external causation, with knowledge of one's own 
interests .... It relates to actions, to beliefs, to reasons for action, to rules, to the will 
of other persons, to thoughts and to principles. About the only features held 
constant from one author to another are that autonomy is a feature of persons and 
that it is a desirable quality to have. 
(Dworkin, 1988, p. 6) 
Critics of autonomy have charged that it focuses too narrowly on the individual as 
independent and controlled by their reason, and ignores the complexity of life with emotions, 
community, reciprocity, and the development of personhood as an ongoing, longitudinal 
process (Sherwin, 1992). Oppressive socialization and oppressive social relationships can 
harm autonomy. This view is founded on the conviction that individuals are "socially 
embedded" persons, with identities that are formed and shaped within intricate and 
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multifaceted social relationships. Oppression in any form can impair autonomy by thwarting 
the development of the capacities and competencies essential for autonomy, and also by 
limiting the available choices for individual decision-making (Beauchamp and Childress, 
2001 ). 
Dependent relationships may predispose individuals involved in those relationships 
to power imbalances. For example, a teacher is the authority in his or her relationship with a 
student, who is in a dependent position in relation to the teacher; a physician is the authority 
in relation to the patient, who may be in the dependent role, and; a child is dependent on his 
or her parents, who hold an authoritative role in his or her life. 
No theory of autonomy is reasonable or acceptable if it presents an ideal beyond 
the reach of individuals. "Even autonomous persons with self-governing capacities 
sometimes fail to govern themselves in particular choices because of temporary constraints 
caused by illness or depression, or because of ignorance, coercion, or other conditions that 
restrict their options" (Beauchamp and Childress, 2001, p. 58). We may qualify as 
autonomous agents, have the competence to be self-directed and so on, but fail to act 
autonomously. For example, we could agree to something without having prepared 
appropriately, even though the information we needed was available to us. Likewise, 
individuals who may not necessarily 'qualify' as being wholly autonomous may be able to 
make certain autonomous decisions in certain contexts. For example, while a child may not 
be able to make life-style choices regarding their careers at a young age, they may be able 
to choose their own clothing and leisure activities. Therefore rather than creating an ideal of 
autonomy, we ought to focus instead on creating a respect for autonomy in the larger sense. 
The value of liberty may be overstated. While liberty is indeed valued and precious, 
it is by no means the only thing of value. One could, for example, be content and happy in 
the absence of freedom. Likewise, we could also be politically free but at the same time be 
alienated and discontented. This shows that regardless of the nature of their relationship, 
freedom and contentment remain distinct from one another and are not reducible one to the 
other. Liberty is one among a variety of important values, and while it is vitally important it is 
not in itself sufficient. Sometimes it conflicts with other values, and in certain circumstances, 
it may not be worth its price in relation to other values (Feinberg and Gross, 1977). 
6.6 Deprivations of autonomy 
Concern for and promotion of moral autonomy often leads to a general objection to 
paternalism. Libertarians such as John Locke and John Stuart Mill contended that 
individuals ought not to have their liberty constrained. In his classic defence of individual 
liberty and freedom of expression in On Liberty, Mill argued that the only reason for which 
the freedom of individuals may be interfered is that of harm to others. 
Respect for the agent's autonomy is the limiting factor in justifying interferences for 
a person's own good, that is, paternalistic interference. Paternalism is justified by Mill if the 
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paternalist has superior knowledge. For example, if one knows that another is about to 
unwittingly step onto a faulty bridge, one is justified in interfering with that person's 
autonomy, thereby preventing harm to the individual. If, however, the person knows full well 
that the bridge is faulty-and fully understands the possible consequences of his or her 
actions-and still persisted in attempting to cross, then paternalism would not be justified. 
Moral autonomy has been explained as consisting of several different senses 
(Husak, 1980): autonomy as the capacity to exercise choice, autonomy as the capacity to 
choose, and autonomy as conformity to moral law. The first of these senses is the 
meaningful opportunity of the agent to exercise his or her capacity to choose: an individual 
is autonomous to the extent that there are no impediments to the meaningful opportunity to 
exercise his or her freedom. These deprivations of autonomy may be physical, as in the 
most straightforward example of a physical restraint, as in confinement in a straightjacket. 
However, as Husak (1980) points out, most paternalistic interferences do not involve 
violations of this sense of autonomy. More often, they involve interference with one's 
freedom. 
In his landmark article, "Paternalism," Gerald Dworkin (1983) attempts to separate 
justified from unjustified cases of paternalistic interference. Even though he tried to use the 
notion of autonomy to create limits to the range of permissible paternalism, he recognized 
that a kind of "freedom-maximizing paternalism" cannot be criticized on the basis of a 
concern for autonomy. For example, those who argue against the enforcement of legal 
sanctions imposed on those who do not wear helmets while riding motorcycles, or who do 
not wear seat belts while driving motor vehicles cannot do so on the grounds of autonomy. 
It seems quite clear that such legal enforcement actually maximizes the individual's freedom 
in that if they do become seriously injured due to not wearing a helmet or a seat belt, they 
would have less meaningful opportunities to exercise their capacities to make choices 
(Husak, 1980). In agreement with this line of thinking was J. S. Mill's concern that 
individuals ought not to be allowed to be free to give up their freedom, that is, enter into an 
agreement of slavery. 
The second of Husak's (1980) senses of autonomy is autonomy as the capacity to 
choose. Here paternalistic interferences may be seen to be coercive, even though an 
individual is not deprived of his or her autonomy. For example, if a robber (the coercer) 
proffers the ultimatum, "your money or your life," it may seem as though the individual is 
being given a choice; however, the circumstances militate for a certain course of action, that 
is, to give up the money in exchange for one's life and therefore the victim is not really 
treated autonomously as there is really only one course of action. Another strategy to 
establish the incompatibility of paternalism with this sense of autonomy is the sense that 
one who is "paternalised" is not allowed to choose - his or her choice is made for him or 
her and thus the individual is treated as though he or she actually lacked the capacity to , 
choose. Husak's conclusion on this strategy is that paternalistic interferences, qua 
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paternalism, are objectionable. He expresses his doubt that this demonstration of the 
incompatibility of autonomy and paternalism will have much appeal. 
The third sense of moral autonomy is that someone is not necessarily autonomous 
simply because they possess either the capacity to choose or the ability to meaningfully 
exercise this capacity. In this sense, a person acts autonomously "when his behaviour 
conforms to moral constraints that are objective though they are products of his own reason 
or will" (Husak, 1980, p. 38). In other words, the moral agent acts autonomously when he or 
she conforms to moral law that he or she has examined and judged acceptable, based on 
his or her skills of reason, rationality, as well as experience, intelligence, and maturity. 
Not all individuals are autonomous agents, and some individuals may be gradually 
developing their autonomy, as in the case of children. Some situations of paternalistic 
interference with the freedom of children are justified. Children are a special population 
within human beings. Their cognitive and emotional capacities are in a process of ongoing 
development during childhood, and as such, they may be lacking in either of those areas, 
preventing them from making fully rational decisions. Dworkin (1983) notes that it is an 
empirical question to exactly what extent children have a sufficient conception of their own 
present interests, and whether they may be able to gauge their future interests. He gives the 
example of the difficulty many children experience in deferring gratification for considerable 
periods of time. Thus, given the deficiencies of reason and other cognitive and emotional 
abilities of children, as well as the risks and dangers that may befall children, parental duties 
of paternalism exist. In order to actually preserve, rather than diminish, the autonomy of a 
child, paternalistic intervention may be necessary, or even demanded as a duty. For 
example, a parent who limits a toddler's freedom along a busy street would be considered 
negligent if he or she did not restrain the child's erratic wandering. The parent must at times 
also overrule a child's demands for inappropriate food. A child might wish to eat sweets for 
three meals a day, day after day; however, that diet, if continued for a sustained period, 
would have serious consequences for the child's development. Again, the parent is justified 
in deliberately intervening with the child's freedom at that time for that child's own good and 
to preserve their future autonomy. Parental interference for the child's own good is justified 
on the basis that it is necessary to protect the child's future autonomy: 
There is, however, an important limitation on the exercise of such parental power 
that is provided by the notion of children eventually coming to see the correctness of 
the parent's interventions. Parental paternal.i~m may be ~hought of as a w~g~r by 
the parent on children's subsequent recogmtlon of the wisdom of the restrictions. 
There is an emphasis on what could be called future-oriented consent-on what 
children will come to welcome, rather than on what they do welcome. 
(Dworkin, 1983, p. 28) 
Despite one's concern over similar behaviour in a competent adult, such paternalistic 
interference would not be justified. 
There are also some instances of paternalism which are justified for wholly 
autonomous agents, because of the assumption that a competent adult would have 
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consented to such interference: "the moral autonomy of agents is not violated so long as 
they consent to a given interference with their freedom" (Husak, 1980, p. 30). For example, 
a contractual agreement between two consenting parties involves some kind of loss of 
freedom. Those involved in the contract are obligated by the terms of the agreement, "which 
means that certain legal options once available to the parties are lost as a result of their 
contractual commitment" (Husak, 1980, p. 30). This loss of freedom is justified as long as 
genuine consent is involved, and therefore the moral autonomy of the agent is not forfeited. 
As in all cases of paternalism, there must be a strong burden of proof placed on the 
paternalist to justify his or her interference. In those cases involving paternalistic legislation, 
the authorities must "demonstrate the exact nature of the harmful effects (or beneficial 
consequences) to be avoided (or achieved) and the probability of their occurrence" 
(Dworkin, 1983, p. 33), such as, for example, the "principle of least restrictive alternative" 
which holds "if there is an alternative way of accomplishing the desired end without 
restricting liberty, even though it may involve great expense, inconvenience, etc., the society 
must adopt it" (Dworkin, 1983, p. 34). Thus, Dworkin supports liberty in the strongest sense. 
6.7 Children and autonomy 
To respect the autonomy of a moral agent is to acknowledge that person's rights to 
self-determination, decision-making, and the freedom to act according to their personal 
values and beliefs. Beauchamp and Childress (2001) believe that such respect goes further 
than simple acknowledgement; "such respect involves respectful action, not merely a 
respectful attitude" p. 63). They feel that such respect must also involve obligations to 
develop and promote others' capacities for autonomous choice, not simply non-interference 
in their affairs. Respect for autonomy thus involves deliberate enabling towards autonomy, 
while disrespect for autonomy includes attitudes and actions that ignore, insult, or demean 
others' rights of autonomy. 
The notion of respect for personal autonomy may be understood as non-
interference: this can be criticized in that non-interference actually fails to respect children's 
autonomy because it does not take account the nature of childhood, which begins as an 
infant who is entirely dependent on the parent or guardian, to the later stages of childhood 
and adolescence where an individual may be quite competent in many, but not necessarily 
in all, areas of ones' life. Sometimes a parent must necessarily override a child's 
preferences, since real respect for the autonomy of children requires parents actively 
attempting to neutralize the obstacles that could interfere with a child's choices (e.g. 
immaturity, incompetence, lack of experience, naivete), helping them to become self-
directed and becoming autonomous agents. 
Children fall into the category of those considered being incapable of self-
determination. Children are particularly vulnerable to adult coercion and therefore have 
particular claims on our protection. They are considered to be incompetent, and as such, 
are "treated in the name of their own best interests, and in spite of their avowed wishes and 
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preferences" (Fried, 1974, p. 23). The courts have determined that persons in the categories 
of children, the insane, and other incompetents, are unable to make rational decisions 
regarding their welfare, and thus this group is not considered autonomous, or self-
determining. As they are unable to give informed consent, parents or guardians are 
entrusted to make decisions on their behalf, and may override the expressed wishes of the 
child, as long as they are acting in the best interests of those deemed incompetent. These 
decisions made by parents or guardians on behalf of children may be called proxy consent 
(Dworkin, 1982). Others have differentiated between proxy decision-making as that made 
for someone who has made their wishes known before they became incompetent; 
substitute decision-making for someone who did not make their wishes known before 
becoming incompetent (Buchanan and Brock, 1989); and decisions made based on an 
assessment of the person's best interests, also known as the best-interests standard 
(Kopelman, 1997). 
Parents have an interest in pursuing their conceptions of the good as much as 
anyone else does; this interest extends to the liberty that parents have in raising their 
children in accordance with their own personal desires and wishes (Daniels, 1996, p. 223). 
One of the difficulties with the parents' liberty in imposing their desires on their children is, 
as Daniels (1996) points out, that there are clear sacrifices involved in this: many children 
will only be able to exercise their own autonomy over their own life plans with considerable 
cost. Therein lies the difficulty: balancing the parents' right to autonomy in pursuing their life 
plans and freedom from the intrusion of others in their childrearing practices, and the child's 
right to freedom of abuse and denial of fundamental opportunities. 
The notion of future-oriented consent justifies certain paternalistic interferences with 
the freedom of children. Dworkin describes the exercise of parental authority in this manner 
as being a "wager" as the parent cannot know for certain which limitations of their autonomy 
the child will appreCiate at an older age. However, it could be argued that there are some 
paternalistic interventions which do not necessarily require this subsequent consent. For 
example, Husak (1980) gives the example of parents insisting that their child brush his teeth 
every night before bed. This results in some nights of tantrums when the child resists doing 
so, but the parents insist. This case of paternalism does not require future-oriented consent 
as this requirement on the part of the parents could be considered a straightforward parental 
duty. A similar example would be the parental duty to ensure the health of his or her child, 
carried out by enrolling the child in a sporting pursuit. Childhood obesity levels are at an all-
time high, attributed to a combination of poor food choices and a lack of physical activity 
(Ebbeling, et aI., 2002). While the child may resent having to engage in physical activity, the 
parent could justify that paternalism on the basic parental duty to protect and promote the 
child's health. The child's autonomy may be respected in that the parent offers choices of 
sports-soccer or swimming-or activities where there is physical activity such as dance. 
Husak (1980) provides a modification of Dworkin's criteria, the literal interpretation of which 
is that parental paternalism is justified only if the child actually subsequently consents to the 
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interference. Husak offers instead "what justifies an instance of parental paternalism is that 
it is reasonable to believe that the child will consent to the interference" (p. 34). Thus the 
paternalistic interference of insisting the child brush his teeth is justified, on the grounds that 
it would be reasonable to believe that the child will one day consent to that interference. 
Issues surrounding raising a child "are simultaneously of the greatest magnitude 
and of the greatest intimacy" (Davis, 1997, p. 9). Parents have to bring to bear their own 
values on these issues-they indeed have the right to do so-but in the end they must also 
do so because they, and their children, must live with the consequences of such issues and 
the questions and challenges they raise 
The reluctance to define, and generally, the very silence of the law on many areas 
of individual choice reflects the value our society places on pluralism. Nowhere is the need 
for freedom to pursue divergent conceptions of the good more deeply felt than in decisions 
surrounding individual life styles, and also those concerning children and how they are to be 
raised. We must preserve choice, and safeguard the choices that are made, but somehow 
within this valuation of individual freedom, we have to consider how to safeguard the lives 
and futures of children who may be at risk from the very people who ought to be looking 
after them and their best interests. It is a moral obligation of parents to promote and respect 
their child's autonomous choices, and a professional obligation of teachers, coaches, and 
others involved in relationships with children, to respect the child's autonomy. The child's 
capacity for autonomy must be respected, but a cautionary note must be tagged onto the 
elevation of respect for autonomy above all other values, and that is the moral claims of the 
"future" child must not be overlooked. 
From the time of infancy, when wholly dependent upon others-adults-for their 
very survival, to later years during childhood when they are less dependent but not entirely 
independent, children remain under the power or authority of adults for many things, 
including education, which will help them exercise their autonomy in their future freedom. 
During this time, their freedom of action is controlled by paternalistic intervention. This 
paternalism is justified on the basis of protection of the child's present and future interests, 
of which autonomy is one such "good". Their lack of adequate reasoning skills and unsettled 
preferences may result in present harm and a curtailment of their futures, and therefore 
justifies paternalistic intervention for their safety and security. 
6.8 Conclusion 
Autonomy is the capacity for an individual to exercise choice about his or her life. 
An individual is autonomous to the extent that he is she is able to be self-determining in 
making meaningful decisions about that which concerns him or herself. Paternalism is one 
kind of interference of autonomy, seen primarily in relationships between adults and 
children, and most particularly between parents and children. This chapter has outlined 
various conceptions of autonomy, which contributes to illuminating issues of autonomy in 
relation to children. As discussed earlier in Chapter Four, children are viewed as non-
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autonomous beings, but who ought to be treated with autonomy-respectful paternalism so 
that their future right to autonomy is both nurtured but also safeguarded until the reach the 
threshold of adulthood. We turn now to consider theories of rights, which will then lead into 
the determination of children's rights, particularly their right to an open future. 
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7.0 Chapter Seven: Rights 
7.1 Introduction 
The concept of rights, known variously as privileges, claims, liberties, or even 
interests, has become one of paramount importance in our society. Rights-talk has served 
as an international language and standard regarding the way people are and ought to be 
treated. Proclamations such as the American Declaration of Independence (1776), the 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789), the American Bill of Rights 
(1791), the European Convention on Human Rights (1953), the United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), 
and both the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959) and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), substantiate the importance placed on rights, 
particularly in the political and legal realms. These charters emerged historically from the 
conception of universal law and natural rights, which were put forth originally to check the 
sovereign power of government over its citizens. These political documents and discussions 
of rights were based on foundational rights, but led to the development of more specific 
rights, as outlined in the UN Declarations, for example. The rights asserted by these 
documents claim respect and status for human beings, and provide vital protections of life, 
liberty, expression, and property. 
Rights can cover a broad range of matters, including beliefs, actions, relationships, 
property, or the safety and integrity of oneself. Rights may apply in both moral and legal 
contexts. Rights may be considered alone, or from the standpoint of an entire system of 
rights and duties; some rights are thought to 'trump' others; some rights may involve 
directing others to act, or even to refrain from acting. The notion of rights pervade many 
spheres of our lives: we hear of the right to freedom of speech, freedom of religion, the right 
to benefit from the products of one's own labours, the right to privacy, the right to education, 
the right to own property, the right not to be harmed, and even the right to life. We hear also 
of the rights of women, children, and parents, as well as other disparate groups having 
special rights, such as patients, and athletes. Rights may be upheld or accorded, denied, or 
violated by other individuals, groups, or the state. Legal rights, unlike moral rights, are 
endowed with legal protection against another person or institution deliberately withholding 
assistance or remuneration in regard to a specific action or certain state of affairs. That 
human beings have rights which are natural, non-renounceable or inalienable, and 
indefeasible has served as the catalyst for philosophers and legal authorities to consider the 
legitimacy of such ideas and their relationship to jurisprudence and moral theory. 
The question of a definition of rights, or what 'having a right' means is far more 
complex than one would first imagine, and thus the conception of having a 'right' and 
performing a 'right action' must be differentiated. This distinction may be understood by the 
following: having a right has nothing to do with the morality of the act. For example, a 
woman may have a 'right' to have an abortion, but having that right does not affirm that she 
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is necessarily 'acting rightly', and the only thing having that right says about morality is that 
others have an obligation not to interfere with her right. Right action falls within the realm of 
ethics, one of the main branches of philosophy dealing with how human beings should act. 
Principles of right action form a type of moral code or natural law by which human beings 
accept in order to live with one another. Moral philosophers began asking questions about 
the nature and source of rights which stemmed from social and political philosophy, and 
developed theories of rightness and obligation. These theories included ethical egoism, 
utilitarianism, Kant's Categorical Imperative, and the Social Contract theory. Through the 
pursuit of right action, concepts of obligation, duty, and rightness developed. 
Analyses and discussions of rights have been based traditionally in philosophy and 
the law. After observing that laws varied from place to place, ancient Greek philosophers 
realized the potential for human laws to be unjust (Almond, 1993). However, other domains 
such as political science and social theory have also included discussions on rights. Modern 
discussions of rights have focused in two main areas (Waldron, 1984): first, philosophers 
and jurists have become more interested in the precision of their use of the concept of a 
right. They have pursued the relationships between rights and duties and obligations in an 
attempt to clarify meanings. Secondly, there have been concerns with relativists, and issues 
of moral truth and objectivity. For example, Waldron asks, given the wide variety of cultural 
practices, including those which we would consider as oppressive and even inhumane, how 
can human rights be granted, expected, or accepted as valid for all people in all times and 
places. 
This discussion will focus primarily on a philosophical approach, and will present a 
survey of rights theory within philosophical literature; however, since the disciplines are 
intertwined, a full consideration of rights cannot ignore the other areas of law and politics. 
Definitional issues of rights, liberties, claims, duties, and obligations will be discussed, as 
will be the question of whether rights have linking duties. The kinds of rights we have, and 
their value or function will be examined. Rights can be differentiated into several areas, 
including natural rights, moral rights, and legal rights. Rights dichotomies such as absolute/ 
prima facie rights, choice/welfare rights, negative/positive rights, and liberty/claim rights will 
be discussed. Theories of correlativity also couple rights with duties, and shall be covered. 
We shall begin with a consideration of rights in general. 
7.2 The nature of rights 
Rights are powerful assertions of claims or interests that demand respect and 
status. They serve to protect individuals and their interests. A right is a justified claim or 
entitlement, validated by moral principles and rules (Feinberg, 1973). Dworkin (1984) 
considers rights to be understood best "as trumps over some background justification for 
political decisions that states a goal for the community as a whole" (p. 153). Having a right 
allows one to claim something as one's due, and to be justified in making that claim. Rights 
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entail certain connections between parties: the right-holders and the right-observers 
(Hinman, 1997). For every individual who demands a right, there must be another party from 
whom either action or no action, i.e. non-interference, is desired. Such action may be 
viewed as being a duty. 
Questions of rights are generally invoked "when it is proposed that interests of one 
or more individuals should be traded off for the sake of others' or in the name of some 
allegedly more important moral or political ideal (Waldron, 1984, p. 19). Rights are based on 
a system of rules which authorize us "to affirm, demand, or insist upon what is due" 
(Beauchamp and Childress, 1994, p. 71) possessing a right also validly constrains others 
from interfering with the exerCising of that right. Statements of rights may "protect against 
oppression, unequal treatment, intolerance, arbitrary invasion of privacy, and the like" (p. 
69). Some of these statements of rights have been given strength through legal 
endorsement, while others are more like aspirations with only moral force behind them. 
Schoeman (1980) asserts that the language of rights enables us to "sharpen our 
appreCiation of the moral boundaries which separate people, emphasizing the 
appropriateness of seeing other persons as independent and autonomous agents" (p. 8), 
and that by considering the rights of others, we stress their moral independence. 
Given that a right is a valid claim, there are two directions in which an individual can 
make a valid claim. First, certain rights may be claims "against specific individuals for 
assistance, repayment of debts, compensation for losses, and so on, or against all other 
individuals-the 'world at large'-to noninterference in his private affairs" (Feinberg, 1984, p. 
109). The second direction an individual may take is making a claim towards the state. 
These claims may be for either specific services and promised repayments, for 
noninterference in one's private affairs, but also for legal enforcement of valid claims one 
may have against other private individuals. Many rights give rise to double claims. Feinberg 
gives the example of one's right not to be punched. First, one has the right to 
noninterference from others, and second, one has a claim against the state for its 
protection. Such double claims are generally legal rights because they are reason-backed 
claims against other individuals or against the state, which are also enforceable by law. A 
moral right is a claim justified by valid reasons and depends on the conscience of the 
claimee or on public opinion. If these same claims are also then enforceable by law, they 
may be both moral and legal rights. 
Rights are considered by some as being vital to the notion of the good life, but may 
also be viewed as being individualistic to the detriment of community. Raz (1986), for 
example, writes about right-based moralities in that they are usually individualistic moral 
theories. If one accepts that the function and justification of morality in general is to protect 
the rights of individuals rather than communal interests, and that rights are the most 
promising instruments in securing these individual interests, then moral action-guides are 
rights-based (Beauchamp and Childress, 1994). 
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The language of rights, within the moral vocabulary, has made significant inroads to 
protect the interests of individuals and also of minority groups, such as women and disabled 
populations. For example, in cases of moral controversy such as abortion and euthanasia 
, 
individual rights have often been raised in an attempt to question established practices or to 
resolve controversial issues. Being a rights-bearer has given individuals strength and dignity 
in actively demanding their interests, and in making claims against others to have their 
rights protected. "When persons possess enforceable rights correlative to obligations, they 
are enabled to be active, independent agents pursuing their projects and making claims" 
(Beauchamp and Childress, 1994, p. 77). Rights have become international currency for the 
evaluation of communities and states, and the treatment of individuals within those 
environments. Rights language itself provides the basic vocabulary for expressing the moral 
point of view. 
7.2.1 Natural law and natural rights 
The ancient Greeks and Romans introduced the concept of natural law, which 
would direct the actions of all rational beings. Roman lawyers developed a doctrine of law 
that all civilization would accept, justified as a natural law for all people. They aimed to 
show that principles of morals could be known by reason alone, and would direct people 
how to live 'properly'. Aristotle and Aquinas' teleological views of nature were concerned 
with specific ends. They felt that everything in nature, including people, were concerned with 
promoting the natural developmental process. A natural law view on rights requires that 
rights be compliant with these ends, and thus, if an act interferes with the natural 
development process, it is wrong. For example, both euthanasia and abortion interfere with 
the 'natural' development of certain conditions, and as such, these acts are therefore 
wrong. The laws of nature could apply only to rational beings who could obey or disobey it 
deliberately and freely. Natural rights are considered to be those which are inalienable and 
indefeasible. They are universal and apply to all, regardless of culture, custom, or any other 
such variable. 
The writings of John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and St. 
Thomas Aquinas include discussions of natural law and rights. Their views may also have 
influenced Thomas Jefferson, as his ideas about freedom and government can be linked to 
their writings. 
Locke considered natural rights to include rights to life, liberty, and property. He felt 
strongly that certain areas of human conduct ought to be immune from governmental 
interference. He called these areas 'rights,' and they eventually played a significant part in 
the formation of the American Bill of Rights within their Constitution. The Bill of Rights, 
formulated in 1791, decrees that the government cannot interfere with certain conduct of its 
citizens and gives them certain fundamental rights, such as the right to freedom of speech 
and of worship. Locke's focus of rights was property rights: the right to own private property 
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which could not be justly taken away by anyone, including the government. He centred on 
property because he felt it is obtained by the fruits of one's own labours, and thus part of the 
person is actually invested in his or her physical property. To take that property away 
unjustly would be tantamount to an assault upon one's physical person. Locke also used the 
term 'property' in reference to life and liberty in addition to simply one's possessions. He 
argued also that all "men" [sic] are equal, which had a profound influence on the creation of 
democratic ideals of equality. All "men" were entitled to rights which were neither given by 
society, nor can they be revoked by society. 
Critics of Locke argue that it is incomprehensible for people to have rights which 
were conceived prior to the creation of society, government, and laws who surely must have 
granted and upheld them. However, since Locke argued that there are certain inalienable 
rights which are neither society's to grant nor to revoke, rights that existed before the 
conception of society, then this criticism loses its strength. There are of course situations 
where certain rights are not absolute. For example, in the case of the right to freedom of 
speech, our SOCiety must overrule certain rights, as in the case of a person shouting "fire" 
without any cause on a crowded bus, or making jokes about bombs or high-jacking on an 
airplane. The alarmist's right to freedom of speech would infringe other people's rights not to 
be harmed, which would likely be compromised should this situation occur. Thus, rights can 
only be infringed with majority consent, such as within a democratic government, when the 
welfare of the general public could be compromised. Rights could be a matter of degree, as 
there are certain areas of human behaviour which can be interfered with only in times of 
great crisis, otherwise they must be left untouched. For example, a curfew restricting 
citizens' freedom of movement might be implemented during some kind of crisis, such as a 
riot or natural disaster. Therefore, people still have a significant latitude in freedom, but it is 
not absolute. Justifying which restrictions are allowable is a problematic topic, one which 
John Stuart Mill pursued in his treatise On Uberty. 
Hobbes disagreed strongly with Locke's views, believing that prior to the creation of 
society, there were no property rights. He held that property is a creation of society, and 
thus there are no rights to anything other than what one can hold by force. Hobbes 
suggested that we should "do unto others" because if we do, others will be more likely to "do 
unto us" (Rachels, 1993). We have a "right of nature" to defend or protect ourselves from 
attack. He considered the natural right to liberty meant having the liberty to do whatever 
there was no rule or moral reason against doing. 
Hobbes developed the concept of the Social Contract Theory, which he felt was 
necessary in order to escape the brutality of nature, with each person out to promote only 
their own interest at whatever necessary cost: "people must agree to the establishment of 
rules to govern their relations with one another, and they must agree to the establishment of 
an agency-the state-with the power necessary to enforce those rules" (Rachels, 1993, p. 
142). This contract makes social living possible. 
150 










perspective, duties correlative to rights tend to be negative: they are duties to avoid 
interfering with action or choice of others rather than duties to provide positive assistance. 
Sumner suggests this approach may be related to general views of political morality, which 
tend to be laissez-faire and minimalist. Given that this approach to rights has been 
increasingly criticized, socio-economic rights such as rights to positive assistance including 
medical care, elementary education, and a decent standard of living, are no longer viewed 
as a devaluation of the language of rights. 
7.2.4 Who has rights? 
There has been considerable debate over exactly who has rights. Some believe that 
in order to be a right-holder, one has to be able to claim one's rights. However, if we accept 
this view, then children, the mentally infirm or comatose, unconscious people, animals, and 
other vulnerable beings would be without rights. I argue that a right-holder does not have to 
be able to assert his or her rights in order to have them. Their rights may be claimed on their 
behalf by parents or guardians or others acting on their behalf. In the case of animals, being 
as vulnerable as they are in the human world, human beings have profound duties to protect 
them and to recognize their rights in the same way that other vulnerable creatures would be 
protected. Rights best capture the purpose of morality, which is to secure liberties and other 
benefits for a right-holder (Beauchamp and Childress, 1994). Injustice and inhumane 
treatment seem to occur most frequently in areas that fail to uphold rights in their political 
ideology, and thus when a right-bearer possesses enforceable rights correlative to 
obligations, they have the potential to become active, independent agents capable of 
making plans, and pursuing their projects. Being a right-bearer in a nation or society that 
enforces rights provides right-bearers with a source of dignity and self-respect. 
7.3 Categories of Rights 
7.3.1 Positive rights and negative rights 
Positive rights demand action on the part of others, specifically in order to secure 
some good. They are rights of performance, whereas negative rights are those of 
forbearance. When a person has a positive right it means that another has some kind of 
obligation to act. For example, in response to a child's right to education, a government may 
have the corresponding positive obligation to provide that education (within the agreed-upon 
framework accepted by that government, such as to provide a state education up to the age 
of 16). The right to education would be an example of a so-called 'welfare' right. Health care 
could be another; if a right to health care exists, then the government has a corresponding 
positive obligation to provide 'health care' (again, within the agreed-upon framework as 
mentioned above, with definitional limitations) to the citizens of that state. Here, however, as 
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explained by Beauchamp and Childress (1994), "the right to forgo a recommended surgical 
procedure is a negative right grounded in the principle of respect for autonomy" (p. 73). 
Positive rights are ideologically attached to a maximizing perspective which 
demands whatever intervention may be considered necessary, and aspires to maintain a 
position anywhere between adequate human functioning and human flourishing. Rational 
assent to the intervention is considered a high priority. Freeden (1991) introduces the 
doctrine of paternalism in his discussion of positive rights. He explains that in order to 
promote the well-being of certain others, it may sometimes be necessary to intervene in 
their lives. 
Moreover, because of mutual social ties, this may have to be secured through 
'intervention' in the life of others as well. Without these actions, the satisfaction of 
human needs, the opportunities for their self-expression and the coordination of 
human conduct are considered to be impossible, although to a sceptical observer 
this may merely appear to be unjustified interference in the private domain. 
(Freeden, 1991, p. 58) 
Positive right theorists contend that the fundamental moral duty towards others involves 
affirmative obligations, which require an act of commission (Feinberg, 1973). Positive rights 
theories are tied to altruism, which holds that we are not merely self-interested, but are 
social beings capable of acts of compassion towards other people. In a similar line of 
thinking, the negative rights position holds that the primary motivation behind all human 
behaviour is self-interest. 
Negative rights are rights to non-interference, requiring a positive duty towards 
others not to interfere. Libertarians hold that one of the government's primary duties is to 
prevent infringements on our liberty or freedom; state responsibility requires protecting 
individuals from that interference. They believe that the primary right of individuals is the 
negative right to be free from constraints, coercion, or other forms of interference from 
others. Leading libertarian Robert Nozick (1974) held that this negative right against 
interference or constraints is influenced by Kant's principle that individuals are ends and not 
merely means, and therefore they may not be sacrificed or used for achieving of other ends 
without their consent. Natural right theories and social contract theorists rely on the principle 
of self-interest, or egoism, which is primarily a negative rights perspective. In contrast, 
natural law theorists hold the view that people are social by nature, and are altruistic. 
Negative rights may be divided into two subclasses: (i) passive rights are those not 
to be interfered with by others in certain ways, such as the right to be left alone, to keep 
one's secrets, to enjoy one's property, to keep one's body and reputation undamaged 
(known collectively as one's 'right to security'), and; (ii) active rights are those to act or not to 
act, such as the right to liberty which involves going where one wishes to go, and saying 
what one wishes to say. Neither active rights nor passive rights may be considered more 
important than the other. 
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7.3.2 Absolute rights and prima facie rights 
Some rights may be considered absolute, such as the right to choose one's own 
religion. Many would consider the right to life to be absolute. However, even the right to life 
may be overridden in certain circumstances such as in war and killing in self-defence. There 
are many rights are not absolute; these are prima facie rights. A prima facie right is one 
which ought to be fulfilled unless it conflicts with an absolute right, or if the right owner 
waives that right. For example, we have a right not to be harmed; however, I might waive 
that right to a surgeon if that surgeon must first 'harm' me by slicing open my abdomen to 
remove a ruptured appendix. A physician might override a patient's right to give informed 
consent if that patient is brought into the emergency room in an unconscious state but in 
need of emergency attention to save his or her life. 
Our rights cannot be infringed without justification, which means sometimes rights 
may be overridden for justifiable reasons. A right is infringed, according to Gewirth (1984) 
when the correlative duty is not carried out, that is, when the required act is or is not 
performed. For example, if the prohibited action of killing is performed, then a person's right 
to life is infringed. A right is violated if it is overridden for no justifiable reason (Beauchamp 
and Childress, 1994), or unjustifiably infringed (Gewirth, 1984). The key distinction is 
justification of the action or of the nonperformance of an action in relation to the right which 
was demanded. 
An absolute right is one that can never be justifiably infringed, cannot be overridden 
under any circumstances, and must always be fulfilled without exception. There are two 
elements to the idea of an absolute right (Gewirth, 1984). First, as with all claim-rights, a 
right is a justified claim or entitlement to the performance or non-performance of certain 
actions and second, certain rights involve the idea of "exception less justifiability" of 
performing or not performing those actions as required. That is, a right is absolute when it 
can never be overridden or infringed, and it must be fulfilled without any exceptions. Thus, 
Gewirth considers the idea of an absolute right to be doubly normative. 
7.3.3 Liberty rights and claim rights 
Rights are sometimes described as claims. Hohfeld's claim-rights are seen as 
justified claims or entitlements to the carrying out of either positive or negative correlative 
duties. Feinberg (1980) considers the actual idea of a right as being included in that of a 
claim, and considers the language of claims and claiming as being required for to fully 
understanding what rights are and why they are of such paramount importance. He explains 
that "claims are always against someone, and therefore necessarily correlated with the 
duties of those against whom they hold; but there is a sense of "claim", closely related to 
"need", in which this is not always so" (Feinberg, 1980, p. 139). He gives the example of 
starving children living in a slum. They are in "need" of nourishment and medical care; they 
have a "claim" to those needs. But who has the duty to fulfil their needs, and their claims? If 
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their parents cannot oblige the claims, then upon whom do the claims fall? Does the claim 
still exist even if the duty cannot be pinned on an individual? Feinberg accepts that needs 
sometimes constitute claims, and that the claim of the child has a correlative duty to be 
fulfilled. Of course, not all needs are necessarily claims. For one to claim to have a right is 
"to assert in such a manner as to demand or insist that what is asserted be recognized" 
(Feinberg, 1980, p. 141). For every right there is indeed a further right to claim that one has 
that right, in appropriate circumstances. 
7.4 The correlativity of rights and duties 
Morality requires us to balance our own interests against those of other individuals, 
and as moral agents, we as human beings have a duty to follow the directives prescribed in 
the moral law (Rachels, 1993, p. 76). The doctrine of correlativity asserts that a person's 
rights are linked to the duties of other people. Feinberg (1973) claims this logical correlativity 
is plausible, and perhaps logically unassailable since legal claim-rights are actually defined 
in relation to other people's duties. Despite this logical plausibility, however, there are some 
difficulties with this doctrine. Feinberg demonstrates not all duties are correlates of the rights 
of others. For example, legal duties of obedience to traffic laws: some traffic laws are not 
directed at specified others. A traffic light might direct me to stop, but if there are no other 
vehicles or persons in sight, and visibility is clear, then who can claim my stopping as his or 
her due? My legal obligation is thus without a correlated right claim against me. Moral 
obligations also present duties without correlated rights. Feinberg gives the example of 
duties of charity. No one person can claim our individual contribution to be his or her specific 
due. 
The conception of a duty is a required act, which may be required by the rights of 
others, the law, or even by one's conscience. Some duties are correlated with rights-claims 
of others, and may be moral or legal in nature. Feinberg (1980) considers a duty as being 
something which obliges. It is something which is required of a person, to be done whether 
or not they want to do it. 
Rights and duties may be considered by some to be correlative, meaning there is 
some kind of normative relation between rights and duties. If X has a right to do or have Y, 
then that right of X's entails some other having an obligation either not to interfere with X 
doing or having Y, or perhaps even to provide X with Y (Beauchamp and Childress, 1994). 
An example of this relationship is the state's obligation to provide 'goods' such as food or 
health care to people 'in need'. Any citizen of that state who fulfils the relevant criteria for 
being 'in need' may thereby claim an entitlement to food or health care. These authors note 
the 'untidiness' within the idea of correlativity of rights and duties, as concepts like 
obligation, requirement, and duty do not always imply corresponding rights. They give the 
exam pie of a doctor agreeing to take someone on as a patient, and receive treatment. The 
doctor has incurred an obligation to the patient, and the patient has gained correlative rights. 
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These rights may be either the right to receive treatment, or the right to refuse treatment. 
Beauchamp and Childress view this correlativity of rights and obligations as being 'untidy' 
because obligations do not always imply corresponding rights. They give a further example 
of charity. Although we sometimes refer to requirements or obligations of charity, "no person 
can claim another person's charity as a matter of right. If such norms express what we 
"ought to do", they do so not from obligation but from personal ideals that exceed obligation" 
(Beauchamp and Childress, 1994, p. 74). So, these 'self-imposed oughts' are not 
necessarily required by morality, and one cannot claim of a right of another. Distinctions 
between perfect and imperfect obligations help elucidate this issue of charity. "Justice 
exemplifies perfect obligation, which entails a correlative right; whereas kindness, 
generosity, and charity exemplify imperfect obligation, which entails no correlative right" 
(Beauchamp and Childress, 1994, p. 74). 
Hohfeld's claim-rights are seen as justified claims or entitlements to the carrying out 
of either positive or negative correlative duties. A duty is the requirement that some kind of 
act should or should not be performed. For example, we have a right not to be harmed, and 
a corresponding duty not to interfere with others. Thus, a right is considered as having been 
"fulfilled when the correlative duty is carried out, i.e. when the required action is performed 
or the prohibited action is not performed" (Gewirth, 1984, p. 92). Conversely, a right is 
considered as having been infringed "when the correlative duty is not carried out, i.e. when 
the required action is not performed or the prohibited action is performed" (p. 92). 
Sumner believes that relational duties are crucial to understanding the concept of 
rights. He does caution though, that unlike Hohfeld, he does not assume that all duties, 
including legal duties, are relational. Nor does he accept that the subject and objects of 
relational duties must be distinct individuals, for some duties might be held by collectives, or 
both held by and owed to the same party (Sumner, 1987). Hohfeld's correlative of a 
relational duty is a liberty, which is the duty described from the perspective of its object. 
7.5 An evaluation of rights 
As with many theories, there is not always universal acceptance of ideas. That right-
based theories are the best considerations of morality is one such example. Some of the 
concerns relate to the relationships between right-based, duty-based, and goal-based 
theories; others relate to the correlativity between rights and duties. Yet other differences 
focus on the adversarial nature between individuals and society at large. We begin first with 
the distinctions between right-based, duty-based, and goal-based theories. 
Dworkin (1974), Mackie (1984), and Raz (1984) have made distinctions between 
right-based, duty-based, and goal-based theories. If we accept a logical relationship 
between rights and duties, one wonders how some theories can be right-based while others 
are duty-based. For example, if P's having a right is defined in terms of Q's having a duty. 
Theories of political morality accept that people have to perform or refrain from performing 
specific actions in specific situations, and the very foundation of these theories has to do 
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with the generation and justification of the performance or non-performance of these 
actions. Waldron (1984) gives the example of the requirement that police officers and other 
people should not engage in torturing others. If we find the impetus for this requirement 
being the pain and suffering that torture generally involves, we are actually concerned about 
the interests of those who might be tortured, and we are thus oriented towards a right-based 
approach. However, if we feel that the "deliberate infliction of suffering debases and 
degrades the torturer, derogating from his humanity and undermining his rational integrity" 
(p. 13), then our concern for the above requirement is duty-based. In reality, people 
probably feel both kinds of concern, but if one can determine one or the other theory as 
being more fundamental, then that theory might be considered right-based or duty-based. 
Kant's moral theory is one of the most notable examples of a duty-based theory. Kant's 
theory requires that people be treated always as ends, and never as means; his orientation 
stems from a deep regard for the rational integrity of those who might treat people in an 
instrumental manner. 
Some consider morality as being based on individual rights. Right-based theory is 
characterized by a concern for individual interest, while goal-based theories are 
characterized moreso by a concern for something considered to be an interest of society as 
a whole. If the social interest is something like national glory, the distinctions are quite 
straightforward; however, Waldron feels that goals like prosperity or general utility cannot be 
defined without concern for individual interests. He notes that the single interest which 
grounds a right-based approach does not need to be restricted to only the peculiar interest 
of an assignable individual; it might be an individual interest which is shared with every other 
individual in society, such as human rights. He explains that a consideration of what is 
distinctive about right-based theories also sheds light on what is controversial about them; 
"they presuppose that the fundamental concerns of political morality must be concerns 
which can be focused on individuals one at a time" (Waldron, 1984, p. 14). Raz (1984) 
disputes this approach, arguing that such a consideration would underestimate the 
importance of indivisible and non-excludable public goods-like tolerant society or different 
ways of life-in constituting even individualist ideals such as autonomy. 
Rights sometimes conflict. In order to deal with such problems, we need to know 
how the special importance of each right-claim is to be understood. Waldron puts forth three 
ways in which to understand the special force of rights. First, a right is no more than a 
particularly important interest. While it may be granted greater importance than ordinary 
interests, in principle, it can still be outweighed when either a similar interest is put forth, or 
when a greater number of lesser interests could vie for overall supremacy. Second, the 
interests protected by rights are assigned apparent, or lexical, priority over other interests. 
These interests are protected and promoted as much as possible, ahead of all other 
interests. This approach would render rights absolute against considerations of mere utility, 
but might also allow for what Nozick (1974) calls "a utilitarianism of rights": for example, 
maximizing fulfilment and minimizing violations when rights conflict. 
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Most controversial is Waldron's third model. In this case, rights are understood as 
the basis of strict constraining requirements on action. The function of a right is to prevent 
particular behaviours involving others from being considered, thereby defining rights in 
terms of boundaries of practical deliberation. Waldron gives the example of "one having the 
right not to be tortured makes it wrong for another to even contemplate torturing you. Two 
issues regarding this model are important. One is the distinction between practical 
deliberation and consequential foresight: "If others are wrongdoers or the world is of a 
certain sort, we may have no choice but to contemplate the avoidable occurrence of the 
very actions and events whose consideration at an intentional level is absolutely ruled out 
by this approach (Waldron, 1984, p. 16). He suggests that others might be skeptical about 
this approach, since "to contemplate the occurrence of an event which we could prevent is 
already to take up a practical attitude to it" (p. 16). The second issue is that given the 
distinction between intention and foresight, the third model seems to be incompatible with 
the idea of a right-based theory as characterized by Waldron. Thus, a duty-based approach 
to political morality dominates in what purports to be right-based theory, despite a strict 
deontology of side-constraints. 
Many utilitarians strongly resist the idea that rights provide the foundations of ethical 
theory. This resistance may stem from the conflicts between individual and social or 
communal interests, which seem to be at odds with one another. What is best for the 
individual may not always be best for communities or institutions. For example, if a coach 
finds a talented young performer who shows great potential to be an Olympic or world 
champion, in order to maximize that potential, the coach might wish to train the athlete 
extremely hard, and deny the child educational opportunities or social pleasures as they 
could detract from optimum training and interfere with competition. However, that athlete 
has rights to make decisions as he or she sees fit regarding his or her life (in an ideal world 
without coach or parental tyranny), and the rights of the individual could prove deleterious to 
the sporting career. Yet another example would be between the rights of an individual to 
health care, and the duties of a society to uphold those rights given the financial burdens 
faced by institutions and governments. The 1989 Declaration on the Rights of the Child lists 
many fundamental rights including that to education, but many nations cannot move beyond 
the struggle to feed its people let alone build schools and provide education. Now, many 
consider there to be a balance between respecting the rights of the individual and 
maximizing the athlete's potential so that the state could benefit from sporting success on 
an international stage. In cases like this, the individual athlete's rights trump the state's 
desire for moulding champions. Rights language, it is argued, is confrontational because of 
the demands it makes. 
In his work on intimate relationships such as those in the family, Ferdinand 
Schoeman (1980) considers rights language as being overly confrontational and 
inappropriate in such settings. As discussed earlier in the section on moral rights, 
Schoeman warns that emphasizing the rights of children could lead to a consideration of the 
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relationship between parent and child as being of almost a contractual nature, which would 
be limiting and leaning toward the promotion of some kind of abstract public good. He feels 
that intimate relationships may not subscribe to these views of rights since talk about rights, 
respect, and welfare of others may be, to a certain extent, irrelevant within this context. 
Rights may have an adversarial characteristic, as they sometimes conflict with each 
other. For example, the state's right to outlaw citizens owning guns conflicts with the right of 
citizens to own property and to live their lives as they see fit. The rights of privacy may 
conflict with the rights of the state to protect society (for example, if a police officer suspects 
a person or group of conspiring to rob a bank, they may wish to use phone taps to overhear 
conversations). A citizen's rights to privacy may conflict with the rights of the press to cover 
a story. When two equally deserving patients require liver transplants and there is only one 
liver, their respective rights to health care conflict. A patient's right to forgo treatment may 
conflict with a doctor's desire to help that patient. A woman's right to an abortion may 
conflict with a foetus' right to life. An athlete's right to make decisions about his or her 
training may conflict with a coaches' duty to protect that athlete. For example, a tower diver 
may elect to perform a dive of very high difficulty, and the coach may feel that the diver's life 
is at risk because he or she is not prepared for such a challenge. Paternalism becomes a 
consideration at this stage within rights. In conclusion, then, legitimate conflicts between 
rights must be recognized as such, and balanced. The differences between a violation of a 
right and an infringement of a right, as discussed earlier, may help in determining legitimate 
conflicts, and solving dilemmas. 
Individuals may also sometimes consider forfeiting their rights. For example, if an 
individual becomes ill, and realizes that at some point in the future, they may be unable to 
attend to their personal affairs, they may assign their legal right to another so that person 
may act in their best interests. Similarly, a person who is going to be away may also give 
someone legal rights to act on their behalf in their absence. Sometimes a person who is 
facing a very difficult decision regarding medical treatment will ask their doctor to make the 
best decision on their behalf. A husband may grant his wife permission to act on his behalf 
over certain issues, thereby forfeiting his rights, and vice versa. She may forfeit her right to 
privacy by allowing him to open her mail. These aforementioned forfeitures may be 
reversible or retractable, while the following is not, at least not for a certain period of time. 
An individual who commits a crime forfeits his or her rights to freedom. 
7.6 Rights and interests 
When an action or practice is said to be "in the interests of an individual or group" it 
means that the recipient would somehow benefit from that action or practice, and therefore 
there is some reason to support that action or practice (Connolly, 1993). The distinction 
between something being in someone's interest and that something being "good" or 
"desirable" is important to make. Since personal autonomy is valued highly in our society, 
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wanting, choosing, and preferring are also important considerations in terms of what are 
considered as people's interests. 
The concept of "interests" is generally discussed in relation to rights. Rights and 
duties serve by protecting or promoting'interests; rights are protected interests: 
~n indivi.du.al's right t? some th~ng is based upon the individual's having a strong 
Interest In It. Recogmtlon of a right requires both that the interest should be of value 
and that its protection should not interfere with the securing by other individuals of 
things in which they have a valuable and comparable interest. 
(Archard, 1993, p. 105) 
Archard gives the example of liberty in relation to our interest in being as free as possible: "it 
is evident that we may claim a right to the maximum liberty compatible with a like liberty for 
others" (p. 105). One person's having a right may be correlated by another having a duty in 
relation to that right. The justification for the imposition of a duty lies with the interest it 
protects or promotes: "'x has a right' means that, other things being equal, an aspect of x's 
well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a 
duty" (Raz, 1988, p. 184). 
The protection and promotion of such human interests through the rights of people 
are what some people consider to be the constitutive element of morality, that a right-based 
morality is a morality of rights and duties. The justification for rights rests upon that which it 
protects, whether an interest or a liberty. Having rights constitutes a form of moral 
protection. 
Rights are based on the interests of people. Where one's interest is a reason for 
someone else to act so as to promote or protect it, and when this reason has the 
peremptory character of a duty in that it serves the interest on which another's right is 
based, and only when the duty is for action which makes a significant difference in 
promoting or protecting that interest does the interest give rise to a right. Rights express the 
right-holder's status as a person, and the respect owed to him or her in recognition of that 
fact. Respecting that person involves cognisance of his or her interests. 
Despite rights being based on the interests of the right-holders, an individual may 
possess rights which are against his or her interests (Raz, 1988). Consider the examples of 
it being in a person's best interest to be incarcerated, despite having the right to freedom, or 
of a person owning property which is more trouble than it is worth. Rights are vested in right-
holders because these right-holders possess certain general characteristics, such as their 
being the beneficiaries of promises, nationals of a certain state, etc. "Their rights serve their 
interests as persons with those characteristics, but they may be against their interests 
overa"" (Raz, 1988, p. 180). 
The language of individual rights leads on quite naturally to the concept of an 
individual human interest. Individual interests may be considered as being what rights 
protect, and "the individuation of interests piggybacks upon that of the rights that protect 
them" (Baier, 1994, p. 244). Sometimes we claim rights before we are even aware of what is 
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valuable about what we are claiming. Baier believes that consciousness of our vital interests 
demands more of us than awareness of our rights; indeed, the language of vital interests 
may be seen as the proper complement, or even successor, to the language of rights. We 
have both the concept of rights and the concept of interests. The language of rights protects 
that which we consider to be vital and protectable individual human interests; welfare rights 
should be included among those recognized universal rights (Baier, 1994). We ought to 
have rights to such vital goods as food, shelter, and aid that we are unable to provide for 
ourselves. Children, the elderly, and the incapacitated or infirm cannot provide the basic 
goods and services for themselves, and must also be protected from significant harm. 
Children ought also to be provided with education during their early years. These welfare 
rights would serve to mitigate the effects of dominance without requiring begging; we would 
not be forced to meet such vital interests by means of violence or imploring others to serve 
our interests. Perceptions of things for which we may wish to fight or beg-if we cannot 
claim them as ours by recognized rights-may vary within and between cultures, and as 
such, disagreement may result over which interests are paramount. 
These fundamental and vital interests lead to rights. Interests are precursors to 
rights, and are of sufficient importance as to require the protection of rights. For example, 
Baier (1994) lists our interest in our cooperative practice of speech and the rights to which 
that interest gives rise; we have other interests in cooperative practices such as food and 
shelter production, and the care of the very young and old, as well as the infirm. She also 
points out that certain basic interests must be met before others, such as shelter before 
freedom of speech. Welfare rights support rights-claimants in articulating and protecting 
their interests. Rights support both community and individual responsibilities, such as 
maintaining common goods of civilized speech and civilized ways of settling disputes. 
An action or practice is said to be in the interests of a person or group of persons, 
which means that the beneficiary of such action or practice will somehow benefit. Therefore 
there is some reason to support that action or practice. When someone is harmed, it means 
that they have been wronged or treated unjustly, or that their interests have been thwarted, 
defeated, or set back (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994). Wronging another means to violate 
their rights, but harming does not necessarily involve a violation. For example, people are 
harmed by disease, acts of God, and simple bad luck; people may be wronged without 
being harmed as when a wrongful action such as withholding promised information 
accidentally redounds to their benefit. What is considered a harm to one person might not 
necessarily be considered a harm to another because of their varying considerations of 
what constitutes a setback to their interests. 
Raz's (1988) proposed definition of rights identifies the interest upon which the right 
is based as the reason for holding that some persons have certain duties: the rights 
themselves are the grounds for those duties. He explains that interests are part of the 
justification of the rights which are in turn part of the justification of the duties. For an interest 
to be sufficient upon which to base a right, there must be a sound argument having a 
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conclusion that a certain right exists and among its non-redundant premises is a statement 
of some interest of the right-holder. Other premises must supply grounds for attributing to 
the interest the required importance, or for holding it to be relevant to a particular person or 
class of persons so that they and not anyone else are obligated to the right-holder. These 
premises must be enough to require no other considerations, and if so, then the individuals 
concerned have the right. Other premises may need to be added to establish that these 
grounds are not entirely defeated by conflicting reasons. Raz explains how someone might 
be part of a group to whom duties are owed, but that individual cannot claim a right on his or 
her own. He gives the example of a government having a duty to improve the standard of 
living for all citizens, while no specific individual has a right that the government should 
improve his or her specific standard of living. 
A right exists where the interests of the right-holders are sufficient to obligate 
someone else. That an action will serve someone's interest is a reason for doing it, but not 
necessarily sufficient to establish a duty to do it. So, even if a person has a particular right, 
not everyone is necessarily under an obligation to do whatever it is that will promote the 
interest upon which that right is based. Some rights are held against certain people, while 
other rights are held against the world at large. For example, we have a right not to be 
harmed; this right applies to everyone but we do grant certain exceptions to doctors and 
various medical staff who in their attempt to help us might have to cause short term harm, 
e.g. phlebotomy is painful at the time but the procedure is instrumental in diagnosing or 
treating certain diseases. Other rights are held against specific individuals because of the 
relationship they have with the right-holder. For example, children have rights to be cared 
for by their parents. Sometimes interests are sufficient to establish a duty on certain 
individuals and not on others. For example, contractual rights are based on an interest in 
being able to create special relations, and so these rights lead to rights against other parties 
involved in the agreement since they are the only ones who can satisfy the interest on that 
occasion. While a right may impose duties on some but not on others, they can also impose 
duties to do certain things but not others. Thus, having a right to life may impose duties not 
to kill or endanger the life of another, but it does not impose the duty to take whatever action 
is necessary to keep someone alive. 
7.7 Rights demand action 
Rights require action on the part of others: they ground requirements for action in 
the interest of other beings. In his analysis of rights, Sumner (1987) develops analogues for 
rights in terms of their structure involving claims. He has two accounts of claims: the benefit 
account of claims and the control account of claims. His analogue of the benefit account of 
claims is a conception of rights as being protected interests; rights are tools for promoting 
individual welfare. This claim's central notion is the idea that a right holder is the beneficiary 
of duties imposed on others, or as being the one whose interest justifies imposing these 
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duties on others. These duties may be either positive, for example to provide some good or 
service, or they may be negative, for example, the duty not to harm others. Sumner's 
analogue of the control account of claims is a conception of rights as protected choices. 
That the right-holder has the freedom to choose among a set of options, and that this 
freedom is protected by a set of duties imposed on others, is integral to this conception of 
rights as protected choices. A choice could be provided by a full liberty. In this case, its 
protection would include claims of non-interference by others. A choice might also take a 
simpler form of a claim, because every claim must involve the power to either demand 
performance by the duty-bearer or to waive it. If this was the case, then the choice would be 
protected by an immunity against the powers of others. 
The two models share the foundation that the function of rights serves as one kind 
of constraint on the pursuit of social goals. They thereby "share the conviction that real 
rights-standard, normal rights-must protect their holders by imposing normative 
constraints on others, and that these constraints must include duties borne by these others" 
(Sumner, 1984, p. 47). So, regardless of whatever else rights may be composed, they must 
include claims. 
The conception of rights as protected interests allows for a more generous 
distribution of rights. This conception can consider freedom or autonomy as a particular 
interest, whereas the conception of rights as protected choices cannot. It generally holds 
that any being capable of autonomy is a being with interests. 
7.8 Conclusion 
In conclusion, having rights constitutes a form of moral protection. They are 
powerful assertions of claims or interests that demand respect and status. They serve to 
protect individuals and their interests. An individual's right to some thing is based upon that 
individual's having a strong interest in it. Knowing the moral status of right-claimants is 
necessary for us to determine whose interests we ought to take into consideration, since 
only those with interests can have their interests considered. Thus I move now to discuss 
children's rights in particular. 
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In a similar vein, the coach holds the same kind of obligation of a physician in that he or she 
ought to seek the well-being or benefit of the athlete. The doctor-patient relationship is thus 
similar to that of the coach-athlete relationship, that between a professor and a student, as 
well as the parent-child relationship, that upon which the term originates. In these 
relationships, one of the pair is the "powerful" with knowledge, and the other individual may 
be viewed as the "powerless" one who needs the knowledge of the other. It is an unequal, 
imbalanced relationship in terms of power and process, and thus one greatly susceptible to 
explo itatio n. 
Current views on paternalism range from the liberal notion that it is not appropriate 
to treat others paternalistically, to some believing that it is never right to do so, while yet 
others believe that there is a place for paternalism in certain relationships, and indeed, that 
it may even be morally required at times. John Kleinig (1984) defends the concept of 
paternalism against strong liberal antipaternalist arguments. He accommodates the central 
liberal sources of aversion towards paternalism, and argues that it does indeed have its 
merits, and may be justified. Kleinig views paternalism as representing "an attempt to 
ensure the good of individuals, where, in contradistinction to patriarchalism, that good is 
conceived as sufficiently independent of the good of others or some social whole to 
constitute on its own a focus of attention" (1983, p. 3-4). 
Paternalism is not a doctrine that Kleinig puts forth as a substitute for persuasion or 
education; rather, he views it as a strategy of last resort. Paternalism, like punishment, is 
justified but is something for which there are strong moral reasons for seeking to eliminate 
its very existence. He de facto denounces paternalism, saying 
it would be a better world were such paternalism not necessary, just as it would be 
a better world were punishment not sometimes called for. Paternalism is not 
something to be evangelistic about. It is not a substitute for persuasion and 
education, but a strategy of last resort. Like punishment, it is something that, 
though justified, we would like to see less of, something for which there are strong 
moral reasons for seeking to eliminate the need for. 
(Kleinig, 1983, p. 70) 
However, despite these views, he does conceive of allowances for paternalism in certain 
situations, which will be discussed further along. 
The term "paternalism" is characterised by the relations between people, or 
between institutions (such as the state or government) and people or groups of people. 
Kleinig discerns the intention as being clearly focused on familial relationships, such as the 
existing relationships between parent (or father) and child. A paternalistic relationship is 
one in which parents act on the presumption that they know better what is best for the child, 
and that they know better than the child itself what is best for it. Paternalism is considered a 
distasteful and insulting practice, with no redeeming features; indeed, adults and older 
children (referred to oxymoronically as 'mature minors' by Onora O'Neill) regard paternalism 
directed towards them to be insulting and offensive, as it presumes incompetence on their 
behalf: "to treat them as young children is to derogate their capacities and standing" 
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8.0 Chapter Eight: Children's Rights 
8.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Seven, I explained that rights are powerful assertions of claims or 
interests that demand respect and status. They are validated by moral principles and rules, 
and serve to protect individuals and their interests. Having a right allows one to claim 
something as one's due, and to be justified in making that claim. Rights are based on a 
system of rules that empower us to affirm, demand, or insist upon what is due, and 
possessing a right also validly constrains others from interfering with the exercising of that 
right. I argue that a theory of rights is an appropriate moral vocabulary in which to secure 
protection of children from harm, and to promote their right to an open future. 
Earlier, I wrote about the notion of childhood as a separate and distinct phase of the 
human condition. This notion has grown over the years, to the point where "the separate 
condition of the child has never been so bounded by thinking, so established in law as it is 
today" (Warner, 1994, p. 46). Children are in many senses considered powerless and under 
the control of adults, particularly their parents. 
[T]he chief thing about being a child is being in the power of grown-ups. Everything 
comes from them-food, love, treats and punishments. They have the power to give 
and to withhold. Some of them make up the rules as they go along to suit their 
convenience and the child, who would like the chance to make up a few rules 
himself, knows it. 
(Vittachi, 1989, p. 1) 
Childhood as a social concept, a marketing niche, and as an area of research (Warner, 
1994) had led towards children no longer being considered as chattels, but as persons with 
unique characteristics and needs. 
In this chapter, I turn from rights talk in general to focus specifically on children's 
rights. I examine the development of children's rights, and consider-in the philosophical 
sense-whether children are eligible right-holders. I determine that children are eligible 
right-holders, and as such, turn to examine Feinberg's (1980) development of the right of 
children to an open future. I focus on the application of the child's right to arrive on the 
threshold of adulthood with as many choices and options as possible. I apply this view to the 
experiences of elite sport children in high-performance sport, and argue that such 
participation in abrogates their right to an open future. 
Movements towards child protection have called for the recognition of children's 
rights. New legal measures such as the Children'S Act (1989) in the United Kingdom and the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) have given children some force 
regarding choices and decision-making, as well as being the impetus for increasing debate 
on the rights of children in general. The Children'S Act (1989) in particular has 
reconceptualised children as persons to whom duties are owed, rather than as possessions 
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over which power may be exercised, in that the Act clarified the parent's role as being one 
of parental responsibility rather than one of parental rights (Lyon and Parton, 1995). 
While recognition of children's rights in society at large has become more 
commonplace, the recognition of children's rights in sport has been slower (David, 1993). 
General norms and values in sport are often different from those in society, and 
increasingly, questions have been asked whether this ought to be so (David, 1998; de Knop, 
1998). For example, the use of drugs and doping methods, sexual discrimination, and 
physical assault in violent sports such as rugby, ice hockey, and boxing are evaluated 
differently in the sporting context than they are in elsewhere. The treatment of children 
differs considerably from general society to the sporting context as well. David (1998), de 
Knop (1998), and Galasso (1988) have questioned whether the norms and values in youth 
sport are respectful of children's rights, particularly as they have been outlined in the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child-hereafter known as the UNCRC or the 
Convention. David, de Knop, and Galasso have identified conflicts with organizational 
structures of sport and young participants. One of the main problems lies in conflicting 
rights. Because of the various interests of those involved, such as coaches, parents, agents, 
sport governing bodies, as well as those of the young athletes themselves, the interests 
sometimes conflict, resulting in the interests of the children being compromised. 
8.2 Recognising children's rights 
Children's rights "came of age" in the 1980s, according to Franklin (1995). In his 
work on children's rights, Colin Wringe (1981) describes the proliferation of calls for 
children's rights during the 1970s. For the most part, the leaders of the children's rights 
movement were adults, although some children and adolescents were involved. The 
authoritarian regime in schools was recognised as part of a more general abuse of 
childhood, particularly regarding the widespread use of corporal punishment, restrictions of 
free speech, the mandatory wearing of uniforms, and the lack of participation by pupils in 
the organization of their schools (Wringe, 1981). A wide variety of groups were clamouring 
for recognition of children's concerns. Despite their diversity, these groups were fairly 
unanimous in their criticisms of the ways children were being (mis)treated by the adult 
world, and their calls for the acknowledgement of children's rights. Wringe (1981) suggests 
the use of the currency of rights may have been due to fashion and imitation since many of 
the rights being demanded belonged "recognizably to a liberal tradition of long standing, the 
only new feature in the situation being their application to children" (p. 10). Some of the 
rights demands on behalf of children included: the demand that children should be seen as 
persons in their own right, the right not to attend school, the right to educational democracy, 
the right to organise democratically, the right of freedom in personal appearance, the right to 
freedom of expression, the abolition of corporal punishment, the right to freedom of worship, 
the right of free access to knowledge, the right of sexual freedom, and many others such as 
the right to vote, work, own property, travel, choose one's own guardian, to receive a 
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guaranteed income, to assume legal and financial responsibilities, to use drugs and to drive, 
in addition to rights to food, space, toys, and books (Wringe, 1981). 
The area of children's rights is a subclass of rights in general. The paradigmatic 
right-holder is a "normal" adult (Wellman, 1995). Children fall into the sub-set of right-
holders, which may include women, foetuses, incompetent adults such as those with 
permanent or temporary mental incapacities, minorities, workers, animals, and even the 
environment. These sub-sets exist because either individuals or groups have made claims, 
or others have made claims on their behalf, demanding a separate set of rights above and 
beyond general rights, such as those outlined in the United Nations Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948). Other groups who have claimed distinct rights include patients, 
students, and athletes. Controversies in philosophical discussions concerning right-holders 
involve who may be a right-holder, and if only persons may be right-holders, then what is a 
person. There are also controversies surrounding rights and correlative duties, and whether 
a right-holder must also have duties, or responsibilities. 
8.3 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) 
In November of 1989, the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (UNCRC). The document expresses some the most basic values regarding the 
treatment of children, including their protection and participation in society. It articulates the 
human rights of children everywhere, and the standards to which all governments ought to 
aspire in realizing human rights for all children, without discrimination. 
The relatively recent international recognition and promotion of children's rights, as 
well as the widespread ratification of the UNCRC have led to new considerations of children 
and childhood. Article 1, which defines children-those 18 years and under unless the 
relevant national laws recognise an earlier age of majority-and then covers non-negotiable 
standards and obligations including rights to survival, to protection from harm, abuse, and 
exploitation, to civil rights, health, education, as well as to participate fully in family, cultural 
and social life. The Convention aims to protects children's rights by laying down standards in 
health care, education and legal, civil, and social services. These standards are 
benchmarks against which progress by world governments can be assessed. 
The overarching philosophy supporting the UNCRC is that children are human 
beings, that they are equals, and that they have the same inherent value as adults (Franklin, 
1995). The document acknowledges that childhood is valuable in itself and not simply or 
merely a training period for adult life; it does so by affirming the right of children to play. The 
UNCRC recognises that the child's path to adulthood is gradual, and is characterised by 
their evolving capacities. Particularly in the earliest stages, children are vulnerable and 
require special protection and support in order to enjoy their rights in full. It may seem 
strange to promote children as equals, but to simultaneously demand their protection, notes 
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Franklin (1995). He suggests that part of the answer to that query lies in the obligation of 
states that are party to the Convention to develop and undertake all actions and policies 
according to the principle of the best interests of the child, as stated in Article 3: 
In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social 
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the 
best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. (Art. 3, 1) 
Thus, the interests of the child ought to be considered in all decisions which affect them. 
The interests of the parents are important, but not all-important, and neither are the interests 
of the state. 
The Convention confirms that children have a right to express their opinions about 
issues concerning themselves. Article 12 says that a child who is capable of forming his or 
her own views may do so freely in all matters affecting the child, and that the views of the 
child be given due weight, in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. Article 12 
does not, however, state that children's opinions are the only ones to be considered. It says 
explicitly that children have a responsibility to respect the rights of others, especially those 
of their parents. 
Legally, the principle of the best interests of the child has come to be informed by 
the principle that where appropriate, the child's views and desires ought to inform legal 
decisions affecting them, such as the right to choose with whom they will live, to accept or 
reject an adoption, or to change their name or nationality. The Convention highlights and 
defends the family's role in the lives of children. The views that parents "own" their children, 
and have absolute rights over them are overturned and replaced with the parents' 
responsibilities to protect and promote their children's rights. In the Convention Preamble 
and in Articles 5, 10, and 18, the document refers specifically to the family as the 
fundamental group of society, and the natural environment for the growth and well-being of 
its members, particularly children. As children mature and begin to understand the values, 
culture, and norms of their society, the parents' responsibilities with respect to their 
children's rights are reduced. The UNCRC acknowledge the balance between the rights and 
responsibilities of families with the increasing capacity of children to be self-determining 
individuals, and exercise their own rights and responsibilities. 
Governments must respect the primary responsibility of parents for providing care 
and nurturance for their children, and are obliged to support parents in their responsibilities 
by providing material assistance and support programmes. Furthermore, governments must 
also prevent the separation of children from their families unless such separation is 
determined as being necessary for the child's best interests as outlined above in Article 3. 
Article 2 of the Convention, and one of the four general principles of the Convention, 
is that regarding discrimination. It stipulates that all children should be able to access and 
benefit from their rights, irrespective of the child's or his or her parent's or legal guardian's 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social 
origin, property, disability, birth or other status. 
176 
Article 6 of the Convention includes the right to survival and development, and 
recognises that every child has the inherent right to life. The term "development" has to do 
with the broadest understandings of mental, emotional, cognitive, social, and cultural 
development, and may be seen as the departure pOint for all other Articles relating to 
economic, social, and cultural rights for children. 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child has been formulated in the spirit of 
protecting and promoting the rights of the most vulnerable populations, children. The notion 
of children's rights is not as outlandish as has been suggested in the past, and has achieved 
respectability. The Convention has contributed to that progress. The kinds of rights that the 
Convention has formulated, however, are primarily legal rights. We turn now to consider 
discourse about the moral rights of children, and whether children really are right-holders at 
all. 
8.4 Moral rights and moral agents 
Critical moral philosophers have questioned the ascription of rights to foetuses, 
children, animals, and other beings incapable of claiming their own rights for themselves. 
Questions concerning whether foetuses or animals have rights are common philosophical 
debates. The practical outcomes of such debates are of vital importance. For example, if a 
foetus or animal is granted the right to life, then abortion and killing animals would be 
considered rights-abrogations of those beings, and from a rights standpoint, those actions 
would be considered morally wrong. The extension of such a query-whether foetuses or 
animals have rights-would presuppose a more fundamental philosophical problem, that 
being which kinds of beings could have moral rights. 
The notion of moral rights was discussed in the previous chapter. The question I 
shall ask here is whether children are the sorts of beings who could be moral right-holders. 
If indeed they are, what sorts of rights they would be entitled to claim, and when would they 
be able to make those claims. If foetuses, for example, are not considered to be the kinds of 
beings who are right-holders, then at what point does a foetus become an infant and then 
when do they become a child? 
Whether children are indeed right-holders hinges upon their nature, as well as upon 
the nature of moral rights. The nature of children and of childhood is discussed in depth in 
Chapter Four, and will not be re-examined here. Moral rights are only one in a family of 
rights, and thus even if children are determined to be possessors of moral rights, such a 
conclusion does not necessarily mean those rights will automatically transfer to another 
family of rights, such as legal or institutional rights. 
A moral right is understood as being "a claim backed by valid reasons and 
addressed to the conscience of the claimee or to public opinion," while legal rights are 
legally valid claims against the state for enforcement (Feinberg, 1984, p. 110). The 
distinction between rights are supported by reason, and those which are not. A legal right 
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that is arbitrary and unsupported by reason is a legal right only, and not a moral right. An 
example of a legal right which is not a moral right-albeit a contentious and a jurisdictionally 
variable one-would be a woman's right to have an abortion. Such a right rests upon law 
only, and not on moral grounds. Some moral rights are moral rights only, and have no legal 
backing. For example, the moral right to be treated politely by strangers is not enforceable 
by law. A child has the legal right to be cared for, and provided with the basics of life such 
as food and shelter. The law cannot, however, legislate that the child has the legal right to 
be loved. That is a moral right. Within the context of sport, the right to be treated with 
respect and courtesy by opponents is primarily a moral right, rather than a legal right. The 
concept of fair play is a moral concept, although in some sports, such as tennis, disrespect 
to opponents or referees may be penalised within the rules of the game; however, in other 
sports, "trash-talking" or "sledging" may be accepted within the ethos of the sport. Violent 
sports such as boxing blur the distinction between moral and legal rights. 
Moral rights are generally independent of and antecedent to legal rights (Feinberg, 
1984). For example, the moral right not to be harmed precedes the legal right not to be 
harmed. Legal rights are jurisdictionally determined, whereas moral rights are universal. The 
moral right not to be harmed applies universally, and is not based upon state enforcement 
for recognition and enforcement. The legal right to obtain a driver's licence, however, is 
jurisdictionally dependent, for in some states it may be 16 years of age and in others it may 
be 17 or 18 years of age. 
Normal adult human beings are the paradigmatic moral right-holders (Wellman, 
1995). Their qualification to hold moral rights is, at the very least, their possession of moral 
agency. Only beings who are moral agents may possess moral rights; a moral agent is one 
who exercises freedom and control. Since the critical function of a right is to confer dominion 
on the right-holder, a right-holder must be capable of acting freely or exercising control 
(Wellman, 1995). The essential function of moral rights is to determine the morally justified 
distribution of freedom and control. One may view the ascription of moral rights to those who 
are incapable of exercising such freedom and control to be idle and inappropriate, without 
any moral purpose, or misleading people into believing that freedom and control may belong 
morally to those who are incapable of either acting freely or exercising control: one can only 
be held morally responsible for one's own actions if one has the capacity to act in response 
to moral reasons. This sense of competency in turn is based, at least, on several 
presuppositions: "the capacity to learn or become acquainted with the relevant facts, the 
capacity to recognize their moral relevance, the capacity to be motivated by them, and the 
capacity to act in the broad nonmoral sense of doing something" (Wellman, 1995, p. 112). 
When someone acts in response to desire, passion, ambition, or self-interest, they are not 
acting morally. 
A moral right-holder then is an agent, and the sort of agency which is required to be 
a moral right-holder is that which renders one morally responsible for one's actions; this 
agent is one who has the capacity to act based on specifically moral reasons (Wellman, 
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1995). Such capacity presupposes, at a minimum, cognition of relevant information an 
, 
ability to appreciate their moral relevance, and to be motivated by them. These capacities 
do not have to be particularly sophisticated, as children can be morally responsible for 
relatively simple decisions even if they do not have any moral duty to act "rightly" in more 
complex situations; moreover, our most basic rights presuppose only a minimal degree of 
moral agency. For example, a six year old child may share his or her bicycle with another 
child without one; the child does this because he or she realises the other does not have a 
bicycle, while they do, and thus they feel compelled to share. While the child shares with his 
or her neighbourhood friend, the child does not have a moral duty to do so with children in 
far-off lands where others are without bicycles. 
While Wellman questions the purpose of ascribing moral rights to non-agents, he 
does qualify such an ascription as not always being meaningless or without moral purpose. 
Ascribing rights to such beings may highlight the value and obligation we have to such 
entities. The issue of rights and our obligations towards animals are an area of great moral 
import; however, it is beyond the scope of this discussion. We focus herein on the 
vulnerability of children, and a consideration of children as potential right-holders. 
8.5 Children as right-holders 
Infants and very young children lack moral agency. Because they lack agency, it 
has been argued that they cannot be moral right-holders (Wellman, 1995). Along the moral 
continuum, newborns are situated at the very beginning, children are seen as being further 
along, and adults are considered to be the paradigmatic moral right-holders. 
Children are in a progressive state of development. They acquire moral agency as 
they mature physically and psychologically, presumably towards adulthood. One of the 
difficulties in any general discussion about children lies in the inherent differences amongst 
other children. The very notion of childhood involves a dynamic state of growth and 
development, and includes such a wide chronological and physiological spectrum that any 
generalizations about "all" children are difficult to make. The United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (1989) definition of a child covers a period of tremendous change, 
with its associated variety of competencies. Thus, it would be inappropriate simply to speak 
of "all" children as though they were exactly the same. It is crucial, however, to nurture 
burgeoning autonomy without abandoning children to self-determination before they are 
capable of making their own decisions. These varying capacities and competencies are 
among the most significant challenges in raising children, as each child ought to be 
recognised as an individual without overlooking the inherent nature of children as being in 
need of guidance and protection. 
One cannot classify children according to chronological age either, as even within 
these categories, competencies may vary dramatically. For the purposes of this discussion, 
very young children will be considered those from birth to approximately two years of age; 
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young children will be those up to the age of approximately seven years; children will be 
those up to the age of about twelve, and adolescents or youths will be teenagers up to the 
age of eighteen years. 
If moral agency is necessary for the possession of rights (Feinberg, 1980; Wellman, 
1995), and since very young children lack moral agency-and if moral agency is necessary 
for the possession of rights-then it appears that the youngest children cannot be moral 
right-holders. Despite the premises supporting the conclusion, this reasoning is somewhat 
disconcerting. The implication of such a theory of rights that renders the youngest children 
as not qualifying as moral right-holders, is dealt with in terms of "claims" by Feinberg. He 
holds that a right is a valid claim, and since a very young child cannot make any claims at 
all, then adults (presumably their parents or guardians) may claim their rights on their 
behalf. Thus, both theories of rights appear to suggest that beings incapable of claiming 
their rights cannot therefore be right-holders. However, because their parents or guardians 
may claim those rights for them, Feinberg believes that they are thereby capable of 
possessing moral rights. This extension would clearly also apply to animals, as humans are 
capable-even obliged-of claiming the rights of animals on their behalf, since they cannot 
do so themselves, nor will they "grow up" as children presumably will. Wellman (1995) does 
not accept that the youngest children are capable of possessing moral rights because they 
completely lack moral agency, which is the primary qualification for being a moral right-
holder. Of course, disqualifying them from being moral right-holders is entirely different from 
being legal-right holders. Because the law says that very young children have rights, then 
"very young children have rights" since legal ascription of rights is, while jurisdictionally 
variable, accepted in societies (Wellman, 1995). 
This discussion has covered the area of moral rights, and whether children are 
moral right-holders. I agree that even though the youngest children cannot claim their rights 
on their own behalf, these rights may be claimed for them by their parents or guardians. 
Older children are capable of possessing moral agency, given their more developed 
intellectual capacities, and thus as moral agents, they are moral right-holders. In 
conclusion, then, all children are moral right-holders, although the youngest children need 
their parents or guardians to claim their rights on their behalf, until they are capable of 
claiming their own moral rights. We turn now to consider the kinds of rights to which children 
may lay claim. 
8.6 Child protection and child liberation 
As discussed earlier, the debate surrounding children'S rights has focused on the 
nature of children and childhood, and whether children differ from adults in morally relevant 
ways. The main issues in regard to children's rights are whether: (a) children as so different 
from adults that they cannot be right-holders at all; (b) children are sufficiently different from 
adults to require a distinct set of rights, or; (c) children ought to be accorded equal rights. 
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We have already determined that children do differ sufficiently from adults in terms of 
requiring special care and protection, and thus we shall now consider the two other issues 
from the protectionist and the liberationist perspectives. Archard (1993) refers to the 
protectionist approach as the "caretaker" thesis, which is similar to Feinberg's (1980) 
version of the child's right to an open future, or future-oriented consent. 
Child liberationists argue that children are wronged by separation from the adult 
world and, by being accorded equal rights, children will be able to protect themselves from 
injustices (Aiken and Purdy, 1998). Proponents of equal rights for children focus on the 
limitations placed on children-primarily those in the western world-and believe that 
children are wronged by these inappropriate limits. While liberationists agree that there are 
differences between adults and children, they do not consider these to be of sufficient moral 
relevance to justify the denial of adult rights to children. Liberationists accept that children 
do require some protective rights, but not when these rights may prevent them from 
exercising the rights open to adults. For example, they agree that children may have special 
access to education, however, compulsory schooling would violate their rights of freedom. 
Child liberationists believe that the possession of instrumental reasoning is sufficient in 
deciding moral standing, and since even young children are capable of making accurate 
judgments about the consequences of a given action, then they ought to be according equal 
rights (Aiken and Purdy, 1998). 
In contrast, child protectionists believe that children have special moral status 
entitling them to special moral and legal treatment. Because children are lacking in 
experience, competence and maturity, children do not have the knowledge or self-control 
required for exercising adult rights and liberties well (Aiken and Purdy, 1998). Their inability 
to recognise fully the consequences of their actions renders them more susceptible than 
adults to harming themselves, or being harmed by others. Those who are experienced and 
able to recognise likely harms are the children's parents or guardians. Therefore, "parents 
are expected to take charge of their children, protecting and guiding them through their long 
years of development, gradually expanding both their rights and their responsibilities" (Aiken 
and Purdy, 1998, p. 452). Child protectionists are also usually supportive of state limitations 
on children: 
Among these limits are requiring attendance in school until a certain age, prohibiting 
the sale of alcohol, tobacco, and other drugs or sexually explicit literature or 
contraceptive devices to children, imposing curfews, mandating health care such as 
vaccinations, and generally limiting the conditions under which children can work, 
engage in sexual activity, consent to abortion, refuse medical treatment, consent to 
be research subjects, make legal contracts, and be held legally accountable and 
punishable for their illegal actions. 
(Aiken and Purdy, 1998, p. 452) 
Such paternalism is justified on the grounds that children are in need of special care and 
protection during the formative years of their lives, particularly if the children are to grow up 
to be fully participating and contributing members of the community. However, as Feinberg 
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writes, children ought not to be treated as children after a certain pOint, "else they will never 
acquire the outlook and capability of responsible adults" (1980, p. 110). 
Children gradually acquire competencies in different areas are they grow and 
develop. A child may be fully competent to make prudent and moral judgments about certain 
things, but not about others. Thus, blanket restrictions may not be appropriate, and this is 
where demands for restrictions on the lives of children are challenged. For example, 
protectionists deny that instrumental reasoning is sufficient to make good prudential and 
moral judgments as the liberationists argue. However, since the capacity to make such good 
and prudential judgments is not held by all adults either, how can they accept a 
chronological boundary separating those in need of protective rights, and those free to enjoy 
full adult rights? Protectionists may have to make stronger requirements for the accord of 
adult rights, which would complicate the already established chronological boundaries, or 
else they may have to consider a less restrictive approach to children's lives and their rights. 
I believe, as many do, that children do differ in morally different ways from adults. 
They are beings in the process of becoming self-directed moral agents, and need support 
and assistance from their parents or guardians to be able to claim their rights. Children are 
vulnerable, and are in need of protection and guidance in their early years so as to 
maximise their futures, and this protection and guidance may be conceptualised in terms of 
rights. Children's rights may be considered in two groups, protective rights and promotive 
rights. 
8.6.1 Protective rights 
Protective rights (Archard, 1993; Franklin 1995), claim rights (Feinberg, 1984; 
Sumner, 1987; Wellman, 1995), or welfare rights (Griffin, 2000; Sumner, 1987), as they are 
known variously, are those which serve to safeguard children. Due to their vulnerability, 
incompetence, and inexperience in the ways of the world, children cannot protect 
themselves from harm, abuse, exploitation, oppression, or neglect by others. These rights 
must be claimed by others-usually parents or guardians-on behalf of the children: 
children themselves do not need to do anything to be accorded these rights. Protective 
rights include the basic welfare rights to food, shelter, health care, and protection from harm. 
The Convention (1989) includes the rights to be protected from economic (Article 32) and 
sexual exploitation (Article 34), and from the illicit use of narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances including the illicit production and trafficking of such substances. 
Protecting children from harm is one of the most crucial functions of children's 
rights. Presumably parents or guardians act to protect and promote their children's interests, 
and thus it seems absurd that children would have to call on legal rights for redress of 
harms experienced within the family. Unfortunately it is not always the case that parents or 
guardians have natural love and affection for their children, or always act in the best 
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interests of their children, and thus children's rights serve also to protect children from the 
very individuals who ought to be protecting them. 
Certain types of maltreatment are obvious. For example, a child who is deliberately 
beaten for misbehaving, or is told repeatedly that she is stupid and that nothing she ever 
does is good enough is clearly suffering from physical and emotional abuse. Other types of 
abuse may be more difficult to identify. While child abuse itself is difficult to define because 
it may take a wide variety of forms, it may be presumed to constitute a significant wrong. 
The wrong of child abuse lies both in the harm done to the child itself, as well as to the 
future adult the child will one day become (Archard, 1998). At one time or another, many (if 
indeed not all) children may feel that their parents are being unreasonable, unfair, or mean-
spirited for what they "force" the children to do. When parents insist that their child go to 
school, or eat their dinner at the table rather than in front of the television-and eat all the 
spinach, or be home by a certain time, children may feel that the parents are torturing them, 
but in reality the parents are acting in the best interests of their child. It just may take some 
time for the child to recognise such limitations as "good" things. In the vast majority of 
cases, the actions of parents, despite how painful they may appear to be at the time, are 
well intentioned and appropriate. However, these are not the cases that ought to concern 
us. It is the cases wherein parents act in ways that do not benefit their children, and may 
actually harm them, with which we are concerned. For example, a parent who lives his or 
her life vicariously through the child, and pressures the child to participate-and excel-in 
certain activities, may also be considered abusive. When a parent forces a child to train and 
compete in intensive sport from an early age, one must question whether such participation 
is in the child's best interests. David (1998) and de Knop (1998) suggest that such treatment 
is abusive, and call on children's rights as stipulated in the Convention (1989) to support 
their claims. Children's rights in sport will be discussed in a later section within this chapter. 
8.6.2 Promotive rights 
Promotive rights (Archard, 1993), or choice rights (Feinberg, 1980a), or liberty rights 
(Sumner 1987), or participation rights (Franklin, 1995) are those that serve to advance the 
interests of children. These include rights covered in the Convention (1989), such as those 
to education. Article 29 states that the education of the child shall be directed towards: 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
the development of the child's personality, talents and mental and physical 
abilities to their full potential 
the development of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and for 
the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations 
the preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of 
understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all 
peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and persons of indigenous origin 
to develop respect for the natural environment. 
(UNCRC, 1989, Article 29) 
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In recognition of the inherent nature of children, the Convention declares children also have 
rights to rest and recreation: 
1 . States Parties recognize the right of the child to rest and leisure, to engage in 
play and recreational activities appropriate to the age of the child and to 
participate freely in cultural life and the arts. 
2. States Parties shall respect and promote the right of the child to participate fully 
in cultural and artistic life and shall encourage the provision of appropriate and 
equal opportunities for cultural, artistic, recreational and leisure activity. 
(UNCRC, 1989, Article 31) 
Article 5 applies to the child's right to be provided with appropriate direction and guidance; 
Article 6 concerns the child's right to development. This right to development may be 
understood in the context of creating one's own life plan, in light of one's interests and 
abilities. Jonas (1974) and Feinberg (1980a) have argued that an individual has the right to 
self-determination, which involves creativity and freedom in developing and changing one's 
direction in life as one chooses. A life directed by others would be a less authentic life. We 
move now to consider the child's right to an open future. 
8.7 The child's right to an open future 
Is there a moral right to be allowed to create one's own life plan? If a child's life 
becomes pre-determined by others, such as by his or her parents or guardians, then his or 
her fate is already determined. The child loses the opportunity to spontaneously and freely 
create and become his or her own authentic self. One loses the sense of human possibility 
in freely creating one's own future (Jonas, 1974). Jonas suggests that it may even by 
tyrannical to try and create another's fate in this way. What is important for an individual's 
experience of freedom and ability to formulate one's own life plan is whether one believes 
that one's future is open and undetermined, and remains still to be largely shaped by the 
choices one makes. Feinberg (1980a) argues that children have a right to an open future. 
This right has been used to justify paternalistic behaviour in the upbringing of children so 
that when they reach the threshold of adulthood, they are prepared to be self-determining in 
creating and living out their own individual life plans. When parents foreclose the futures of 
their children, they have done them wrong. Feinberg has been one the most influential 
philosophers to articulate and defend this thesis, and thus this work relies primarily on his 
explanations and discussions of the recognition and promotion of the child's right to an open 
future. 
That a child has a right to an open future means that someone has a correlative 
duty-most appropriately parents or guardians-that they not foreclose the future options 
that the child would otherwise have by personally formulating his or her own life. Deliberate 
foreclosure of reasonable opportunities from which the child may choose would be a 
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violation of the child's right to an open future. Denying a basic education, or health care, or 
even love and nurturance, would limit or deny the child the opportunity to create an 
autonomous life. Such constraint would limit the child's options for his or her life plans. For 
example, if a child does not learn to read or write, then his or her employment possibilities 
would be severely curtailed, as would many life prospects in general be limited. An inability 
to read a newspaper, a job advertisement, a novel, the label on a can of food, or forms at a 
hospital would seriously hamper all aspects of life. While some skills may certainly be 
learned later on in life, such learning often more difficult and take far longer than it would in 
childhood. 
Typical parenting often does involve many constraints on a child's behaviour and 
opportunities that the child may resent at the time, or in the future. Demanding that the child 
attend school when the child-at the time-does not wish to do, or making the child take 
piano lessons against his or her own wishes, is constraining. While one could argue that 
piano lessons may be part of a child's education, learning how to read and write would 
surely take precedence over the former, since those skills are essential in contemporary 
society. Indoctrinating a child into a particular religion at a young age also forecloses their 
future in some ways. Children are heavily and often forever influenced by exposure in their 
early years, and thus the earliest and strongest ideologies to which they are exposed may 
remain with them forever. Though they may later choose to leave religion, or to choose 
another religion, the first one to which they were exposed will likely be the most influential as 
they were indoctrinated during their most impressionable stage. 
In arguing for the child's right to an open future, one may ask how children's rights 
might pose special philosophical problems. While adults possess a number of rights of 
children equally, there are some rights that apply exclusively to adults. There are also rights 
that, while not exclusively particular to children, are generally characteristic of them. He calls 
those rights that are common only to adults "A-rights," those that are common to both adults 
and children "A-C-rights," and those which are characteristic of children to be "C-rights". 
A-rights are thought to be those possessed only by adults. Examples of these would 
be the legal right to vote, drink alcohol, smoke cigarettes, get married, enter into legally 
binding contracts, and stay out all night. A subset of these rights are autonomy rights, which 
are protected liberties of choice. For instance, the free exercise of one's religion, which 
presupposes that an individual already possesses religious convictions or preferences. It is 
important to note that when parents choose to expose their child to religious practices, they 
are exercising their rights, and not those of their children. 
A-C-rights are those shared by adults and children. An example would be the right 
not to be mistreated by others. If a child is accosted by a stranger who hits him and takes 
away his candy, the stranger "has interfered wrongly with the child's bodily integrity and 
property interests and has violated his or her rights just as surely as if the aggressor had 
punched an adult and forcibly helped himself to her purse" (Feinberg, 1980a, p. 125). 
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C-rights are not those that apply exclusively to children, but are generally 
characteristic of them. They might also apply to adults in certain limited circumstances. 
There are two subclasses of c-rights: first, dependency rights, and second, rights-in-trust. 
Dependency rights are those that apply to all children, and adults in special cases such as 
those who are mentally challenged and unable to support themselves. These rights are 
based on the child's dependence upon others for the basic goods of life, such as food, 
shelter, and protection. 
The second subclass of C-rights are rights-in-trust, which resemble those in the 
autonomy rights subsection of A-rights belonging to adults. They are special because the 
child cannot yet exercise these rights until later when he or she is "more fully formed and 
capable". These rights are "saved" for when the child becomes an adult. So, because 
sophisticated autonomy rights may be ascribed to children before they are actually able to 
exercise them, it is possible for these rights of children to be violated "in advance". This 
means that by violating conduct in childhood, when the child reaches adulthood, certain 
options may already be closed. The child's right-while he or she is still a child-is to have 
these future options kept open until she or he becomes a fully formed self-determining adult 
capable of deciding among such options. Feinberg identifies these "anticipatory autonomy 
rights" as autonomy rights in the special conception necessary to be held "prematurely" by 
children. These rights-in-trust are summed up into the single "right to an open future." An 
example of such a right and its abrogation is certain of the harms experienced by elite child 
athletes. The children experience harms such as spinal injuries that have life-long 
consequences. Their right to arrive on the threshold of adulthood with as many possible 
options available to them is abrogated since the nature of their injury has foreclosed a 
number of options. For example, they may never be able to become a firefighter or a pilot 
because they would not be able to satisfy the physical requirements of those professions. 
Some rights with general names are difficult to classify, particularly when attributed 
to older children (Feinberg, 1980a). For example, some rights, such as the A-right to free 
speech, may straddle the divide between subclasses in the A-right and C-right category as 
children grow and mature. When ascribed to a ten-year old child, the right to free speech, 
interpreted as the freedom to express political opinions, is primarily an A-right but is also a 
C-right in terms of the opinions which the child may come later to hold, but which are 
currently beyond his or her comprehension. 
A-C-rights protect interests that children have now. A distinction ought to be drawn 
between interests and present desires-or what Goodin (1997) considers "preferences"-
which often clash. The advancement of the child's interests are a constituent of the child's 
good qua child at present, but the child may also come to have interests as he or she grows 
up, and these are protected by these rights-in-trust within the class of C-rights. "While he is 
still a child these "future interests" include those that he will in fact come to have in the 
future and also those he will never acquire, depending on the directions of his growth" 
(Feinberg, 1980a, p. 127). Present desires may interfere with those interests. For example, 
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children have interests in autonomy, which are manifested during childhood through the 
right to education. A child may have preferences to not attend school, but these preferences 
clash with his or her rights-in-trust of autonomy. If the child does not go to school, and does 
not learn to read and write, then at the pOint of becoming an adult, he or she will have a 
foreclosed future since those skills of reading and writing are significant components of 
burgeoning autonomy in that they allow the then-adult to obtain employment, which in turn 
will contribute to the person being independent and self-governing. Thus, if the adult-to-be 
wishes to exercise his or her autonomy at a later stage, the options must be kept open 
during childhood. Perhaps, as unlikely as it sounds, he or she will never have to make 
choices which depend on reading or writing, but that child is the potential adult who will 
need such basic skills, and since the child is potentially that adult, it is that adult who is the 
person whose autonomy must be protected now. 
Clearly, children are different from adults. When a mature adult is faced with the 
challenge of being satisfied now, and having his or her future options left open, our respect 
for the other's autonomy is such that we cannot force his or her present choice even if it 
would protect his or her future liberty. "His present autonomy takes precedence even over 
his probably future good, and he may use it as he will, even at the expense of the future self 
he will one day become" (Feinberg, 1980a, p. 127). Children, however, are treated 
differently in order to secure their future liberty. While autonomous adults are free to make 
their own deciSions, even those that may affect their future freedom and are imprudent, 
children's interests are protected by the future self which exists in childhood in the form of a 
claim to prudence. Respecting a child's future autonomy requires intervening in his or her 
free choices now. While adults are free to make their own choices and live with the 
consequences, in order to respect the future adult's autonomy, the child's present desires 
may be denied. Thus, the child's right to an open future must be protected against present 
desires, as they may interfere with his or her future interests. 
8.8 Conflicting rights 
One of the primary drawbacks of deontological theories is how to deal with conflicts, 
as in the case when a conflict arises between children's C-rights and their parents' A-rights. 
For example, one of the most frequent clashes occurs between the child's protected 
personal interest in growth and development, and the parents' right to determine their own 
child's upbringing, or to create their own individual lifestyle, or to practice their own religion 
without interference from others. Since the state often reinforces the interests of the general 
community, there may be further conflicts. For example, communities are concerned about 
public health in that they have an interest in children not being sources of infection to others, 
that children grow up socially well informed enough to vote as informed and responsible 
citizens, and that children not become involved in criminal activity or a drain on the state 
welfare services. Due to the three unique perspectives involved, family legal issues such as 
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custody hearings, maltreatment or neglect charges against parents, and criminal trials for 
the violation of compulsory school attendance laws and child labour regulations, become 
adversarial contests among the various rights of children, parents, and the state who 
represents the community's interests. 
Since children are incapable of legally defending their own future interests against 
present infringements by their parents and others, they are protected by the state in its role 
of parens patriae. As explained in Chapter Five, this doctrine confers on the state the right, 
even the duty, to protect children and others incapable of protecting themselves. In such 
situations, the state becomes the "parents of last resort" in protecting children, sometimes 
even from their own parents. When the courts attempt to make decisions concerning the 
welfare of children, they attempt to do so as they presume the children themselves would 
decide when they become adults, which is not always straightforward. The courts try not to 
make decisions in the name of the future adult, and can sometimes delay making serious 
and final commitments by interfering with the parents until the child reaches maturity is 
becomes legally capable of self-regarding decision-making. 
The state is generally reluctant to interfere in family affairs, and will do so usually 
with only the most compelling evidence. When parents abuse, neglect, or exploit their 
children, they can expect the state as parens patriae to interfere in their private relationship 
with their children, and if need be, assign the children to the custody of court-appointed 
trustees. However, "given satisfaction of reasonable moral standards of care and education, 
[no] court has the right to impose its own conception of the good life on a child over its 
natural parents' objections" (Feinberg, 1980a, p. 139). While the state cannot choose the 
influences that are best for the child, it may expect that all public influences remain open, 
and that children-through their education in accredited schools-be exposed to a wide 
variety of information about the present and historical world. The state is expected to be 
neutral between atheism and theism in the private lives of its citizens; it is must allow 
citizens to choose between private and public schools, sectarian or non-sectarian; parents 
may raise their children with their own values, ideals, and political persuasions; essentially, 
the family is free to create their own environment for the child, within the minimal standards 
of humanity, health, and education as determined by the state. 
8.9 Challenges of the right to an open future 
Challenges surround the proposition of the child having a right to an open future. 
The child's right to an open future sets limits around the choices parents have in raising their 
own children, and may also impose duties upon the state in its role as parens patriae to 
enforce those limits. These protective duties towards child protection invoke the connected 
ideals of autonomy-or self-determination-and self-fulfilment, concepts which are 
notoriously confusing. 
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Conceptual clarity is difficult because of the myriad beliefs surrounding raising 
children, discussed in Chapter Four on conceptions of children and childhood. Because 
children are fledgling members of the adult community, the stage of childhood is spent 
becoming socialised into their community. They learn their parents' and community's values 
and mores, which they internalise and meld with their developing identities. Since children 
are born without precisely determined character structures, they must be socialised into 
appropriate members of the adult community, and this socialization may include measures 
of discipline that may be contrary to the wishes of the children themselves. The nature of 
parents is such that they protect their children: they are characteristically paternal towards 
their off-spring. Sometimes this protection is from the foolishness and immaturity of the 
children themselves, but it may also be from dangers from other members of society. 
Community and state officials in the form of police and the judicial system work towards 
constructing and maintaining a framework of safeguarding citizens through its power and 
threats of punishment. The state's protective policies-typically western democratic states, 
for the purposes of this discussion-towards citizens are paternalistic in that they intend to 
protect in a manner characteristic of parents. Sometimes, however, the state uses these 
powers to protect children against their own parents. 
The term "autonomy" plays a central role in discussions about children's rights. 
There are two senses of the term: first, it may refer to the capacity for self-governance 
(which is a matter of degree), or; second, it may refer to the sovereign authority for self-
governance which is absolute within one's own moral boundaries (Feinberg, 1980a). There 
are also two senses of the term "independent" which also plays an integral role in 
discussions of children's rights. One sense of the term refers to self-sufficiency that involves 
the capacity to support and direct one's life, and to be ultimately responsible for one's 
choices. The other sense is primarily political, which refers to de jure sovereignty and the 
right of self-determination. These are important distinctions, as both autonomy and 
independence refer to capacity and to self-determination, crucial elements of discussions on 
children's rights and with paternal interventions by the state. The state justifies its 
interventions in parent-child relationships by appealing to the future autonomy of the 
children. It argues that the future adult the child will become has the right of self-
determination, like all free citizens. That right is violated in advance of adulthood if certain 
fundamental and irreversible decisions that determine the course of a person's life are made 
by anyone else before that individual attains the capacity of self-determination. 
Policies protecting a child's burgeoning right of self-determination do not necessarily 
promote the child's own good. Although there is little agreement by philosophers as to what 
constitutes a person's own good, many would connect a person's good ultimately with his or 
her self-fulfilment, which is not the same as autonomy or the right of self-determination. Self-
fulfilment is also understood in different ways, but each sense includes as "the development 
of one's chief aptitudes into genuine talents in a life that gives them scope, an unfolding of 
all basic tendencies and inclinations, both those that are common to the species and those 
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that are peculiar to the individual, and an active realization of the universal human 
propensities to plan, design and make order" (Feinberg, 1980a, p. 143). Thus, self-fulfilment 
understood in this way is different from achievement, and one must ensure that it is not to 
be confused with pleasure or contentment even though achievement may often be highly 
fulfilling, and fulfilment in turn may be highly gratifying. 
One way of deriving the right to self-fulfilment is to base it on the good of self-
fulfilment. Any given adult is more likely to know his or her own desires, dreams, interests, 
talents, and natural dispositions better than anyone else. Thus, he or she is probably more 
capable of making personal decisions to the end of his or her own good than any state 
official, or a parent at an earlier stage who attempts to pre-empt personal choices. The 
individual's advantages in relation to this are sufficient that for all practical purposes, that 
recognition and enforcement of the right to self-determination, or autonomy, is a causally 
necessary condition for achieving self-fulfilment, or the person's own good, for an individual. 
Another way of deriving the right to self-fulfilment is to view it as morally basic as 
the good of self-fulfilment itself. This interpretation holds that autonomy is more important 
than personal well-being, and that even when a person is not achieving his or her own good 
by making his or her own decisions, it remains that the individual must be the one to decide, 
for better or for worse, how to live his or her own life, since "the life that a person threatens 
by his own rashness is after all his life; it belongs to him and to no one else" (Feinberg, 
1980a, p. 144). 
The third view of regarding the adult's right to autonomy is where there is no priority, 
and one must attempt to somehow balance autonomy against personal well-being on an 
intuitive basis. Since the two separate ideals of sovereign autonomy (self-determination) 
and personal well-being (self-fulfilment) are likely to be involved in the discussion of the 
grounding of the child's right to an open future, Feinberg states that it is not essential to 
prioritise one ideal over the other. Thus, he believes it is in this manner that the good (self-
fulfilment) and the right (self-determination) of the child fits into a discussion on the 
justification of this right to an open future. 
Both conceptions of self-fulfilment and self-determination can breed paradox unless 
they are dealt with carefully. The fully self-determined adult is a person who has determined 
his or her own life-circumstances and personal character. It seems inevitable that regardless 
of the policies adopted by a child's parents, or of the state in terms of laws, 
the child's options in respect to life circumstances and character will be substantially 
narrowed well before he is an adult. He will have to be socialized and educated, and 
these processes will inevitably influence the development of his own values, tastes, 
and standards, which will in turn determine in part how he acts, feels, and chooses. 
That in turn will reinforce his tendencies to act, feel, and choose in similar ways in 
the future, until his character is set. (Feinberg, 1980a, p. 146) 
The situation is inescapable that parents will influence their children according to how the 
parents choose to live their lives. The environment in which the child grows up will shape his 
or her character and habits, and parents will serve as ready models for their children. This 
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inevitable limitation of options, if it can be shown that it is in accordance with the child's 
actual or presumptive, explicit or tacit consent, can happen without violating the child's C-
right to self-determination. The problem lies with consent: one cannot simply ask the child 
for their actual explicit consent to the formative decisions of parents since when the child is 
first exposed to the family environment, he or she was unable to give consent. At birth the 
infant was not developed enough, and neither did he or she have any values or preferences 
of his or her own with which the parents could consult. Obviously in the early stages of 
infancy and childhood, the child is unable to communicate such information. When the child 
is able to communicate relevant preferences, values, and the capacity to consent, that 
outcome will have been influenced by the child's earlier experiences and will depend on how 
the parents raised the child. The parents in effect influence the child when he or she is 
young, and they shape the same child who will later make decisions about his or her 
preferences and values. It is would be very difficult, if not impossible, for a child to be raised 
in a completely neutral environment which would not be influenced or shaped by the values 
and preferences of the parents. It is challenging for parents to decide what the child might 
choose if he or she was competent to make his or her own autonomous choice, but also to 
try and consider and take into account in childhood the interests of the adult which the child 
will become. It is extremely difficult for parents to judge during childhood whether the 
interventions they make on behalf of the future adult are appropriate or desirable by that 
future person. These are very difficult and complex issues, since the future adult is so 
integrally shaped by his or her experiences, the consent of that future adult may essentially 
be a product of his or her childhood. If a child is raised to value certain things, he or she will 
likely do so as an adult, who will look back and value the values his or her parents instilled 
during his or her childhood. Thus, future-oriented consent for interventions during childhood 
are notoriously difficult to evaluate. There is a paradox of self-determination by an adult. If 
the adult is to create his or her own life, and be the product of his or her own self-
determination, then he or she must already have a self who is fully formed and capable of 
carrying out the determining. He or she cannot have determined that self completely alone 
because he or she would already have had to have formed a self to do that. The circle is 
infinite. 
The paradox of self-fulfilment is somewhat similar. To discover what would be good 
for a child, one has to find out what are his or her propensities, skills and aptitudes, or 
highest potentials. We have to learn about the child's character in order to try and determine 
what might fulfil his most primary characteristics. We are faced once again by a vicious 
circle when we accept that if a person's own good is to be conceived of as self-fulfilment, 
then we cannot really know the young child's long term future good until his or her "nature" 
is fully formed, just as we cannot know the best way to shape the child's nature until we 
know what will be for his or her own good. Because the child's values begin to develop in 
childhood, it is impossible to simply leave the child's entire future open to him or her to 
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embrace upon settling adult values. Regardless of what parents do, a child will begin to 
acquire his or her values right away. 
A child's own future character will largely be a product of the self being moulded 
from the beginning. By educating and socializing children into any culture, their futures are 
in some ways being curtailed; however, it is not possible to wait until a child has a fully 
formed character to educate or socialize the person. Thus, parents participate in creating 
some of the interests whose fulfilment will constitute the child's own good. "They cannot aim 
at an independent conception of the child's own good in deciding how to do this, because to 
some extent, the child's own good (self-fulfillment) depends on which interests the parents 
decide to create" (Feinberg, 1980a, p. 148). 
The paradoxes of self-fulfilment and of self-determination as outlined by Feinberg 
sound plausible; however, by his own admittance, they are only approximate 
generalizations. Human life is a continuous process of physical, psychological, and 
sociological development from birth until death. There is no clearly defined boundary 
separating childhood and adulthood, both of which are abstract social constructions. As 
such, there are no absolutes when considering distinctions between the two, as many 
central distinctions differ by degrees. For example, we cannot say that there is a stage in a 
young child's life where his or her character is wholly unformed, or where his or her talents 
and temperament are entirely malleable without latent bias, or that there may not be any 
self-determination without the self who does the determining being already fully formed. 
By the time a child has reached the end of his or her first decade, the majority of a 
child's C-rights-in-trust have already become A-rights. Competency varies between 
individual children; one child at the age of five may have very different abilities than another 
at the same chronological age. Age stipulations for the point at which all the natural rights-
in-trust become actual A-rights are mere approximations. For example, not all eighteen year 
olds or even twenty year olds may be as mature and cognizant of their values and beliefs as 
are some sixteen year olds. The role of the child in shaping him or herself is a process of 
continuous growth and development started at birth, and there is no specific point before 
which the child played no role in shaping his or her identity, and after which he or she is the 
sole responsible maker of his or her character and life plan. Even at the very beginning, an 
infant has a kind of basic framework of character and proclivities, as well as a genetically 
fixed potential for learning various skills and talents. Feinberg compares the exposure of a 
child to a basic nurturing upbringing and a social environment to be the equivalent of adding 
water to dehydrated food; it fills out and actualises its stored-in tendencies. 
From the very beginning of a child's life, exposure to its parents and their values 
and beliefs, as well as outside influences, will lead the child in a certain direction. From 
there, the parents will promote the child's future autonomy and well-being with due respect 
to the initial bias from heredity and the child's early environment. The child will be able to 
contribute to the making of his or her own self in an ever-increasing capacity. As the child 
moves through the developmental stages, the child will plan an ever-increasing role in 
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creating his or her own life until reaching the arbitrary division between childhood and 
adulthood. At this stage, the child is assumed to be ready and responsible for self-
determination. This is, at least, how growth ought to have proceeded, when parents and 
others have raised a child with maximal regard for the autonomy of the adult that he or she 
will one day become. 
In much the same way, parents who have raised their child so as to promote his or 
her self-fulfilment will have tried at every opportunity to strengthen the child's apparent 
tendencies and inclinations. Feinberg assumes that with parental support, talents that have 
been discovered through exposure to a multitude of opportunities will have been allowed to 
develop and flourish. Parents will encourage the child towards the kind of career which 
matches his or her character. Feinberg suggests that there will be no self-fulfilment for a 
child who is inclined to lead a sedentary lifestyle but endowed with fine motor control over 
his sensitive fingers to be pushed into a job requiring hard physical labour and no patience 
for small painstaking tasks, or the other way around. Of course, these situations are ideal. I 
recognise that not every child will be fortunate enough to be raised in such as environment. 
Each child will be different from all others, with unique interests and proclivities, 
temperaments and talents. He or she will have distinctive attitudes towards life, which may 
take years of searching and analysing to understand and justify as an adult. His or her 
discerning parents may possibly be able to identify and understand these elements of life 
more clearly than the child, and insofar as it is possible, may help direct the child towards 
his or her own preferred directions. Of course, the natures of children and of parents are 
often at odds with each other, but as the child matures, he or she may come to see the 
parents as nurturing concerned only for the child's best interests. If the child's life has been 
left open for his or her own finished self to determine, then Feinberg believes that the 
fortunate adult who emerges will already have achieved a certain degree of self-fulfilment 
through his or her own already autonomous choices in promoting his or her own 
preferences from the earliest opportunities. 
8.10 Children's rights in the context of sport 
In this section, I discuss some of the work done primarily by sociologists who have 
applied conventions and rights frameworks to sport. This section illustrates such application 
of generally established frameworks towards child protection in sport specifically. 
Organised sport at all levels is controlled exclusively by adults. Children who 
participate in sport have no control over rules, regulations, the appointment or release of 
coaches, managers, referees, or any other sporting officials, and as such, they are at the 
mercy of adults who control their entry into sport and then all subsequent participation, 
training, and competition (Galasso, 1988). The harm and abuse experienced by children 
participating in organised, competitive sport at the highest levels has been discussed at 
great length in the chapter on harms in sport. Brackenridge (2001) believes that "the laxity 
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with which children's rights are applied in sport has facilitated other types of exploitation, 
such as sexual abuse" (p. 15). Sport is often considered as being beyond the scope of the 
laws of society, for actions which would be considered assault and battery out on the street 
are either overlooked in sport, or even supported and encouraged as they are in boxing, ice 
hockey, and other sports. Recently, this has changed as some cases of violence within 
sport have been taken to legal courts for redress. For example, American hockey player 
Marty McSorley was charged with assault with a weapon after he hit another player on the 
head with his stick during a game. He was found guilty, but was given a an extremely minor 
penalty (a small fine), and thus the purpose of the court case remains questionable. Violent 
sports are examples of these cases, wherein rights abrogations are often overlooked. 
However, David (1998) argues that rights ought to be accorded to individuals within and 
beyond sport; if children are persons, and if persons have rights, then children also have 
rights. These rights apply ought to apply universally, including in sport. When sport becomes 
child labour, slavery, and involves other such horrors as child trafficking and doping of 
children, then clearly, children are being harmed and their rights are being abrogated 
(David, 1998; Galasso, 1998). 
Concerns have been raised by many sociologists (Donnelly, 1993, 1998, 2000; de 
Knop, 1998), physicians (Mafulli and Helms, 1988; Nash, 1987; Tofler et aI., 1996, 1998), 
and others (David, 1993; Kidd and Eberts, 1982; Ryan, 2000) about these experiences, and 
calls have been made for the protection of children in sport. Kidd and Eberts (1982) 
conducted a legal inquiry into athletes' rights, wherein they questioned intensive training and 
competition for children, and recommended further investigations into child athletes' rights. 
In 1988, Beamish and Borowy published the results of a systematic study into Canada's 
high-performance sport system. They analysed athletes' working conditions and argued that 
athletes are poorly paid crafts workers. In their research on children's sport, Cantelon (1981) 
and Donnelly (1993, 1997) have approached child's partiCipation in terms of labour laws. 
Their findings are that athletes often do experience exploitative practices that would never 
be tolerated outside the sporting environment. With no voice, and thus no power to make 
their concerns known, these young athletes have little reproach to abusive and exploitative 
treatment, other than through the advocacy of others. Concerned professionals have turned 
to their plight, and have called for changes to be made. Donnelly (1997) has advocated the 
application of labour laws, particularly those protecting children working in the entertainment 
industry, to sport. Another approach has been the application of human rights towards 
children in sport, particularly as outlined in the 1989 United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. The rights outlined in the Convention are accepted and supported 
internationally. 
While many examples exist where sport has existed outside the legal framework of 
society, traditions appear to be changing. One of the most important examples of a sporting 
practice being brought before the courts was the Bosman case (David, 1988). The 
European Union and its member states recognise the principle of the right of freedom of 
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movement and employment for all citizens. However, the European Union of Football 
Associations (UEFA) strongly limited this fundamental human right with its own regulations. 
Jean-Marc Bosman, a player for the Belgian club FC Liege, argued that locking a player to a 
football club through contract and transfer fee restrictions was a violation of the Treaty of 
Rome (Cashmore, 2000). At the end of his contract, FC Liege demanded a transfer fee from 
any other football club who wanted to sign him. Bosman believed this violated his right to 
freedom of contract for citizens of the European community. He went to the European Court 
of Justice, and in 1995, the Court established a landmark ruling ending the necessity for 
transfer fees. The Court determined the UEFA ruling to be a gross violation of European 
law, and demanded the EUFA change their regulations. Consequently, a player may now 
sign with any European club. This was an extremely important landmark case, as it 
established that human rights violations applied to sport as well as in society at large. Thus, 
it ought to follow that human rights violations of children in sport ought to be recognised as 
such. Children's rights ought to be taken into account by all those involved in sport: parents, 
coaches, trainers, officials, sport governing bodies, and government officials themselves. 
Unfortunately, this has not been the case. 
As David (1998) and de Knop (1998) have argued, many of the Convention's rights 
are directly relevant and applicable to sport. Rights to survival and development are 
protective rights outline in the Convention (1989), and thus Article 6 outlining such rights is 
applicable to, and ought to cover children's participation everywhere, including the sporting 
environment. Many of these harms have been considered elsewhere, and thus only a few 
on the Articles of the Convention will be expanded upon here. 
Article 3 covers the principle of the best interests of the child, which is one of the 
most fundamental of children's rights. Article 5 is about the right to be provided with 
appropriate direction and guidance. The right to be protected from discrimination applies in 
sport; Article 2 states that all children are to have equal opportunities for participation, 
training, and competition. Articles 13 and 15 concerns the child's right to freedom of 
expression and of association. 
Article 17 relates to access of appropriate information. In order to make informed 
choices, information must be available to those who need it. Athletes and parents need to 
know the philosophy of the sport organisation in order to determine if that is the right 
environment for the child: the child has the right to know what they are getting themselves 
into and what they may expect to get out of an activity or team experience (Galasso, 1988). 
Selection criteria, training and competition expectations, disciplinary practices, transfers, 
coaches' qualifications, travel requirements, and financial outlay must be clear and 
available. Athletes and parents need to know the repercussions of missing practices or 
competitions: will the athlete be punished in some way, such as by not being selected for a 
future competition. 
Athletes need to know where they may go for help about harassment or abuse in 
sport. They need to be able to access medical attention, particularly without worrying about 
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repercussions from the coach or other authority. If an injury or illness is revealed, this 
information may have a significant impact on the athlete's career. The coach may not 
choose the athlete for a competition, or the athlete may lose sponsorship funds if his or her 
career is in jeopardy from the medical condition. Even rumours may be sufficient to 
discourage a sponsor. This would relate to Article 16, which deals with the right to privacy. 
An international athlete's personal details are often discussed by the media; this kind of 
invasion of privacy is difficult for anyone to deal with, but a child may have additional 
difficulties coping. Medical personnel have professional duties of confidentiality, but this 
responsibility ought to apply to all trainers and others involved with the athlete. Dealing with 
an injury is difficult enough for an athlete, but having to read about the details and 
comments from others would be unpleasant and distracting. Article 39 is about the right to 
benefit from rehabilitative care, which would apply in this area and also relate to rights to 
privacy. Articles 33, 34, 35, and 36 cover a number of forms of abuse and exploitation. 
These apply in a variety of situations involving children's participation in sport. 
Article 24 is about the right to health. There are many risks associated with 
participation in sport, particularly in sport at the highest levels. Few sports, if any, have 
entirely no risk of injury. Many of the harms suffered by children in sport have been 
discussed in an earlier chapter. However, a number of pertinent issues are discussed here. 
The recent expose of the former East German sports system has revealed years of 
deliberate, systematic abuse of young girls in sport, including the administration of drugs 
and doping agents to children (Ungerleider, 2001). The American Academy of Pediatrics 
(AAP) supports exercise for children, but has issued a number of cautions related to 
children's participation in intensive training. Sustained, high-intensity training for children 
may induce musculoskeletal, endocrine, hematologic, thermorgulatory, psychological, and 
social damage (AAP, 2001 a, 2001 b, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 1996, 1990). While a number of 
chronic injuries are clearly accidents resulting from uneven playing surfaces and collisions 
with other players, there are other injuries which are preventable (AAP, 2000b). For 
example, after the "spearing" rule in American football was instituted, cervical spine injuries 
were reduced, and rules about wearing helmets with visors in ice hockey also reduced the 
number of injuries. Of significant concern is overuse injury. In soccer, the practice of 
"heading" the ball by young players has come under scrutiny by researchers. A study 
comparing adult soccer players who began playing soccer in youth leagues with controls 
showed 81 % of the soccer players to have mild to severe deficits in attention, concentration, 
and memory (Tysvaer and Lochen, 1991). Recommendations to prevent injuries in young 
players include reducing the size of the ball, and also delaying introducing the skill of 
"heading" until the players are older and more skilled in ball control. Young female athletes 
are at higher risk than non-sporting youth for developing eating disorders, particularly the 
"female athlete triad" (AAP, 2000c), an issue which must be addressed by all children's 
sport governing bodies, and policies implemented to protect young athletes. 
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The right of the child to have his or her views heard and considered (Article 12) are 
also protective rights in that they apply first to respecting the child's dignity, and second, 
towards supporting the child's interests. A child participating in sport has thoughts regarding 
his or her participation, and these views must be respected. The child athlete must have the 
right to withdraw from participation if he or she so desires. 
Article 19 covers the right to protection from abuse, neglect, and all other forms of 
violence. The child must be protected from overenthusiastic parents, coaches, and others 
involved in the sport. While the parents are ultimately responsible for the child's health and 
welfare, there must be policies in place which would allow state representatives to intervene 
on the child's behalf under circumstances wherein the child's rights are violated. Parents 
also need to be aware that when they hand their children over to the control of the coach, 
they are not abdicating all responsibility for the child. While the coach certainly has in loco 
parentis obligations to care for the child, the onus remains on the parents to safeguard their 
child's health and safety. Appeal procedures and processes must be available and 
transparent for athletes and parents. There must be no opportunity for reprisal. The athlete 
has a right to be present and have access to evidence regarding disciplinary matters 
(Galasso, 1988). In all cases, the best interests of the child must be the paramount 
consideration. 
Article 32 is about protection from economic exploitation. Very few sports, if any, are 
entirely free of the influence of money. While a myth exists that all high-performance 
athletes are making a financial fortune, that is certainly not the case for all athletes. Some 
athletes do make millions of dollars, but these are primarily professional athletes such as 
football, basketball, and ice hockey players, golfers, tennis players, among others. 
Furthermore, not all athletes in these leagues make millions, only a select group. Even at 
the highest level, some athletes struggle for money to train and travel to competitions, for 
equipment, medical needs, and not all of them have sponsorship. Female athletes earn less 
than their male counterparts. Even international competitions, such the All-England Tennis 
Championships, award less prize money to women than to men. The Canadian men's 
hockey team is made up of professional players who earn multi-million dollar salaries in 
addition to their sponsorship, while the women's team is made up of women who work as 
plumbers, administrators, and hold other full-time jobs. Beamish and Borowy (1988) 
reported financial constraint to be one of the main reasons Canadian athletes left their 
international sporting careers. 
While not a major issue of concern in North America, South American and 
European football clubs scout young children, some as young as 11-years of age. This may 
also happen in hockey, but certainly not to the same degree as in football. Anecdotal reports 
have been made about football clubs signing children on below the age of ten. Many of the 
young footballers come from undeveloped countries, often from remote areas from poor 
families. Parents may be given what they consider enormous amounts of money in 
exchange for signing a contract promising their young child to a football club (David, 1998). 
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The children are sent away to training programmes. Sometimes these clubs are far away 
from their parents, even on different continents. Article 9 applies here, which covers the 
child's right not to be separated from his or her parents. These clubs rarely give any 
consideration to the developmental needs such as social integration and education of the 
children they recruit, claims David (1998). 
As with any high-performance sport, very few actually make it into the professional 
leagues, and those who do not make it are forgotten. This was the case for Marc-Herve, a 
young footballer from the Ivory Coast (David, 1998). He was scouted in Africa, and sent to a 
French football club. After being fired from the team, he was dismissed without any form of 
compensation and abandoned by the team without money to go home or a residence 
permit. A 13-year old Zairian was scouted by Juventus Torino in Italy in 1994, but his father 
refused to let him go (David, 1998). An 11-year old Italian boy was offered a contract by AC 
Milan (David, 1998). In France, 15-year old players are sometimes offered upwards of 
$50,000 to sign contracts with clubs (David, 1998). Despite many of these young prospects 
falling by the wayside, the very few who do make it to the professional leagues often earn 
such lucrative salaries that these practices are profitable for professional football clubs. This 
kind of commercialisation can certainly be viewed as a kind of slave trading. These children 
are "bought" and exploited for the economic gain of the football clubs. While their parents 
may have received what they consider a fortune for the child, and usually sign on with the 
best interests of their children in mind, they and their children are exploited, and thus Article 
32 protecting children from economic exploitation is very much appropriate to this dark side 
of sport. A coach with Milan AC football club remarked on the practice of enticing young 
athletes from Africa: "By 2005 no African national soccer teams will be left. European clubs 
are importing younger and younger African players, and taking away their nationality by 
picking them for European national teams" (Jusu, 1999, p. 24). 
Camel racing circuits in the Gulf States use children as camel jockeys (Anti-Slavery 
International, 2000). Children as young as six, and sometimes younger, have been routinely 
"trafficked" from South Asian countries to the Gulf to supply the demand for camel jockeys. 
After the death or injury of a number of these child-jockeys, the Anti-Slavery International 
organisation joined other human rights organisations in an effort to ban this practice. While 
the United Arab Emirates Camel Jockey Association formally banned the use of children as 
jockeys in 1992 in response to the campaign, evidence obtained by British television in 1997 
showed these rules are being ignored. Children continue to be bought, abused, and 
exploited in the business of camel racing, although moreso now from Africa than from South 
Asian countries. In an example of how being a signatory to the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (1989) is criticised as mere political posturing rather than as any 
kind of moral or legal promise, the United Arab Emirates is one of the countries who signed 
the Convention, and yet ignores this practice. Anti-Slavery International and the other 
human rights organisations have requested that the UAE ban this practice, and also make 
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every effort to repatriate these young children to their families, and provide them with 
compensation (Anti-Slavery International, 2000). 
Articles 28 and 29 of the Convention relate to rights regarding education. When 
children are removed from state-sponsored schools, they must still have access to 
education. Some teams have private tutors and some parents tutor their children at home. 
However the child is educated, he or she must receive an equivalent programme to his or 
her non-sporting peers. After winning the 1982 Alpine Skiing World Cup Downhill 
championship, Canadian Steve Podborski bemoaned the fact that he had not graduated 
from high school, despite having been very successful in sport. Sport is not a substitute for 
formal education. 
While child athletes certainly have rights in sport, they also have responsibilities 
(Galasso, 1988). They are expected to adhere to codes of fair play and the rules and 
regulations of their sport. They must refrain from engaging in all forms of foul play such as 
cheating, verbally or physically abusing other athletes, sporting officials, and others 
involved. Young athletes should be represented on committees, and be involved in decision-
making to the degree possible. Children are capable of assuming responsibilities early on in 
life, and being responsible for their actions is certainly an excellent starting point. Codes of 
fair play for athletes, parents, and coaches are one way of educating all those involved in 
sport. Implementing and enforcing such codes in children's sport ensures awareness of 
rights and responsibilities from early experiences into sport, which ought hopefully to stay 
with athletes throughout their careers, and parents as they support and encourage their 
children. 
Finally, it has been suggested that the pursuit of athletes' rights reflects a lack of 
commitment to excellence (Beamish and Borowy, 1988). Claims have been made that an 
interest in athletes' rights may be incompatible with a winning attitude, and may interfere 
with the athletes' ability to perform at the highest levels. These claims are preposterous. The 
United Nations Declaration on Human Rights (1948), as well as more specific rights such as 
those guaranteed to all Canadian citizens by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
cannot be given up, nor can they be taken away, simply because someone wishes to 
compete in sport, at any level. Athletes may actually be entitled to more rights on the basis 
of the unique demands required by high-performance sport, rather than fewer or even none. 
Knowing that they will be treated fairly and justly, having access to established criteria in 
advance of selection processes, and awareness of and access to appeal procedures, 
athletes may be able to focus exclusively on their training and competition, rather than 
having to be concerned with other crucial but distracting variables (Beamish and Borowy, 
1988). Such knowledge and information would surely enhance, rather than detract from, 
performance. The recognition and respect of the rights of children in society and in sport are 
surely a worthy vehicle towards eliminating harm and promoting the best that sport has to 
offer. 
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8.11 Wrongs of children's rights 
This chapter has focused on the promotion of children's rights, and has discussed a 
myriad of institutionalised and proposed rights for children in general society, as well as in 
the specific environment of sport. We have considered theories of child liberation and child 
protection, and promotive and protective rights. What we have not yet approached is 
whether the language of rights is actually the most appropriate one for the protection of 
children. 
The way society views and values humans is crucially determined by the kinds of 
rights which are accorded them, and thus giving rights to children may be seen as a public 
and palpable acknowledgement of their status and worth (Archard, 1993). Rights talk in 
general has faced criticism. The presupposition that the language of rights is the best 
approach to analyse and evaluate the situation of children has been challenged on three 
fronts. The most frequent criticism has been that rights are individualistic in nature, and may 
actually be detrimental for individual members within certain close-knit communities 
(Macintyre, 1985; Gilligan, 1982; Sandel, 1982; Schoeman, 1980). In staunch opposition to 
such claims, MacCormick (1977) argues that rights promote the interests of children, and 
"that they have as their specific aim the protection or advancement of individual's interests 
or goods" (p. 192). Rights serve to promote an individual's interests by conferring status on 
the rights holder and giving them dignity. Not being accorded rights means individuals are 
dependent upon others, and may have to plead, request, or beg from others to be treated in 
particular ways (Feinberg, 1970). The endorsement of rights by the United Nations for all 
human beings, including children, supports the view that rights do promote an individual's 
interests. 
Other challenges to rights have included the view that rights talk tends to be "all-or-
nothing" which serves only to further separate the realms of childhood and adulthood, and 
that rights talk may be morally impoverishing and neglect an alternative ethical view of the 
world, characterised by the affectionate, caring interdependence of the ideal parent-child 
relationship (Archard, 1993). 
Rights do not have to be all-or-nothing. That children are not accorded all adult 
rights does not have to mean that they have no rights at all. In much the same way that 
adults who breach certain rules may have their rights abrogated, and returned when 
deemed appropriate-for instance, if an adult is charged with driving while intoxicated, his or 
her right to drive may be withdrawn for a period of time-children can also have some rights 
and not others. There are moral claims to be made on behalf of children that do not have to 
necessarily be expressed in the language of rights, and this does not make them any less 
valuable than rights claims. Wrongness or degrees of wrongness do not have to rely only on 
whether a right has been violated. However, it stands that rights talk does allow the 
declaration, recognition, and enforcement of claims that are otherwise difficult to make. 
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Affection and caring interdependence ideally characterise the parent-child 
relationship, while the rights model applied within intimate relationships may seem to 
interfere with the interplay of affection and care characterising such relationships (Archard, 
1993). Along similar lines, Schoeman (1980) cautions that 
The danger of talk about rights of children is that it may encourage people to think 
that the proper relationship between themselves and their children is the abstract 
one that the language of rights is forged to suit. .. Emphasis on the rights of children 
might foster thinking about the relationship between parents and child as quasi-
contractual, limited, and directed toward the promotion of an abstract public good. 
(Schoeman, 1980, p. 9) 
Such talk could possible forge a divide within intimate relationships. Waldron (1993) 
suggests that "to stand on one's right is to distance oneself from those to whom the claim is 
made; it is to announce, so to speak, an opening of hostilities; and it is to acknowledge that 
other warmer bonds of kinship, affection, and intimacy can no longer hold" (p. 373). What 
seems to be so unpleasant or antagonistic about the notion of rights talk within the family is 
the assertion of such rights, beyond simply the existence theory of the rights. However, 
when that affection and care is either non-existent or is questionable, there must be some 
kind of method of protection available for children. Since rights are often claimed only when 
things have gone wrong in intimate relationships, it seems heavy-handed to claim that rights 
cause antagonism. Furthermore, in those situations where a right may cause antagonism, 
appeals to rights may be required so as to promote a greater good. For example, in a 
situation where a child is being abused by a family member, the child claiming the right to be 
separated from the family may negatively affect the intimate relationship with his or her 
parents. While we would all prefer to think of the family as being a sphere of mutual respect 
and concern, an environment wherein the interests, opinions, and happiness of all members 
are taken seriously by all, this ideal is simply that: an ideal. In reality, as within all 
relationships, there are cases of morally questionable power dynamics and traditions that do 
not respect equally the inherent moral worth of each family member. Injustice within 
relationships may include physical and psychological abuse, as well as less tangible 
injustices, such as the family's acceptance of racist or sexist attitudes. Essentially, not all 
individuals involved in intimate relationships, or family members, respect and accept the 
view that the well-being of each member matters, or certainly, that the well-being matters 
equally (Dworkin, 1977). Rights serve as fall backs when affection and attachment fail. 
8.12 Rights and virtues 
A significant criticism of rights theory has been its focus on the individual, rather 
than on the community. Communitarian Alasdair Macintyre (1985) was one of the early 
critics of what he considered as the "individualist concepts" of rights. The concern is that 
individual rights, with its orientation based on individual autonomy, assumes a false 
conception of persons as being "unencumbered selves;" such a conception of persons may 
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disregard the moral import of communities and the shared commitments that arise from such 
relationships (Sandel, 1984). Sandel and Macintyre argue that rather than trying to establish 
universal rules and principles of right action, we ought to instead consider the established 
values of a particular society, and its virtues. They believe we should look to morality within 
a framework of virtues which are grounded in practices and the modes of life that 
communities use to sustain themselves. Virtuous conduct is based on the theory of virtue 
ethics, which involves both the identification of character traits that are considered morally 
praiseworthy, and the integration of these virtues in practice. 
One of the necessary elements of the virtue ethics approach is to identify the kinds 
of qualities we should like others and ourselves to possess. Such qualities form a long list 
including: honesty, truth-telling, promise-keeping, loyalty, patience, perseverance, integrity, 
tolerance, fairness, courage, temperance, chastity, considerateness (Wringe, 1998). As 
Wringe rightly points out, the list seems to be almost endless, and may continue with little 
indication of rationale, structure, or priority. MaCintyre (1985), however, identifies virtues 
which are linked with modes of behaviour that promote the flourishing of particular 
communities. Such virtues are not grounded in universal principles, but rather with particular 
communities and with particular circumstances. It seems clear that such an approach is 
problematic, and possibly dangerous. The Nazis identified with particular values and virtues 
of their communities, and such identification led to the extermination of millions of victims 
(Wringe, 1998). Without criteria for external appraisal-such as a universal moral code-
communities may act in accordance with their particular values and virtues, but in doing so, 
may grossly abrogate general morality which views genocide as wrong, as well as other less 
egregious examples. 
In many societies attitudes and beliefs are shared; however, they may also differ 
widely. Few societies remain self-sufficient and self-contained, or small enough for us to 
know all those who affect our lives and who are in turn affected by our actions (Wringe, 
1998). As such, attitudes and beliefs are not shared in most societies, and few are aware or 
even concerned with how their own attitudes and beliefs affect the fortunes and misfortunes 
of other persons in those communities. Individuals in modern society where people often live 
far away from immediate and extended family, and their friends, and as a result, are not 
particularly subject to the scrutiny or control of their communities or societies. Therefore, 
individuals are relatively unaffected by those who attempt to prescribe such duties of loyalty, 
or obedience based on some kind of moral responsibility to the community. Coercive moral 
doctrines remain fairly ineffectual in such situations, where the individual is autonomous is 
most spheres of his or her life. However, this may not necessarily be so in a small 
community such as that of sport, which is purportedly entered into on a volunteer basis. 
In large organisations, as in large societies described previously, particular 
established practices and implicit understandings and obligations are often replaced by sets 
of rules. Social control can no longer be exercised over others by duties ascribed by 
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tradition, including traditions of religious followings. Rather, in the attempt to give 
consistency to morality, universal principles such as rights have been formulated. 
In recent years, a number of sport organisations have developed "codes of conduct" 
or "codes of ethics" (guidelines and stipulations of right-and sometimes wrong-action) for 
athletes, coaches, parents, researchers, and even spectators in some cases. These 
organisations have included professional groups such as football's international ruling body 
(FIFA), national coaching organisations (Sports Coach U.K., Coaching Association of 
Canada), university levels (Canadian Inter-university Sport), and children's sport (National 
Alliance for Youth Sport, National Youth Sports Safety Foundation), in addition to academic 
groups such as the British Association of Sport and Exercise Science. Much of the 
development of such codes have originated from scandals within sport such as sexual 
harassment and abuse of athletes by coaches, and less frequently, of athletes by their peers 
(Brackenridge, 2001). By establishing such rule-based codes of ethics, it seems these 
organisations aim to govern conduct by establishing guidelines for right action. Such 
guidelines are not without reference to virtuous conduct however. In Alpine Canada's Ski 
Coaching Code of Ethics (Alpine Canada, 2002), for example, principles of respect, 
responsibility, integrity, and honour are outlined in terms of the coach's relationship with both 
athletes and parents. 
Virtue ethics has been described by Macintyre (1985) as perhaps the best theory to 
replace the questions of rights theory, and its associated problems. For example, the 
question of "What rules ought we to follow?" may be replaced with "How ought I, as an 
individual" to live?" Behind the question is the notion of "flourishing", and some have 
suggested that this concept may be more useful to those who are seeking an ethic for 
coaching relationships, beyond that provided by rule-based codes of conduct (McNamee, 
1998). While McNamee does not suggest that rule-based considerations are necessary less 
valuable than virtue conSiderations, he writes that they may co-exist for the purposes of 
guiding professional conduct in coaching. Virtue-based considerations such as courage, 
honesty, and justice guide would be preferable in guiding conduct rather than adherence 
only to the rule book. McNamee asks 
Are we not to prefer those who merely keep the rules for fear of being punished but 
those who keep them in order that the contest is a fair and equal test of relevant 
abilities and powers? And if sports are to flourish too, must we not have trustworthy 
coaches and wise administrators as well as honest performers all of whom keep the 
sporting faith; the spirit of the game? 
(McNamee, 1998, p. 161) 
Since the pursuit of human well-being or flourishing (eudaimonia) may be better served by 
some characters than others, then in order for persons to achieve or experience "the good 
life", a core of virtues are required (McNamee, 1998). These virtues cannot be acquired by 
simply consulting a moral rule book for specific guidance. McNamee (1998) gives the 
example of trust and the virtuous coach. He writes that in order to enact and evaluate 
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trusting relationships, a range of dispositions including courage, wickedness, spite, 
generosity, foolhardiness, and benevolence are necessary. 
As described earlier in this work, in Sections 3.3 and 3.3.1, trust is an essential 
component of the coaching relationship. I would argue further that it is an essential 
component of any close relationship, including that between parent and child. It is especially 
important in children's sport because of the inherent vulnerability of children to harm. While it 
is essential for coaches to respect the rights of children in promoting their best interests and 
avoiding harm, parents who entrust their children to the care and guidance of a coach would 
like the coach to go beyond simply one who is a "respecter of rights" but who is also 
trustworthy, and a virtuous person. That individual should not only adhere to codes of 
conduct which will include respecting athlete's rights but ought to also be a "good" person. 
When a code directs one to "respect the rights of athletes", one would like to think the kind 
and virtuous person will go beyond simply the mechanical upholding of such directives, but 
will uphold them in a kind and considerate manner, as a virtuous person. 
Given the nature of sport, and the discretionary power of both coaches and parents, 
respecting the rights of athletes could be strengthened by their application by a virtuous 
person. As McNamee (1998) states, "the rules do not specify their own scope and 
interpretation; agents, who are variously virtuous and vicious, do" (p. 165). However, we 
cannot overlook the importance and value of rights theory in protecting vulnerable beings. 
As Wringe (1998) argues, reflection and reasoning on ethical matters cannot be dispensed 
with in the virtue ethics approach to seeking how we ought to live our lives, and how to 
determine right action. 
8.13 Conclusion 
As the treatment of children in society has been conveyed out of the privacy of the 
family and brought into the public domain, children's issues have come to the forefront of 
many agendas. Every sphere of childhood is being examined, and pronouncements are 
made to improve and safeguard the experiences of children in a variety of environments. 
International comparisons and recommendations are made of education systems, social 
welfare systems, and of health care systems. While it would be na'ive to think that there will 
one day be a world for children that is entirely free of maltreatment, disease, and conflict, 
the recognition and promotion of children's rights is a positive step towards improving the 
treatment of children. 
Parents have responsibilities to protect, nurture, and love their children. These 
moral obligations demand that parents care for their own children more deeply than for other 
children, and that they ought to go to considerable lengths to meet the needs of their 
children, including keeping them safe from harm. The good parent or guardian must strive to 
safeguard the child's "open future" by maximizing the child's particular nature, but at the 
same time protecting the child from harm. There is a crucial but paramount balance to be 
sought in protecting the child, while at the same time allowing the child to develop his or her 
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talents, to learn the skills of self-determination, and to begin identifying interests which will 
help the future adult find the path towards self-fulfilment. There are opportunity costs to any 
and every upbringing. When one skill or talent is nurtured, another one may be overlooked 
or neglected. The fundamental argument here is that the child has a right to an open future. 
A life narrowed too early forecloses the child's opportunity to create and develop his or her 
own life plan, which is an essential element to every self-fulfilled and self-determined life. 
In this chapter, I have determined that children are moral right holders, in addition to 
being legal right holders. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) 
has served to set standards for the way children are treated on an international scale. 
Children have both protective rights safeguarding their health and safety, and promotive 
rights to prepare them for a self-determined and self-fulfilled life. Rights serve as a fallback 
in cases where children's needs for love and care-and as a result, the child's best 
interests-are compromised. The child's right to an open future is one of these promotive 
rights which serves to avoid foreclosing a child's right to create and live out his or her life 
plan with as much freedom as possible. This right recognises that the experiences of many 
children in competitive sport may foreclose their futures, in addition to harming them directly 
during the time of their training and competition. 
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9.0 Chapter Nine: Summary and Recommendations for Further Study 
9.1 Conclusions 
In this thesis, I have argued that some children who participate in high-performance 
sport are being harmed by such experiences, and their right to an open future is being 
abrogated. The unique and distinctive ethical issues raised by the participation of children in 
high-performance sport relate to serious safety and health concerns, autonomy and 
individuality, paternalism and family integrity, and the commodification of children. There are 
ethical concerns about a degradation of the quality of parenting and family life when parents 
are tempted to seek excessive control over their children's lives, and to value their children 
according to how well they meet overly detailed parental expectations of performance and 
achievement. Few would argue that the risks and realities of physical and emotional harm, 
as well as foreclosure of certain life plans is not only questionable, but simply wrong. They 
may even argue that such concerns and actualities ought to justify a prohibition on such 
participation. In addition to concerns about specific harms to children, there are also 
concerns about such practices undermining social values, for instance the exploitation of 
children by parents and coaches. Other concerns include the protection and promotion of 
personal choice-or autonomy-for both children and adults, the encouragement of 
individuals to fulfil their dreams, the rights of children to develop their own life plans and to 
have an open future, and the rights of parents to determine the lifestyles of their children. 
Limitations of individual freedom must be made only when the benefits of such prohibitions 
clearly outweigh the value of maintaining these kinds of challenges and experiences. The 
compelling cases of physical, psychological, and social harms that some children 
experience through their participation in high-performance sport must somehow be 
mitigated by a balance between the values that society wishes to reflect, and the freedom of 
individual and parental choices. For children to arrive on the cusp of adulthood with their 
futures open and as unconstrained as possible should be one of the paramount objectives 
of both childhood and parenthood. 
One of the challenging tasks has been to understand and describe the moral 
objections to children participating in such environments. Few moral philosophers can agree 
on the "best" moral theory, and some may not even be able to reach consensus on the 
practical implications of any particular theory, although limitations of various theories may be 
identified. While it may not be possible to identify the single best way to live one's life, it is 
possible to identify factors that hinder rather than help individuals to flourish. For example, 
lack of education, poverty, homeless ness, sickness, abuse, and exploitation are unequivocal 
impediments to human fulfilment. The argument that children are either not suited to 
participating in high-performance sport, or that the environment of high-performance sport is 
not an appropriate environment for children is based on the evidence of harms that children 
experience while participating in high-performance sport, and the foreclosure of their futures. 
Arguments about the child's right to individuality, a life free from harm and exploitation, and 
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an open future ought to be promoted over the parent's right to dictate the present life of their 
child when that lifestyle forecloses their future. These overarching rights of children and of 
parents or guardians may clash. The challenge rests on determining the balance between 
competing rights and benefits. 
In summary, I have argued in this thesis that some children participating in the world 
of high-performance sport are being harmed by their participation, and their futures are 
being foreclosed. The argument within this thesis was organised as follows. In Chapter Two, 
I provided a theoretical discussion on harm based on Feinberg's non-normative sense of 
"harm" as a set-back to interests, and the normative sense of "harm" as a wrong, or a 
violation of an individual's rights. Chapter Three followed with discussions of actual 
experiences of children that contextualised the discussion by illustrating the harmful nature 
of certain sporting practices, and explained the harm done to some children. The harm 
argument is compelling when confronted with the litany of medical reports on the injuries 
suffered by young athletes while in training and in competition. This chapter also discussed 
the power imbalance between athletes and coaches, and the inherent subordination of the 
young athletes in such relationships. This discussion illustrates the potentially harmful nature 
of children's participation in elite sport and the effects such participation may have on the 
shaping of a child's identity at the time and in the future. 
Chapter Four outlined conceptions of children and childhood. It discussed historical 
and modern conceptions of childhood, and included a short discussion on parenthood as 
well. This chapter examined how these conceptions serve to inform the nature of elite child 
athletes, and the inherent contradictions between childhood and the adult world of high-
performance sport. 
Chapter Five offered an extended analysis of the concept of paternalism within the 
literature. Given the inherent vulnerability and immaturity of children, their relationships with 
adults are necessarily paternalistic, but I argued that they must be autonomy-respectful 
paternalistic relationships. Such autonomy-respectful paternalism is predicated on the 
potential risks of harms. The higher the risk of harm, and the more permanent that harm, the 
more appropriate that autonomy-respectful paternalism becomes. When harms may 
substantially shape a child's subsequent life prospects, the case for paternalistic 
intervention is further strengthened. Such serious harms do not allow children the chance to 
benefit by learning from their mistakes. In some sporting practices discussed in this thesis, 
the stakes are so high that losing the gamble once could be life-threatening, and if situation 
is permanent, one cannot benefit from the wisdom accrued. When such practices are life-
ending, there is clearly no opportunity for subsequent learning by the athlete him or herself, 
although others should surely learn from such terrible consequences. 
Chapter Six provided a further substantial analysis of autonomy, consent, and harm 
as they relate to children's participation in elite sport. This chapter outlined the nature of 
autonomy and demonstrated the difficulties of trying to identify anyone conception of 
autonomy as it relates to children because of the inherent changing and developing of 
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children as they progress from wholly dependent at birth to being autonomous beings at the 
threshold of adulthood. 
Chapter Seven evaluated the capacity of a rights vocabulary to determine whether a 
rights-based moral vocabulary is the most appropriate language upon which to construct an 
approach to child protection through children's rights. I argued that rights theory as a moral 
framework applies to a consideration of the participation and exploitation of children in elite 
sport, and serves to protect them. Children in this environment are being harmed by morally 
indefensible conduct that both sets back the children's interests, but also violates their rights 
to freedom from harm, and to an open future. 
Whereas chapter seven focused specifically on rights in general, Chapter Eight 
focussed specifically on children's rights, particularly as they are articulated in the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). I applied Feinberg's articulation of the 
child's right to an open future in the context of children's participation in high-performance 
sport. I argued that children's experiences ought to, in every possible respect, keep their 
futures as open as possible. Insofar as it is possible, children ought to be encouraged and 
assisted in developing the skills of self-sustainment and self-determination so that they may 
construct their own life-plans and live out those life-plans according to their own interests, 
and not those of others. The nature of high-performance sport is such that it threatens the 
child's right to an open future, and as such, children's participation in this environment 
requires reconceptualisation. 
9.2 Recommendations for further study 
This work has attempted to challenge the morality of the participation of children in 
high-performance sport; however, it is only a start. Many issues remain unexplored and 
unexamined. 
Firstly, it must be determined whether children can participate in high-performance 
sport in any way without being harmed physically, psychologically, or socially. If such 
participation simply cannot take place without these harms-as outlined in Chapters Two 
and Three, then children ought not to participate in high-performance sport. If such 
participation can occur, but under certain conditions, then guidelines need to be put into 
place which guard against such harms for children. One method of removing child athletes 
from this environment could be accomplished by raising the minimum age requirements. 
This has already begun, for instance, the minimum age for participation in gymnastics in 
Olym pic com petition has already been raised from 14-years to 16-years of age, but I do not 
believe this is far enough. It ought to be raised to at least 18-years, possibly even 21-years 
of age. A higher age limit would necessitate a transformation of the sport from its present 
orientation towards acrobatics and contortion ism possible only for young children into an 
adult sport. The titles at world championships and the Olympics would also be more 
appropriate: the "ladies" figure skating titles and "women's" gymnastics titles are really more 
appropriately termed "girls" figure skating or "girls" gymnastics since the vast majority of 
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competitors are well below the age of majority is almost all countries. Figure skating judging 
also rewards jumps disproportionately, and gymnastics has focused increasingly on 
acrobatics, both of which require very high strength-to-weight ratios and thus these sports 
tend to see a very high proportion of disordered eating behaviours as athletes attempt to 
remain as light as possible. If these sports had an older minimum age, athletes would be 
post-pubertal and the "race against puberty" with its associated harms would be mitigated. 
Older athletes would also be better equipped to give informed consent to the rigours and 
dangers associated with intensive training and the risks of competition which child athletes 
are forced into through proxy consent of their guardians. 
Secondly, it is unacceptable that individuals (parents, coaches, agents, and others) 
with vested interests (in the child and in the child's participation in sport) deem themselves 
suitable judges of what is morally appropriate in relation to their vulnerable young charges. I 
recommend that the nature of these kinds of relationships between children and adults in 
the sport environment be explored in more depth than has been conducted herein. I 
propose that a kind of "athlete's ombudsperson" be available in every sport for confidential 
consultation by athletes. This person must have the qualifications to assess accurately the 
nature of the sporting practices, and the power to demand changes that serve to protect 
young athletes from harm. This person must also be at arms-length from the coaches and 
parents so the athletes will feel comfortable in seeking help. I also propose that an ethics 
committee be appointed. This committee would not be sport-specific but would evaluate 
sporting practices across all sports, which would allow more objective evaluation. I would 
recommend that the composition of this committee would include a layperson from outside 
sport in order to help overcome the inherent prejudices and tolerance of those closely 
involved in a sport. For instance, if a gymnastics coach was on the panel evaluating 
gymnastics, his or her experiences and knowledge of the sport would likely interfere with an 
objective evaluation of the sporting practices-they would be more accepting of practices 
that they consider "part of the sport" and have greater difficulty perceiving the harmful 
nature. It would be a challenge to compose a committee with people who are informed 
enough to understand the nature of sport but are also able to recognise the dangers 
associated with intensive training and competition. Such a committee might include a child 
psychologist, an educator, a physician, a coach, a sports administrator, and a community 
representative. Both an ombudsperson and an ethics committee would also serve to deal 
with the issues of sexual abuse in sport, since many athletes feel helpless in seeking help to 
deal with such issues. An ethics committee would work towards preventing such situations 
from occurring by identifying unsafe situations, such as coaches and athletes working alone, 
outlining travel policies such as not allowing coaches and athletes to share rooms, and they 
may also either investigate themselves or set in place a group to investigate allegations of 
inappropriate behaviours. Further, codes of practice need to be developed and 
disseminated, and both the ombudsperson and the ethics committee could do this. The 
United Kingdom has formulated a detailed code of practice in relation to the prevention of 
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child abuse in sport, but few other countries have done the same thing. I recognise that this 
is not a solution to the harms in sport, but it serves to educate and create awareness of the 
issues, and also provide avenues of redress. Such education would promote the athletes' 
autonomy, and protect them from harm, as explained within this thesis. 
Thirdly, an examination of the parental control of young athletes needs to be 
conducted. While paternalism-as outlined in Chapter Five-is a paramount and integral 
component of the parent-child relationship, and by extension in the coach-child relationship, 
such control must be examined so as to protect the children. Parents are given great 
latitude in raising their children, but when children are being harmed by the very individuals 
charged with their protection, something must be done. I would recommend a mandatory 
educational programme for parents of all children involved in competitive sport at all levels. 
This could be financed by the sport governing body, each sport club, or even an external 
sponsor. This programme does not have to be an expensive or time-consuming 
undertaking. A workshop or seminar could suffice. Such a programme would serve to 
ground parents regarding the nature of their child's participation, that in reality a very, very 
small number of child athletes will grow up to earn their living as professional athletes, and 
participation as a child should not be predicated on such outlandish expectations. 
Guidelines need to be formulated by sporting organisations to deal with over-
zealous parents who are harming their children. While it may not be appropriate for any 
individual or group to act as "gatekeepers" to keep such parents from enrolling their children 
in sport, if the expectations of parents surrounding their children's participation in sport are 
introduced at entry levels of sport, and regularly consulted throughout all levels of sport, 
parents might also be able to keep their expectations reasonable. Another suggestion would 
be the appointment of parent monitors. At each competition, two parents would be selected 
who would act as peer-monitors. They would wear some kind of identifying sash or vest, 
and their job would be to observe the proceedings. If a child is injured, or another parent 
starts getting out of hand, they have the power to eject that person, or stop the competition, 
or take whatever action is needed to ensure the environment is child-friendly. Raising 
awareness would help reduce unpleasant and potentially harmful situations. 
Fourthly, a moral examination of the physician-athlete relationship would shed light 
on the varying conflicts experienced by both the physician and the athlete. This relationship 
is paternalistic in nature, and as such, justification of an examination is based on the 
prevention of harm and the promotion of the young athlete's best interests. The physician is 
confronted with pressures to keep the athlete in competition, and to return an injured athlete 
to competition at the earliest possible opportunity. These pressures often lead to the health 
and safety of the athlete being compromised, whether they are child or adult athletes. While 
this is clearly an abrogation of the physician's professional duty to the patient, the pressures 
and conflicts of interest cannot be discounted. 
Fifthly, an examination of the medical and sociological literature as discussed 
throughout this thesis has revealed that a wide variety of harms exist in the sports discussed 
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herein; a further study would explore the breadth and depth of such harms in a wider variety 
of sports, and would catalogue the nature and extent of these harms. It is not necessary to 
demonstrate that large numbers of children are being harmed to censure the harmful 
practices-that any number of children are being harmed is surely enough to question these 
practices-but accurate quantitative data would serve as stronger corroboration in 
demanding changes to the offensive practices in sport. 
Sixthly, a comprehensive coaching education programme oriented to the high-
performance child athlete must be developed. All coaches who are involved with such 
athletes must be required by sport governing bodies to take this course. Of course, 
education does not guarantee child protection, much the same way that codes of conduct 
do not guarantee adherence; however, they serve as guidelines. Sometimes simply to state 
what is and what is not acceptable is enough to change some behaviour. For example, 
certain harmful practices that are part of a sport culture need to be isolated and identified as 
such, that identification is the first step in eliminating or reducing the harms described within 
this work. Coaches often scream and shout at athletes, insulting and tormenting them, 
purportedly to improve performance. This behaviour must be named for what it is-abuse 
and harassment-and eliminated. 
In conclusion, I have not intended in any way to devalue the contributions of parents 
or guardians in any way, nor have I intended to belittle coaches and others involved in sport. 
When one attempts to criticise any aspect of sport, one may be seen as being an opponent 
of sport. If I did not have a deep love and concern for sport, I would not have dedicated my 
education and career to its study. My objectives for this ethical analysis of children's 
participation in high-performance sport are to raise awareness of how elite sports children 
are being treated, and to improve children's experiences in competitive sport, as well as to 
highlight the fact that children-regardless of their environment-ought to be recognised 
and treated with the respect they deserve. Such recognition and treatment includes 
respecting their right to an open future, and the right to be protected from harm. Respect for 
children in the sporting environment is demonstrated by the direct action of parents, 
coaches, and others involved in sport to nurture and protect children by recognizing them 
first as children, and second as athletes. 
Parents have loved, nurtured, and protected their children from the beginning of 
time and will continue to do so forever; however, sometimes parents and others involved in , 
the lives of children make questionable decisions regarding the welfare of children, and act 
in ways which do not promote the best interests of the child. Somehow children must be 
protected from decisions that have harmful repercussions, permanent or short-term. While it 
would be na·ive to think that the purpose of this work is to eliminate the harms associated 
with children's participation in high-performance sport, it may be realistic to believe that 
raising and identifying moral concerns about such experiences will draw attention to the 
issues, and may serve to reduce the harms. Experience suggests that harm, in some 
degree, is attached to almost all human activities; some of these harms though may be 
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eliminated or the risks reduced. Sport policies need to be designed that will reduce the 
overall harm associated with children's participation in high-performance sport. We must 
accept that these sports are here to stay, and that we have to implement policies in these 
arenas so that children suffer the least possible harm in their participation. If protecting 
children means that they do not belong in the world of high-performance sport, that view is 
justified by the harms they incur, and not the immorality of their participation. The promotion 
of children's rights in general, and in particular the child's right to an open future, will serve 
to protect children in the burgeoning development of their autonomy and the promotion of 
their open futures. 
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